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THE PHILOSOPHY OF AMERICAN HISTORY

The Historical Field Theory

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The Historical Field Theory

BY
MORRIS ZUCKER

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The Historical Field Theory

PREFACE

At the very beginning of this work the reader is entitled to a statement, quite simply and frankly, as to its objectives. With the presentation of the Historical Field Theory history should emerge from the status of an art to assume the rank of a science. This statement, if valid, must be of great significance. Science in other fields has met with remarkable success because knowledge of the factors involved in an existing state has enabled the prediction of a future state. Were similar methods applicable in the field of history we could obviate to a large extent a great deal of the chaos and ultimate frustration in organized social effort.

The Historical Field Theory will enable us to plan adequately our future organization because we will understand the nature and the limitations of the social forces with which we operate, and of which we ourselves are a part. We will be able to avoid the pitfalls of so-called practical statesmanship, as well as the Utopianism of idealists who have so often led us to disaster.

While the principles of the Historical Field Theory have been developed from the record of Civilization as a whole, they have been applied directly to the analysis of American history, beginning with the settlements to the present time. The welfare, the progress, and the happiness of the American people is nearest to all our hearts. Yet if this theory is truly scientific it must be universal in scope. The future of our country is inextricably interwoven with the fate of the rest of mankind. We cannot escape it, nor do we desire to shirk the full measure of our responsibilities. Everything hinges on what, and how, and why. This work and the succeeding volume is an effort to supply these answers in the spirit and with the authority of science.

Historians up to now have agreed that there exists no science of history. Most are ready to concede that such a science is impossible. Necessarily this work must consider the reasons for a conclusion advanced by so many eminent scholars, while the analysis of their respective positions will afford an interesting background for the further elucidation of the body of principles which are comprised within the general Historical Field Theory.

But we have gone further. We have chosen American history as the appropriate medium for the application of the laws of historical science, not only because error here can be more readily disclosed, but because the results of this investigation must be of greatest practical importance in shedding light upon the future course of our development.

History is a process, not a formula. It is a process, moreover, in which man himself enacts a decisive role. This fact, more than any other, has contributed to the indefiniteness which is characteristic of contemporary historical thought. We all know the vagaries and uncertainties which appear to control the actions of human beings as individuals. By an easy transition we ascribe the same uncertainties to society itself, which is assumed to be merely an immense aggregation of individuals. The reasons for this fundamental error will be fully discussed; an error which could not but vitiate the entire course of analysis which is distinctive of the classical school of historical writers.

Since the laws of history—if such we succeed in establishing—must apply to every particular epoch in every form of Civilization it was deemed best for the purposes of this work to develop those laws from the civilizations which have contributed most to the formation of the American nation. In the succeeding volume the principles of the Historical Field Theory are established directly out of the general analysis of the currents in American history from the colonial days to now. This method enables us besides to project forward the course of our history for the next twenty years.

Some readers will not resist that impulse, and turn to those concluding pages out of turn. They must be cautioned concerning the well-established maxim of science that it is not the conclusion, but the process by which it is derived, that is decisive. Of course, the ultimate test of theory is its complete agreement with every pertinent fact, now known or later to be established. Bias in science is the certain road to intellectual disaster. In science there can be neither love nor hate, only devotion to principles.

After establishing the nature, the origin and the mode of manifestation of the social forces which produced the events history records, we had to consider whether those consequences were governed by strict causality, or were indeterministic in character. Nothing would be more destructive to the purposes of this work than to leave an opening for the contention that while causality in history can be traced through the past to the immediate present, the future is clothed in uncertainty, and may be molded by the accident of events.

This problem goes to the essence of practical statesmanship. We must establish that historical events are causally determined; we must present in the most conclusive fashion the nature of the forces which produced those events; we must make clear the organization of the social background out of which those forces were developed, and in whose matrix the elements of those particular events were nurtured. Then by producing all these relations in a given historical field of operation, it will be possible to establish the future course of social development within the limitations of this field.

This may seem very abstract, and too uncertain a basis upon which to build the science of history. The problem assumes a far different aspect when we leave generalities and speak in terms of living realities by substituting facts for theory; where the very theory itself arises out of, and must be in complete agreement with all the relevant facts.

Since Indeterminism, Chance and Probability in their multitude variations constitute the last intellectual resort of fumbling statesmanship, it is incumbent upon us to establish irrefutably two scientific propositions; first, that historical events are determined by social laws; and second, that these laws are causal in character. If the analysis falls short of the goal, then this work will have been written in vain. Should it achieve its purpose, the Historical Field Theory must constitute a definite contribution to our knowledge.

Finally, the expression—The Historical Field Theory—is an adaptation to our purposes of the great physical theories of the electromagnetic field as developed by Einstein into the Relativity Theory, with its vast philosophical possibilities. While the methods employed by physical and historical science differ necessarily according to their spheres, the fundamental principles of science are the same. In our development of the nature of the social structure in a given historical period, and in the analysis of the inter-relation between its component divisions, the student of modern physical science will recognize how deeply we, in our particular investigation, are indebted to this great contribution to modern thought.

It is for this reason that we determined to name this theory as a gesture of respect and admiration for Albert Einstein. It would be strange indeed if the final dethronement of absolute conceptions in the physical world did not sooner or later result in the annihilation of similar conceptions in the sphere of historical thought.

While paying our measure of tribute to the great leaders of modern physical science, we must emphasize the essential dissimilarity in the method of historical investigation from which we derive the laws of social motion. The inherent relativity of historical forms has been pointed out by numerous workers in this field. Our contribution, if at all, is in demonstrating the relation between the events of a given time and the historically-conditioned social organization which gave rise to those events.

It is unnecessary to stress that science is a vast cooperative process which records the results of the collective effort of many minds, at different times, and in all lands. The Historical Field Theory is the result of such a social process. Throughout this discussion every effort has been made to indicate the source of its basic principles by appropriate reference to the works of the great thinkers who have contributed to the shaping of contemporary culture. The historical theory here advanced itself is the result of many years of effort, and is published in the quiet confidence that it will meet successfully the rigid tests of scientific analysis.

The Periods in American History which follows this work applies the historical principles herein developed to the general scope of the American scene. It is contemplated to publish later separate volumes with an exhaustive treatment of each of the four periods. The final volume of the series on the Philosophy of American History will be the History of Capitalism in the United States.

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CHAPTER I

The Subject-Matter of History

DESPITE the impressive wealth of historical writing, serious differences exist among historians as to the definition, and consequently the scope, of history. Our first problem, if history is to become a science, is to define its subject-matter. In this we must avoid the error of some philosophers who endow the word creations of their own thoughts with fetish-like properties.

Nevins in his closely reasoned work on the theories of history suggests the possibility of prejudging the evidence through definitional defects,[1] while Barnes doubts that any methodology can entirely eliminate the introduction of unconscious assumptions in the course of our reasoning.[2] Classical science long ago devised effective controls for errors in reasoning by compelling the theory to agree with the reality. Historians, like any other group of thinkers, are not immune to the common defects of mankind. The importance of a definition consists in its agreement with the thing defined, and science can never permit it to take the place of the thing itself.

Spencer cautions us against surreptitiously assuming in our definition the very proposition we are called upon to prove.[3] We will therefore build up our definition of history rather than stating it apodictically, thereby establishing its rationale while affording at the same time an insight into the methods of the great historical writers. That classical purist in modelling his terms, Spinoza, tells us that a definition, if it is to be perfect, must explain the inmost essence of a thing; [4] one that neither involves nor expresses anything except the nature of the thing defined, and does not substitute for this any of its properties.[5] Hegel says simply that a definition contains everything that belongs to the essence of an object.[6]

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[1] Gateway to History—Nevins (1938) p. 43.

[2] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes (1937) p. 1204.

[3] First Principles—Spencer p. 115.

[4] Improvement of the Understanding—Spinoza p. 37.

[5] Ethics—Spinoza p. 100.

[6] Philosophy of History—Hegel p. 50.

HISTORY AS NARRATION OF EVENTS

What is history? Is it merely the collection of facts and records and data? Then the statistical charts and the blue-books in government archives represent the very acme of historical perfection. But their very mass and variety accentuates their general incomprehensibility. Still this data is part of the stuff out of which history eventually must be written.

The problem becomes, therefore, one of selection. On what basis is the selection of suitable or necessary facts to be made? What about the standard of reference of the observer, with his individual psychological quirks and subjective rules for measuring and appraising the significance of historical phenomena? "Since facts," writes Beard, "do not select and order themselves on the printed page, the historian, critics insisted, selects his own facts and arranges them according to some scheme of values and in choosing the linguistic forms, sees them from some angle of social vision. In the spirit of this criticism the president of the American Historical Association declared in 1933, the great year of the banking crisis and the New Deal inauguration, that written history is not a science or an art, but contemporary thought about the past, instructed and delimited by the records and documents of history as actuality." [7]

No wonder Spengler writes the following obituary for history as a science. "When Hegel declared so naively that he meant to ignore those peoples who did not fit into his scheme of history, he was only making an honest avowal of methodic premises that every historian finds necessary for his purpose and every historical work shows in its lay-out." [8] Spengler would have been better advised to speak only for himself. No thinker imbued with the scientific spirit would ever dream of proceeding in this fashion.

Should we, then, in an effort to escape that dilemma expand history into a comprehensive chronicle of events? Then there is Carlyle to chuckle sardonically: "Consider two things: first, that one Tongue, of average velocity, will publish at the rate of a thick octavo volume per day; secondly, that a Literary Contributor, if in good heart urged by hunger, will many times, as we are credibly informed, accomplish his two Magazine sheets within the four-and-twenty hours; such Contributors being now numerable not by the thousand, but by the million. . . . History then, before it can become Universal History, needs of all things to be compressed. Exclude compression altogether, we could not remember an hour, or at all." [9]

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[7] America In Mid-Passage (1939)—Beard pp. 913-14.

[8] The Decline of the West—Spengler p. 22.

Carlyle raises the issue, but he does not supply its solution. For the problem still remains what is to be included and what left out in the annals of history, and by what yardstick are events to be measured to qualify for admission to those deathless tomes now accumulating dust on groaning shelves. Instead of a solution Carlyle offers an evasion and a surrender. "History," says he, "is the essence of innumerable Biographies. But if one Biography, nay our own Biography, study and recapitulate it as we may, remains in so many points unintelligible to us; how much more must be these million, the very facts of which, to say nothing of the purport of them, we know not, and cannot know!" [10]

Nor are we advanced any further when an essayist like Emerson seizes upon the same thought and furbishes it with such grand rhetoric: "All public facts are to be individualized, all private facts are to be generalized. Then at once History becomes fluid and true, and Biography deep and sublime." [11] All of which means exactly nothing.

Nordau in his thoughtful work on historical methods agrees that "a true understanding of the matter and meaning of history is not to be obtained by the anecdotal method which records events, and nothing but events with the delight of the gossiping barber." [12] And Henry Adams, the greatest stylist American historical writing has produced, breaks down in the sorrowful confession: "Perhaps no good historian was ever a good lawyer. . . . The lawyer is required to give facts the mould of a theory; the historian need only state facts in their sequence." [13]

In his great autobiographical work of candid but too severe self-evaluation Adams writes: "Historians undertake to arrange sequences—called stories, or histories—assuming in silence a relation of cause and effect. . . . He had even published a dozen volumes of American history for no other purpose than to satisfy himself whether, by the severest process of stating, with the least possible comment, such facts as seemed sure, in such order as seemed rigorously consequent, he could fix for a moment a necessary sequence of human movement. Where he saw sequence, other men saw something quite different, and no one saw the same unit of measure." [14]

[9] Essays—Carlyle Vol. III pp. 250-2.

[10] Essays—Carlyle Vol. II p. 231.

[11] Essays—Emerson p. 17.

[12] The Interpretation of History—Nordau (1910) p. 88.

[13] History of the United States—Adams Vol. III p. 45.

[14] The Education of Henry Adams—Adams p. 382.

Adams is to be honored the more for recognizing that without laws and principles, history can never realize its full potentialities for mankind.

HISTORY AS INTERPRETING EVENTS

We have seen that history as a meticulous collection of facts would collapse of its own weight, and that history as a record of events would die of inanity, for, as Beard has truly said, gossip is still the chief intellectual amusement of the human race.[15] Our investigation must lead us to the consideration of methods of interpretation and the search for—if such there be—historical laws which are independent of the observer and possess an objective validity. Leibig's statement that the attaching of too high a value to mere facts is often the sign of a want of ideas, wins from Buckle the commendation that the sentence should be engraved in letters of gold over the portals of every learned institution.[16]

Nor are we assured that all the pertinent facts of a given event exist, or are obtainable, or are undoctored. In the latter respect governments are not more circumspect than individuals. Prescott tells us in his great work on the conquest of Peru how three hundred years after the event he experienced the greatest difficulty in obtaining from the Spanish government and archives authentic and unvarnished information.[17] But even if the facts are certain, the widest divergence of opinion frequently develops as to their interpretation, particularly when they deal, as history must, with such imponderables as human motivations.

Take by way of illustration Beard's and Hildreth's treatment of that episode in American history known as the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania during 1794. According to Beard it was merely a convenient opportunity for Washington, at Hamilton's instigation, to teach the masses respect for law and order. The President, following this advice, "called out a strong body of men, and accompanied by Hamilton, he himself started for the scene of disorder. Before this display of power, the insurgents dispersed and the myth of the rebellion exploded." [18]

Hildreth's version presents a more dramatic episode. There we see seven thousand armed insurgents led by United States Senator Ross and Albert Gallatin, the future Secretary of the Treasury.

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[15] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard Vol. I p. 787.

[16] History of Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. II p. 416.

[17] The Conquest of Peru—Prescott Mod. Lib. Ed. p. 1234.

[18] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, pp. 357-8.

Government officials are killed, postal service is cut off, courts are closed. Fifteen thousand Federal troops are called out against a possible insurgent strength of greater that number. The President cautions and negotiates with the ringleaders, all of whom are subsequently pardoned. Nevertheless twenty-five hundred men remain encamped at the scene all winter at the enormous expense, for those days, of $800,000.[19]

Divergent as their respective narratives are, both Hildreth and Beard agree that this lamented occurrence afforded the young Republic an opportunity to exhibit decision and vigor at a trying period of our history. It is also fair to state that Hildreth was an outspoken Federalist, and Beard had he been his contemporary doubtless would have been as strongly anti-Federalist. But candor compels the statement that McMaster, whose placid nature avoids strong partisanship, fully supports Hildreth's description of that insurrection,[20] thereby maintaining intact the latter's well-deserved reputation for painstaking factual thoroughness.

Should one insist upon corroboration by a more recent writer, that is afforded by Baldwin whose work deals exclusively with that interesting episode in our history. Therein he asserts that many of the insurrectionists after capturing munition trains of the Federal forces, toyed with the idea of going back to Britain or setting up a new state.[21] However, the real upshot from our present viewpoint is that two exceptionally endowed historians with the same body of facts before them arrive at opposite conclusions concerning the motives of the principal actors in an exciting historical drama.

BIAS OF THE OBSERVER

If such striking differences can exist as to facts which can be weighed, how much greater the occasion for controversy when imponderable ideas are the cause of dissention? "It is a characteristic faculty of the Germans," says Schopenhauer, "to look in the clouds for what lies at their feet." [22] This amiable defect afflicts others besides the Germans.

For example, the aims of the Constitutional Convention and the construction to be given to the product of its labors have ever been a fruitful source of contention among us. This led even Hamilton to philosophize on the litigious quality of human nature, and to declare rather floridly: "When the Almighty Himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, His meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated." [23]

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[19] History of the United States—Hildreth Vol. IV pp. 498-516.

[20] History of the People of the United States—McMaster Vol. II pp. 190-204.

[21] Whiskey Rebels—Baldwin (1939), pp. 169-70.

[22] Schopenhauer—Essay on Government p. 29.

Gibbon suggests a formula for the guidance of the historian when in doubt as to the facts. Writing of the conflicting evidence submitted by contemporaneous writers, he says: "It would not be an easy task to reconcile the accounts of the Greeks, the Venetians and the Genoese; and while I depend on the narrative of an impartial historian, I shall borrow from each nation the facts that redound to their own disgrace and the honor of their foes!" [24] The method prescribed by that omnivorous gatherer of facts might be effective before the bar of equity but must fail before the bar of history. We are not trying to win a case but to establish a truth. If history is ever to become a science its methodology must be certain, and its sphere of operation definitely circumscribed, before an investigation is undertaken to establish its laws of motion.

But Gibbon had struck an important chord. Impartiality is the note. No one who has studied the classic pages of that great writer can charge him with violating his own dictum. Yet Buckle,[25] Marx,[26] and Wells [27] with the same facts as a criterion have given a much profounder and certainly a more correct analysis than he, of the causes of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, that great historic cataclysm whose effects have reverberated down the ages, and still manifest themselves in the history of Europe to-day.

Others also have emphasized the importance of impartiality. "The historian," says Bancroft, even more than philosophers and naturalists, must bring to his pursuit the freedom of an unbiased mind; in his case, the submission of reason to prejudice would have a deeper criminality; for he cannot neglect to be impartial without at once falsifying nature and denying Providence." [28] Bancroft could never understand why his distinction between the naturalist and the historian is fallacious.

He could readily perceive how a physicist or a chemist starting out with dogmatic views concerning nature and the laws governing the manifestation of its phenomena must wind up in error, for realism is ever the brake to erraticism. But an historian selects his

[23] The Federalist—Hamilton No. XXXVI.
[24] The Decline and Fall of Rome—Gibbon Ch. LXIII Mod. Lib. Ed. Vol. II p. 1200.
[25] History of Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. I pp. 187-188; Vol. II p. 128.
[26] Capital—Marx Vol. I pp. 94, 152, 798; Vol. II p. 559; Vol. III pp. 102, 452, 697, 914.
[27] The Outline of History—Wells, pp. 457-67, 814.
[28] History of the United States—Bancroft Vol. V p. 70.

own materials. From them he deduces certain conclusions. To them he brings a bundle of prejudices, both inherited and acquired. And since, as yet, there are no regulatory laws to curb his vagaries, hence Bancroft's ministerial adjuration first to the laws of man and finally to the laws of God to curb his propensities for distortion.

Impartiality, or the absence of it, can be as readily discovered in the historian as in the scientist. The ultimate test is the correctness of their generalizations when applied to the unfolding realities. Infinite patience and didactic thoroughness are admirable, but not enough. Through eight volumes and over four thousand pages of his monumental work McMaster meticulously arranges his facts and quotes his authorities, and yet in the end he succeeded in accomplishing nothing more than an approximation toward Carlyle's goal of infinite compressibility. McMaster is thorough; he is impartial; he is factual; he is even dull to the extent of emasculating his soul from his pages, where Gibbon's always scintillates, and Bancroft's occasionally irradiates. But in the end he learned little and passed on to others the same coin.

For example, in his last volume McMaster passes on without comment the argument made by the Governor of South Carolina in 1856 for the re-opening of the slave trade, or else recourse would have to be made to white immigrant labor with their alien ideologies to operate the South's factories, run her locomotives and harvest her crops.[29] That slave labor can never be successfully applied to a competitive industrial technique requiring the exercise of initiative and judgment is a fundamental truth of tremendous historical significance which surely must have been known to McMaster, but of whose existence the reader of that passage would never suspect.

Rhodes was the last grand master of the peripatetic school of historical writing. Beginning in leisurely gait through the corridors of our history with 1850, he carried his factual narrative up to the present period through eight volumes. But something happened to him on the way. As long as the slavery question was the fulcrum of his narrative Rhodes is brilliant, at times inspiring, and always absorbing. After the turmoil of the Civil War is over and the Reconstruction Period gets under way, his sureness is lost, his attention wanders, and the reader struggles through with the grim determination to complete a necessary task.

With the delicate discernment of the true artist Rhodes was aware even before his reader that his work was slipping. And so we have in his preface to the sixth volume the results of his frank self-examination which does him honor both as a scholar and as an

[29] History of the People of the United States—McMaster (1913), Vol. VIII, pp. 344-5.

historian. He admits that since 1877 other social questions have arisen to which his former measuring rod no longer applied. Problems of concentration of capital, industrial crises and conflict, imperialism and colonial expansion, all these are new to him, and events no longer respond to the touch of his literary artistry.[30] Just as Don Quixote had long ago paid the penalty for assuming knight-errantry to be compatible with all forms of civilization, so Rhodes was to discover that an historical method developed out of the exigencies of a limited period would no longer suffice when that period closed on the stage of history.

PERSPECTIVE IN HISTORY

Next to impartiality in analyzing facts classic historians stress the importance of proper perspective. Yet the widest possible differences exist as to the time limit beyond which history ends and chronology begins, and a veritable chaos ensues over the problem of focus and interpretation. Nor is there any basis for the assumption that each succeeding generation must necessarily be wiser than its predecessor. Obviously we are the children of our time, and some of us even attain to intellectual maturity. Yet the infinitely rich record of the human drama affords no ground for the thought that generations of men of other times and different civilizations were not every inch our equal, and often our superior in mental, moral and aesthetic qualities.

Strict chronology according to Astronomer's Time is convenient but is not historically compelling. "These dates, it must be frankly admitted, are arbitrary," writes Symonds, "nor is there anything more unprofitable than the attempt to define by strict chronology the moments of an intellectual growth so complex, so unequally progressive and so varied as that of Italian art." [31] The founders of our republic, or the leaders during Webster's day, or the industrial giants of the post Civil War period, can compare favorably with our own, though they had neither radio nor telephone nor automobile nor the thousand and one conveniences which are the pride of our times. Our republic a century ago was most assuredly a hundred years younger, but the level of its intellectual life does not suffer by comparison.

Perspective is assumed as essential for the proper evaluation of events in their due historical setting. We shall presently see that this plea actually hides a fundamental flaw in the methods of classical writers and is a self-admission of incompetency in the chosen field of their endeavors.

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[30] History of the United States—Rhodes Vol. VI pp. V-VII.

[31] Renaissance in Italy—Symonds Vol. I p. 709 Mod. Lib. Ed.

How far back must one go for perspective? Fox tells us that "a learned committee of the National Education Association, reporting on the school curriculum in 1895, declared that, 'the formation of the Constitution, and a brief study of the salient features of the Constitution itself, conclude the study of the portion of the history of the United States that is sufficiently remote to be treated after the manner of an educational classic,' and advised that nothing be done about the century and more that had since transpired." [32]

Should this draw a smile from our bright moderns, let us look at a writer who thinks that four hundred and fifty years is scarcely enough for historical perspective. About the middle of the 14th Century English wool was found to be peculiarly adapted to the use of weavers in the Low Countries. This led to the enclosure of the ancient commons by the aristocracy and the ruthless denuding of English villages of their human population to be turned into sheep walks. One of the most touching passages in More's "Utopia" [33] is where he speaks of the sheep, which are naturally mild, who now devour men, as it were, by unpeopling villages and towns. The history of this bloody process is treated by such standard authors as Macaulay,[34] Marx [35] and Green [36] who write fully on the subject. Constitutional writers like Hallam [37] take note of it, and text-books like Cheyney's [38] make it compulsory reading. Yet the writer for the Encyclopedia Brittanica concludes: "It was a period of dislocation of social relations of which we are not now in a position to judge accurately." [39] Certainly that judgment is not due either to a lack of authentic records and even more authenticated perspective.

Mere passage of time does not necessarily induce clarity of judgment. That facts should be judged in relation to their times is urged by Grote [40] and Symonds,[41] the latter also stressing the impossibility of men of one century to sympathize with the ethics of a past and different epoch. However, it is not a matter of sympathy but of understanding. While the manifestations of human nature change, its fundamental character retains an extraordinary stability, otherwise we could not read the Bible, Homer, Plutarch, Dante, and Shakespeare with so much keen emotional exaltation and intellectual understanding.

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[32] The United States Since 1865—Hacker and Kendrick, Introd. by Fox (1938) p. V.
[33] Utopia—More p. 139.
[34] History of England—Macaulay Vol. I pp. 341, 344, 462-3; Vol. V pp. 83, 449, 483, 530.
[35] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, pp. 788 to 811; Vol. III, p. 938.
[36] History of the English People—Green Vol. II p. 23.
[37] Constitutional History of England—Hallam Vol. I p. 103.
[38] Industrial and Social History of England—Cheyney, pp. 121-5, 259-63.
[39] Encycl. Brit 9th Ed. Vol. XIV p. 264.
[40] Greece—Grote, Vol. I, p. 432.
[41] Renaissance In Italy—Symonds, Vol. I, p. 479; Vol. II, p. 664.

That every generation must rewrite past history is a corollary following out of futility, and is blandly accepted as an indisputable truism by the historical world. Commager reluctantly concedes it,[42] and Haldane [43] exults in it. What does this prove but the pitiable deficiencies of present-day methods; the paucity, one is tempted to say the absence, of co-ordinating generalizations developed from the fulness of life itself which would enable mankind to follow through the course of its own drama?

Fiske in his work on the Federal Constitutional Convention relating to the subject of the slavery compromise writes: "It is difficult to read this or any other episode in our history whereby negro slavery was extended and fostered without burning indignation. But this is not the proper mood for the historian, whose aim is to interpret men's actions by the circumstances of their time in order to judge their motives correctly." [44] Yet later on in the same work he condemns McMaster for adopting that judicial attitude.[45] The point is that the true function of history should be neither to condemn nor to praise, but to explain, and that it has not adequately done because it does not possess sufficient basic principles with which to apply itself to this task.

Such a contemporary as Beard proves by his own work the fallacy of waiting upon perspective to correct the deficiencies of judgment. In his monumental work he points out correctly enough the inadequacies of the Teutonic peoples alleged love for freedom as explaining the development of self-government in England, and helps explode the Teutonic origin theory of the English people. He emphasizes rather the early development of a strong despotic monarchy and her insularity as being responsible for welding England into a homogeneous nation.

Far from accepting the Magna Charta as a momentous step forward in human progress he writes: "Happily for the growing nation, the attempts of the baronage to break the Crown by imposing upon it the anarchic restraints of Magna Charta in the interests of inherited feudal privileges were defeated by the magnificent disregard which King John's successors showed for most of the prohibitions written down in that historic document."[46]

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[42] Introd. to Adams' History of the United States.

[43] Inequality of Man—J. B. S. Haldane (1932) p. 50.

[44] Fiske—The Critical Period of American History, p. 265.

[45] Ibid. p. 352.

This startling judgment of the Great Charter certainly runs contrary to what might be called popular opinion. With equal certainty it counters the consensus of professional opinion on that subject. Here therefore, is an opportunity to test the merits of the classical theory of history in which subjectivism and individual interpretation takes the place of scientific, objective principles.

The facts surrounding the grant of the Great Charter by King John in 1215, and its frequent confirmation by succeeding rulers are beyond dispute. Guizot states it was renewed and confirmed by almost every king over thirty times between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries.[47] The Charter's contents are certain. Over seven hundred elapsed years ought to allow sufficient room for perspective to operate. Consider then its ringing notes which have reverberated through the ages, and are still heard to thrill our hearts, and will continue to inspire the actions of succeeding generations of men.

Among the Charter's provisions are: Freedom of the Church of England is recognized (Article I), and freedom of conscience in Article LXIII.

No impost tax shall be imposed without consent of the common council (XII).

Towns, cities and ports are confirmed in their ancient liberties (XIII).

Regular sessions of the common council shall be held and assembled after due notice (XIV).

Persons charged with offenses shall be tried in their own communities (XVII).

No freeman shall be mulcted under the pretense of a fine (XX).

Private property taken for public use shall be paid for (XXX).

Standards of weights and measures shall be established (XXXV).

No person shall be condemned without judgment of his peers (XXXIX).

"We shall sell to no man, we will not deny to any man, either justice or right" (XL).

Freedom of movement from place to place, or out of England is guaranteed (XLI).

So much for Beard's "anarchic restraints of the Magna Charta." That its grantor and his heirs attempted to renege on their promises is a matter of historic record. It is also a matter of record that they were frequently prevented from disregarding its terms, and the final balance sheet shows a considerable accession to the privileges originally conceded. The arbitrament of force as the decisive catalyst was the usual recourse for both sides.

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[46] Beard—The Rise of American Civilization—Vol. I p. 18.

[47] History of Civilization In Europe—Guizot p. 237.

All this, of course, is well known to Beard. The gravamen of his contention really is that the Great Charter was extorted from the king by the feudal barons for the perpetuation of feudal power. In this Beard's logic is inexorable. The barons were not Jeffersonian democrats in disguise. The greater part of the Charter provisions are for the protection of baronial interests. Nor is he alone in that judgment. Hegel a hundred years before him had written: "The barons of England extorted Magna Charta from the King; but the citizens gained nothing by it, on the contrary they remained in their former condition." [48] The vital distinction between these two commentators is that Hegel looked upon history as a movement, as a process of development from inactive bewilderment through incoherent action to conscious contemplation; [49] while Beard thinks only of all the provisions of the Charter and their consequences if carried out unchanged in a straight line for all eternity.

There can be no doubt that if the barons would have had their way history would have been stymied in the thirteenth century. Professor Robinson in his recent work strongly emphasizes this point.[50] In fact, it would have stopped at the first century of the Christian era if the Roman Senate had had the power or the intelligence to carry out the terms of Augustus' will.[51] Every ruler has planned his regime in perpetuity. Man acts, but does not control the consequences of his acts. Individual wills must yield to social forces which few of us understand and fewer can dominate though collectively we can, and often do, master them.

Beard's fundamental error, so characteristic of modern historians, consists in gauging a thirteenth-century fact by twentieth-century ideologies, despite his efforts to avoid doing so. By the same standards Magna Charta could be condemned as woefully inadequate in its provisions for regulation of industry, factory inspection and child labor. But for its own day it was by the common consent of mankind a tremendous step ahead and a powerful lever for effecting further social progress.

That words and concepts must be gauged to their historical setting is emphasized by Guizot. "The terms 'servitude and freedom' recall to our minds ideas far more precise and definite," wrote he, "than the facts of the eighth, ninth or tenth centuries to which they relate. If we say that the towns in the eighth century were in a state of freedom we say by far too much: we attach now to the word 'freedom' a significance which does not represent the fact of the eighth century. We shall fall into the same error if we say that the towns were in a state of servitude." [52]

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[48] Philosophy of History—Hegel p. 430.

[49] Ibid., p. 103.

[50] The Human Comedy—Robinson (1937) p. 239.

[51] The Decline and Fall of Rome—Gibbons Vol. I p. 2 Mod. Lib. Ed.

The same problem of interpretation recurs with every age. Chief Justice Hughes in his valuable book on the Supreme Court emphasizes that constitutions as well as laws must be considered in the light of changing social conditions.[53] The organic instrument, of course, cannot be enlarged without amendment; it must simply be applied in the light of new conditions. This often requires prodigies of legal ingenuity. Hence the conclusion for which Hughes has been widely criticized as justifying the usurpation of judicial power: "The Court is the final interpreter of the acts of Congress. Statutes come to the judicial test not simply of constitutional validity but with respect to their true import, and a federal statute finally means what the Court says it means." [54]

The real test for history if it is ever to become a science is to show precisely by what means social institutions change and evolve, remain stagnant or decay, and by what laws the unfolding events in society are controlled. Moral indignation regarding the past is simply a throw-back of present ideologies upon an era foreign to them and reflects only the weakness of historical methodology.

H. G. Wells, as might be expected, reverses the usual formula by projecting his ideas into the future. "It is not by setting up polling booths, but by setting up schools and making literature and knowledge and news universally accessible that the way is opened from servitude and confusion to that willingly co-operative state which is the modern ideal. Votes in themselves are worthless things. Men had votes in Italy in the time of the Gracchi." [55] Our warm-hearted idealist errs both in his past and in his future.

Not all men had votes in the Greek and Roman republics where slaves and foreigners far out-numbered the citizens. Some modern European states exult not only in their vastly increased schools, but also in their enormous accession of polling booths where almost perfect scores are unfailingly checked up for the winning candidates. Obviously there are some links missing in the Wellsian chain of causality, and one searches vainly through his absorbing pages in an effort to find them.

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[52] General History of Civilization in Modern Europe—Guizot Vol. II p. 133.

[53] The Supreme Court of the United States—Hughes (1936) pp. 114, 142, 195.

[54] The Supreme Court of the United States—Hughes (1936) pp. 229-30.

[55] The Outline of History—Wells p. 707.

INHERENT DEFECTS OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES

Instructors of the young immemorially have found it both convenient and necessary to teach by precept, moral and example. These methods of intellectual infancy when translated into historical writing form the backbone of the analogy school of writers. They are legion. But once we know that analogies, while often entertaining and sometimes instructive, can never be conclusive, then a great deal of their harm is counter-acted. For historical analogies can never meet a problem four-square, if only because the element of time and place is always against them. Reasoning by analogy has done more to retard the development of history as a science, which must always deal with specific factors for specific events, than any other contributory element.

Kant, in his time the greatest intellect of the age, says: "Indeed, the grand and only use of examples, is to sharpen the judgment. For as regards the correctness and precision of the insight of the understanding, examples are commonly injurious rather than otherwise; as casus in terminis, they seldom adequately fulfill the conditions of the rule. Besides, they often weaken the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws in their universality, independently of particular circumstances of experience; and hence accustom us to employ them more as formulae than as principles. Examples are thus the go-cart of the judgment, which he who is naturally deficient in that faculty, cannot afford to dispense with."[56] Spinoza says simply: "An exact parallel does not exist."[57]

As an instance of the fallacy concealed in historical analogies let us begin with an episode nearest home. On Sept. 21, 1939 President Roosevelt addressed to Congress an appeal for the repeal of the Embargo Act which forbade shipment of materials of war to belligerents. He based his plea on the return to the principles of international law which governed our commerce since 1789, and he cautioned that the only departure from that policy led to the War of 1812. "That policy turned out to be a disastrous failure—First, because it brought our nation close to ruin, and second, because it was a major cause of bringing us into active participation in European wars in our own War of 1812."[58]

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[56] Critique of Pure Reason—Kant p. 99.

[57] Ethics—Spinoza Part Two, prop VIII in scholium.

[58] Reported in the New York Times Sept. 22, 1939.

Disregarding for our purpose the validity of the President's analogy of historic relations between that period and the present day, it logically leads to a conclusion of fact where the realities indisputably contradict the assertion.

Did the embargo—the short embargo of 1807, the long embargo of 1808-9, or Madison's embargo of 1812—any embargo, in fact, bring this country to the verge of ruin as asserted? On the contrary, McMaster shows that it gave rise to a rage for manufacturing which swept the country by diverting the capital formerly employed in commerce and shipbuilding to the construction of factories, canals, roads and internal improvements.[59] Naturally the commercial interests and those it employed suffered heavily, but the net result was to give a powerful stimulus to the industrialization of the country and actually to increase the national wealth. This conclusion is concurred in by Adams.[60] Hildreth, despite intense partisanship, proves in his usual honest and methodical way the enormous growth of American industry due to the cutting off of foreign imports, and gives valuable statistical data on this score from Gallatin's reports.[61]

Just as it was erroneous for President Roosevelt to urge the embargo repeal as a means of escaping financial disaster, so it would be equally erroneous to contend that the same beneficial consequences of that period will be repeated in our times. This instance only proves the inability to make out a case for a political policy in 1939 by the experiences of 1812.

Plutarch was the amiable father of the analogy method. At least he followed it consistently, but he made no pretense of establishing immutable laws by that process of reasoning. "My method, on the contrary," writes he, "is by the study of history, and by the familiarity acquired in writing, to habituate my memory to receive and retain images of the best and worthiest characters. . . . History suggests a variety of good counsel of this sort, by the way, to those who desire to learn and improve." [62] Action and events excited his interest, and as an historian, he nearest approaches Nordau's ideal gossiping barber. Xenophon, as an eye-witness of events, is his best pattern [63] of historical perfection.

That time and place mean nothing to an historian adopting the easy path of analogy is observed in a modern writer who compares the policy of Dionysius in Sicily 2300 years ago with the modern

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[59] History of the People of the United States—McMaster Vol. III, pp. 299, 319. 500, 501.

[60] History of the United States—Adams, Vol. IV, pp. 280-2, 362-3.

[61] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, pp. 149, 209, 467, 586, 630, 681.

[62] Lives by Plutarch—pp. 294 and 323 (Coronet ed.)

[63] Ibid., p. 1255.

American Monroe Doctrine.[64] Perhaps it would be unjust to inquire whether he meant the Monroe Doctrine as understood by its promulgator, or by President Pierce, or Secretary Blaine, or Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson, or Secretary Hughes, or by the present incumbent of the White House, each of whom adapted the Doctrine to the exigencies of his time. Analogies are glorious things with an aspect of profundity withal, and marvellous results are obtained by its adepts. Many analogies doubtless may be made between a man and a mouse. But science will progress most by studying their differences.

Among the great literary treasures of our history none surpass in virility the collection of papers published by Hamilton, Madison and Jay, and collectively known as "The Federalist." Replete throughout its eighty-five numbers are learned references to the political organizations of Athens, Sparta, Carthage, Rome, the Venetian Empire, the United Netherlands, Germany and of course England. Characteristic of their method is the following: "Among the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic Council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present confederation of the American States." [65] Yet none knew better than they how pragmatical were the delegates to the Constitutional Convention whose work was essentially one of compromises dictated by the conditions of their own day. Abstractions had their place, but the controlling factors were the specific provisions of the document itself in relation to the problems of their time.

It is not generally remembered that Tolstoy at the close of his masterpiece "War and Peace" changes his role as a novelist to that of a critic of historical methods in an essay of thirty-five pages. Any opinions expressed by that profound Russian intellect merits careful examination. Referring to analogies and their deficiency he writes: "There undoubtedly exists a connection between all the people living at one time, and so it is possible to find some sort of connection between the intellectual activity of men and their historical movements, just as one may find a connection between the movements of humanity and commerce, handicrafts, gardening, and anything you like." [66] But he discards that method as more plausible than sound.

It requires a mind like Henry George, however, to condemn the

[64] History of Greece—Bury p. 643.
[65] The Federalist—No. XVIII by both Hamilton and Madison.
[66] War and Peace—Tolstoy p. 1117.

Socialist movement of his day as "a proposal to bring back mankind to the socialism of Peru, but without reliance on divine will or power. Modern socialism is in fact without religion, and its tendency is atheistic." [67] Leaving aside for the moment his reference to the superior morality of the Peruvians who occasionally practiced human sacrifice as part of their religious customs,[68] it is a peculiar science that can compare the institutions of the Inca State with ideologies developed on the basis of a modern industrial economy. This method is all the more strange when George had at his command the intellectual achievements of his great contemporaries, Prescott's "Conquest of Peru" and Marx's "Capital," the first of which he did not use, while the second he did not understand.

In an opposite sense but of the same nature is H. G. Well's protest against the modern use of the word proletariat. He points out that the role of the Roman proletarii was to breed children as future colonists or soldiers, concluding that "it is a great pity that modern political discussion should be confused by an inaccurate use of a term which has no exact modern equivalent and which expresses nothing real in modern social classification." [69] Wells overlooked the undoubted right of Radicals to adopt an ancient word for their own purpose, so long as they are consistent in that use. Marx clearly defined proletariat as meaning that class which does not own its means of production, and whose relation in capitalist economy is that of sellers of labor power to the owners of capital. That a worker also owns a tooth brush and a radio does not make him a capitalist. He is still a member of the proletarian class so long as wages is his chief source of revenue.

Reasoning by analogy, did not the common sense of mankind instinctively reject its logic in political affairs, would have prevented the formation of the present Union of forty-eight sovereign states. In 1811 the House of Representatives had before it the application of Louisiana for admission as a State. Josiah Quincy from Massachusetts opposed it on the theory that the constitution was a compact between the original thirteen states, and new states could be made only out of the territory within the original limits of the Union. No power had been delegated to Congress to admit foreigners to a share of political power under the compact. "Suppose in private life," he argued, "that thirteen men form a partnership, and that ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the consent of the other three. Would it not be at the option of the

[67] The Science of Political Economy—Henry George p. 198.

[68] The Conquest of Peru—Prescott Mod. Lib. Ed. pp. 785, 901-2.

[69] The Outline of History—Wells p. 390.

three to abandon the partnership after so palpable an infringement of their rights?"[70] This plausible application of the law of partnership[71] was later to bear pernicious fruit in laying down the theory for nullification[72] and eventual secession,[73] but in every instance these plausibilities, effective as they always are in partisanship, disguised fundamental realities which belied their sophistry.

Comparisons are the first cousins of analogies. Henry Adams gives us a peculiar account of the great struggles between England and France for world hegemony. "As in the year 1754 a petty fight between two French and English scouting parties on the banks of the Youghiogheny River, far in the American wilderness, began a war that changed the balance of the world, so in 1811 an encounter in the Indian country, on the banks of the Wabash, began a fresh convulsion which ended only with the fall of Napoleon. The battle of Tippecanoe was a premature outbreak of the great wars of 1812."[74] No doubt every patriotic American bosom swells with pride at the terror Youghiogheny and Tippecanoe inspired in the hearts of Napoleon and the British statesmen, but an impartial observer might even question if they knew how to spell those names, let alone where the places were located or what they signified.

Simultaneously one's national pride suffers a blow, while suspicions concerning the Adamsian method of writing history are confirmed, when we note his remarks on Touissant L'Ouverture's death in Napoleon's prison: "But even when shivering in the frosts of the Jura, his last moments would have glowed with gratified revenge, had he known at the same instant Bonaparte was turning into a path which the negroes of St. Domingo had driven him to take, and which was to lead him to parallel at St. Helena the fate of Touissant himself at the Chateau de Joux."[75] At any rate we can console ourselves that it was the inhabitants of the New World, and not those of the Old who wrote finis to the Little Corporal's career, as an obdurate world still imagines.

Another form of analogy is the drawing of a comparison between vital events in two different forms of civilization, and developing from that philosophic conclusions of weighty present historical meaning. After pointing out the tremendous social significance of the introduction of gun-powder in battering down the be-walled and be-castled ramparts of embattled feudal aristocracy, thereby giving rise to modern urbanism and its rich exfoliations, Beard continues: "If a single matter of gun-powder could make such 'contributions to civilization,' what may be said of the possibilities of electricity in the hands of modern enterprise? Is it not possible that five centuries from now the beginnings of a new moral and intellectual order may be traced to the first whirling dynamo?" [76]

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[70] History of the People of the United States—McMaster Vol. III p. 377; Vol. IV p. 212.

[71] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, pp. 155, 226.

[72] History of the United States—Adams Vol. VIII pp. 4-16.

[73] History of the People of the United States—McMaster Vol. VIII p. 521.

[74] History of the United States—Adams Vol. VI p. 67.

[75] History of the United States—Adams Vol. II p. 20.

The answer to this hypothetical question is no. The reasons for this categorical negative should be equally clear. Gun-powder resulted in the re-distribution of the social forces in medieval Europe. The dynamo in modern times merely created a new force to be applied in the process of production and as a convenience in every day life. The equilibrium of social forces has not been disturbed by its introduction. Since this is a vital point in the Historical Field Theory, it will merit further elucidation at this juncture of our inquiry.

That a thing in itself is not revolutionary is attested by the fact that gun-powder was used in Asia without at all disturbing the social equilibrium, particularly in China where it had been known for centuries before its introduction into Europe.[77] In feudal society all a man needed to be equipped for war was a sword and bow. Cavalry and armor was for the aristocracy. Aristotle remarks with that profundity which characterizes all his generalizations: "The cities whose strength lay in their cavalry were oligarchies . . . for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry . . . but the light-armed and the naval elements are wholly democratic." [78] The reasons he gives are conclusive; to supply and support a war horse was a heavy expense beyond the means of the masses, and those cities where naval power was supreme depended for its support on the public treasury.

Under feudalism the baronial castle was a refuge and a challenge against centralization of political power. Gun-powder in the hands of kingly power supported by the towns levelled those embattlements and laid the political basis for that order of society dominated by the formerly despised burghers, or bourgeoisie. "Gunpowder and cannon 'democratized' war and had an explosive effect on the hierarchical organization of society," [79] Corey exclaims with evident satisfaction. Hegel sings an historical Te Deum over the knightly figures of Sir Walter Scott. "We may indeed be led to lament the decay or the depreciation of the practical value of personal valor—

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[76] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard I Introd. p. XII.

[77] History of Civilization in England—Buckle I p. 146.

[78] The Politics—Aristotle, pp. 89, 107, 160.

[79] The Decline of American Capitalism—Corey (1934) p. 262.

the bravest, the noblest may be shot down by a cowardly wretch at safe distance in an obscure lurking-place; but, on the other hand, gun-powder has made a rational, considerate bravery—Spiritual valor—the essential to martial success." [80]

Adam Smith makes an extended analysis of the development of military art from the earliest days to support his contention that as its technique becomes more intricate it tends to develop as the specialty of a small group which constitutes a professional army. Whereas among the ancient Greeks a fourth or fifth of the whole body of the people would take the field, "among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed, that not more than one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any country can be employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country which pays the expense of their service." [81] Strangely Gibbon uses the same one per cent as the absolute maximum for the military establishment of Roman society eighteen centuries previous.[82] From this Smith draws the conclusion that as society progresses it tends to become more peaceful because it cannot bear the overwhelming expense of modern warfare. Like a true-born Briton he cautions against any further increase in the public debt as likely to wreck England, that burden having then reached the stupendous figure of 128,000,000 pounds (in 1776).[83]

From the facts adduced the following conclusions may fairly be drawn. First, gun-powder was a means, and not an end in itself. Second, that it gave impetus to a social ferment then working due to the irreconcilable antagonisms between the nobility, the king, and the burghers. Third, the serfs as such only play a role in forcing the disintegration of society, not in their own behalf, but as agents of more powerful social elements. Fourth, that the kingly power was aggrandized, while the mercantile groups, the handicrafts and manufacturing elements received a considerable accession to their freedom of enterprise. That was the historical role of gun-powder in the Middle Ages.

Now as to Beard's whirling dynamo. It is a means for the generation of electric energy to be used in industry or as a consumptive necessity. It is not a lever in the hands of a subjected or exploited class against their oppressors. Electricity merely is substituted for steam energy, as that replaced the water wheel which in turn was a clumsy and uncertain substitute for human or animal power. And lastly, electricity is a social gain and not a class weapon. Its employment, no matter how extended, must reproduce the same economic relations of our society. Like all other forces of nature it is merely a means in the common store-house of mankind. Socially considered, the dynamo does not contain the historically explosive qualities of gun-powder.

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[80] Philosophy of History—Hegel p. 402.
[81] The Wealth of Nations—Smith Book V pp. 657-8.
[82] The Decline and Fall of Rome—Gibbon, Vol. I, Ch. V, p. 90.
[83] The Wealth of Nations—Smith p. 882.

Nordau has summed up all that can profitably be said on the errors lurking behind analogies, comparisons and speculations in the following trenchant sentences: "The distrust with which abstract reasoning should be regarded applies still more strongly to reasoning by analogy or intuition. Each of these methods is a source of ideas and judgments in the consciousness which it takes for knowledge. They are easy, comfortable methods, but they lead too often to pathless quagmires of error and delusion." [84]

SUBJECTIVE RATIONALIZATION BY HISTORICAL WRITERS

Historians themselves have been the greatest stumbling block to the development of history as a science. Since history does not write itself, despite the poets, it depends first on the chronicler who records the facts and then upon the writer who interprets the facts. "Every teacher of history evolves a philosophy of history which will find expression in spite of all efforts at repression," writes Schlesinger.[85] Since the training, background and personality of the teacher affords infinite opportunity for variation, an infinite variety of historical philosophies might well be expected were not the financial resources of publishers and the patience of readers finite in character. "The Philosophy of History," writes Theodore Parker, "is of more importance than the facts of history; indeed, save for the antiquary, who has a disinterested love thereof, they are of little value except as they set forth that philosophy. Now the subjective character of an historian continually appears, colors his narrative, and affects the judgment he passes on men and things." [86]

That this subjective character of selecting and interpreting facts vitiates the result is apparent by the mass of uncertain and often contradictory historical systems. But does not every other branch of knowledge first pass through the transmitting mechanism of the human intellect? Are the truths of mathematics, physics, chemistry and physiology the less profound because of it?

[84] The Interpretation of History—Nordau p. 274.

[85] New Viewpoints in American History—Schlesinger (1937) p. X.

[86] The American Scholar—Parker p. 179.

Ah, protests Professor Schlesinger, "it may well be beyond the power of the human mind to comprehend the intricate drama played on so vast and ever shifting a stage." [87] Mere intricacy does not stagger the human intellect; on the contrary it acts as a challenge. When once history will emancipate itself from the methods of medievalism just as science did three hundred years ago, and looks to the outer world for the laws of motion of human society instead of ransacking vainly through the recesses of one's inner consciousness, then it will have attained the full dignity of intellectual maturity. We have yet to prove the existence of such laws and indicate their mode of operation, but for the present the emphasis is that the problem presented is one of difficulty rather that of inherent impossibility. Before the affirmative proof can be presented it is essential first to clear the field of all encumbrances to the scientific approach toward a philosophy of history.

"Reason governs the world and consequently history," is Hegel's dictum.[88] While Beard abandons Hegel's creed to the theologians,[89] he is not stranger to the use of Hegel's subjectivism in the consideration of historical problems. In his introduction to a composite book on current public questions he speculates on the consequences to our civilization if a few hundred thousand engineers out of the earth's teeming multitudes should quit work for good. Great cities would sink in ruins; communication would end; transport, light and fuel would stop; disease would engulf our people and leave whole continents festering in death. Hence tremble for the power of our engineers.[90]

A gruesome but impossible picture. Why? Because in modern society engineers are the servants and not the masters of industry. Let them go on strike and they will be coerced if they cannot be replaced. France and England have not hesitated to use the powers of state to compel recalcitrant trainmen to return to work. The President has power to continue railroad operation during a labor dispute. Marx has long ago proved how and why technological labor is a purchasable commodity like any other kind of labor-power,[91] and can be found walking the streets in search of employment like any other type of worker.[92]

The "technological interpretation of history" was indeed the child of its time during the melancholy period following the crisis

[87] Political and Social Growth of the United States 1852-1933 Schlesinger p. V (1937)

[88] Philosophy of History—Hegel, p. 25.

[89] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, p. 5 (1936).

[90] Toward Civilization—Edited by Charles A. Beard p. 3 (1930).

[91] Capital—Marx Vol. III p. 354.

[92] Ibid. p. 455.

of 1929. "How best to produce and distribute the products of man's efforts is an engineering problem for each detail of which there is always a right answer," [93] wrote Harold Loeb, the High Priest of Technocracy when that was the vogue. Then followed a detailed plan for the re-organization of society on technocratic lines, which he does in the worst traditions of subjective rationalization, altogether divorced from the slightest resemblance to reality outside of the make-believe "scientific" jargon employed in the exposition.

DEFECTS OF THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO HISTORY

Berle, of whom it is said that he writes with the dispassionate factual eloquence of the telephone book, still stumbles into the subjectivist mold when he undertakes to interpret his own facts. He would subject the modern economic organization to the following basic tests: "(a) Does it provide an adequate supply of goods as tested by the normal market? As tested by the apparent need? (b) Does it provide a maximum number of people with an opportunity to make a living under this process—a life under this process—conceived as conditions under which people can live, maintain families, expect to continue in the economic system, and end this side of the relief line or poorhouse? (c) Does it accomplish this process with due regard for the liberty and self-government of the individual?" [94] All these desirable objectives are beautifully humanitarian but has nothing to do with the actually controlling forces in society.

It rather was incumbent upon Berle to prove that the mainspring of modern capitalist economy primarily is to produce commodities in order to consume, rather than to produce for a profit to which consumption is incidental, and when profits cease production must inevitably stop. The basic defects which caused the collapse of the N.R.A. phase of the New Deal—of which Berle was a principal architect—were due to the subjective idealization of the aims of modern economy, which capitalists were quick to throw overboard once they recuperated sufficiently from the devastating effects of the crisis and ensuing depression.

All schemes of social betterment based on rationalizing desirable ends without relation to the actual basis of the social structure are bound to remain what in essence they are—utopias. This holds of the present, as it did in the past and applies to the future.

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[93] Life in a Technocracy—Loeb p. 76 (1933).

[94] Investigation of Business Organizations and Practices—Berle quoted by Beard in Midpassage, p. 880.

H. H. Bancroft tells us in his final sketches how a man walked into his printing office in San Francisco and left the manuscript of Progress and Poverty for him to look over. Bancroft recognized its importance and urged the writer to have it printed in New York where it would receive the attention it deserved.[95]

Henry George suffered the inevitable fate of all noble humanitarians who predicate their schemes for social alleviation on the rationalization of desirable ends. "The reason why, in spite of the increase of productive power, wages constantly tend to a minimum which will give but a bare living, is that, with increase in productive power, rent tends to even greater increase, thus producing a constant tendency to the forcing down of wages." [96]

Therefore he proposes that society take for itself this usufruct of land, the rent, through the medium of taxation and thus abolish for personal aggrandizement what is essentially a creation of society. "Would not all this land be cultivated and improved just as well if the rent went to the State or Municipality, as now when it goes to private individuals? If no private ownership in land were acknowledged, but all land were held in this way, the occupier or user paying rent to the State, would not land be used and improved as well and as securely as now? There can be but one answer: Of course it would." [97]

The Single Tax movement called forth by this peculiarly American type of practical idealist was a failure, as were others before and after it because Single-Taxers did not evaluate correctly the forces of modern economy where land, when so used, is only another form of the existence of capital obtaining an average rate of profit.

H. G. Wells' fertile imagination can be depended upon to weave out of its capacious resources the structural pattern of future civilization. He applies but two simple tests: Is it desirable? Is it logical?—and all practical difficulties disappear before the infectious enthusiasm of our perennial optimist—if only mankind would have the sense to adopt his five recipes for perpetual happiness.

These are carefully noted in Wells' Outline. All mankind has to do is to work out (1) "a Science of Property as a basis for freedom and social justice; (2) a Science of Currency to ensure and preserve an efficient economic medium; (3) a Science of Government and Collective Operations whereby in every community men may learn to pursue their common interests in harmony; (4) a Science of World Politics, through which the stark waste and cruelty of warfare be-

[95] Retrospection—Hubert Howe Bancroft, pp. 343-4.

[96] Progress and Poverty—George p. 280.

[97] Ibid. p. 396.

tween races, peoples and nations may be brought to an end and the common interests of mankind brought under a common control; (5) and above all, a world-wide System of Education to sustain the will and interest of men in their common human adventure." [98]

It might have been better for mankind if Wells had first set out to establish a Science of History. Had he succeeded the five tasks he outlined for it would have been immeasurably advanced toward their practical realization. But, excellent writer that he is, Wells' mind does not run along scientific lines, despite his warm appreciation of its possibilities. As to concepts of freedom and justice, mankind has never suffered from a lack of them. Many a heinous offense darkens the pages of the human record after a solemn invocation to Almighty God and the unctuous repetition of the Lord's Prayer.

APOLOGETICS A FORM OF SUBJECTIVISM

Among the most reprehensible of the uses of history is the conscious application of its alleged principles to justify this as the best possible of all worlds, and in the defense of existing social relations as ordained in the very order of things. No excuse is offered for them; they may be unfortunate, but are the necessary and inevitable results of immutable laws. The genius of a Carlyle may clothe in the historical setting of the French Revolution the Darwinian principles of the survival of the fittest, and he who has the power is best fitted to rule according to the laws of nature. "For ourselves," says he, "we answer the French Revolution means here the open violent Rebellion, and Victory, of disimprisoned Anarchy against corrupt wornout Authority; how Anarchy breaks prison; bursts up from the infinite Deep, and rages uncontrollable, immeasurable, enveloping a world; in phasis after phasis of fever-frenzy;—till the frenzy burning itself out, and what elements of new Order it held (since all Force holds such) developing themselves, the Uncontrollable be got, if not reimprisoned, yet harnessed, and its mad forces made to work towards their object as sane and regulated ones." [99]

Even the warm-hearted Tyndall allows his scientific spirit to overwhelm his humanitarianism when he pays the following tribute on the occasion of the unveiling of a statue to Thomas Carlyle: "With Carlyle, as with Empedocles, Lucretius and Darwin, the Fit survives. His doctrine is the doctrine of science, not 'touched' but saturated with religious emotion. For the operation of Force—the scientific agent—his deep and yearning soul substituted the operation of the Energy before referred to, which to avoid periphrasis, we call God.[100]

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[98] The Outline of History—Wells p. 923.

[99] The French Revolution—Carlyle p. 167.

These sublime mechanists could not perceive that Sympathy and Mutual Aid are also tremendous manifestations of Social Energy, but the atheist Peter Kropotkin has devoted to their study the tremendous power of his equally brilliant intellect.[101]

Of a similar nature to Carlyle, but with its own variation, is Douglas' defense of slavery in his debates with Lincoln. He turns the phrase that a nation cannot exist half slave and half free, and that a house divided against itself must fall, against Lincoln by appealing to constitutional principles. Uniformity of local laws and domestic institutions was neither possible nor desirable and never intended by the framers of the Constitution. Uniformity would be ruinous to State rights, State sovereignty, personal liberty and freedom, he contends, and the great principle of self-government embodied in the various compromises could be vindicated only by allowing each Territory as it applies for admission to the Union to decide for itself the character of its domestic institutions under the general provisions of the Constitution.[102]

For sheer artistry the sophistry of Douglas' retort could not be improved, and the consensus of opinion at that time was that Lincoln had much the worst of the argument. Lincoln certainly lost that battle, but he eventually won the Presidency.

From our standpoint the intellectual position of both sides was defective. Society is not comparable to a house, and appeals to self-government will not hold before the onward rush of social forces which found slavery an impediment to further national development. It is precisely the nature of these social forces which it is the object of this inquiry to disclose, but it must be obvious that neither Lincoln's appeal to logic nor Douglas' to rhetoric is of much assistance in grasping the larger problems which were finally resolved in the very civil war both strove so earnestly to avoid.

Nothing is more common than the preachment of the theologian for submission to the status quo as ordained by God. The more erudite in this day and age appeals to science and history as justification for the obvious social injustices. A publication by a professor of science at Issy, France, and Mt. View, California having duly passed the Censor Deputatus and received the imprimatur of the Vicarius Generalis defends with a wealth of scientific charts, diagrams and illustrations the descent of man from a single pair, the identity and unchangeableness of human nature, and concludes that "primitive man, such as real Science presents him to the eyes of Faith, is fit to receive all the communications of the supernatural order, truth or grace, with which the Divine Bounty enriches him." [103] And thus let all rest until the final Judgment Day.

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[100] New Fragments—Tyndall, p. 396.

[101] The State—Its Historic Role—Kropotkin p. 11.

[102] History of the People of the United States—McMaster Vol. VIII pp. 320-2.

But the worst offender is the man who approaches society dressed in the garb of scientific disinterestedness, and after concluding the survey of our economic development, asks pharisaically, What is progress? And then he contents with some placid generalities as to its subjective implications, shows by averages and indubitable mathematical calculations how the billionaire and the Bowery derelict down to his last dollar both have five hundred million dollars plus fifty cents between them, counts up the number of autos, radios and telephones in use as evidence of unexampled prosperity, and concludes triumphantly that thousands of trained social workers are prepared to minister to want and hunger so that its sufferers may decorously wither away to the potter's field.[104]

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF HISTORY

Our analysis thus far must have established one incontrovertible fact; namely, that while the widest disagreement exists among historians as to the significance of events in society, they are all agreed that the essence of history is events in society. No one yet has succeeded in making history outside of society. A lone traveller may conquer the Pole; but it is an historic event only insofar as he maintains the nexus between himself and society.

A Peary may return to receive the world's acclaim; a Stevenson may perish after attaining to man's illimitable goal, the conquest of the unknown; but it must be a goal which bears relation to Man in all the infinite divagations of his wants, dreams, and aspirations, whether originating in the ardent desires of his conscious faculties or in the deeper recesses of his unconscious yearnings. It is conceivable that humans crossed the North Pole before Peary; but his achievement wins glory only because of its historical setting in a definite form of social organization, and possesses historic significance only in this setting.

We apply no mystic significance to the word event, or to any other word employed in definitions. Dictionaries make a valid distinction between event and occurrence or happening. To the first there is always the association of an antecedent state, but there is no implication here as to how this state arose, why it developed, whether there exists causal or accidental relation, or any connection whatever. An event to us is simply something that happens of which history takes note or may choose to disregard. The same applies to the concept of society. We take it in its broadest sense of an aggregation of human beings bound together in some form of organization at a given time. A long process of development precedes the particular form of a social organization, but with that we are not now concerned; neither are we with its origin, nor its purpose, nor its ultimate goal. Anthropomorphism, teleology and eschatology must be definitely ruled out of our definitions.

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[103] Whence and How the Universe? J. Guibert and V. A. Bast (1928) p. 607; similar 427-8.

[104] Economic Development of the United States—Lippincott, pp. 743-56.

Definitions are the very essence of scientific concepts, and all definitions—this cannot be too strongly emphasized—must be the mental picture of the reality, must be related to and developed out of the reality, and in the event of a clash between the mental picture and the external fact, the former must always recognize its dependence upon and yield to the fact.

Bergson recognizes that "it is impossible, with concepts and observations taken from outside points of view, to make a thing." [105] Let us consider some concepts of history as employed by the leading authorities. Dewey writes: "From a human standpoint our study of history is still too primitive. It is possible to study a multitude of histories, and yet permit history, the record of the transitions and transformations of human activities, to escape us. Taking history in separate doses of this country or that, we take it as a succession of isolated finalities, each one in due season giving way to another, as supernumeraries succeed one another in a march across the stage. We thus miss the fact of history and also its lesson; the diversity of institutional forms and customs which the same human nature may produce and employ." [106] Here Dewey correctly emphasizes that it is not so much the event, but the process which produced the event that should be the object of the historian's analysis. Later we shall discuss in detail this philosopher's defects in the purely functional approach in the analysis of facts, while the scientist must seek for laws to explain both the function and the fact.

Nordau writes: "History in the widest sense is the sum of the episodes of the human struggle for existence. The definition hardly needs explanation." [107] However, Nordau felt upon further thought

[105] Bergson—An Introduction to Metaphysics p. 40.
[106] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey p. 110.
[107] The Interpretation of History—Nordau p. 13.

that it required some explanation, for later he writes, "If history is to be anything more than a mere collection of stories and tales, if it is to do anything more than while away the tedium of the reader like any other imaginative story, it must give a picture of the life of mankind." [108]

This starts the treadmill going again as to the nature of the picture, the character of the observer, the relative weight to be attached to the facts, and would bring upon us, justly, the censure previously voiced by Carlyle. The mere chronicles of one day would choke the Library of Congress. Bakers still bake, miners still dig, the Stock Exchange still looks like a mad-house on a busy day. History has nothing to do with these events unless they are definite types of a process. The repetitious nature of those activities show they are governed by certain social laws or factors of the national economy. Their interruptions are governed by other laws or factors. While undoubtedly it is the business of history to give a picture of the life of mankind, mere copies of the same essential picture will yield no clue to its inner processes. By what yardstick is one to judge what is and is not essential to a correct picture?

Haldane writes: "Historians have inevitably thought in terms of words. They have read many books and documents. . . . But when I look at history, I see it as man's attempt to solve the practical problem of living." [109] Then the most perfect historical state is that where man, as in some tropical countries, has solved the problem of living by simply helping himself to the bounties of nature. Yet those fortunate peoples have not created our civilizations. A more correct statement by Haldane would have been, to solve the practical problem of living by the labor of others. There he would have struck a note of the highest historical importance in our Civilization, and the study of the manner in which were developed the various forms of human exploitation would have supplied him a significant key to the inner mechanism of history.

"History," says Santayana, "is merely memory aided and directed." [110] In that case the sagas and the epics, the Veda and the Bible, Plutarch and Froissart possess the highest historical validity. One may well recognize the tremendous role those noble indices to memory have played on the stage of history each in their particular sphere, without being much the wiser concerning the social systems of whose culture they were a part.

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[108] The Interpretation of History—Nordau p. 89.

[109] The Inequality of Man—J. B. S. Haldane (1932), p. 68.

[110] Quoted by Schlesinger in the preface to his Political and Social Growth of the United States 1852-1933.

Beard has no definition of history. Like a thorough-going pragmatist he has a practical method and not an abstract theory. His method is to get the facts on the theory that if they are impartially presented their significance is self-explanatory. He rejects the suggestion of stability of American institutions on the ground that "such assurance would doubtless have been justified if the American social order had been as unchanging as the structure of feudalism in the Middle Ages, but it happened to be at the moment the most dynamic society in the world." [111] That this is not a casual remark, but basic to his method of thought is seen later when he says: "Had the economic system of the North and the South remained static or changed slowly without effecting immense dislocations in the social structure the balance of power might have been maintained indefinitely by repeating the compensatory tactics of 1787, 1820, 1833, and 1850." [112]

History deals not with speculations but with realities and the reasons for them. The application of scientific methods to the analysis of American history will show, not that American society of that time was in a fluid state—we all know that fact—but exactly why all further compromises of the nature to which Beard adverts had become impossible.

Beard laments that the machine age has produced "no large philosophic view of America in a world setting after the style of Hegel, no interpretation of American intellect in terms of material circumstance according to the formula of Buckle." [113] And in his latest work, this jeremiad is continued: "No sociologist, aspiring to Newtonian simplicity, proclaimed a new formula. . . . Such work was in sum and substance what MacIver called 'an extensive and intensive mapping of the contemporary social scene,' that is, essentially repertorial in the best sense of the word. It largely ignored historical perspective and the issues of prognosis. . . . Just as economists shrank from correcting theory by the fruits of institutional research and from emulating Adam Smith, Ricardo, or Alfred Marshall, sociologists declined to grasp at the universal in the manner of Augusta Comte and Herbert Spencer." [114]

It is to Beard's credit that he recognized the void in contemporary social thought, and to point out the cause of this defect. That a tremendous historical generalization predicated on the laws of social motion can hold before a nation the mirror of its future seventy years before the event, is evidenced by the following remarkable forecast made by Marx in 1867 concerning the future of Japan: "In Asia, on the other hand, the fact that state taxes are chiefly composed of rents payable in kind, depends on conditions of production that are reproduced with the regularity of natural phenomena. And this mode of payment tends in turn to maintain the ancient form of production. It is one of the secrets of the conservation of the Ottoman Empire. If the foreign trade, forced upon Japan by Europeans should lead to the substitution of money rents for rents in kind, it will be all up with the exemplary agriculture of that country. The narrow economical conditions under which that agriculture is carried on, will be swept away." [115] From the internal laws of motion of capitalist economy Marx was able to predict the entire course of Japanese economic development and inevitable imperialistic policies without waiting to have all the facts of the Manchukuo and China incidents before him.

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[111] Beard—The Rise of American Civilization Vol. I p. 631.

[112] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 3.

[113] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard (1936), Vol. II, pp. 794-5.

[114] America in Midpassage—Beard pp. 898-900 (1939).

RELATION BETWEEN ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY

The fundamental relation existing between sociology and history has long been observed. Bushee defines sociology "as the science which treats of the organization and development of human societies." [116] Spencer asserts that from the "facts concerning the social classes, social organization, social customs, arrangements, changes there emerge the data for Sociology, to which History, as commonly understood, is merely the handmaid." [117] It would follow that the more closely history attains the scientific ideal of coordinating facts into principles, to that extent will sociology speak with assuredness of present trends and future possibilities, and lay down the conditions under which possibilities become realities.

History's debt to Buckle has only been formally recognized and has never been repaid even in the counterfeit coin of emulation by the succeeding generations of writers. They have, in the main, taken malicious pleasure in stressing his foibles and magnifying his errors, while paying little heed to the sterling contribution he made toward its method. Few have been able to reach the exalted moral level he had the courage to follow himself: "In estimating, therefore, what each man has done, we must judge him, not by the errors he commits, but by the truths he propounds. Most of his errors are

[115] Capital—Marx Vol. I p. 158.
[116] Principles of Sociology—Bushee p. 9.
[117] Facts and Comments—Spencer p. 279.

not really his own. He inherits them from his predecessors, and if he throws some of them off, we should be grateful, instead of being dissatisfied that he has not rejected all."[118]

If Buckle spoke darkly about murder uniformity[119] and suicide waves,[120] it is to his credit that he perceived the importance of social statistics as an aid to the analysis of historical phenomena in the search for underlying laws. He pointed out that in history individual peculiarities count for nothing, but should be left to the biographer;[121] in every great epoch there is a single unifying principle which binds together the whole.[122] Throughout his work he stresses order, symmetry and law;[123] while he points out that these laws are to be found in the external realities instead of ruminating in the inner recesses of one's consciousness.[124] He knows that he is blazing a new path;[125] pleads the immensity of the task and the imperfection of a single enterprise;[126] and urges that the facts of history can be generalized into universal law.[127]

The closing pages of Chapter Four of Volume Two in Buckle's work rank among the noblest lines ever conceived by the human mind. In them he lays bare the most sacred reaches of his soul. One reads them through dimmed eyes with veneration for the man, and with the inspired humility to carry on the noble task he had undertaken and was compelled all too soon to lay down, uncompleted. It would be an act of impiety to attempt to compress those thoughts. They must be read for themselves to appreciate the noble grandeur of Buckle's character.[128] He is a glory to the people whom he loved, and to the humanity whom he enriched.

Gibbon's concept of history is one which he pursued with majestic simplicity. He made no pretense of the whys and wherefores of social evolution. "Wars and the administration of public affairs, are the principal subjects of history."[129] The number of actors whose peregrinations are to be recorded vary with the type of government; few in an oligarchy, and many where, as in great monarchies like England, the pursuits of the humble and the obscure obtrude themselves on the stage. "The art and genius of history have ever been unknown to the Asiatic," [130] where "the most important scenes will depend on the character of a single actor." [131] Throughout the glittering parade on Gibbon's stately pages one catches glimpses here and there of the life of the lowly and the humble, but only as background for the main scene.

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[118] History of Civilization in England—Buckle, Vol. II, p. 388.
[119] Ibid Vol. I p. 18.
[120] Ibid. Vol. I p. 19.
[121] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 593-4, 671.
[122] Ibid Vol. I p. 627.
[123] Ibid Vol. II p. 255.
[124] Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. I p. 573.
[125] Ibid Vol. I p. 106.
[126] Ibid Vol. I p. 671.
[127] Ibid Vol. I pp. 5, 167, 552, 631; Vol. II pp. 136, 177, 244, 256.
[128] Ibid Vol. II pp. 256-9.
[129] The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon Vol. I p. 206.

METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF HISTORY

In contrast to the scientific approach to history which we are trying to pursue, let us consider the grand attitude of medieval mysticism, as summed up in that body of Jewish doctrine known as the Kabbalah. "Kabbalah means: tradition for the initiated, occult doctrine for the man who perceives the hidden background behind every word and expression in the Bible. Even in the time of Moses, profound knowledge of this description was conveyed in secret ways." [132] This selective mysticism is nothing new; it is the age-old secret of existence for every esoteric group in every religion who claim intimate access to God, and as exclusive keepers of the key to the mysteries of existence which must necessarily be shrouded from the common herd.

In the 13th century the Zohar, fundamental work of the Kabbalah, appeared and in the 20th century Waton undertakes to reveal to us once more the sublime truths contained therein for the guidance of the present generation. At the beginning of the latter work we are told that "history is one continuous, rational and predetermined process of human existence through which the destiny of man realizes itself," [133] and after going through its compact pages the only addition made to the original definition is that "history is the realization of the eternal purpose of God." [134] It would all be crystal-clear if we had definite ways of discovering God's purpose, and the manner in which He operates, but after studying that work the mystery to the uninitiated becomes deeper than ever. Leibnitz had the best possible answer for those who would pretend to pierce the veil of human destiny: "What does not happen is impossible; what happens is necessary." [135] At least it has the sublime merit of brevity, with no possibility of refutation.

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[130] Ibid Vol. II p. 714.

[131] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1,261.

[132] History and Destiny of the Jews—Kastein (1936) p. 276.

[133] The Philosophy of the Kabbalah—Waton (1931) p. 15.

[134] Ibid p. 127.

[135] Introduction to Descartes' Method by Frank Sewell p. 135.

Nordau's definition of the philosophy of history is all the more important because he subscribes to Mach's opinion that they are mainly classified among "the sciences of deceit." [136] At least he fairly states its aims. "The philosophy of history," he writes, "is an attempt to give a rational explanation of historical events. It endeavors to discover the law that regulates them, and to trace a meaning in its operation that introduces logical order into the events of the past, illuminates the present, and casts some light upon the future." [137] The statement is too general and carries within itself the idea of meaning or purpose to history.

Guizot comes nearer to the essence of the definition when he writes: "The philosophy of history consists in showing the relation of events with each other—the chain which connects them—the causes and effects of events—this is history just as much as the description of battles, and all the other exterior events which it recounts." [138] Later he calls that "the immortal portion of history which all generations must study, in order to understand the past as well as the present." [139] This is a description, not a definition of history.

In scientific definitions care must be taken to exclude superfluities or terms not necessary to the clear exposition of the fundamental idea. Uncertain terminology is the fruitful seed of future error. In that respect scientists must exercise more care in defining their concepts, than do theologians in their own field when defining the nature of the Holy Trinity. Otherwise one could not understand Buckle's passionate outburst against putting in the same class Watt, the mere adaptor of laws previously known, to the "godlike Newton" [140] whose inspired genius discovered the existence of basic natural laws.

PARSIMONY PRINCIPLE IN HISTORICAL LAWS

Newton in his great Principia lays down two basic rules for the guidance of scientific inquiry; first, we are to admit no more causes than are true and sufficient to explain their appearances; and secondly, to the same effects we must supply the same causes. Modern thought has introduced the element of time without at all affecting the method. Professor Hecht writes: "The principle of parsimony which underlies all scientific formulation requires the use of the

[136] The Interpretation of History—Nordau p. 395.
[137] The Interpretation of History—Nordau p. 49.
[138] General History of Modern Civilization in Europe—Guizot p. 9.
[139] Ibid p. 222.
[140] History of Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. II p. 414.

fewest possible factors in describing a situation."[141] Despite the revolutionary significance of the Relativity Theory, or rather because of it, Einstein repeats: "In every important advance the physicist finds that the fundamental laws are simplified more and more as experimental research advances. He is gratified to notice how sublime order emerges from what appeared to be chaos."[142]

The great philosopher supports the great physicist. "Here also," writes Kant, "does reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of various powers—inasmuch as particular laws of nature are subordinate to general laws; and parsimony in principles is not merely an economical principle of reason, but an essential law of nature. . . . For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess a faculty of reason; not without reason a consistent and self-accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth."[143]

INSUFFICIENCY OF MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES AND STATISTICAL METHODS

Among the factors contributing to the inability of history to keep abreast of modern scientific progress are both the school that adopts the mathematical description of its processes, and the school that as vehemently rejects that method. History has suffered from oversimplification, as well as from the declared impossibility of organizing its phenomena. The pure-and-simple economic determinist supplies a ready answer to the most intricate problem, while the Freudian psychologist would have you consider every possible quirk of the Unconscious and its uncertain effect on the behavior of the individual multiplied by the number of his reactions to society and the logarithm of the relations of the world's population to each other.

Yet we all recognize the many useful applications of mathematical methods to social phenomena. All sorts of practical knowledge is derived from statistical charts. Upon these calculable variations insurance tables are constructed and periodically modified; governments calculate their revenues with an astonishing degree of certitude; public utilities prepare for future service demands; and school authorities play tag with Nature's subtle mysteries by providing sittings for life not yet in being.

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[141] The Uncertainty Principle and Human Behavior—Hecht; Harper's Magazine Jan. 1935 p. 237.

[142] Where Is Science Going? Introduction by Einstein p. 13.

[143] Critique of Pure Reason—Kant pp. 345-9.

But this mathematical dependence can be overdrawn. Blind reliance on its principles when unrelated to the actual factors governing population increase led, for example, clever statisticians to produce their charts to infinity with little heed to what was happening about them, with the result that New York City's educational authorities were caught with a plethora of grammar school buildings in view of a declining birth-rate and a dearth of high school facilities when industry could not absorb young workers. Thus, too, expected governmental revenue from definite sources do not materialize in times of crisis; bear markets react to other laws than geometrical, or even arithmetical progression as in the booming 1920's; and all of us in numerous ways are brought sharply to face the fact that mathematics is the creature and not the creator of history. However, we will have occasion to observe what startling results history can achieve in a definite field by employing the function concept and the idea of a limit with the independent and dependent variables of social movements.

Ancient and modern science differ principally in this, that ancient science applied itself to formulating concepts while modern science seeks to discover laws from the constant relations between variable magnitudes, and latterly with the consideration of time as an independent variable.[144] History likewise, if it is to reach its full estate, must consider the actions of men in relation to their own time within the sphere of their historical setting.

WHAT IS CIVILIZATION?

Since this work deals with a particular segment of modern civilization, let us define that term. "Civilization is something more than the occasional seasonal growing of wheat," writes H. G. Wells. "It is the settlement of men upon an area continuously cultivated and possessed, who live in building's continuously inhabited with a common rule and common city or citadel." [145] This is an excellent description but not yet a definition. Many of the aborigines whom the settlers met on the east coast of North America would come within the scope of this projected definition.

Guizot states: "Civilization appeared to me to consist of two principal facts, the development of human society and that of man himself; on the one hand, his political and social, and on the other, his internal and moral advancement."[146] The record of the world's great civilizations show that the most negligible of their aims was the political, moral and social development of man in the mass.

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[144] Creative Evolution—Bergson, pp. 333-6.

[145] The Outline of History—Wells pp. 131-2.

Until recent times the mass of humanity scarcely figured as a conscious element in the scheme of civilization, and even now, but inchoately. If man has made progress, it was generally against the interests of the dominant elements within a civilization, and he made it furtively, guardedly, within the interstices of the political integument until subterranean forces compelled intermittent eruptions, giving rise to those sublime cataclysms we call the English, the American and the French Revolutions.

Lewis H. Morgan whose work on ancient society, despite subsequent modifications due to the advancement of knowledge, still ranks as a classic in its field, has proved that it was the institution of private property and the establishment of the rules of inheritance which marks the distinction between barbarism and civilization. "Before the close of this period, mankind had learned to support themselves in numbers in comparison with primitive times; they had propagated themselves over the face of the earth and come into possession of all the possibilities of the continents in favor of human advancement. In social organization they had advanced from the consanguine horde into tribes organized in gentes, and thus became possessed of the germs of the principal governmental institutions. The human race was now successfully launched upon its great career for the attainment of civilization."[147] Solon finally organized Greek society on a property basis,[148] and Numa[149] that of Rome; a conclusion fully supported by Grote as to Greece[150] and Mommsen as to Rome.[151]

Engels develops the emergence of the state as a class mechanism for the preservation of existing property relations as the decisive mark of Civilization. He writes: "The state, then, is by no means a power forced on society from outside; neither is it the 'realization of the ethical idea,' 'the image and the realization of reason,' as Hegel maintains. It is simply a product of society at a certain stage of evolution. It is the confession that this society has become hopelessly divided against itself, has entangled itself in irreconcilable contradictions which it is powerless to banish."[152]

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[146] General History of Civilization in Modern Europe—Guizot, p. 270.

[147] Ancient Society—Morgan, p. 536.

[148] Ibid p. 272.

[149] Ibid p. 339.

[150] History of Greece—Grote, Vol. III, pp. 94-124.

[151] History of Rome—Mommsen Vol. I pp. 372-398.

[152] The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State—Engels p. 206.

His great co-worker, Marx, develops with scientific precision the material basis of production without which Civilization is impossible. "If the laborer wants all his time to produce the necessary means of subsistence for himself and his race, he has no time left in which to work gratis for others. Without a certain degree of productiveness in his labor, he has no such superfluous time at his disposal; without such superfluous time, no surplus-labor, and therefore no capitalists, no slave-owners, no feudal lords, in one word, no class of large proprietors." [153]

It is in the rich valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates, the Ganges, that the richest civilizations flourish and not in Patagonia or in Greenland where life is one continuous struggle against the niggardliness of nature; nor yet in the luxurious tropics where the sun bakes the stamina out of the human frame, and food often is the free gift of nature. No clearly defined sacerdotal, military or princely caste emerges until the material basis for their proper maintenance is created by a society which already has solved the problem of producing a surplus of material wealth.

BASIC DEFINITIONS FOR THIS WORK

We will now state the two definitions upon which the Historical Field Theory will be subsequently developed:

I. History is the record of events in society.

II. The philosophy of history is the study of the laws of motion of society.

Seligman approaches the mere phraseology of our definition by the statement that "history is the record of the actions of men in society." [154] But matters of such great importance are not to be resolved by empty verbal disputes. Their sound is the same, but their content is different. There is a fundamental difference in our respective conceptions of the nature of society and the social forces.

At another point in the same work Seligman emphasizes that history deals with man in society,[155] but what to him is merely a conclusion forms for us the beginning of our analysis. We must understand very much more of what is meant by the general term "society" if we are to penetrate beyond the happenings into the deeper significance of historical events.

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[153] Capital—Marx Vol. I p. 561.

[154] Seligman—Economic Interpretation of History p. 104.

[155] Ibid p. 2.

CHAPTER II

The Nature of the Social Forces in History

A. HUMAN NATURE AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE IN HISTORY

J. B. S. HALDANE writes that while history has produced great stylists like Gibbon and Macaulay, it is not a science.[1] As a distinguished worker in that field he knows that the essence of science is certainty of the facts, and the establishment of provable generalizations from the known phenomena, derived by observation from their laws of motion and relation.

One of our great historical stylists, Symonds, puts the case succinctly: "The mystery of organic life defeats analysis; whether the subject of our inquiry be a germ-cell, or a phenomenon so complex as the commencement of a new religion, or the origination of a new disease, or a new phase of civilization, it is alike impossible to do more than to state the conditions under which the fresh growth begins, and to point out what are its manifestations. In doing so, moreover, we must be careful not to be carried away by words of our own making. Renaissance, Reformation, and Revolution are not separate things, capable of being isolated; they are moments in the history of the human race which we find it convenient to name, while history itself is one and continuous, so that our utmost endeavors to regard some portion of it independently of the rest will be defeated." [2]

Were Symonds as versed in scientific procedure as he was in the methods of historical inquiry and organization of material, he would have discovered that the process of apparent arbitrary selection and classification applies to all branches of knowledge. No fact presents itself labelled physics, chemistry or biophysics, nor are their divisions crystal-clear; yet that has not prevented the organization of those vast branches of knowledge sufficiently to meet even the crucial test of prediction.

Certainty even in those classic divisions of knowledge is denied by modern scientists. A distinguished teacher of biophysics contends that if it is difficult to describe with certainty the position and motion of the particles within the hydrogen atom—the simplest material substance known to man—and that helium, the next gas in line, is already too complicated for complete treatment,[3] then problems of society are altogether beyond the scope of the classical scientific method.

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[1] The Inequality of Man—Haldane (1937), p. 68.

[2] Renaissance in Italy—Symonds, Vol. I, pp. 4-5.

This causes Spengler to write: "Is there, then, a science of History at all? To answer this question, let us remember that in every personal word-picture, which only approximates more or less to the ideal picture, there is both something of Nature and something of History. No Nature is without living, no History without causal, harmonies. For within the sphere of Nature, although two like experiments, conformably to law, have the like result, yet each of these experiments is a historical event possessing a date and not recurring. . . . There is, therefore, not a science of history, but an ancillary science for history, which ascertains that which has been. . . . And just because this is so, historical and natural-science data are different. The latter consistently repeat themselves, the former never. The latter are truths, the former facts." [4]

With an astonishing resemblance to the modernist indeterminacy school of thought Carlyle wrote a century ago: "Every reunion of men, is it not, as we often say, a reunion of incalculable Influences; every unit of it a microcosm of Influences;—of which how shall science calculate or prophesy? Science which cannot, with all its calculuses, differential, integral and of variations, calculate the Problem of Three gravitating Bodies, ought to hold her peace here, and say only: In this National Convention there are Seven-hundred and Forty-nine very singular Bodies, that gravitate and do much else;—who, probably in an amazing manner, will work the appointment of Heaven." [5] Yet Carlyle, with all his professed uncertainty as to the actions of the numerous gravitating bodies in the States-General of 1789 and the National Convention into which it was transformed describes with unsurpassed graphic vigor the powerful social forces which compelled them to gravitate around the idea of abolishing feudalism, and resulting in the eventual enthronement of the bourgeoisie.[6]

Some historic events are inconceivable, others are impossible, and still others inevitable. The National Convention when it came into being could not have made peace with the nobility after the spontaneous uprising which drove one hundred and fifty thousand of them from their manors[7] and the peasants had divided amongst themselves the seigneurial estates. The American colonies could no longer return to the old allegiance after Bunker Hill. Emancipation of the Negroes was inevitable after 1860. Some historic events impress their doom; others are born with their congenital birth-marks. History is not all uncertainty. It is for us now to discover the key to the relation of events, leaving for subsequent discussion the problem of their causality or accident, chance or destiny.

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[3] Uncertainty Principle and Behavior—Hecht, Harper's Magazine, Jan. 1935 p. 244.

[4] The Decline of the West—Spengler pp. 153-4.

[5] The French Revolution—Carlyle p. 528.

[6] Ibid., pp. 173, 257, 270, 518, 720.

RELATIVE CONSTANCY OF HUMAN NATURE

Historical science, like physical science must have an independent variable to which the dependent variable is related. They react upon each, modify each other, but are impossible of analysis without each other. In physics it is the speed of light. In history it is the constancy of human nature.

Some people are inclined to smile at this hoary truism. Others deny this as a truism. But affirmance or denial must yield to the ultimate arbiter, fact. It is not so much the statement of a truth but the significance it conveys which is the touchstone of scientific progress. "Galileo," says Einstein, "formulated the problem of determining the velocity of light, but did not solve it. The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science." [8]

To speak of the relative constancy of human nature is not to speak of an immutable human nature. The scientific historian cannot recognize such absolutes because they do not exist. Man does undergo changes in the way he feels, thinks, reasons and acts. But we are concerned with those changes as they manifest themselves in definite time and place and under particular conditions. Looking over the brief 2500 years which characterize European civilization, we see how little indeed man has altered in the innermost essence.

Hook takes Mosca to task for his antiquated terminology in dealing with human nature. The language, he contends, should be brought up to date by using the expressions of modern dynamic

[7] Ibid p. 181.

[8] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld (1938) p. 95.

psychology and psychoanalysis.[8a] But mere new, complicated and ponderous phraseology cannot long disguise a paucity of thought. The historian is vitally concerned with the human substance of his material, and in the endeavor to discover the laws of social motion the material itself must remain in recognizable form despite its mutations. It is the very reasons for these mutations and diverse manifestations of human nature which constitute the burden of his labors.

In this spirit we must approach the problem of human nature. Did we not have an abiding faith in our ability to understand the human beings of past civilizations, history would be meaningless and its organization as a science impossible. The facts amply support, or rather demonstrate the importance of this faith. The psalmist of the Bible still sings true in our hearts; Herodotus and Xenophon narrate the deeds of men strikingly similar to ourselves; Alexander and Caesar are leaders whose motives and actions we can understand as clearly as those of Napoleon; Aristotle, Maimonides, Spinoza and Hegel reason in a manner not unstrange to our mental processes.

Anthropology and sociology support the validity of this belief. "Now, so far as it relates to the history of human civilization," writes Barnes, "one may regard this physical or human nature as relatively static and changeless. It doubtless changed in some details between 1,000,000 and 25,000 B.C., during which time man advanced from a very low form of humanity to the stage of Homo sapiens. It is possible, too, that human nature will change in the future, as a result of natural causes or artificial breeding, or both. But between about 30,000 years ago, when Homo sapiens first appeared in Europe as a Cro-Magnon, and our own day, there has been no essential change in human nature. Man, thirty thousand years ago, was physically just what he is to-day. He had just as good a brain—in fact, the same brain—as we possess to-day. He would have been just as easily and extensively educable as we are, if the appropriate fund of information and teaching methods had then been available. All that separates us from the Cro-Magnon of 30,000 B.C. are the cultural changes which have occurred since." [9]

To the apologist for the existing social order with all its inequality, brutality and injustices, who would seize upon this as an admission of social immutability, the answer is simple. Change the conditions of organized existence, and you give opportunity for the play of other human qualities. Man is a bundle of greed, hatreds and jealousies. But man is also a strange and noble admixture of love, self-sacrifice and devotion. One has but to glance at the human record, nay, just look about in the world around us, for overwhelming proof of this proposition as an earnest of ultimate success to those who labor for human betterment and social advancement.

[8a] Reason, Social Myths and Democracy—Hook (1940) p. 122.

[9] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes (1937) p. 18.

Of the estimated five hundred thousand years since Pithecanthropus erectus strode the earth only a minute fraction of it, the past six or seven thousand years, shows evidence of anything akin to civilization. The nomads pour down from the plains and "instead of carrying off the booty, the conquerors settle down on the conquered land, which becomes all booty for them; the villagers and townsmen are reduced to servitude and tribute-paying, they become hewers of wood and drawers of water, and the leaders of the nomads become kings and princes, masters and aristocrats."[10] This is the anti-Marxian Wells' thoroughly Marxian analysis of the beginning of civilization and the origin of the state. The ages that were passed by people before history was written among them must have been filled with revolutions, nomadic wanderings and the strangest mutations. They must have been similar in character despite particular variations; with their struggles of rulers against rulers, of internecine conflict, of occasional overthrow by the emergence of the ruled, who enjoy—some of them—the evanescent glory of power.

Civilizations form out of a complex of two basic elements, their material and ideological aspects—using the latter term to signify the sum of their spiritual, emotional and psychic qualities. Both react upon and modify each other, complement each other and are the points of origin, each in their unitary field of operation, for those vast transformations which change the character of a civilization. The material and ideological aspects do not travel in parallel lines, and their specific weight in determining action will vary in accordance with definite historic conditions.

For example, the history of the United States can show at the same chronological time a civilization far in advance of its period ideologically, and yet thousands of years behind its period from a material aspect.

Henry Adams tells us that the physical conditions of American civilization in 1800 were not even comparable to those of a thousand years before. "Throughout the South and West houses showed little attempts at luxury; but even in New England the ordinary

[10] The Outline of History—Wells p. 134.

farmhouse was hardly so well built, so spacious, or so warm as that of a well-to-do contemporary of Charlemagne."[11]

If one should be tempted to dismiss that picture as a phantasy of Adams' poetic temperament, the fish-blooded McMaster gives ample detailed evidence in Chapter One of his first volume in corroboration of Adams not only as to the mode of living, but as to food, clothes, roads, amusement, and one is even tempted to say, education. An impersonal authority like a Federal government committee wrote recently: "Twenty-five years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence farmers here and abroad were still employing largely the techniques of 3,000 years before. Plows were wooden, crude. In many areas hand tools were favored over plows in preparing soil for seeding."[12]

Yet ideologically the founding fathers laid the basis of a future society far transcending that ever before attained by man, and still far beyond that which we, the sixth generation of inheritors have been able to achieve. Still the records of their deliberations show them to have been both prudent and practical men; in the Continental Congresses, in their Confederation and at the Constitutional Convention. No mechanical measuring rod of material conditions explaining the ideological reflexes, as indulged in by some Marxists, could account for their stupendous achievements. There must be, there is another basis of reckoning—that combination resulting from the material conditions of the age in relation with the degree of freedom of movement, together with the intellectual accumulations of the race which had unequalled opportunity to flourish in a rich and virgin soil amongst a self-reliant and energetic people.

That history can be thrust backward by the actions of men as well as given a forward impetus is recognized by Engels. He pleads guilty for himself and for his great co-worker, Marx in having stressed too much the formal material aspect of history to the apparent neglect of the ideological effect of man's own ideas when reacting to those conditions. In thinkers of lesser magnitude that would have been an unremediable defect. "The basis of this is the common undialectical conception of cause and effect as rigidly opposite poles, the total disregard of inter-action."[13]

At another point Engels recognizes specifically the reaction of ideas in moulding history. "The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its consequences, constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc.—forms of law—and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the combatants: political, legal, philosophic theories, religious ideas and their further development into systems of dogma—also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form." [14]

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[11] History of the United States—Adams Vol. I pp. 16-17.

[12] Technological Trends and Natural Policy; Rep. of National Resources Committee June 1937, pp. 97-8.

[13] Marx-Engels Correspondence—Letter 227 pp. 510-512 (1934, first English publication).

The pragmatic school consistently urges the indissoluble relations between man's reactions and the material world of which he is a part. Man is not an automaton propelled by physical laws, nor is he a wax receiving imprints only from the outer world. Man is also a bundle of emotions, ideas and moral conceptions both inherited and acquired. "Morals is connected with actualities of existence," writes Dewey, "not with ideals, ends and obligations independent of concrete actualities. The facts upon which it depends are those which arise out of active connections of human beings with one another, the consequences of their mutually intertwined activities in the life of desire, belief, judgment, satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In this sense conduct and hence morals are social: they are not just things which ought to be social and which fail to come up to scratch." [15]

THE PREDICTABLE IN HUMAN NATURE

Social existence, and hence history, would be impossible if human conduct were altogether unpredictable. All our plans for the next day, the week, the year, nay the very next hour are predicated upon the consciousness of a certain order, stability and continuance of things. It is of no consequence that our important plans more often miscarry than otherwise. Were it not so, the human record would be drab indeed. Repetition is the stronger, firmer, element in existence with powerful resistance toward variation. Creation or decay is the law of history.

Bergson stressed this point. "Precisely because it is always trying to reconstitute, and to reconstitute with what is given, the intellect lets what is new in each moment of history escape. It does not admit the unforeseeable. It rejects creation." [16] But where creation with him is the function of the ultra-intellectual intuition,[17] to us creative evolution is the product—most often the by-product—of the interplay of social forces created by aggregates of individuals bound together by the organized form of their existence.

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[14] Marx-Engels Correspondence—Letter 213, p. 475.

[15] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey p. 329.

[16] Creative Evolution—Bergson p. 163.

[17] Ibid pp. 360-1.

Historians must take their field as they find it. They cannot like physicists or chemists work under ideal conditions of their own choosing in order to discover in their purity the laws which pertain to their phenomena. But American history offers the nearest approach to the study of the laws of social motion under conditions approximating a scientific laboratory. "Should history ever become a true science," says Adams, "it must expect to establish its laws, not from the complicated story of rival European nationalities, but from the economical evolution of a great democracy. North America was the most favorable field on the globe for the spread of a society so large, uniform and isolated as to answer the purposes of science. There a single homogeneous society could easily attain proportions of three or four hundreds million persons, under conditions of undisturbed growth." [18]

The last statement proves the insufficiency of Adams' historical method, if he had not already confessed it in his "Education." The law of population of a given society, as we shall demonstrate, is dependent upon the prevailing mode of production and the property relations to which it gives rise. That is why the United States despite its unparalleled resources of both material and technique had for the ten years preceding the Second World War found itself in a state of chronic over-population.

Nor is Adams correct in his theory of isolation. No modern nation can claim that happy state, if such it be. The very existence and development of the United States was dependent upon its relations with, rather than its degree of isolation from, the rest of the world. It is the origins of the threads of the American story, that are definite, but these offer no certain key to the analysis of the existing pattern, nor of the state toward which we are heading.

Fiske develops this idea further in his analysis of the historic conditions underlying the organization of our Federal Union. "The experiment of a federal union on a grand scale required as its conditions, first, a vast extent of unoccupied country which could be settled without much warfare by men of the same race and speech; and secondly, on the part of the settlers, a rich inheritance of political training such as is afforded by long ages of self-government." [19]

There is a striking resemblance between the conditions demanded by Adams as essential for a science of history and those required by

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[18] History of the United States—Adams Vol. IX p. 222.

[19] The Federal Union—Fiske in Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History Vol. III p. 350.

Buckle in the same quest. "If, therefore, we could find some civilized people who had worked out their civilization entirely by themselves; who had escaped all foreign influence, and who had been neither benefited nor retarded by the personal peculiarities of their rulers,—the history of such a people would be of paramount importance. . . . To find such a people as this is obviously impossible; but the duty of the philosophic historian is, to select for his especial study the country in which the conditions have been most closely followed. Now, it will be readily admitted, not only by ourselves, but by intelligent foreigners, that in England, during, at all events, the last three centuries, this has been done more constantly and more successfully than in any other country."[20] Each philosophically-minded historian will find little difficulty in making his own country the particular field for his exacting labors.

At the beginning of his monumental work Buckle admits that scientific methods applied to history were still in their infancy and that a century of consistent progress in that branch of knowledge would be required to place history on a scientific basis.[21] The closing sentence of volume two is a paean to the establishment of law, regularity and causality in scientific history,[22] as a means toward attaining the ultimate goal of all science, namely the power of predicting events;[23] which, to society, means the control and shaping of its own destiny.

IMPORTANCE OF GENERALIZATION IN HISTORICAL SCIENCE

Man's ability to predict and to control the operation of physical phenomena is due to his powers of generalization. Leaving aside for the present the problem of causality or indeterminacy, the theory and practice of science has been that if given an initial state with whose properties we are familiar, and if we know the laws of nature applicable to it, we can predict its future state by virtue of the operation of these laws.

The power of generalizing principles from known phenomena is the most difficult and rarest qualities of the human intellect. It is not only the diversity of historical phenomena, it is its apparently lawless and contradictory mode of manifestation, the bewildering reactions of countless human wills in different circumstances and different lands, that gives color to the theory that a science of history is impossible.

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[20] History of Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. I p. 168.
[21] History of Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. I p. 24.
[22] Ibid Vol. II p. 472.
[23] Ibid Vol. I p. 123.

"The historian," writes Weisengruen ironically, "must know all the persons of the period he describes, their family relations, their actual course of action, as well as the opinions they held of each other. . . . All to the smallest detail."[24] The chemist and the engineer arrive at quite exact results in their operations and their predictions without knowing the love-life of every single electron and proton of the materials with which they work.

The political economist makes no wild guess in asserting that John Smith, the New York Central railroad conductor, with a modest savings bank account and a steady job, will not branch out the following day as the sole owner of the system for which he works. The mighty generalizations of a Newton or an Einstein were not made after a Cook's tour through the space of which they wrote.

History laughs at politics, claims Santayana. "Yet looked at from outside, with the wisdom that comes after the fact, people's actions may seem to the historian to have been directed upon the ends actually achieved; when as in fact the result was unintended and probably unforeseen; though it is easier to foresee the future than to command it, and only those seem to command it who pre-figure it with enthusiasm. Infinitely deeper than the logic of our thoughts is the fertility of our destiny; and circumstances keep us alive by continually defeating us."[25]

This politely polished cynicism which passes for profound wisdom in certain circles is belied by every act of the city common council and the federal legislature. They do not always arrive at the purpose aimed at. Dog bites man does not make the headlines, and the common-run-of-the-mine achievements of governmental agencies do not enter into the profound wisdom of our parlor intelligentsia. But the fact remains that the overwhelming mass of governmental objectives are generally achieved, and where programs fail it is mostly due to insufficient knowledge of all the social factors involved.

Marx laid his finger on the role of generalization in science when he said that in the analysis of economic forms neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use but that the force of abstraction must replace both.[26] At the beginning of his main work, he makes one of the profoundest generalizations since Newton when he wrote: "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of pro-

[24] Quoted by Boudin in his Theoretical System of Karl Marx p. 47.

[25] Realm of Truth—Santayana Book Third p. 22 (1938).

[26] Capital—Marx Vol. I preface p. 12.

duction prevails, presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities, its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity." [27]

If Marx is right the key to the problem of capitalist economy everywhere lies in the analysis of the exchange value of a commodity. Harvey, Darwin and Spencer by their vast generalizations did no less for physiology, biology and the general theory of evolution.

Veritable mountains of facts are meaningless unless they are organized and systematized by some valid, comprehensive generalization. "Facts," wrote Macaulay, "are the mere dross of history. It is from the abstract truth which interpenetrates them, and lies latent among them like gold in the ore, that the mass derives its whole value; and the precious particles are generally combined with the baser in such manner that the separation is a task of the utmost difficulty. . . . Hence it is that the writers of modern times have far surpassed those of antiquity. The historians of our own country are unequalled in depth and precision of reason, and even in the works of our mere compilers we often meet with speculations beyond the reach of Thucydides or Tacitus." [28]

Such a strict materialist as Engels draws a valid distinction between generalizations arrived by the power of abstracting the essential laws underlying phenomena, and a priori conceptions arrived at by deductions about an object, instead of the object as it exists.[29]

Sir James Jeans is heir to the reactionary "we-don't-know-what-it-is-all-about" school of modern thought led by Whitehead, Eddington, Heisenberg and Russell. "Our mental activities are stimulated by sense-impressions which originate beyond our senses; to account for these we invent an external world of objects and entities, but everything beyond our senses is pure inference. The inferred entities are of many kinds, but fall into two distinct categories, which we may label as 'observables' and 'unobservables.' " [30] Unless historians are ready to concede the objective reality of the external world and the people who inhabit it, they might as well write finis to their work after the title page.

Science is exact to the degree that its generalizations agree with external realities. Barnes in a recent work sums up admirably the secret of scientific advancement. "This is evident," says he, "when the general methodology of science is considered, a useful and convenient simplification may safely regard scientific progress as consisting of five separate stages, if one remembers that these processes are often carried on more or less simultaneously: (1) analysis of the problem to be solved; (2) formulation of competing hypothesis; (3) collection and classification of all relevant facts; (4) testing of hypothesis by experiment; (5) resultant formulation of tentative natural laws." [31]

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[27] Capital—Marx Vol. I p. 41.

[28] Miscellaneous Works—Macaulay Vol. I pp. 164-187.

[29] Anti-Duhring—Engels p. 111.

[30] Jeans—The New Background of Science (1933) pp. 171-2.

History will never in a changing world approach the ideal in its generalizations, but that is not equivalent to asserting that they cannot be more than speculations. Its conclusions can be at best approximations, but its goal must be ever closer and more correct approximations by the study of social phenomena where individual idiosyncrasies are discounted by the more predictable reactions of the mass.

History by its very nature must deal with masses of men as they exist within the confines of their particular form of social organization. The individual is important, but the social organization is of paramount importance. This at once settles Carlyle with his innumerable biographies, and Weisengruen with the need for knowledge of every heart-beat and lover's quarrel of every single being throughout the ages in order to write history. It is not necessary to know what exactly Jesus and Mohammed did and said every moment of their lives in order to study how profoundly their teachings influenced the lives and actions of uncounted millions down the ages, and will continue to do so in ages to come.

SPECULATION VERSUS SCIENTIFIC PREDICTION

Historic prediction based on known laws is something far different than speculation or prophecy. In the famous passage with which Adams closes the ninth volume of history he tried to introduce into history the Second Law of Thermo-dynamics, or entropy, into the American history of the future: "The traits of American character are fixed; the rate of physical and economic growth is established; wealth and population have reached their maximum; they were intelligent, but with circumscribed fields for activity; they were scientific but dominated by their science;—all had reached the inert level of a dying planet. What interests were to vivify a society so vast and uniform? What ideals were to ennoble it? What object, besides physical content, must a democratic continent aspire to attain? For the treatment of such questions, history required another century of experience." [32]

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[31] Barnes—Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World p. 1264.

There is no question but that Adams thought he was indulging a profound philosophic insight when he penned those lines. The consequences he foresaw could not, and will not materialize, for Adams' basic assumptions are the figment of his pessimistic soul. Were the United States ever to reach that level of stagnation it would deserve to be conquered by the Patagonians, and most likely would be by others before them. The Second Law of Thermodynamics in history belongs to the drawing room intellectuals to be settled between cups of tea or cocktails. We will dwell on this more fully in the chapter on causality.

From Adams' speculation we turn to Spengler's prophecy. Everything is all very neatly tabulated by him for the satisfaction of Bachelor of Arts cognoscenti who have already learned all they will ever need to know. The Spenglerian historical charts look impressive; ergo they must be scientific; in fact one has a distinct recollection of having seen or heard somewhere those names and dates. It all works out like a railroad time-table. We are headed to a well-deserved doom after 2200 A.D., having hit the incline around 2000 A.D.[33] It's all in the cards.

Millikan answers this prophet of doom: "But in point of fact the ups and downs of history have certainly been too few to warrant any valid statistical cyclic generalizations, and besides the conditions in the past that permitted periods of decline to occur have been so changed by the modern multiplication of agencies for both the spread and the preservation of science and of art that if there is anything that is certain it is that the Cassandras of the present merely represent a class that has always existed at all times and places, the class that in the language of Job 'multiplies words without knowledge.' " [34] The only kind of prediction that the science of history can recognize as valid is that following out of definite laws operating in a definite medium. None of those prophets of doom succeeded in establishing either.

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE MAKING OF HISTORY

Between the schools of Carlyle and Froude who insist that history is a collection of innumerable biographies, and that of Buckle who would relegate the individual to function as a register of the external material forces, there are numerous variations of opinion. The issue is not settled, it is merely postponed, by resort to such compromises as that it is a combination of both, in the manner of our easy-going eclectics.

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[32] History of the United States—Adams, Vol. IX, pp. 241-2.

[33] The Decline of the West—Spengler Appendix Tables I, II, and III.

[34] Science Lights the Torch—Millikan Article in Toward Civilization. Ed. by Beard, p. 40.

It is the duty of scientific history to show precisely how this interaction is brought about, what are the starting propulsions and regulating mechanisms, and how they operate. Does the individual play a role in the making of history; and if so, how and to what extent?

Hegel has a fine retort to the proverb that no man is a hero to his valet, "but not because the former is no hero, but because the latter is a valet." [35] So might Caesar's valet look upon his master—bald, dyspeptic, rheumatic, prancing attendance about a younger and voluptuous Cleopatra, and ask himself disdainfully, is this the mighty Caesar before whose glance the world trembles? These world-historical persons die early like Alexander; they are murdered like Caesar; they are transported to St. Helena, like Napoleon—whence the mystery of their power?

Hegel calls them the agents of the World-Spirit. No science of history can thus reduce these giant personalities to the category of mere messenger boys, albeit of the gods. But by the same token, care must be taken to consider these men in their historical settings without which their careers would be unthinkable.

Beard may allow himself the luxury of speculating as to what would happen if a shrewd capitalist were to erect a factory in an African jungle and then have to look around for a competent labor supply and an appreciative market for his electrical appliances.[36] This miracle of a shrewd capitalist—a character purely of Beard's creation—would end his enterprise from behind the barred doors of the psychopathic ward. He exists nowhere but in the phantasy of the historian.

"If Galileo and a few more like-minded men had been burned alive at an early age," writes Haldane, "we might very possibly still be living under a civilization not greatly different from that of the Middle Ages." [37] Yet he admits that one hundred and sixty-one years passed before society was ready to put a steam tug in practical operation. If history has proven one thing, it is that modern inventions were generally the product of pragmatic minds whose devices were called forth by the technological need of a competitive economy; and we have the high authority of the National Resources Committee for the statement that modern monopolies do not adopt inventions as readily as do competitive industries.[38]

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[35] Philosophy of History—Hegel p. 32.

[36] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard Vol. I p. XI.

[37] The Inequality of Man—Haldane p. 60.

It is not therefore the bald inventive genius of man—whether working individualistically in the dingy attic, or collectively in luxurious laboratories—that is the mainspring of technological progress, but rather the social conditions which bring it forth, first by preparing the cultural background, and secondly, by stimulating its profitable employment in the society of the time.

Motley gives us a vivid picture of the possibilities opened up to historians by the modern tendency of periodically releasing confidential government archives to their use. "To him who has patience and industry many mysteries are thus revealed, which no political sagacity or critical acumen could have divined. He leans over the shoulder of Philip the Second at his writing-table, as the King spells patiently out, with cipher-key in hand the most concealed hieroglyphics of Parma or Guise or Mendoza." [39] Yet the final results of Motley's labors in no way modify the verdict of history as recorded in the consequences of Philip's indefatigable industry.

Similarly the day will come when the archives will pour forth the details of the negotiations of Sept. 1938 and August 1939 between Chamberlain, Hitler, Daladier and Mussolini, and later with Stalin. Sir Neville Henderson has already begun the process through the medium of a White Paper on the last negotiations with Hitler. A shade of menace in a passage of a Polish diplomatic note, the momentary shift of Hitler's emotional balance, a smile, a grimace, a turn or twist at the wrong moment in the wrong direction, and the decision is made for war where it might just as readily have been for peace. Such is the romantic school of irresponsible visionaries who pose as great diplomats and profound statesmen. The "Times" correspondent hails this balderdash as a "fascinating report"; a forerunner of trivialities to come for trivial minds.[40]

These disclosures may modify judgments concerning personalities, but they will not affect the larger and actually the decisive issues involved—a capitalist-economy Germany seeking to emerge as a fetter-free power with access to the world markets and raw materials for her own exchange; and Britain and France determined not to relinquish their grip on Europe and the world for fear of losing all. Individuals may shift the emphasis or change the coloring, but they cannot divert the course of the larger social forces of which they are the agents, but in whose making they also function as effective elements.

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[38] Technological Trends and National Policy—Govt. Pub. June 1937 p. 7.

[39] The United Netherlands—Motley Vol. I p. 54.

[40] New York Times October 18, 1939.

GREAT MEN AS MAKERS OF HISTORY—THEIR LIMITATIONS

Hegel divides history writing into three classes; the original, of the type of Xenophon's Retreat of the Ten Thousand, Caesar's Commentaries and the French "Memoirs"; the pragmatical, which records the past and draws analogies for the present; the philosophical, which seeks to lay bare the basic forces beneath the human drama.[41] Macaulay turns a lance against the aristocratical contempt for the writers of memoirs[42] on the part of those who think it beneath their dignity to delve into the details of biography to describe the revolutions of nations. Yet always the personal element must be measured against those imponderable but devastating social forces which make religions and break empires. Some individuals may be their temporary masters, but most in the end are their unwilling servants.

These social forces have their origin in the hopes, fears, ambitions, the temporary wants and hereditary inclinations of millions of human beings, constantly changing, developing, dying and being replaced by millions of others who meet the resultant conditions with their own mass yearnings and inhibitions.

An individual great leader like Charlemagne could labor mightily, not to create but to restore, a great civilization of which its creature, Christianity, had ended in swallowing up its creator, the Roman Empire. He extended widely his political hegemony, consolidated its government, aided the establishment of scholastic institutions, endeavored to restore science and consolidate justice. "Yet after Charlemagne's death it proved utterly powerless—externally defenseless against the invasions of the Normans, Hungarians, and Arabs, and internally inefficient in resisting lawlessness, spoliation and oppression of every kind. Thus we see side by side with an excellent constitution, the most deplorable condition of things, and therefore confusion in all directions. Such political edifices need, for the very reason that they originate suddenly, the additional strengthening afforded by negativity evolved within themselves: they needed reactions in every form, such as manifested themselves in the following period."[43]

[41] Philosophy of History—Hegel pp. 1-5.
[42] Miscellaneous Works—Maçaulay, Vol. I, p. 191.
[43] Philosophy of History—Hegel p. 365.

Charlemagne's empire suffered the fate of all purely synthetic creations of individual genius like that of Alexander, Ghengis Khan and Napoleon which died with their creator, or because of the ineptitude of their successors.

Fiske writes ambiguously that as causal agencies a Cromwell or a Luther may count for more than a million ordinary men; but that, after all, our ultimate source of enlightenment still lies in the study of the general conditions under which the activity of our Cromwell or Luther was brought forth.[44] It is one of the cliches of the "great man" theory of history that if the great leaders had not lived their movements could not have succeeded. As to whether a million ordinary men combined could have equalled one Cromwell, Fiske did not undertake to prove; but the record of history clearly shows that Cromwell and his followers were both the product and the creators of their time. The vast background in England of a decaying feudalism and a rising bourgeoisie; in Europe of a decadent Church and its outmoded political institutions, offered the stage for a Cromwell and a Luther. Had they not lived other leaders might have been created; in fact the historic conditions of that time had brought forth the material of that leadership in the persons of Pym, Hampden and Calvin.

Rhodes quotes Napoleon as saying that without Rousseau and his "Social Contract" there would have been no French Revolution. Yet the ninety per cent illiterate French peasants who did not read Rousseau knew what they wanted and proceeded to get it without benefit of the wisdom contained in those immortal pages.

Rhodes himself hesitates to draw the conclusion in connection with which he quotes Napoleon,[45] that if Lloyd Garrison had not lived the Republicans would not have succeeded in 1860. While it was due to Garrison and his associates that slavery became the topic of discussion at every Northern fireside, the really decisive factor was the divergent historic development of the sectional economies and resultant ideologies which in effect created two nations under one roof. The roof could not long withstand this divisive pressure. In a progressive world the onus was on the South. Slavery could not bear examination; to describe it was to condemn it. And no suave counsel of prudent statesmanship could prevent the respective ideological concentration of moral fervor on the ambiguous issues of States Rights versus No Secession.

Great men have their proper sphere, but they are not the exclusive content of history. Hamilton could speculate as was then, and still is, the custom on the fate of the young American Republic: "Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsion (Shays Rebellion), if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have had upon the liberties of New Hampshire, or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?" [46] Yet the very same Hamilton had answered his own inquiry in a previous number when he wrote that if Shays and his followers had not been desperate debtors, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a miniature civil war.[47]

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[44] Essays Historical and Literary—Fiske Vol. II p. 25.

[45] History of the United States—Rhodes Vol. I pp. 62-3.

It is the inherent vice of the "great man" theory of history to suppose that the genius could have operated in all lands and at all times by the sheer magic of his personal powers. That it requires more than individual magnetism, but also the concatenation of historic events focused at the critical moment for the great leader to come forth, is borne out by the very rebellion to which Hamilton adverts.[48] The issues were the aftermath of a great Revolution still in the process of consolidation. Eventually an understanding Massachusetts Legislature voted a pardon and indemnity for all engaged in the late insurrection, and a grateful Federal government supported Shays to a good old age on the pension due him as a Revolutionary officer.[49]

Contemporary history is replete with great leaders who strut their play on the world stage. It would be futile to deny their potent influence. One thing can be stated with apodictic certainty. These leaders are the creatures and not the creators of the historic conditions from which they emerged. The Russian Revolution made it possible for Stalin to gather in by gradual accretions his great power. Germany, tied and suppressed under the Versailles Treaty, threw off its democrative cloak when the time arose to re-open unfinished business under Hitler; at first furtively under the pretext of national consolidation, and finally in the open struggle for imperial power. Italy arrived last as a consolidated nation, had least to show for its military sacrifices in the First World War, and embraced Mussolini to save itself from internal disintegration. This is not the place to evaluate fully the roles and merits of these great personalities, but if any proof at all was required, their careers supply it abundantly to demonstrate the proposition that great men do not create, but take advantage of, the historic conditions to which they owe their power and their glory. "In times of confusion every active genius finds the place assigned him by nature," remarks our greatest commentator on the mutabilities of individual fortune, Gibbon.[50]

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[46] The Federalist—Paper No. XXI by Hamilton p. 107.

[47] Ibid Paper No. VI by Hamilton p. 24.

[48] The Federalist—Papers No. XXV, XXVIII and LXXIII by Hamilton and XLII by Madison.

[49] History of the United States—Hildreth Vol. III p. 542.

IS SOCIETY AN ORGANISM?

Plutarch in his delightful perambulatory fashion tells us of Menenius Agrippa's practical application of the organic theory of society long before Spencer attempted to prove it with pompous formulas and Wilson blessed it with professorial cant. Even in Agrippa's time this alleged scientific truth so recently unearthed by gigantic intellects had reached the category of being a celebrated fable.

The occasion for Agrippa's parable was a revolt of the Roman commonalty against patrician exactions. They assembled before the senate in menacing demeanor, demanding redress. "Menenius Agrippa, the senate's chief spokesman," wrote Plutarch, "after much entreaty to the people, and much plain speaking on behalf of the senate, concluded at length, with the celebrated fable. 'It once happened that all the other members of a man mutinied against the stomach, which they all accused as the only idle, uncontributing part in the whole body, while the rest was put to hardships and the expense of much labor to supply and minister to its appetites. The stomach, however, merely ridiculed the silliness of the members, who appeared not to be aware that the stomach certainly does receive the general nourishment, but only to return it again, and redistribute it amongst the rest.' Such is the case, ye citizens, between you and the senate. The counsels and plans that are there duly digested convey and secure to all of you your proper benefit and support." [51]

Plutarch tells how powerfully the people were impressed with Agrippa's ineluctable conclusion; yet the mutations of history confounded the logician when the barbarian Maximin, foot-runner for the Emperor Severus, was to succeed him in time to the purple of Augustus;[52] as splendid a case as any of the limb supplanting the head.

Through many gradations this organic theory of society has come down to the present age, which caused Bukharin to protest bitterly:

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[50] The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon Vol. I p. 240.

[51] Lives of Plutarch—Life of Coriolanus, p. 266, Coronet Ed.

[52] The Decline and Fall of Rome—Gibbon Vol. I p. 147.

"The social interpretation of the organic theory is the following: the ruling class is the head; the workers or slaves are the arms and legs; as arms and legs may not in nature replace the head, it is well for subordinates to hold their peace!" [53] Fortunately for the progress of society the slaves, serfs, burghers and workers have not always held their peace, and even on occasion replaced the heads after decapitating others, as for example Charles I, and Louis XVI.

Spencer follows out to its logical conclusion his synthetic philosophy that all existence is to be regarded as following the laws for the redistribution of matter and motion in accord with the famous formula for evolution. The plausible philosopher finds a ready analogy between the living body and the social organization, and utters the famous dictum that "a society is an organism," and that all its divisions and co-ordinations are maintained in organic unison despite death and transformation of individuals, just as living structures undergo continuous metabolic changes of the individual cells of the component organs and systems. To Spencer the state is the culminating head of the social organism, and while it may be as muddleheaded as that of ordinary individuals, and usually is, still that is its regulatory function in the pre-ordained order of the evolutionary processes.[54]

CLASSIC WRITERS ON MAN AND SOCIETY

Aristotle long before Spencer subscribed to this scheme of things. A well-regulated society, he contended, with that peculiar assuredness of philosophers who lay down recipes for all eternity, must consist of the following classes: first, food producers; second, mechanics and artists; third, merchants and traders; fourth, serfs and laborers; fifth, the warriors; sixth, the slaves; seventh, the wealthy citizens; eighth, the magistrates and officers. He considers the need for other classes, such as day-laborers composed by impecunious free Athenians, but the first eight are the basis of the social organism.

Slavery is the very foundation of his society. This he defends with every artifice of his powerful intellect. "There must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest." [55]

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[53] Historical Materialism—Bukharin p. 87.

[54] Principles of Sociology—Spencer Vol. I Part II, The Inductions of Sociology.

[55] The Politics—Aristotle pp. 91-3.

Here Aristotle gave the cue to many a profound disquisition by our American statesmen in the Old South, and offered the substance for many a preachment during the fateful thirty years of slavery debate until the final outcome of the Civil War ended all debate. History, if it is scientific, can have nothing to do with absolute moral standards, because it does not recognize their existence.

The lofty Socrates does not diminish his stature when his companion excused before him, unrebuked, an absence by the necessity for going off in pursuit of his runaway slave. His ideas must be gauged by the conditions and the standards of his time. In some respects the morality of ancient Greece was below that of the Aztecs, on whose soil no one could be born a slave. The ethical concepts of the Greeks did not prevent them from transforming their fellow-Greeks into slaves for non-payment of debt.[56] Roman culture was but a poor copy of that of the Greeks, but Roman policy never allowed a Roman to be a slave,[57] and the dignity of the Roman body was never subjected to ignominious torture[58] during the long span of Rome's glory.

It may appear anomalous to some, but Engels was consistent with himself when that equally great co-worker with Marx in the founding of scientific socialism wrote the best possible historic defense of slavery: "We should never forget that our whole economic, political and intellectual development has as its presupposition a state of things in which slavery was as necessary as it was universally recognized. In this sense we are entitled to say: Without the slavery of antiquity, no modern socialism. It is very easy to inveigh against slavery and similar things in general terms, and to give vent to high moral indignation at such infamies. Unfortunately all this conveys is only what everybody knows, namely, that these institutions of antiquity are no longer in accord with our present conditions and our sentiments, which these conditions determine." [59]

Where Spencer sees gradual evolution working with immutable effect toward a pre-destined goal, though his individualistic soul revolts against the coming slavery of a state despotism composed of disciplined hordes of administrative and military officials, Engels sees the same evolutionary process terminating, however, in social revolution which will bring freedom to mankind. The essential differences between the two philosophies is that Spencer's evolves by natural laws, and Engels' by the human adaptation of those laws.

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[56] History of Greece—Bury p. 173.

[57] History of Rome—Mommsen Vol. III pp. 106-7.

[58] The Decline and Fall of Rome—Gibbon Vol. I p. 549.

[59] Anti-Duhring—Engels, p. 206.

We cannot now discuss their respective merits in the light of the fifty years which have elapsed since both wrote their treatises—they were contemporaries and residents of the same country.

The great English mechanist Spencer concludes: "the love of power, the selfishness, the injustice, the untruthfulness, which often in comparatively short times brings private organizations to disaster, will inevitably, where their effects accumulate from generation to generation, work evils far greater and less remediable, since vast and complex and possessed of all the resources, the administrative organization once developed and consolidated, must become irresistible." [60]

The great German humanist Engels concludes: "Man's own social organization which has hitherto stood in opposition to them as if arbitrarily decreed by nature and history, will then become the voluntary act of men themselves. The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history, will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom." [61]

Historical writing necessarily reflects the social concepts of its authors. Beard is consistent in treating a given civilization as a growing organism, but contends that its interpretation is individual and the risks of error consequently staggering.[62] Beneath the haphazard and contradictory policies of men, Beard argues, these social forces manifest themselves to set matters on their course. "Presidents came and went, governors and legislatures came and went, but the movement of social forces that produced this legislation was continuous. It was confined to no party, directed by no single organization, inspired by no overpowering leadership. Such were the processes and products of American democracy when the mind was let free to inquire, to propose and to champion." [63]

Beard discreetly closed his second volume on an upward note since his work was completed during the halcyon days of 1927. Twelve years later in his "America in Midpassage" his disillusionment and pessimism also reflect the melancholy days of the Great Crisis and its Depression aftermath. Even Beard does not undertake to forecast the spirit of the fourth volume—which we all hope will appear in due time—and must reflect a society uncertain, but determined to go on, though not knowing exactly where or why.

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[60] The Coming Slavery—Spencer p. 331.

[61] Anti-Duhring—Engels p. 318.

[62] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard Vol. I p. XIV.

[63] Ibid Vol. II p. 589.

Fiske's historical system reflects the Spencerian philosophy of which he was the great American protagonist. Social as well as organic evolution to him, consists in the continuous adaptation of the community. Society, like the organism, continually increases in definite heterogeneity through successive differentiations and integrations.[64] Civilization is not artificial, but a part of nature; it is not an accident but necessary, and proceeds by the operation of the same laws underlying the whole of organic creation.

He even goes so far as to state: "As surely as the astronomer can predict the future state of the heavens, the sociologist can foresee that the process of adaptation must go on until in a remote future it comes to an end in proximate equilibrium. The increasing interdependence of human interests must eventually go far to realize the dream of the philosophic poet, of a Parliament of Man, a Federation of the World." [65] Unfortunately sociologists deal with millennia and historians with a much smaller segment of time. The road on the way is infinitely more important to the historian than the goal. That Fiske was at times uncertain concerning both the road and the goal was illustrated in his work on The Critical Period in American History when discussing the effects of the Revolution on the respective economic policies of the United States and England.[66]

That Buckle should adopt the organic theory of society is the natural consequence of his philosophy. But like a true creative intellect he gives to that concept his own profounder meaning. Asserting that moral truths are stationary but intellectual truths are progressive, he holds out to mankind the absorbing possibilities of human perfectibility which lie in the development of education, science, and the arts.[67]

It is left for the professors to settle the question with that admirable ease which comes only from divorce with all reality: "What is society? It is an organic association of individuals for mutual aid. Mutual aid to what? To self-development. The hope of society lies in an infinite individual variety, in the freest play of individual forces." [68] And so on, ending in the really original doctrine that it should be the end of government to assist in accomplishing the objects of organized society. Such a startling revelation of the moral sentiment deserved for its discoverer the headship of a great university and afterwards as Chief Executive of his country, where it was further elaborated in another work.[69] A few years later this resurrection of Rousseau's theory of society was embodied in an organic instrument for world government, the League of Nations, which struggled on to pre-ordained failure because of ignorance concerning social laws until the coup de grace in the blood baptism of September 1939.

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[64] Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy—Fiske Vol. II pp. 225-7.

[65] Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy—Fiske Vol. II pp. 227-8.

[66] The Discussions of free trade and the proper channels of commerce in pp. 136-7 of the Critical Period by Fiske.

[67] History of Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. I pp. 164-5.

[68] The State—Woodrow Wilson p. 633.

UTOPIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIETY

There are three kinds of Utopians; the plain, the "scientific" and the political. The authors of the League of Nations compact belonged to all three. Rousseau is a fine example of the first. Starting out with the dogmatic assertion that all men are born free, but are now in chains, he considers that a violation of an original social pact. "Now as men cannot create any new forces, but only combine and direct those that exist, they have no other means of self-preservation than to form by aggregation a sum of forces which may overcome the resistance, to put them in action by a single motive power, and to make them work in concert." [70]

This anthropological phantasy does not change its nature when dressed up in the garments of the scientific sociological nomenclature of Ward. "Government is becoming more and more the organ of social consciousness, and more and more the servant of the social will. Our declaration of independence which recites that government derives its just powers from the 'consent' of the governed has already been outgrown. It is no longer the consent but the positively known will of the governed from which government now derives its powers." [71] Upon this basis Ward foresees the evolution of society from present-day plutocracy to sociocracy.

This pleasing theory is constructed out of the conception of society as a monolithic unit where the masses by the sheer weight of their numbers, and fully conscious of their desires and knowing the effective remedy for their ills, impress their will on a thoroughly pliant government. Life belies this arm-chair theory of progress. Society is not a solid crystal but is constantly changing its elements, its organs, even its dimensions. Class control of the government, open or concealed, against the opposition of the masses or with their fervent support obtained by control of the press, the schools, the church, and the varied means for moulding opinion—this is the common experience of mankind wherever government exists, be it under the guise of democracy, monarchy or the totalitarian state.

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[69] The New Freedom—Wilson p. 48.

[70] Social Contract—Rousseau Ch. VI p. 13.

[71] The Psychic Factors of Civilization—Ward p. 323.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL FORCES

Some things are easier to describe than to define, but as one great thinker remarked, to describe a phenomenon is not to explain it. Historians have, by the very nature of their trade, dealt with social forces without understanding them, or even recognizing their existence. Gibbon, among our best exponents of the great man theory of history, is too much the conscientious student of his subject to neglect the insidious progress of social decay within the vitals of the Roman Empire. This incomparable chronicler of the deeds of Marcus Aurelius, Diocletian, Julian, Narses, Belisarius and Stilicho, to name but a few his genius brings to life in those immortal pages, even Gibbon paid anxious heed to the underlying causes of that historical cataclysm. Among the factors causing the collapse of the mighty empire he enumerates the spread of bureaucracy, the deadening spirit of uniformity, the institution of slavery, the extinguishment of genius, the extremes of wealth and poverty, a mercenary army recruited from among barbarians who were thus taught by the Romans the military art by which they were later to be destroyed, the degeneracy of the Senate, the abolition of popular assemblies, the recurrent civil wars resulting in the thinning out of ruling families, the lack of definite succession, and so forth.

But they are merely incidental to the course of his story. Throughout this melancholy enumeration, we see stated the operation of underlying social forces operating within the mass and upon individuals, and through them reacting upon society until Alaric, the barbarian soldier schooled by Theodosius, exposed the startling decay of Rome by conquering it in 410 A.D. as a prelude to its total eclipse in 476 A.D.

Men act. They are impelled to do so by a multitude of motives. Freud analyzes the subterranean workings of man's ego. Ward discusses the individual's psychic factors in social existence. The historian records his actions. The philosopher speculates upon them. Yet to this day the nature of the social forces operating through masses of men and shaping the individual's reactions to life, are still as mysterious as were the movement of the heavenly bodies before Copernicus.

Freud exhibits the daring of genius even in his mistakes. To ascribe, as he does, a preponderant influence to sex ideas as the cause of totemism and taboo from which developed the exogamous family and religious ceremonials[72] is to go far afield from ground carefully worked up by Morgan[73] and Spencer.[74] Ward analyzes man as a social being in all his various aspects, physical, mental, moral and psychological, as the instrument through which the social forces operate, yet he treats of both man and society in a functional relationship without regard to time, place and particular form of social development.[75]

Man of the Graeco-Roman civilizations, for all his anatomical similarity, is not the man of the Middle Ages; nor is he altogether the same as we know him in Modern Civilization. The American of 1940 is not exactly the same American of 1789 when our constitutional government was ushered in with all its express and implied restrictions as to popular suffrage, property classifications, and helotry of both white indentured servants and black slaves.

Social conditions change, and man changes with them. It is futile to debate the priority of the change, since they act and re-act upon each other, shape and modify each other, and register those transformations both by gradual evolution and sharply-registered upheavals.

SOCIAL FORCES EXIST ONLY IN SOCIETY

Social forces require a social medium for their operation. Robinson Crusoe could not make history on his lonely island. Let a thousand others join him, and vast problems arise by that very fact. It makes a tremendous difference whether they are all fellow-Britons or are a mixture of races representing various degrees of development. If members of a similar civilization, they carry with them the social traditions of their times. They might organize a community as did the settlers of Plymouth and Boston. Immediately questions arise as to government, laws, rights, duties, privileges and even problems of social precedence.

Perhaps the dismbodied spirit of what was later to be Max Nordau perched itself on Crusoe's shoulder and whispered significantly for him to assert his superiority. "Parasitism arises out of the original inequality of men."[76] Thus urged to assert his mastery, Robinson might scheme to attain control over the group, and finally reduce them to his will by the exercise of cunning, force, or superstition. They might be set to work for him and minister to his wants.

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[72] Writings of Sigmund Freud—Part V pp. 807, 828, 887.

[73] Ancient Society—Morgan Part III pp. 393-421.

[74] Principles of Sociology—Spencer Vol. III pp. 144-5.

[75] Psychic Factors of Civilization—Ward p. 97.

Obviously the material conditions for such a society must be at hand. All that can be said along this line has already been enacted in history countless times. It is not the island, or nature, or Robinson Crusoe who created those social forces. They originate out of and are part of society itself. No matter how widely one differs on everything else, it must be agreed that social forces manifest themselves in groups of human beings bearing a definite relation toward each other in a given time and place.

These relations may be casual, as that of an audience at the theater; limited, as by a contract; permanent as by law. They vary in degree and intensity according to the epoch and particular period of history. It is not so long ago when in certain Western American communities each member of the group carried his gun for self-protection. It is the function of history to study the nature of these social systems in order to intelligently record events. It is the duty of the philosophy of history to analyze the laws which govern the movement of these social forces. And both are immeasureably advanced toward the clarification of their respective phenomena if they are investigated in connection with their particular period, epoch and era.

B. The Social Organization As The Dependent Variable In History

RELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL POWERS

The unit of society is the individual, but it does not follow that the social forces are merely the sum of that of its individual components. The mere co-operation of human beings develops distinctive social powers within their group of which no single individual can possess a proportionate part. A single individual might build himself a house; he cannot by sheer dint of consecutive labor build a large suspension bridge. Co-operation by mere differentiation and specialization creates social powers unknown to the unit. "The reason," wrote Marx, "is that a body of men working in concert has hands and eyes both before and behind, and is to a certain degree, omnipresent. The various parts of the work progress simultaneously." [77]

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[76] Nordau—Interpretation of History, p. 151.

The great Hegelian principle that mere quantitative differences are transformed into qualitative changes is supported by Napoleon's pragmatic testimony obtained from the Egyptian battlefield: "Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes; and 1000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1500 Mamelukes." [78] The difference in training, discipline and co-operation among the French troops could overcome the greater individual skill, and perhaps daring, of the individual Mameluke.

The multiplication and differentiation of social powers beyond the mere aggregate of the individual units is a truth long ago established by political economy, and to whose soundness every modern industrial establishment bears daily witness. The problem of history is not so much individuation, as the problems arising out of the group. With the mechanization of production, for example, came a revolution in ethics. "Under the machine, morality is not a matter of the inward spirit but simply of external conformity to the mores of standardized masses—a morality of material utility and success." [79]

Feudalism had its own standards of measuring social success. During the Middle Ages when the church was in the prime of its power, the subtlest intellects of Europe exhausted their strength on the rites and dogmas of Christianity.[80] The keenest minds vied for influence and honors among the hierarchy, while secular recognition was to be found in government, usually reserved for the aristocracy.

With the development of capitalism a new spirit was evoked among those ambitious for power, now to be found in the economic sphere. The low level of American politics after the Civil War was due to a succession of mediocrities, because the most virile personalities were siphoned off into industry and finance. From the standpoint of social morality not much could be said for either statesmen or captains of industry.

Modern history recognizes the preponderant importance of the mass and is concerned more with statistics, data, and charts, than with the gyrations of heroes. "The writers of antiquity never thought of lingering on the ordinary business transactions which were happening every day before their eyes. Many things that are now dark would be cleared up if we had more knowledge of the operations of Greek trade." [81]

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[77] Capital—Marx Vol. I p. 359.

[78] Quoted by Engels in Anti-Duhring p. 146.

[79] Toward Civilization—Introduction by Beard, p. 7 (1930).

[80] History of Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. I p. 554.

Buckle and Marx were the great leaders in this forward movement. Disregarding the merits of their social philosophies, both devoted the best efforts of their finely-wrought intellectual powers to the study of the laws of social movement. "I am deeply convinced," wrote Buckle, "that the time is fast approaching when the history of Man will be placed on its proper footing; when its study will be recognized as the noblest and most arduous of all pursuits; and when it will be clearly seen, that, to cultivate it with success, there is wanted a wide and comprehensive mind, richly furnished with the highest branches of human knowledge. When this is fully admitted, history will be written only by those whose habits fit them for the task; and it will be rescued from the hands of biographers, genealogists, collectors of anecdotes, chroniclers of courts, of princes, and of nobles,—those babblers of vain things, who lie in wait at every corner, and infest this the public highway of our national literature." [82]

COMPARISON OF SOCIAL FORCES OF THE 10TH AND 20TH CENTURIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Since the establishment of definite social forces arising from the relations of groups of human beings is essential to the formulation of the Historical Field Theory, it is of primary importance to prove their existence from the record of history itself. We must first establish the reality of social forces, before we can discuss their development and their mode of manifestation. The human record demonstrates in striking fashion the variability of their manifestation, and the mutability of their results so as to enable us to compare over a long period of years their consequences in the lives of a people inhabiting approximately the same territorial area. No attempt will be made to apply the results of this analysis to the specific problems of American history. They are of interest only insofar as they tend to prove that social forces do exist, and must exist in all forms of historic development; but the nature of these forces and the course of their development in American history must be proven

[81] History of Greece—Bury p. 646.

[82] History of Civilization in England—Buckle Vol. I p. 671.

specifically from the evolution of our national existence during the course of our inquiry in a following work.

We could just as well study the diverse civilizations of the 20th century itself to establish our proofs. Astronomer's Time and Time's Arrow runs the same for the Australian bushmen as for the Congo tribes; for the Eskimo village, the Hindu caste society, and the stagnant civilizations of the Orient, and of those in the Western world. But the correctness of our thesis can be most strikingly adduced from the comparison of life in Western Europe of the 10th century with that of Western Europe of to-day.

Putnam's tabular view of universal history presents in chronological order the most glaring inconsistencies in the uneven development of mankind. At the very time when the ruling classes of Western Europe had relapsed into barbarism from the high level of Roman culture, due to the disintegration of political forms following the collapse of the empire; when reading and writing had become almost a lost art,[83] and the Latin tongue itself was being stultified by ill-use and disuse,[84] printing by movable blocks was being perfected by the Chinese, while Cordova under Arab-Jewish influence was becoming world famous for its learning and science, for its industry and commerce, as well as for its art and poetry.[85]

Charlemagne's empire dissolved with his death. Each man became a law to himself, the stronger imposed their will on the weak, and the defenseless besought the support of the powerful proprietor, with his family connections and their retainers. Alongside of the barons, sometimes in opposition to them, grew the temporal power of the church. All property was held in fief, subject to rights and obligations.

Every element of life, even in the free and chartered cities was drawn into the feudal enclosure of protection and privileges. "It was a confederation of petty sovereigns, of petty despots, unequal amongst themselves and having, one toward another, certain duties and rights, but invested in their own domains, over their personal and direct subjects with arbitrary and absolute power. That is the essential element of the feudal system; therein it differs from every other aristocracy, every other form of government. There has been no scarcity in this world of aristocracies and despotisms. There have been peoples arbitrarily governed, nay absolutely possessed by a single man, by a college of priests, by a body of politicians. But none of these despotic governments was like the feudal system." [86]

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[83] Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon Ch. XXXIX, Vol. II pp. 65-74 Mod. Lib. Ed.

[84] General History of Civilization in Europe—Guizot, pp. 68-78.

[85] Tabular Views of Universal History—Compiled by George P. Putnam and George H. Putnam p. 82.

The kingdom of Charlemagne was split up into a number of great fiefs, and sub-fiefs and sub-infeudations reaching to the smallest division of land; and below them were the serfs, in some places even slaves. No man's home was safe unless it was a castle. It required a long period of development ending in the decay of feudalism itself to establish the principle that every man's home was his castle, and that the sovereign writ ran to all.

The cowardice and abasement of the French led to the incursion and conquest by the Normans in the ninth century. Having acclimated themselves to the higher civilization of France and reviving the martial spirit of that noble people, they eventually crossed the Channel under William in 1066, who thereby became the conqueror of England. With the Normans was introduced there the feudal system, where it developed in a manner peculiar to itself due to England's insular position and freedom from interference with the struggles of the continent, unless by her own volition.

Under feudalism social distinction was founded on the possession of land acquired through inheritance among all the males under the Salic Law of France, and to the eldest male in degree of consanguinity according to the English rule of primogeniture; who also added the device of entail in order to prevent the break-up of estates. The land on which London is built to this day is owned by a few aristocratic families.

American history presents some striking records of the attempt to establish feudalism on our soil and to hold intact the original property entailed. Locke, the celebrated English philosopher, no less, was engaged to write a constitution for the colony of Carolina at the behest of Lord Shaftesbury, one of its proprietors. With methodic thoroughness he produced a document creating eight seignories of twelve thousand acres each to be assigned unalienably among the eight proprietaries. Their holdings amounted to one-fifth of the total area of the colony. The remaining land was to be divided into various categories. This was to be done in a bewildering array of baronies, landgravates and manor estates with a race of hereditary tenants over whom the lords of the manor, barons and seignors were to exercise full jurisdiction without appeal, and to the end of time.

There was to be an admiral, chamberlain, chancellor, constable, chief justice, high steward and treasurer. Besides the president, each court was to have six counsellors for life, at least four of whom were to be nobles. Every provision Locke's ingenious intellect could devise was put in to prevent the development of democratic power in Carolina.

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[86] History of France—Guizot Vol. I p. 231; see also History of the Middle Ages—Hallam Vol. I pp. 23-4.

There was only one thing Locke did not do. He did not, because he could not, transplant to the new world the material basis for the feudalism of the old world, namely, the closely-knit hereditary control of all the land together with the existence of a large hereditary landless class. The inevitable consequence of Locke's oversight was the inability of Carolina to attract sufficient settlers, and the unwillingness of the settlers there to submit to anachronistic restraints, with vacant land everywhere around them beckoning enticingly and calling for the assertion of their inherent sense of human dignity. Twenty-three years after the promulgation of Locke's eternal constitution the inhabitants of Carolina forced its abrogation.[87]

A somewhat similar scheme, though on a less elaborate basis, was carried out in New York by the Dutch along the Hudson River, and later extended by the English after their occupation, to the Mohawk valley. By a strange anomaly of history, it actually required a constitutional amendment to the basic law of the State of New York adopted by referendum on November 8, 1938, to destroy the last vestige of feudalism within its territory. It is safe to say that very few voters then realized the significance attached to Section Ten of Article One which they ratified declaring that "all lands shall forever remain allodial so that the entire and absolute property is vested in the owners, according to the nature of their respective estates." [88]

RELATIVE VALIDITY OF MORAL CONCEPTIONS

Ecclesiastical institutions under feudalism reflected the material basis upon which that order of society was reared. It is not the function of the historian to moralize, but rather to trace the materiality of moral conceptions as they develop out of the property and class relations of a given period.

The absolutism and dissoluteness of the church of those days was typical of medieval life. Excommunication was the punishment more often for secular disobedience than for religious offenses. Indulgences were readily obtained by those who could pay for them. "The corruption of the head extended naturally to all other members of the church. All writers concur in stigmatizing the dissoluteness and neglect of decency that prevailed among the clergy. Though several codes of ecclesiastical discipline had been compiled by particular prelates, yet neither these nor the ancient canons were much regarded. The bishops, indeed, who were to enforce them had most occasion to dread their severity." [89]

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[87] History of the United States—Hildreth Vol. II pp. 28-43, 211.

[88] Addition to Article One of the Bill of Rights, having the effect of abolishing all rents and services subject to which the land was heretofore held, despite the formal abolition of feudal tenures in 1846 after the anti-rent riots in New York.

The Domesday Book recorded 25,000 slaves in England long after the Christian church had established its ecclesiastical suzerainty,[90] and the principle that gentility comes by the father, not the mother, condemned to slavery the offspring of many an earl long after the construction of what is to-day Westminster Abbey was begun.[91]

Sometimes the church inspired popular insurrections, sometimes the church led insurrections, but always with the object of aggrandizing the power of the church by playing religious zeal against political attachment. The church was the conservator of culture in its monasteries and universities; but always the degree and character of the culture was determined by the temporal needs of the church to which everything was subservient, including the spiritual aspect of its activities. But the church incubated learning, and later on in Italy actually served to create the glory of the very Renaissance which was to sow the seed for the Reformation.

Through the medium of the Crusades the church won a little glory, but conferred upon mankind indirectly a great service. This was to break down the barriers between peoples, to impoverish the nobility, to create the power of the king, to weld a national unity, and to help the upbuilding of the bourgeois class. The ruin of the nobility gave rise to the concentration of the fiefs, and the rich burghers with the commercial towns behind them united with the king and eventually gave the death-blow to feudalism as a political power.

These were but some of the consequences ensuing from that complex of social forces we denominate as the feudal system. Well might Engels write: "Antiquity did not know of any abolition of slavery by rebellion, but the serfs of the middle ages gradually enforced their liberation as a class." [92]

Feudal barons found it necessary in order to prevent themselves from slaughtering each other to mutual extinction, to establish some sort of understanding concerning each other's rights and boundaries. This led to occasional conferences among kinsmen and the superior lords of a particular territory. Baronial jurisdictions were likewise erected to administer justice between the possessors of fiefs under them. These incipient political and juridical consultations were the forerunners for the establishment of Parliaments, or Cortes, or States-General.

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[89] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam Vol. II p.106.

[90] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam Vol. II p. 461.

[91] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam, Vol. I, pp. 165-7.

[92] The Origin of the Family and the State—Engels p. 190.

None had the power to enforce its claims outside of their own physical resources. There was no public power, no standing army, no regular taxes, no fixed tribunals. The necessities of the forces to which they themselves owed their existence gradually led to the emergence of those essential organs of civilized existence. "The constitution of England," writes Hallam, "has indeed no single date from which its duration is to be reckoned. The institutions of positive law, the far more important changes which time has wrought in the order of society, during the six hundred years subsequent to the Great Charter, have undoubtedly lessened its direct application to our present circumstances. But it is still the keystone of English liberty." [93]

Writing a century before the modern type of iconoclast who destroys all our gods indiscriminately and unintelligently, Hallam delivers a masterful reply to those who had adopted lately "the fashion to depreciate the value of Magna Charta, as if it had sprung from the private ambition of a few selfish barons, and redressed only some feudal abuses." [94] Whatever one's views may be regarding the development of English political institutions, upon one thing all will agree, namely, that they were the resultants of internal conflicts created from within the structure of feudal society itself.

Among the elements of the feudal social mechanism none played a more vital role than the free cities and towns. They were a heritage derived from Roman civilization, and the germ-center for the development of modern capitalism, the material basis of Modern Civilization. Their absorbing rise to power should offer the most conclusive evidence for the correctness of a scientific theory of history, spanning as it does three epochs of Civilization, the Graeco-Roman, Feudal and Modern.

Hallam points out that certainly it was not the intention of the barons when conferring certain charter immunities upon their cities to develop a competitive power which was eventually to destroy them.[95] No ruling class ever deliberately creates the seeds for its own destruction; these are evolved from within the womb of society itself where virile social forces have opportunity to unfold the full amplitude of their power. Motley, too, shows in his absorbing history of the Dutch Republic how gradually the industry and wealth of the towns during the Middle Ages placed them in a position to balance the power of the sovereign against the nobles until in time they began to preponderate over both.[96]

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[93] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam Vol. II p. 242.

[94] Ibid. Vol. II p. 243.

[95] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam Vol. I pp. 219-220.

INTERNAL RELATION OF THE ECONOMY TO SOCIAL FORMS

Marx answers a certain type of historian who imagines that the ancient Greeks and Romans lived by plunder alone: "But when people plunder for centuries, there must always be something at hand for them to seize; the objects of plunder must be continually reproduced. It would thus appear that even Greeks and Romans had some process of production, consequently an economy which just as much constituted the material basis of their world as bourgeois economy constitutes that of our modern world." [97]

Ancient European civilization was built around the city-state. Athens had its celebrated law-givers, statesmen, philosophers, poets, sculptors and rhetoricians; it also had an economy to support them. Curtius gives an interesting description of the bustling industrial life of Athens. "Thus the greatest variety of branches of manufacturing industry was introduced into Athens, where through the emulous rivalry of natives and strangers, and the interchange of the most recent inventions, all trades rose to a perfection never reached before. They continued to be indigenous there because no other city could vie with Athens. Athens became the school of manufacturers and artisans, the central market for all manufactures of a higher kind, and at Athens the prices were fixed and the standard of taste established." [98] But preponderantly Greek civilization was built upon the bent backs of slaves.

Rome had its latifundian estates owned by patricians and worked by slaves with freedmen and occasional Roman overseers. It also had an extensive manufacturing industry and commerce, particularly with its great granaries of Egypt and North Africa. "The Roman mercantile transactions of this period fully kept pace with the contemporary development of political power, and were no less grand of their kind." [99]

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[96] The Rise of the Dutch Republic—Motley Vol. I p. 37.

[97] Capital—Marx Vol. I pp. 93-4.

[98] History of Greece—Curtius, Vol. II, p. 539.

[99] History of Rome—Mommsen Vol. II p. 452.

Gibbon tells us that a pound of Indian silk was worth a pound of gold,[100] and that the balance of payments was met by heavy taxes extorted from the provinces.[101] The integrity of the Roman coinage, that common denominator of all trade and commerce, was maintained despite the revolutionary changes among the political luminaries. Banking, usury and speculation had reached a high level of perfection.

Plutarch writes in his lively fashion that Crassus "observing how extremely subject the city was to fire and falling down of houses, by reason of their height and their standing so near together, he bought slaves that were builders and architects, and when he had collected these to the number of more than five hundred, he made it his practice to buy houses that were still on fire, and those in the neighborhood, which, in the immediate danger and uncertainty the proprietors were willing to part with for little or nothing, so that the greater part of Rome, at one time or other, came into his hands." [102]

Mommsen points out what to us is the specific difference between the capitalism of Rome and that of modern times. "Commerce flourished; but it was universally non-reciprocal. Even on the northern frontier the Romans did not seem to have been able to give merchandise in exchange for slaves who were brought in numbers from the Celtic and probably even from the Germanic territories." [103] Modern capitalism is essentially an exchange of value equivalents with the settlement of the balance of payment in the universal equivalent, gold.

HISTORIC ROLE OF FREE CITIES IN DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

Cities under Roman jurisdiction were allowed great latitude of internal administration [104] by the pragmatical imperial policy. "The privileges of the municipal cities of Italy were originally founded on the republican institutions of Rome herself; the supreme power, so far as it was conceded, and the choice of magistrates, rested with the assembly of the citizens. But after Tiberius took this away from the Roman comita to vest it in the Senate, it appears that this example was followed in every provincial city." [105]

[100] The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon Vol. I p. 49.
[101] Ibid. Vol. I p. 141.
[102] Plutarch's Lives; on Marcus Crassus p. 651 Mod. Lib. Ed.
[103] History of Rome—Mommsen Vol. II p. 460.
[104] General History of Civilization in Modern Europe—Guizot p. 145.
[105] The Middle Ages—Hallam p. 139.

With the collapse of the empire and the resultant anarchy, every town besought help for its self-protection. "Every town, except within the royal domains was subject to some lord. In episcopal cities the bishop possessed a considerable authority; and in many there was a class of resident nobility." [106] Many cities were entirely free and depended on their own walls and the courage of its burghers to maintain their independence. Others received liberal grants of local autonomy at the hands of the central power in exchange for onerous taxes which were nothing less than periodic ransoms. Their fortunes fluctuated in inverse ratio to the strength or necessities of the exactor.

But in course of time a body of rights and privileges grew up around the towns which even King John was compelled to recognize in the Great Charter by the terms of Article Thirteen. Sometimes the cities rebelled, and either re-won or newly established their local sovereignty. In all cases they were the mecca of independent spirits, freedmen, and escaped serfs in search of asylum, civil or ecclesiastical.[107]

Through wealth accumulated by trade and industry they could make loans and sometimes dictate terms to lord or king. By diplomatic moves at critical times, particularly in aligning themselves with the central power as against a host of petty feudal despots, they in time helped create a politically solidified nation, the prerequisite for that freedom of movement which was the essence of the laissez-faire period of capitalist economy. The humble Germanic towns became the powerful Hanseatic League, and were the pattern for other confederacies in North Germany.[108]

As centers of manufacture, trade and commerce, the cities were in a position to satisfy the taste for luxuries on the part of the feudal aristocracy. At first pure and simple unadulterated force was the proper medium for effecting a transaction. Sometimes the town was captured after a struggle, but its skilled inhabitants had either succumbed on the battlements, or had yielded up industry to the futility of unremunerative toil. Often also the town was successful in repulsing assault with painful consequences to their tormentors.

The final upshot was mutual recognition of each other's sphere in the scheme of things and the establishment of a complementary advantageous basis for intercourse. "The enfranchisement of the towns or communities in the eleventh century was the fruit of a real insurrection, of a real war—a war declared by the population of the cities against their lords. The first fact which we always meet with in annals of this nature, is the rising of the burgesses, who seize whatever arms they can lay their hands on;—it is the expulsion by the people of the lord, who come for the purpose of levying contributions, some for extortion. . . . After a war had continued a certain time, whatever may be the belligerent parties, it naturally leads to a peace. The treaties of peace between the cities and their adversaries were so many charters. These charters were so many positive treaties of peace between the burgesses and their lords." [109] Often royalty intervened, or was called in by the respective parties. Whatever the immediate gains of the temporary victors, in the long run the aggrandizement of the central power was the result.

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[106] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam Vol. I p. 216.

[107] General History of Civilization in Modern Europe—Guizot p. 135.

[108] History of Germany—Lewis pp. 325-329.

FEUDALISM IN ITALY—ROLE OF CITY-STATE

Feudalism was never established in Italy with the same thoroughness it attained in France and England. After a series of conquests by Visigoth, Lombard, Norman and Saracen, Italy was broken up into numerous dukedoms, principalities and independent cities. Feudalism, the particular gift of Germany to world systems of government, was introduced by them into the peninsula by the establishment of rural lords, who eventually succumbed to the power of the city-states.

It was this extraordinary fluidity of Italian political forms which produced that intellectual mobility as the essential precursor of the Renaissance. "Thus, the principal cities, and especially Milan, reached, before the middle of the twelfth century, a degree of population very far beyond that of the capitals of the great kingdoms. Within their strong walls and deep trenches, and in the midst of their well-peopled streets the industrious dwelt secure from the the license of armed pillagers and the oppression of feudal tyrants. Artisans, whom the military landowners contemned, acquired and deserved the right of bearing arms for their own defense. Their occupations became liberal, because they were the foundations of political franchises; the citizens were classed in companies according to their respective crafts, each of which had its tribune or standard-bearer." [110]

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[109] General History of Civilization in Modern Europe—Guizot pp. 137-8. See also Wealth of Nations—Smith Book III Ch. III.

[110] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam Vol. I p. 295.

The turbulent politics of Italian cities created the possibilities of great social transformations which eventually were stifled by Charles the Fifth and the Jesuits; but its intellectual stimulations bore rich fruit in Germany, France and England.

COURSE OF SPANISH FEUDALISM

Historical processes in Spain about the tenth century exhibited the same tangled skein in its political and economic institutions. These were the result of successive conquests first by the Visigoths, then by the Saracens during the irresistible military career of early Mohammedanism, followed by the slow process of conquest by attrition under Spanish kings who finally re-won the peninsula for Christianity. The reconquered territory was claimed and held by the nobility as waste land won from the vanquished. The result was vast landed estates with an impoverished peasantry ruthlessly exploited, devoid even of the feudal privileges which the necessities of the nobility of England and France had hardened into traditions of obligations in exchange for certain rights.

Military orders attained great estates through their victories and ruled them like conquered provinces that were inhabited not by their own kinsmen, but as the former property of the Moors.

As an offset, the exigencies of the time dictated the issuance of extensive charters to some of the towns. "In recompense for such liberal concessions the incorporated towns were bound to certain money payments, and to military service. This was absolutely due from every inhabitant without dispensation or substitution, unless in case of infirmity. The royal governor and the magistrates, as in the simple times of primitive Rome, raised and commanded the militia; who in a service always short, and for the most part necessary, preserved that delightful consciousness of freedom, under the standard of their fellow citizens and chosen leaders, which no mere soldier can enjoy." [111]

This spirit of independence helped create the material basis of a progressive economy in commerce, trade and industry, which in turn was a powerful lever for maintaining their liberties built on the military organization among the inhabitants. For the infrequent meetings of the Cortes these towns received writs for the election of deputies. At the Cortes of Burgos in 1315, there were one hundred and ninety-two representatives from more than ninety towns;

[111] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam, Vol. I, p. 429.

at that of Madrid in 1391, one hundred and twenty-six were sent from fifty towns.[112]

Early royalty was obliged to recognize the power of this Third Estate. The kings had to swear observance of the laws enacted by the Cortes and to preserve the liberties of their people. Gradually the power of this legislative body was annihilated, while its enactments became mere formal recognition of the reigning will; and after the mummery attending an accession, when it was called into being, dissolved itself to meet at royal pleasure.

Instead of developing democratic forms as in the northern countries, an overwhelming aristocratic order and ecclesiastical institutions crushed out the early evidences of popular power. The General Privileges of 1283 declared that the Cortes was to meet in annual session; [113] the encroachments of despotism annulled that solemn pledge while swearing fealty to its principles at every coronation.

RESUME OF FEUDALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

In this brief analysis of basic social forces during the Middle Ages certain conclusions have been drawn which are collateral to the main question. It is quite possible for the reader to reject these conclusions without jeopardy to the principal thesis here developed; namely, that events recorded by history are the result of circumstances arising from the operation of social forces in a limited social background.

Necessarily these forces originate from the division of groups within society, and it is needless now either to dogmatize or generalize whether they are complementary or antagonistic, or whether they are influenced most by material, spiritual, ethical or purely personal considerations, or by a combination of them in various proportions. If divisions within society are the basis for the creation of social movement, it follows that the greater the complexity of these divisions, the more varied will be the historical pattern; and the greater the opportunity for their movement, the more intricate will be the social structure. Homogeneity of the social structure will tend toward stability and stagnation; heterogeneity will result in greater adaptability toward variation, and, under favorable circumstances, to progress. This profound truth was well recognized by Spencer, who, however, never grasped the inner significance of its dialectical implications.

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[112] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam, Vol. I, p. 440.

[113] The Middle Ages—Hallam, p. 257.

DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL FORCES PREVAILING IN MODERN WESTERN EUROPE

Let us examine the social organization of Western Europe to-day. If we view the economic structure first, it is not because of bias toward economic determinism. On the contrary, where intellectual freedom was first achieved, there we find the highest development of economic organization and the most democratic form of government. That there is an intimate connection between the freedom of the spirit and the economic development of society, the growth of democratic forms in Modern Western Europe amply demonstrates.

From the standpoint of general social progress England's supremacy stands unquestioned. There the people are really the masters of their own destiny. That they make no intelligent use of that power is another question. They have the power, though they may, in the opinion of certain schools of thought, lack the will and more else besides to use it. But that now is not our problem.

This popular power itself is but of recent origin, and the result of progressive development by gradual accretions through the centuries. That which France accomplished in one fell swoop under the flaming torch of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," the English people won by nibbling and cribbling, taking one redoubt at a stride, combining first with industrial capitalists to repeal the Corn Laws, then forming a strategic alliance with the revengeful landed aristocracy to force through the Ten Hour Bill.

That great apostle of revolution, Marx, summed up the difference between the two nations as follows: "France limps slowly behind England. The February revolution (1848) was necessary to bring into the world the 12-hour law which is much more deficient than its English original. For all that, the French revolutionary method has its special advantages. It once and for all commands the same limit to the working day in all shops and factories without distinction, whilst English legislation reluctantly yields to the pressure of circumstances, now on this point, now on that, and is getting lost in a hopelessly bewildering tangle of contradictory enactments. On the other hand, the French law proclaims as a principle that which in England was only won in the name of children, minors and women, and has been only recently for the first time claimed as a general right."[114]

Engels puts the difference between English and French political development succinctly: "Originally an oppressed estate liable to pay dues to the ruling feudal nobility, recruited from serfs and villeins of every type, the burghers conquered one position after another in their continuous struggle with the nobility, and finally, in the most highly developed countries, took power in its stead: in France, by directly overthrowing the nobility; in England, by making it more and more bourgeois, and incorporating it as the ornamental head of the bourgeoisie itself." [115]

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[114] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, p. 328.

English economic progress was the counterpart of its political progress, with no question as to precedence. One was the condition for the further development of the other, and intellectual progress constituted the foundation for both. One need only to recapitulate the steps: The decay of the ancient nobility through internal wastage and civil war; the growing power of parliament; the struggle against Catholicism and the Papacy; the series of events from 1640 to 1689 resulting in the Great Revolution, the Bill of Rights, the development of parties, a responsible ministry and the freedom of the press; the ultimate abolition of rotten boroughs, extension of the franchise, curbing of the House of Lords, and the modern rise of the Labor Party as the harbinger of the movement for a new social order developed from the womb of the old;—all this is well known to the student of history.

THE ROLE OF THE ENGLISH BOURGEOISIE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION

Economically the burghers of the towns situated on water-ways became great merchants who amassed fortunes through the manipulation of the variations between costs of production of different countries, and the products of different civilizations. To-day merchant-capital is merely the intermediary between production and consumption, whereas in the past merchants started, regulated and controlled the inter-charge between the polar extremes of the economic process.

In time, production assumed the ascendent role through advances in technical skill and the application of scientific knowledge to industrial processes. The mercantile system gave way to industrial capital. Free trade was its watchword, freedom to buy and sell unrestrained in the markets of the world; freedom to produce and trade unhampered by government restrictions within the realm.[116]

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[115] Anti-Duhring—Engels, p. 186.

[116] Wealth of Nations—Smith, p. 851.

This was the basis of the paeans to laissez faire by its classic advocate, Adam Smith.

Political philosophy assumed a parallel course. Buckle protested against governmental interference with the natural relation between producers and consumers; similarly he protested against the artificial stimulation of manufactures through tariffs under the pretense of promoting industry and protecting native labor against foreign competition. Against this protective principle in any of its forms Buckle wrote some of his sharpest passages. "The great enemy of civilization is the protective spirit; by which I mean the notion that society cannot prosper, unless the affairs of life are watched over and protected at nearly every turn by the state and the church; the state teaching men what they are to do, and the church teaching them what they are to believe." [117]

This was the prevailing philosophy of the 19th century. It gradually yielded to the exigencies of the time in the 20th with its social legislation, curbing of monopolies, regulation of utilities and programs for public health and housing. Where industry had opposed governmental interference, it now welcomed control of imports, and supported an armed foreign policy with the view to dominating markets and sources of supply bought with its own exchange as the prized international valuta.

Culturally its keynote was science and technology, with faint genuflections to the art and literary achievements of a by-gone age. In a practical age the banker towered above the churchman, and the philosopher was too insignificant to merit even contempt. It also had its idealism, but of a sort that dealt with mass alleviation rather than the vicarious pleasures of obtrusive personal philanthropy.

Education was widespread and superficial, with its point of view adjusted to the requirements of the ruling economic class, while the masses were held in a bondage nonetheless real because it was concealed by all sorts of ideological refinements. True, the bondage was of their own making, and the key to freedom through the ballot was in their own hand awaiting only the will for emancipation. Parliament still ruled supreme, while the people cast the decisive votes. If democracy failed to achieve its inherent possibilities in England, it was because while the English masses voted Parliaments into periodic power, Parliament itself remained as the permanent committee of the English landed and moneyed aristocracy.

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[117] History of Civilization in England—Buckle, Vol. II, p. 1.

HISTORIC ROLE OF THE FRENCH BOURGEOISIE

France achieved the same goal but by methods distinctively French. Feudal lords succumbed to the centralizing influence of the throne which tended to become autocratic. Where the States-General had become but an empty form, in England the representative of the Estates was welding a new political power. Feudalism lasted two hundred years longer in France after it had dissolved itself in England, and the method of its extinction was the conscious act of the people in storming the Bastille in contrast to the English dissolution by evaporation. An attempt in the 17th century to revive the power of the French Parliament through the wars of the Fronde failed because of the uncertain union of contradictory elements in the struggle against the crown upon which both the nobility and the people had embarked.

Without any unity of action or aim, and by turns excited and dismayed by the examples that came to them from England, the Frondeurs had to guide them no Hampden or Cromwell; while the masses had not reached to a state of self-realization as in Puritan England. "They had at their back neither people nor army. The English had been able to accomplish a revolution; the Fronde had failed before the dexterous prudence of Mazarin and the queen's fidelity to her minister," concluded Guizot[118] in his masterful history of that period.

The Fronde failed precisely because it was not a class movement—that powerful engine of social progress—such as had aligned the masses passionately behind the English Parliament, and the aristocracy as fervently behind Charles I. The French showed no lack of Hampdens and Cromwells when the National Convention of 1789 spoke in the name of the people and, later, to rally defenders against foreign intervention. Revolution and counter-revolution is the history of French political progress, with each recession leaving a crest still higher than the highest point of the last success. Napoleon followed Robespierre, himself was displaced by a Bourbon, who yielded to Orleans, and he to the bourgeois Napoleon the Little. The Paris Commune of 1871 was drowned in blood by the enemy of Sedan whom the French ruling class called in to quell their still more fearful proletarian opponent in Paris. Political anachronisms still exist in the French parliamentary machinery, but the French peasant is a republican if only because he now tills the soil his ancestors forcibly wrested from the nobility and the church.

[118] History of France—Guizot, Vol. IV, p. 196.

Two great princes of the Church, Richelieu and Mazarin, proved that in a crucial struggle the Frenchman looks to Paris first and to Rome afterwards. The reformation was accomplished by Frenchifying the Catholic Church where in Spain it was Romanized. Where France finally emancipated itself from the influence of the Jesuits, in Spain it was deeply intrenched despite a temporary expulsion. Rabelais and Montaigne laid the ground for Voltaire and Rousseau. Industry, commerce, art and literature thrived in an atmosphere of sophisticated tolerance cautioned by the occasional restraint of a hereditary despotism, whose head nevertheless prided himself upon being the first gentleman in France.

From the standpoint of wealth, France suffered the penalty of being part of the continental system with its vital interests in Europe, while its internal economic requirements compelled a curb to the growth of population. Adam Smith points out that in his time (1776) the population of England was less than eight million, while the number of the inhabitants of France was twenty-four million; yet England raised by taxation ten million pounds quite easily, while France had to bleed its people white to mulct from them fifteen million pounds.[119] This difference was the reflection of their respective economies, where the English exploited the world, and the French nobility exploited chiefly their people.

France became an imperial power in the classical sense, while the English had learned the modern technique of exploitation. That is why to-day the same England has a population of forty-five million, an increase of over four hundred per-cent, while France's population has been relatively stagnant for a long while with an increase to forty-two million or only seventy-five per-cent during the same period. That there is no absolute law of population is a principle which neither Anderson nor Smith nor Malthus after him could understand; that population is regulated by the state of the prevailing mode of production is a truth Marx long ago discovered and which our literary cognoscenti have not yet unearthed to apply to the disquieting tendencies in current American growth.

LIMITED ROLE OF CAPITALISM IN MODERN ITALY

Modern Italy is faced by the problems left unsolved for four hundred years after Charles the Fifth had crushed the Reformation, and the Inquisition had extinguished the Renaissance.[120] Both were

[119] The Wealth of Nations—Smith, p. 856.

[120] Renaissance In Italy—Symonds, Vol. I, p. 293.

the offspring of Spanish policy, and both were effectual means of Italian national retardation long after Spain had relapsed into that torpor from which she has not yet been aroused, despite the heroic efforts of the ill-fated Republican Government which collapsed before Franco. The cities of Italy shone like brilliant luminaries in the darkness of the Middle Ages until the black pall of dogmatism extinguished the light after the conqueror had wrought his will.

Yet the world will never, can never, forget its debt to the great and noble Italian people. The star of our civilization first shone over that beautiful land, and the forces of regeneration set in motion by Mazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi have proven how deep and rich courses the creative stream in the blood of that immortal people.

Feudalism first succumbed before the onslaughts of the burghers of the Italian cities. Surrounded by the castellated strongholds of the aristocracy, they laid siege to them, or conquered them by wiles where force was ineffective. But they were conquered by one means or another. As an evidence of their submission the lords were compelled to live in the towns, and that explains the anamoly of lordly palaces within the walls of Italian cities.

These thriving centers carried on the trade between the Orient and Europe. Industry, manufactures and commerce were the source of their wealth and expanding power. Business integrity of the highest order won for them the proud distinction of being the bankers of Europe. Their noble families were of commerical origin. The great Medici gained favor by siding with the proletariat in their local struggles. The long conflict of Guelf and Ghibelline factions were essentially class struggles, with the former representing the commercial class, the latter the party of the nobiilty. "The Guelf party meant the burghers of the consular Communes, the men of industry and commerce, the upholders of civil liberty, the friends of democratic expansion. The Ghibelline party included the naturalized nobles, the men of arms and idleness, the advocates of feudalism, the politicians who regarded constitutional progress with disfavor. That the banner of the Church floated over the one camp, while the standard of the Empire rallied to itself the hostile party, was a matter of comparatively superficial moment. The true strength of the war lay in the population divided by irreconcilable ideals, each eager to possess the city for itself, each prepared to die for its adopted principles." [121]

That the Church supported the one side and finally betrayed both was a decisive factor in the submergence of Italy which followed the conflict. Spanish power saved Italy from further invasion and the brutal despoliation of the character suffered by Rome in 1527 at the hands of itinerant bands of roving robbers organized as armies.

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[121] Renaissance In Italy—Symonds, Vol. I, p. 36.

Peace reigned after the Spanish invasion and conquest. Jesuits preached the temporal power of Kings to support the absolute power of Popes. Internal struggles ceased. Popular revolutions ceased. Commerce and industry languished. The enterprising Italian spirit vanished. That magnificent, glorious Italy that lighted up the torch of progress in the Middle Ages for Europe and for the world was no more. Its genius was extinguished. Its creative spirit descended to the Baroque. Only to read the names of its noble sons who gave of their abounding greatness to art, literature, poetry, music, architecture, science, history and philosophy, is but to heighten the anguish occasioned by the world's irreparable loss. But Italy still lives. Thank God, it still lives despite the darkness of the Fascist gloom. Upon its sacred soil still live the inheritors of the Italian spirit. May it soon blossom forth in the radiant effulgence of its imperishable glory.

Italy entered the twentieth century burdened with the accumulated infirmities of the past. Surrounded by virile capitalist economies she was confronted with the choice of relapsing into economic serfdom under their tutelage, or modernizing her own on a competitive basis. But the world markets were pre-empted, the colonies divided, the sea-lanes bottled up and closely guarded. To survive or succumb, that was the issue, and while the soul of Italy still lived there could be but one answer. Her politics were dictated by her necessities, and the rise of Mussolini was made possible only because her democracy had failed to meet the issue in a world of imperialist policies, where "democracy" itself is an ideological weapon of conquest on the part of virile capitalist powers.

SPAIN'S ABORTIVE INSTITUTIONS

The very creators of Spain's greatness were the indubitable causes of her decay. Eight hundred years of continuous conflict against the Moors had endeared the Church to the masses for its unflinching, unending, uncompromising struggle to wrest from the infidel the soil dedicated to Christ. Loyalty to the sovereign, obedience to the military chieftains was indelibly engraved on the national consciousness. Cervantes at a later date might win their plaudits at his brilliant caricature of romantic chivalry, but in its time the Cid and its infinite variations in poetry and prose fired the imagination and stirred the blood of that brave people. A fortunate succession of able sovereigns raised Spain from insignificant rank to the hegemony of Europe and the mastery of the New World, creating an empire which for sheer magnitude has never been surpassed in the annals of history. Ferdinand and Isabella, Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second formed a line of rulers who for sheer ability in a successive period has never been equalled. So powerful was the momentum of their greatness, that over a hundred years of ineptitude and imbecility that followed them to the throne could scarcely undo the great work they had accomplished.

But wise rulers alone do not make a great nation, nor does imbecility alone ruin a great one. Some of England's greatest political successes and its greatest success, the industrial revolution, were achieved under the reign of the insane George the Third.

Spain had no industrial revolution because the national economy was successfully throttled to serve the needs of the aristocracy. Aristocrats suffer chronically from the lack of revenues; no matter how great these were, a deficiency always ensued. Hence the ruthless exploitation of the surface wealth both at home and in the colonies, while domestic manufacture languished and vast areas of the native arable soil were left uncultivated.[122]

Trade with their opulent colonies was narrowly restricted to selected ports from whence a limited number of ships could depart at a stated time. The rate of profit was high, but its mass kept constantly diminishing as the accumulated wealth of the Aztec and Inca states was rapidly drained off and the replacements, despite the slave-drivers' lash, was disappointingly slow. Spain had not learned that the value of a single annual crop from the tobacco fields of Virginia gave more wealth to both the planters and the English merchants, than the Conquistadors were able to tear from the sacred temples of Indian civilization accumulated over the centuries.

CAUSES OF SPANISH DECLINE

As Spain's government languished, torpor seized the nation, affected its military forces, palsied its hand in Europe, while vitality remained only in the colonial extremities of the empire. "Then, truly, did she drink to the dregs the cup of her own shame. Her glory had departed from her, she was smitten down and humbled. The mistress of the world, the queen of the ocean, the terror of

[122] The Wealth of Nations—Smith, pp. 239, 395.

nations, was gone; her power was gone, no more to return. . . . The real and overriding cause, which determined the whole march and tone of affairs, was the existence of that loyal and reverential spirit which made the people submit to what any other country would have spurned, and, by accustoming them to place extreme confidence in individual men, reduced the nation to that precarious position in which a succession of incompetent princes was sure to overthrow the edifice which competent ones had built up." [123]

And Adam Smith, the great apostle of individual enterprise and laissez faire during the infancy of modern capitalism when it was itself a revolutionary force in society, asks with unusual feeling: "Have the exorbitant profits of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon augmented the capital of Spain and Portugal? Have they alleviated the poverty, have they promoted the industry of those two beggarly countries?" [124]

For centuries since the knell to its former greatness was sounded Spain slept fitfully on in its corner of Europe but little disturbed by the throbbing pulse of life about it. Once a ruler roused sufficient energy to expel the Jesuits, only for this Order to be restored again by another ruler amidst the rejoicings of a devoutly religious populace. Occasionally there were rumblings of liberalism, to be silenced again by the overwhelming lassitude of a people born to believe and taught to obey. There have been insurrections but no rebellions. There have been adaptations but no inventions. There has been a republic without the republican spirit. But even that pale ghost has been put to rest by Franco with the active aid of Hitler and Mussolini and the quiet indifference of England and France.

Spain lives with its feet in the twentieth century and its spirit buried in the sixteenth. Being so placed, it actually feels itself to be the foremost where the world sees the hindmost. The sick man of Europe used to be Turkey; later it was the Balkans; to-day unquestionably it is the Iberian peninsula. The spirited and chivalrous people of Spain and Portugal once thrilled the world with the glory of their achievements. Such qualities in a still virile people—as Napoleon discovered—cannot die. Being dormant they are capable of being aroused; and once awakened the world will again resound with the glory of their deeds attuned to a new era, and blazing a path once more in newer fields as did the honored heroes of their imperishable past.

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[123] History of Civilization in England—Buckle, Vol. II, pp. 23-4.

[124] The Wealth of Nations—Smith, p. 578.

ATROPHY IN GERMANY'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

After the glorious period of Frederick I, called Barbarossa by the Italians, when the imperial crown of Caesar was bestowed upon the House of Hohenstaufen as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the annals of Germany during the fourteenth and fifteenth century appear colorless. The really great achievements of the plodding human race often lack the zestful exuberance of glittering personalities, and if they do shine it is only the future generations who appreciate their merit.

So it was in Germany. Towns grew up, maintained their independence, carried on industry and manufacture, built ships and sailed them to distant marts. Armed burghers won there independence, and later their paid mercenaries sustained it. Orders of nobility sank into penury by their own waste and slothfulness. Robber knights could not continue endlessly to steal from those who erected mighty ramparts for the protection of their industry, or surrendered that industry where protection failed or was lacking.

Gutenberg introduced the art of printing, and the manufacture of gun-powder for practical purposes was begun by a monk, no less, of the Franciscan order. The attitude of the noble knights toward a soldier using a gun was similar to that of a modern nation lacking means for the manufacture of airplane bombers—it was considered an unethical weapon of war, and short shrift awaited the musketeer who had the misfortune to be captured, while the bowman received the honors of war. Knighthood could no longer wax poetic behind its steel armor when the uncouth plebeian could lay him low with a single shot at a safe distance.

World history might have been substantially the same without Luther; neither side of such an argument is capable of proof, because no proof can be sustained against an actuality with the suggestion of a probability. That Luther could not have preached without a Church, nor denounced so effectively unless that Church was profligate, nor reformed its creed and practice unless the times were ripe for such a transformation;—these are truisms which must meet with acceptance by the inquiring mind. Germany carried on the struggle for the Reformation, sometimes alone, and the Reformation affected even the Counter-Reformation of the Catholic Church through the Council of Trent and the labors of Loyola, which resulted in the modernization of that world-embracing institution.

The Thirty Years' War ended in the dismemberment of Germany in 1648. Its aftermath of ruin, disorganization, and banditry actually resulted in a temporary throw-back of Germany to barbarism, and a political reversal from which it did not fully recover for over two hundred years. Before Bismark, Germany was only "a geographical expression." After the war of 1870 and Sedan, she emerged the most powerful empire of Europe.

But like Italy this national unity arrived a little too late in history; that is, too late without undergoing the necessity of upsetting several competitive imperial apple-carts. As a virile nation with an expanding capitalist economy she needed markets; she needed raw materials; she needed safety for her water-borne commerce; she needed to establish the German mark as an international medium of exchange. The colonial world was already partitioned between England and France, with their satellites Portugal, Holland and Belgium holding rich empires by their sufferance.

The inevitable conflict for world hegemony, the political aspect of economic security for imperialist capitalism, came in 1914. The treaty of Versailles proved to be but a truce. To destroy Germany the Allies would have had to demolish the material basis of her national existence and turn that land into pasture fields. If the implacable Ghengis Khan could have been persuaded from doing that to China in the thirteenth century,[125] it can readily be understood why Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson could not perpetrate such a deed in the twentieth century. Germany's problems in a capitalist economy still exist. Those needs for her are paramount to every other consideration. The recuperative powers of twenty years have steeled them to a renewal of the struggle and the battle is now on.

EXISTENCE OF HISTORICALLY CONDITIONED SOCIAL FORCES IS ESTABLISHED

In the course of this brief survey of the historical development of over a thousand years many conclusions have been stated without attempting to adduce adequate proof. It would have been far beyond the scope of this inquiry to have undertaken to do so. The reader is entitled now to demur to any or all of these incidental conclusions. It can be claimed that the material factors have been given a preponderant role at the expense of the ideological motivations. It can be contended that over-emphasis has been placed on the development of towns, commerce and industry instead of learning, culture, religious and ethical conceptions. A strong case can be made for the role played by great leaders in the various vital activities of social existence. In fact the reader at the present stage of our analysis is entitled to substitute his own factors for ours in every decisive step in the development of mankind during those years.

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[125] The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon, Vol. I, p. 1209.

But there is one thing he cannot do. He cannot escape the ineluctible conclusion that historic events do develop in a suitable social background, and that without social groups there could be no social forces and therefore no history.

Social forces have been defined, as the actions arising between groups of human beings bearing a definite relation toward each other in a given time and place. Some may be inclined to ask, why all this bother about a truism accepted by everybody? Our reply is that this alleged truism has been for most an inchoate concept, and a phrase uncritically accepted without examining the possibilities of that concept.

Society has been taken for granted. The groupings within society have been fully described by many writers but the reasons for them have been little understood. Why men act as they do has intrigued the best minds of every generation, and the upshot of their synthetic opinion to-day is that man is an unknowable and unpredictable creature, with infinite possibilities latent in the permutation of personalities and events.

By demonstrating that history is the record of events in society, our next step has been to establish that society is not an amorphous body, nor an organism where each part functions according to its pre-determined nature, but that it is composed of various aggregates or groupings whose actions toward each other are determined by their social relations.

These relations are various in character, growing in definiteness as society develops, and increasing in complexity with increasing differentiation. So far we have advanced but little over the Spencerian formula. To emphasize the material basis of the prevailing mode of production and exchange of a given epoch of our civilization as the determining factor of the ideological superstructure of an historical epoch is merely to re-iterate what Marx has already taught.

Our object so far has been to prove that at a given period in history the social relations are determined and the reactions of each group and their inter-actions within the group are established by the combination of all the motivating factors of human conduct—

material, moral, spiritual, aesthetic, with all their normal and abnormal psychological reflexes.

Since our conception of history does not deal with isolated individual motivations, but considers them only in their social relations, we dismiss completely individual motivating elements without social significance. In our discussion of the individual and society we gave due heed to the importance of the individual unit and how his wants and desires, his loves, hates, fears, yearnings and superstitions condition his personality and modify his relations to his fellow men. But once those relations affect society in the gross they enter into a larger orbit and become a movement within a movement.

While their complexity offers some difficulties to their analysis, these are not insuperable difficulties if it can be established that definite social forces are created out of definite social relations which act upon and modify each other but are nonetheless the condition for each other's existence.

This we have attempted to prove by pointing out the various social groupings during medievalism and in modern society. The former was characterized by the basic feudal relations between the nobility and the serfs, their ecclesiastical institutions, governmental forms and internal conflicts and the ideological efflorescences associated with the generic phrase, the Middle Ages; while modern capitalist society is characterized by the basic relations of the mode of production with the private ownership of capital producing for profit on the one hand, and the sale of labor power, physical and mental, by those whose chief means of support is from wages and salaries on the other.

One may take exception to this characterization of modern society, but the challenge is made quite directly that no matter how one undertakes to describe the reactions of the social groupings, the existence of social groups and their mutual relations—in short, the existence of social forces in history, must be conceded if history is at all susceptible of rational analysis.

Since there are not lacking those who maintain the latter, there is one final proof which science reserves for the sceptical mind, the prediction of future events on the basis of our knowledge of the social structure and the social forces to which it gives rise. Some may even deny the existence of social forces altogether. So may one deny the existence of gravitation, taking care, however, not to walk off the roof of a very tall building.

This method of analysis once and for all settles the argument of the historian's personal frame of reference. Many scientists approach their subject with distinct predilections and personal dogmas. Pretty soon they discovered that there are certain laws which govern their particular phenomena, and that their penetration into the processes of those laws depended upon the degree in which they succeeded in divesting themselves of pre-conceived notions. In brief, intellectually they entered into the nature of the reality in order to understand it and, if possible, to control it.

For this reason we can afford to be generous with each other at the present point of our analysis, and let each choose for himself the social forces which, in his judgment, most adequately account for those important effects we label historic events. Later on as we refine and develop the nature of these social forces, we will observe how they operate in their various media, how they affect, and are in turn transformed by their media. We shall understand the construction of the social medium itself, see how it evolved, and is evolving. Then we will have to do what every scientist is compelled to do, and modify our conceptions to accord with the facts, if our theories are to reflect faithfully the reality of the outer world as we observe it.

The phrase "social forces" is often met with among historians. To them it is but a generic term which stands for a composition or mixture in various proportions of all the known motivating agents, individual and collective, volitional or involuntary, conscious or sub-conscious in origin.

One is reminded here of the contention advanced by Engels concerning the claim as to who originated the theory of surplus value. After pointing out that although Priestley and Scheele had produced oxygen long before Lavoisier, it is the latter who is justly honored as the father of chemistry because he knew the significance of what he had discovered, Engels wrote: "Marx stands in the same relation to his predecessors in the theory of surplus value that Lavoisier maintains to Priestley and Scheele. . . . He saw that he had to deal neither with dephlogisticised air, nor with fire-air, but with oxygen." [126]

Our immediate problem is to describe the character of the social structure, to analyze how the social forces originate, how they operate, and how they are modified; to establish whether they are governed by laws; and if so, whether these are causal or indeterministic in character; to consider the role of human will; to dissect the nature of progress, and to discover if there is any progress, aim, purpose or destiny in history. And after we shall have established the field for the operation of these social forces, we will test the completed theory by the established facts of American history.

[126] Capital—Marx; preface by Engels. Vol. II, pp. 23-4.

CHAPTER III

The Structure of Society and Its Component Divisions

A. THE INTERNAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES IN SOCIETY

AT A given moment, the quantitative structure of a civilized society is definite, and the qualitative nature of its functional divisions is prescribed and their mode of operation is established. In reality civilized society is a constantly changing aggregate consisting of the totality of all its component divisions. These divisions are the state, the economy, and the ideological superstructure.

Each division is itself susceptible of minute sub-division, with inter-locking activities trespassing upon each other. But no matter how particularized the activity, it must fall into one of the three main divisions.

The state may itself be engaged in production or distribution of products, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, or in the marketing of agricultural products, but fundamentally its function is to govern and enforce the laws of the nation. A particular economy may be so closely associated with the powers of government that it is difficult to point out where one ends and the other begins. Such is the case in the Soviet Union to-day. Many thousands have since paid the penalty with their lives in questioning either the nature of the economy or the Socialist character of the Soviet state.

By the ideological superstructure we include men's ideas, thoughts, religious conceptions and group emotional outlets; their beliefs, dogmas and aspirations, some of which assume definite shape and organized expression during a particular phase of historical development. There are times when the ideological superstructure controls both the state and the economy, or one might with equal justice contend that the state dominated both, or the economy the other two. The Roman Catholic Church during the apogee of its power in the Middle Ages in addition to its authority over the religious spirit, exercised a preponderant influence over the state, and as the greatest single land-holder in Christendom, was also a tremendous economic power. The Soviet state seeks sole domination over the internal economy outside of petty handicrafts and production for personal use, while it attempts to effect complete control over the ideology of its people insofar as it affects the welfare of the state.

SOCIETY IN ITS DYNAMIC ASPECTS

Society as a whole is the independent variable, while its component divisions, the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure, are the dependent variables. All three combined determine at a given time the nature of society, yet society rises above any of its three divisions and limits them within their sphere.

The particular historical period will decide the classification of the divisions in the order of their importance. We will note, for example, that in the period between the outbreak of the American Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution the ideology prevailed over the state, which was then weak, and at times non-existent. This was true of the economy which was badly shattered during the struggle.

After the Civil War and up to the time of Wilson's New Freedom the expanding economy of Big Business and finance capital dominated both the state and the national ideology. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal has tried valiantly, and with fluctuating fortunes, to place the state in a preponderant position. But all three variable factors combined cannot rise above society, since they constitute the totality of the social mechanism, though within the structure they play roles of varying importance.

Societies may be stationary, retrograde, or progressive, to accept for the time Ricardo's classification.[1] Such characterizations are necessarily subjective, unless all are agreed beforehand upon the measuring rod to be employed. But no matter what level a society may have reached on its upward march or in its decline, the relative divisions of the social structure may be the same, or they may modify their internal ratios in various proportions.

In the logical methodology of classical history there should follow the development of the concepts of the state, the economy, and the ideological superstructure together with the consideration of their movement. From our viewpoint this method is unhistorical and unscientific. It is unhistorical because those concepts, insofar as they correctly record the reality, must faithfully mirror the nature of the temporal external world which is in constant flux and movement, and must be the end result of the analysis instead of the starting point for all sorts of subjective rationalizations. It is unscientific because any attempt to define social phenomena without regard to the definite historic relations which brought them forth is indulgence in merest generalities where concrete particularization is required, and leads to the employment of a priori conceptions without reference to time and place. There are no absolute forms of the state or ideal conditions of human society outside of the thoughts which give them origin. Purpose pertains to man, not to the objective realities.

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[1] Political Economy and Taxation—Ricardo, Ch. XI, p. 112.

Happy is the nation whose chronicles are few, runs the adage. Perhaps that nation is happy; it most certainly is stagnant. The inter-play of social forces is essential for a high level of social existence, and the complexity of inner relations within the social structure determines the variety and tempo of their movement.

Mere movement is not enough. Masses of men may be gathered to build a great wall as in China, rear pyramids as in Egypt, or dig ditches to fill them up again as in the early days of work-relief under the New Deal. Gymnasts may exercise and armies may deploy, and yet the social order despite tremendous mass exertions may be of a relatively low, stagnant or declining character.

Certain types of government in Latin America may undergo revolutions every few weeks without affecting its internal social organization outside of a few changes in personalities at the top. Destruction caused by war shows movement enough, and while history is replete with their effects, the social structure even in the most desirable outcome of the struggle, may be but little affected by its results.

But no matter what the form of movement, and the mode of manifestation of the social forces, the state of unstable equilibrium, and the degree of fluidity of motion for groups within the social structure, and of individuals within the groups, must determine the rate of its transformation and therefore the richness of its history. History without such variety of movement ceases to be history for the sheer repetitious nature of the phenomena it is called upon to record.

DIFFERENCE OF SOCIAL POTENTIAL IN THE MAKING OF HISTORY

Mankind instinctively recognizes this law of movement. The freedom to act, to speak, to plan and to devise are the most cherished attributes of human existence in a virile society. There is in society powerful evidences of the existence of the contradictory yet complementary forces of evolution tending toward stability, heredity forms and under sheer necessity the need for adaptation and gradual change. The different aggregates within society in their internal composition are themselves susceptible to the influence of those factors.

Methods of production, distribution, finance and transportation themselves create those forces which, for example, compel one producer to devise serial production in place of heterogeneous production, to substitute steam power for the waterwheel, and replace that improvement with electrical energy. Hand manufacture with tools which are accessory to human skill give place to the machine holding in its giant frame some modification of the handicraftman's tool, and renders him subservient to the motions of the machine where before he was master of his tool.

Competition compels the desperate search for more concentrated methods of distribution in order to cut down to the minimum that necessary but dead expense of social circulation from the sphere of production to the ultimate consumer. Modern finance facilities assist the concentration of myriad small hoards into vast masses of banking capital, and through credit operations speeds up the fundamental processes of the market.

Transportation responds to the need for speed to lessen the tie-up of capital, by affording greater accessibility to sources of supply and to the markets of the world. All these vast processes fraught with such tremendous significance to our economy, require for there coordination the employment of directive energies urged on by the overwhelming need of modern economy to overcome the inertia of tradition or perish in the competitive struggle.

With different social environments different impulses are created. The market place of Teheran bears no resemblance to our Stock Exchange. The Wall Street coffee houses of New York in 1790 were ample for the business of its day. Each social group responds to the needs of its time, and in the creation of those needs they themselves play a vital role. They are bundles of social energy each with their own potential properties, yet part of the entire social mechanism of which they are a segment. The effect becomes the cause of its own more effective adaptation to changes in environment and consequently transforms its internal organization. These manifold potential properties of aggregates within society, and of aggregates within themselves acting and re-acting upon each other in organized movement we call the difference of social potential.

The potential properties of social aggregates can manifest themselves only in a social medium through forces generated within the social structure. The field of operation for these forces varies with the degree of historical development. Society while definite in structure at a given moment cannot be arbitrarily isolated as to parts and functions, though there can be no harm in such a morphological procedure as is pursued by every science in its theoretical analysis of changing relations. "The structures," says Dewey, "while enduring, are also subject to modification. Continuity is not a bare repetition of identities." [2]

We stated that society is the totality of its three divisions in their mutual inter-actions, the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure. But at any given time the social structure in its totality can be studied as a fluid, mobile aggregate, giving full weight to the inter-play of the various parts. This conception of society with all its aggregates in translatory motion in relation toward each other we call the social continuum.

Our analysis thus far can be summed up as follows: History is the record of events in society. These events are the results of social forces operating in a definite historical field through aggregates of different social potential which constitute the social continuum, and by mutual inter-action determines the nature of the social structure.

Modifications of the social structure must be effected through the influence of forces impressed upon it. The power of those forces will influence the degree of such transformations. History, as we will discover during the course of our investigation, is not in the general direction of ever greater perfectibility. There have been, and there still are regressive movements in the general character of our Civilization.

ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ASIATIC AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION

Guizot is one of a large number of authoritative writers who recognizes the difference of social potential as the main-spring of progress; its absence, the cause of stagnation. After pointing out the stationary character of civilization in India and Egypt he continues: "How different to all this is the case as respects the civilization of modern Europe! Take ever so rapid a glance at this, and it strikes you at once as diversified, confused, and stormy. All the principles of social organization are found existing together within it; powers temporal, powers spiritual, the theocratic, monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements, all classes of society, all the social situations, are jumbled together, and visible within it; as well as infinite gradations of liberty, of wealth, of influence. These various powers, too, are found here in a state of continual struggle among themselves, without any one having sufficient force to master the others, and take sole possession of society. . . . Let it not, I beseech you, be forgotten—bear in mind, as we proceed with these lectures, that it is in this diversity of elements, and their constant struggle, that the essential character of our civilization consists. . . . Modern Europe, indeed is born of this struggle between the different classes of society. I have already shown that in other places this struggle has been productive of very different consequences; in Asia, for example, one particular class has completely triumphed, and the system of castes has succeeded to that of classes, and society there has fallen into a state of immobility."[3]

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[2] Logic: The Theory of Inquiry—Dewey (1938), p. 245.

Without free play for differences of social potential there is no opportunity for progress. A distinguished American sociologist, Lester F. Ward, has demonstrated the importance of sexual differentiation in organic evolution, and the role of war and migrations in stimulating the differences of racial potentialities.[4] Henry Adams has observed this fundamental law. "In Europe or Asia," says he, "except perhaps China, undisturbed social evolution had been unknown. Without disturbance, evolution seemed to cease. Wherever disturbance occurred, permanence was impossible. Every people in turn adapted itself to the law of necessity."[5]

Society cannot exist without stability; yet it cannot progress without change. The forces tending toward the maintenance of the existing order are generally overwhelming. All orders who derive their sustenance, honor or emoluments from the state, its economy and the social institutions are invariably ranked among its defenders; in fact to turn against one's class has always been condemned as an act of apostasy. To these mighty influences must be added the prestige of power and the tremendous inertia of custom, teaching and tradition. It is not to be wondered at that no society ever gave way to another until it virtually collapsed from the ravages of internal degeneration.

Every age has seldom lacked those who come forth with a new idea, a greater vision, a better functional arrangement. Society cannot hearken to every mellifluous note of the advocate. Self-preservation will not permit it to wander recklessly off the established course into every by-path perceived by the dreamer's eager vision.

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[3] General History of Civilization in Western Europe—Guizot, pp. 26, 27, 30, 141.

[4] Dynamic Sociology—Ward, Vol. I, pp. 331-2.

[5] History of the United States—Adams, Vol. IX, p. 222.

Stability, heredity, tradition, running true to type—all these are powerful and essential elements for the survival of society. Nature bears ample evidence that of myriad attempts at variation, only few succeed. But nature also teaches that inability to modify in accordance with new conditions results in stagnation, and often in extinction.

History when viewing the long record of ruined civilizations and mighty empires that passed, though built for eternity, can sum up in a single phrase the cause of their decay: Inability to change. The worship of the past and blind loyalty to the present is the certain road to historical oblivion. As Professor Cheyney puts it: "One hundred per-cent Americanism is more dangerous to the perpetuity of American institutions than a less percentage would be. Established formulas, traditional conceptions, final legal principles, dominating ideals are the mark of a highly specialized, unadaptable, unchangeable community and however elevated or admirable, are forces tending, under this historic law, to its ultimate destruction." [6]

Among the immortal dialogues between Socrates and his disciples, the great iconoclast puts forth a defense of the right to oppose the established order, which for sheer cogency cannot be improved upon after the lapse of over two thousand years. He marshals all the arguments adduced by the defenders of the status quo; custom, honor, tradition, the privileges conferred by the state, the rights one enjoys, even to the opportunity of emigrating to another place of one's better liking, and taking all his worldly goods with him. To all this Socrates, heeding his "mysterious voice" has but one answer: "Let me follow the intimations of the will of God." [7]

Many others throughout history have listened to Socrates' "mysterious voice." Impelled as by that same power which led him to prefer the hemlock to liberty and self-imposed silence, countless others have chosen to listen to the intimations of the will of God and to speak that which is deep within them in the face of overwhelming social pressure. Many of their ideas—most of them—would have led to certain disaster the very society they sought to serve, would have multiplied the evils they desired to cure, and have destroyed where they proclaimed their resolve to build. Yet nevertheless, society would do well to treasure as its dearest possession those few spirits in every generation who hold up the torch toward a better road; conscious that though the particular path indicated would most probably lead to a cataclysm, yet anxious to weigh betimes what modifications are necessary to adopt, if we would escape the unvarying verdict of history: Change or Decay.

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[6] Law in History—Cheyney, p. 15.

[7] Dialogues of Plato—Crito; Or, the Duty of a Citizen, p. 53.

The same Athens which feared the biting tongue of an itinerant teacher allowed satires on the comic stage where everything on earth, and heaven too, could be laughed at and splashed with ridicule.[8] The scoffer is soon forgotten, but the serious teacher is most to be feared for the truths he may propound. Every ruling class has an uneasy consciousness of its own internal limitations. It must therefore be the more adamant in proportion to its weakness.

Suspicion, perhaps fear of the non-conformist, is inherent in all elements of society, and perhaps more so on the part of the masses who follow their instincts and prejudices than by the more reflective who are inclined to balance niceties. The Athenian democracy had an effective way to curb those whom they feared through the device of ostracism and banishment, though for not more than ten years.

Plutarch tells us of Themistocles: "At last the Athenians banished him, making use of the ostracism to humble his eminence and authority, as they ordinarily did with all whom they thought too powerful, or, by their greatness, disproportionable to the equality thought requisite in a popular government."[9] Alexander the Great after his conquest of Greece ordered the cities to re-admit over 20,000 of these exiles.[10] Plato long ago emphasized that while monarchy tends toward tyranny, and aristocracy toward oligarchy, democracy's greatest danger is degeneration to ochlocracy.[11]

All these political consequences, unlike in origin but similar in nature, are tendencies impelled by that great under-current in all forms of life which resists variation as dangerous to its existence; that the type evolved through long generations of gradual development is not lightly to be cast aside, or even modified, to suit the temporary exigencies of the moment.

Conservation of the type and conservatism in political philosophy are forces of tremendously greater importance than variation, or revolution. The sure danger lurking in heedless change is extinction. Conversely, the penalty for inability to change is stagnation and decay. Of the two the latter is the lesser evil. Since life is a constant adaptation to immediate realities and not to remote possibilities, the overwhelming inertia of society is toward conservatism, rather than toward revolution. Yet both are the counterparts

[8] History of Greece—Bury, p. 368.

[9] Plutarch's Lives—Themistocles, p. 148.

[10] History of Greece—Bury, p. 813.

[11] The Republic of Plato; Books VIII and IX.

of each other, mutually antagonistic, insufferable to each other, yet essentially brothers under the skin. Mutation itself is part of the evolutionary process.

SOCIAL PROGRESS THE VARIANT OF SOCIAL FREEDOM

Spencer's political system was consistent with his own philosophy even when it countered his most cherished prejudices. He emphasized that "it is true of a social aggregate, as of every other aggregate, that the state of homogeneity is an unstable state; and that where there is already some heterogeneity, the tendency is toward greater heterogeneity. Lapse from homogeneity, however, or rather, the increase of such heterogeneity as usually exists, requires that the parts shall be heterogeneously conditioned; and whatever prevents the rise of contrasts among conditions, prevents increase of heterogeneity." [12]

Years after toward the close of his great labors Spencer wrote an essay denouncing as superstitions the assumed divine right of parliaments and the implied divine rights of majorities. "While men have abandoned the old theory respecting the source of State-authority, they have retained a belief in that unlimited extent of State-authority which rightly accompanied the old theory, but does not rightly accompany the new one. Unrestricted power over subjects, rationally ascribed to the ruling man when he was held to be a deputy-god, is now ascribed to the ruling body, the deputy-godhood of which nobody asserts." [13] Our bright young moderns may talk glibly about the monolithic state, the totalitarian state and the authoritative state, but when divested of their stream-lined garments these are merely the contemporary expressions of a fundamental impulse to compel uniformity and discourage ultimately the very progress of which they profess themselves champions.

No less an authority than Marx himself has hailed contradiction, or opposition toward the ossification of social forms as the essence of all dialectic, and therefore of historical movement.[14] Suppression of minorities is no longer the exclusive privilege of so-called reactionary states.

Sir Thomas More was infinitely wiser in the moulding of his

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[12] Principles of Sociology—Spencer, Vol. II, p. 288.

[13] The Man Versus the State—Spencer, p. 407.

[14] See the following works by Marx on this fundamental proposition:—Capital, Vol. I, p. 654, also pp. 639, 695, 837; Vol. II, pp. 84, 117 on dialectical unity of opposites in productive process; Vol. III, pp. 499, 522, 706; Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 116-124; Critique of Political Economy, p. 309; Feuerbach by Engels, p. 98.

Utopia than the exponents of allegedly scientific Socialism, for woven into the structure of his society is ample provision for disputation concerning the best ways of effecting man's greater happiness in body and mind. However, while he blessed his society with few laws, he made provision for many slaves.[15] Utopias past and modern have their drawbacks. Historians are much happier in the world of reality.

Progress seems so easy and sure when handed down by the decree of some all-wise and beneficent ruler, who possesses besides the incidental power to compel conformity. Aristotle in his Politics makes a careful note of those great law-givers who legislated for all eternity for states which are now non-existent.[16]

Fiske speaks of "the naïve faith that some sovereign decree or some act of parliament or some cunningly devised constitution or some happily planned referendum will at once accomplish the desired result. But cold, hard experience soon shows that sovereign edicts may be neglected, that it is far easier to make statutes than to enforce them, and that in such a delicate and complex structure as that of society the operation of laws and constitutions is liable to differ very widely from what was anticipated." [17]

The constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics hailed by some of the intelligentsia as the most liberal in the world, would have been of tremendously greater historic significance if it had not descended from on high, but had been gradually worked up clause by clause by a constituent assembly endowed with full power and a people behind them conscious of that power and trained in its effective exercise.

The character of a society does not change by donning a glittering revolutionary garment, if underneath the evolutionary processes have not wrought a paralled transformation in the composition of society. An indomitable heretic like Spinoza could be led by his philosophy to teach obedience to authority as the prime duty of the citizen,[18] while Descartes, the revolutionary trail-blazer in philosophy humbly bows to the dictates of the Catholic Church one hundred years after Calvin.[19]

Greek history records as the prelude to its Golden Era the resolution of the conflict between the debtor and creditor classes by the laws of Solon in the famous Seisachtheia, or Relief Law. "The oligarchy had tried their best to enforce this law of debtor and creditor, with its disastrous series of contrasts, and the only reason why they consented to invoke the aid of Solon, was because they had lost the power of enforcing it any longer, in consequence of the newly awakened courage and combination of the people." [20]

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[15] Utopia—More, sections on the travelling of the Utopians and their customs.

[16] The Politics—Aristotle, pp. 51-3.

[17] Essays—Historical and Literary—Fiske, Vol. II, p. 279.

[18] Ethics—Spinoza; third and fourth Notes to last scholium of Part Two.

[19] Method and Meditations—Descartes; at beginning of Part III of the Discourse on Method, and in the Dedication of his Meditations.

Among the drastic provisions of the relief law was the cancellation of contracts in which the debtor had borrowed on the security of his land or of his person, depriving the creditor of the right to imprison, enslave or extort work from the debtor, and wiped off the records the mortgages under which the vast numbers of Athenian citizens held but empty title to land while the usurers soaked up the usufruct. This beneficent legislation, far from destroying the internal differences and therefore the progress of Athens, resolved those struggles into a higher form of civilization by broadening the democratic base of the republic and paving the way for the future greatness of Athens.

Illustrations of the different mode of operation of the difference of potential within the aggregates of society, where these social groups originate from within themselves the forces impelling action by the state, is afforded by the opposite experiences of Athens and Rome in the efforts at solution of the debtor-creditor problem.

In Athens we see the pressure originating from within the debtor class and claimed as a right of the masses. In Rome relief from the exactions of creditors was extended by Caesar as a boon. In Athens the people were strong enough to defy the ruling oligarchy, to palsy the hand of the state and threaten a complete social turn-over. In Rome the beneficence came as part of a crafty state policy in futherance of the ruler's personal ends. Athens was on the road toward its greatest glory. Rome was at the end of the Republic and at the dawn of the Augustan age.

"It was Caesar, who, perhaps stimulated in this case also by the more humane Egyptian and Greek legislation, especially that of Solon, introduced this principle—diametrically opposed to the maxims of the earlier ordinances as to debt—into the common law, where it has since retained its place undisputed. According to the Roman law the debtor unable to pay became the slave of his creditor. . . . For the really insolvent that principle of law, though doubtless modified in secondary points, had been in substance retained for five hundred years; a direct recourse to the debtor's estate only occurred exceptionally, when the debtor had died or had forfeited his burgess-rights or could not be found. It was Caesar who first gave an insolvent the right—on which our modern bankruptcy regulations are based—of formally ceding his estate to his creditors, whether it might be sufficient to satisfy them or not, so as to save at all events his personal freedom, although with diminished honorary and political rights." [21]

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[20] History of Greece—Grote, Vol. III, p. 104.

A social advance fought for in Athens as a right and conferred by gracious majesty in Rome out of its largess was fought over again two thousands years later in our own United States. Nothing does McMaster greater honor than his profound humanity in espousing the cause of American debtors. His pages are replete with passionate remonstrance over the horrible practice of imprisonment for debt so common here. Data is submitted that this gross inhumanity was ended less than a hundred years ago in many of our leading states.[22] The fundamental difference between us and antiquity in the treatment of debtors is that while they fought for relief, or received it at politic hands, ours was the result of that philanthropic spirit let loose by the social institutions whose origin was rooted in a great political revolution.

As will be fully developed in a succeeding work, the political possibilities inherent in the American Constitution afford the widest latitude for the full play of the differences of social potential among the aggregates of our society, and within the aggregates themselves, making possible a continuous evolutionary re-adaptation of the principles established in our Great Charter and the noble Declaration which gave it birth.

All the varied forces existing within the historical field of a given time root from the main source which exists within the difference of potential of social aggregates. Each unit of every aggregate contributes toward its intensity and mode of manifestation. Mere movement, as we saw, is not enough. To be an efficient cause of social progress it must be the result of an internal development within the aggregates, among its individual components and operating as a social force, rather than as something superimposed on society by external pressure or by an individual will. This is a universal law of social evolution recognized as such by Spencer in sociology and by reflective historians who generalize the facts, though they do not consciously recognize that principle underneath its phenomenal representation.

The Marxian school has developed most the historical application of the Hegelian dialectic from the materialistic standpoint.

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[21] History of Rome—Mommsen, Vol. IV, p. 626.

[22] History of the People of the United States—McMaster, Vol. I, pp. 98, 212, 312, 343; Vol. II, pp. 95, 400; Vol. III, p. 415; Vol. IV, pp. 494, 532, 541, 544, 547; Vol. V, p. 225; Vol. VI, pp. 97-100. Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 153 abolished in states less than one hundred years ago.

Among its profoundest modern scholars none stood higher in the presentation of that principle than Bukharin[23] whose premature end by Soviet liquidation will be regretted by every one who appreciates genuine intellectual acumen wherever it is found. In its proper place among the theories of history we shall discuss Marxian dialectical materialism, but at the present stage of our analysis it is important only to point out that it stems from the Hegelian concept of that universal dialectical process in history, the contradiction of opposites in a polar field.

Modern totalitarian states boast of their efficiency in co-ordinating not only the physical movement, but also the mental processes of vast numbers of human beings. Far from being an evidence of progress it is the very antithesis of the progressive processes in society because it violates the most fundamental requirements of all social transformations, both evolutionary and revolutionary, which requires the normal operation of the difference of potential within society as an essential prerequisite for progress.

Monolithic parties and totalitarian states are not new to history. The Egyptian pyramids, Aristotle tells us, were begun, among other reasons, to occupy vast masses of men and keep them from conspiring. "The building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratidae, and the great Polycratean monument at Samos, all these works were alike intended to occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes after the manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring into the treasury their whole property."[24]

No attempt, of course is being made to draw an analogy between the political and economic requirements of a modern authoritative state like Germany, Italy or Japan. But all of them can point, for example, that prior to the war, unemployment had disappeared amongst them, whereas it was an admittedly glaring deficiency among the free capitalist economies of the so-called democracies which none of them could solve on the basis of their economic system. There is much more to the problem than that, though they cannot be blamed for making the most of an evil which capitalism apparently cannot cure on a peacetime basis. But even if the totalitarian states were to present the maximum of material benefits to their people, they bear the doom of history which is writ large for all societies that destroy the difference of social potential within their social structures.

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[23] He wrote a masterful analysis of the Marxian doctrine in a symposium published in 1935 entitled Marxism and Modern Thought.

[24] The Politics—Aristotle, pp. 143-4.

HEGEL'S METAPHYSICAL DIALECTICS IN HISTORY

Hegel was the first great philosophical historian who attempted to analyze the internal processes of historical development. To him there was but one law. All history, Hegel contends, was the struggle of Spirit rationalized and perfected in man, himself a product of the outer reality, to unite with the Idea which is the ultimate reality of all existence. The Idea reposes in the innate matter of creation. In Man it develops as Spirit, which strives through the mediation of Reason for union with its opposite.

The problem of history is to lay bare the essential destiny of Reason in order to discover the ultimate design of the world. To him who looks at the world rationally, the world presents a rational aspect. Universal processes are not designed for individual hopes and ambitions. Man is the means for the operation of the Divine Spirit functioning through Reason to attain ultimate unity with the Infinite Idea of God. The Idea manifests itself in nature in implicit form. Through man it develops as Spirit, and with Reason as its mode of operation the historical processes unfold themselves. The cunning of Reason works through passion to the self-realization of the Idea.

Man acts, but is not responsible for the consequences of his acts, which far transcend his original and limited purpose.

The State is the perfect embodiment of the Spirit. Orientals have not learned that Spirit is free; that only the ruler is free, and hence the extremes of despotism. The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, but as freedom only for some; hence the existence of slavery. The German nations first attained to consciousness of man as man, therefore all are free, and through the medium of the Reformation and constitutional forms have realized the highest form of existence of the Spirit. Hence Hegel's apotheosis of the Prussian State as the perfect realization of the Idea in its political manifestation.[25]

DEFECTS OF THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM

Before ripping Hegel apart, as some are tempted to do, one should recall Buckle's maxim that a thinker is to be honored for the truths he propounds, rather than condemned for the errors he makes.

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[25] All these ideas are an adumbration of Hegel's extensive Introduction to his Philosophy of History.

These errors are most often the product of his times, while his truths are an imperishable gift to posterity.

Hegel's great truth was his analysis of historical movement by the inter-action of opposites in dialectical unity with each other. It was his outstanding achievement to have perceived long before Clerk Maxwell and Hertz and Einstein that all forces, including historical forces, operate through the medium of a temporal field where opposites are in relation toward each other, act upon each other, modify each other and themselves, and change their form, though not their essential nature by a resolution of that contradiction into a higher or lower synthesis, depending upon the balance of forces; or to maintain, as in Asiatic civilization a fixed relationship over enormous periods of time because of the petrification of social forms and the paralyzing of contradictory forces.

Spengler reflects the attitude of many slipshod minds who condemn dialectics as "a game with concepts." [26] It is perfectly obvious to one who had studied carefully both Hegel's and Spengler's works that the latter had not the faintest conception of the meaning of dialectics as employed by Hegel.

It is quite the custom among our literati to treat Hegel, as in Marx's time, like "a dead dog," [27] losing sight of the fact, as Marx never did, that Hegel is best understood by disregarding his premise, the Idea, and discounting his conclusion, the glorification of the Prussian State.

Beard, unfortunately, did neither. At the very beginning of his monumental work Beard derides Hegel's "naïve conviction" as to the end result of his great hypothesis,[28] but one looks in vain through Beard's bulky volumes, including the Midpassage, for an analysis of the dialectical processes in the spirit of its great delineator. Toward the conclusion of the second volume Beard bemoans the fact that America has given rise to no historian writing in the large philosophic style of Hegel,[29] a lugubriosity which is repeated in his most recent work twelve years after the original pronouncement.[30] In science people do not choose according to their taste. One may reject Hegel for sufficient reason, but a thinker of such calibre cannot be brushed aside either with ridicule or supercilious indifference which so often cloaks sheer ignorance.

[26] The Decline of the West—Spengler, p. 354.
[27] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, p. 25.
[28] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, p. 5.
[29] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 795.
[30] America In Midpassage—Beard, pp. 897-8.

MARX'S HISTORICAL DIALECTICS

Marx and his followers made the most of Hegelian dialectics as applied to historical development. Leaving aside the intrinsic merits or lack of such in Marxian historical methods, the extraordinary richness of that conception can be discerned in a recent work of Bukharin who describes no less than twenty-one specific movements of the historical dialectic process. Among them are first, the transitory character of every form of society; second, its arising from definite historical conditions; third, its internal development from the conditions then existing; fourth, that each social form carries within itself the seeds for its own destruction; fifth, the absence of absolute limits for being or becoming of a social structure in accord with modern scientific theory in mathematics and physics; sixth, the zigzag or uneven character of historic development; a theory which, if not grasped, renders inexplicable for one thing the internal party conflicts of the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1930; seventh, the passage of quantitative differences into qualitative distinctions, one of the profoundest conclusions promulgated by Hegel which Marx develops with great acuteness in the second volume of Capital in the analysis of the reproduction of capital where is laid the basis of his theory of economic crises; eighth, the existence at the same time of quantitative continuity and qualitative interruption, which explains the stagnation of various segments of society; ninth, the division of the one, by the process of fission or differentiation with growing heterogeneity, as for example, the development of the credit system from its origin in simple usury; tenth, the inner contradictoriness of each whole, as is witnessed by the internal conflict within the capitalist class itself, say, chain stores against local merchants; eleventh, the development of contradiction within the one, as when the capitalist class is prevented by its own internal conflicts from at all times presenting a united front; twelfth, and most fundamental of all, the struggle of opposites as the immanent law of movement, from which Marx derived the theory of the historic role of the class struggle as dialectically conceived; thirteenth, the passing of one opposite into another, as when the burgher class became the ruling class, which demolishes the Spencer organic theory of society since the stomach now functions as the brain; fourteenth, the negation of the old form and its presence in the new, as in the use of the pre-existing social institutions of the feudal class by the new ruling class for its own purposes; fifteenth, the development of the new from the old by sublation, that is, not by sheer destruction, but by the unfoldment of its inherent powers of growth in a suitable medium through its own forces—as Engels points out, a seed will develop not by its mechanical destruction, but by organic transformation in a proper soil from which the future plant grows;[31] sixteenth, the contradiction between form and content, as for instance, the "greatest democracy in the world" which is the boast of the Soviet Union where ninety-five per cent of the voters go to the polls and the single party candidate gets a hundred per cent vote with freedom of speech on the affirmative side, the negative previously having been one hundred per cent liquidated; seventeenth, the mutual maneuvering by the class antagonists, each warily advantaging the temporary discomfitures of the other, in a sphere of unstable equilibrium, thereby creating an under-current of unrest likely to erupt in significant manifestations of social antagonism; eighteenth, the many-sidedness of antagonistic connections in horizontal and vertical directions taking in all spheres of social activity, political, economic, and ideological; nineteenth, the universality of those connections, as witness foreign intervention in Russia 1919-21, and in Spain during the Civil War of 1936-39; twentieth, the general laws of being and becoming as evidenced in a society of minute ramifications and in a state of constant flux;[32] twenty-first, the final and grandest conception of all, the resolution of the internal contradictions of society through a synthesis into a higher civilization by the rational application of dialectics to a given situation; as, for example, the political conditions which confronted the American Continental Congress in 1775 and the French National Convention in 1789,[33] which crystallized the soul of their respective peoples in the world-shaking American and French Revolutions.

DEFECTS OF THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC

This rather elaborate presentation of the dialectical processes continually operating within society as conceived by the theoreticians of the Marxian school is remarkable for the kaleidoscopic pattern of history in the making which it is enabled to envisage. But it is only a pattern. The ordinary human mind which is hopelessly lost when attempting to analyze a combination of two or three movements, gives up the job when twenty or more act in combination with the varied possibilities of their permutations.

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[31] Anti-Duhring—Engels, pp. 154, 157, 160.

[32] These phases of the dialectic processes as a whole are described with great thoroughness by Bukharin in "Marxism and Modern Thought," and particularly summarized on page 21 of that work.

[33] This final phase is developed by Marx in a remarkable passage, the famous Chapter XXXII of Capital, Vol. I, Kerr Edition.

Hence that relapse by the average radical to a simple pattern, historical materialism, and a single force, labelled economic determinism. It is a curious commentary upon the simplicity of the critical faculties when it is observed that most refutations of Marx are on premises that he never advanced. In this respect he has suffered the common fate of other great intellects of being the most widely referred to and the least understood genius of his time.

Where Marx really failed—the most impressive and tragic failure of that imposing intellectual system—was in the application of his dialectic to the democratic form of the state, particularly as it was developing during his lifetime in the United States. While it is understandable why the limitations of his time prevented the thorough analysis by Marx of the role of the American Revolution in history, that does not palliate the grievous fault of his American followers in not completing the task then beyond both his knowledge and his powers.

The consequences of this theoretical failure on the part of Marx to analyze the nature of the democratic state now manifest themselves on a gigantic scale in the sphere of world politics. Later we shall go fully into the causes of this failure. But for the present it can be stated that these causes are imbedded in the mechanical dogmatizing about dialectics when genuine historical knowledge was lacking concerning American developments.

B. The Function of the State in the Social Structure

In the analysis of the historical conditions essential for the operation of the difference of social potential, the reader has been asked to accept but one proposition, namely, that the opportunity for social differentiation vary directly as to the heterogeneity of the social aggregates, and inversely as to the forces compelling social stability.

Maintenance of social stability is the specific function of the state, which is itself the product of a specific form of social evolution. Law and order is the beginning and end of its credo whether that state be a Democracy, Fascist or Soviet. The state is the great conservator of society. As such it has been uncritically accepted by historians as ordained in the very nature of things, forgetting that the state powers without exception in the past have been employed in the maintenance of the status quo, to delimit growth up to a certain point, and to be ready to go down in ruins tearing the social fabric with it, as did imperial Rome and monarchical France, and czarist Russia, rather than surrender its powers to a competitor class.

The same uncritical faculty is exhibited by radicals to-day who apply the dictum of the class nature of the state to the democratic state as it exists in the United States; and, generalizing a conclusion derived from past history, maintain that the American democratic state is unsuitable for the realization of the aims of the working masses, and therefor must be shattered to be replaced by a dictatorship of the proletariat during the course of a social revolution.

Since our aim is not to condemn but to analyze the scientific factual value of the propositions, we will discuss in logical order the three divisions of the social aggregate, namely, the state, the economy, and the ideological superstructure for the proper formulation of a scientific theory of the nature of social progress.

FABLED ORIGIN OF THE STATE

Both ancient and modern historians, strange as it may appear, agree upon the pretty fable that once upon a time man lived in a state of nature; very weak, always hungry, without shelter or protection. At last his pro-social instincts got the best of him, and so he united first with his kin into families, and then into gens and tribes which finally developed into a nation. Bound together thus by ties of blood, speech, a common religion and social institutions, differentiation eventually set in resulting in the development of political, ceremonial, ecclesiastical and industrial institutions.

Modern writers are too sophisticated to subscribe to the theory of divine origin. Careful research, as Woodrow Wilson pompously assures us,[34] shows no evidence of an original social compact, as Locke or Rousseau conceived it. The State just grew like Topsy by inherent powers of nature, or by the rational concern of enlightened mankind for its own improvement, as Plato would have it.[35]

Confucius tells no more than many knowing moderns now assert about the function of the state in the following: "The Duke of Sha asked about the government. The Master said, 'Good government obtains when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far are attracted.' " [36]

[34] The State—Wilson, p. 12.

[35] The Republic of Plato—Book VII, Chap. V.

[36] The Conduct of Life—Confucius, p. 176.

His great disciple Mencius forestalled Menenius Agrippa, Herbert Spencer and a host of others by this pretty tale of society as an organism: "Hence there is this saying: 'Some labor with their minds and some with their muscles. They who labor with their minds, govern others; they who labor with their muscles, are governed by others; they who govern others are supported by them.' This is a principle universally recognized." [37] Just as iron-clad as Spinoza's geometrical demonstration of the existence of God, once you grant him the validity of the eight definitions with which he begins his Ethics. So had Mencius first to prove that not force but brains is the historic basis of the state from the very dawn of the historic record to the present time.

Science is not called upon to evolve a definition of the state as an abstraction divorced from all contact with time and space. We must consider the state as a reality whose nature history itself mirrors, and the first fundamental lesson that record teaches is that the state is supported by force and lasts only so long as it can enforce its decrees.

H. G. Wells in his description of the first recorded civilization, the Sumerian, six or eight thousand years ago, shows us city-states warring against each other, enslaving the defeated, carrying on commerce with distant lands in ships, with a language, writing and ideas to express and fight about, with religious factions engaged in deadly combat while professing no doubt, the moral unity of Sumeria and the brotherhood of all Sumerians [38] under an all-loving God.

Aristotle expresses ideas on the state which have a modern professorial ring. "When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state came into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. . . . Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal." [39]

That man and not nature created the state, and that the state does not exist for the sake of a good life for all men, but only for those who control the state, Aristotle himself abundantly proves by his defense of the institution of slavery. This seeming contradiction does not prove that Aristotle was not a great logician, but rather that he was a good Greek whom God created to philosophize and to moralize and engage in politics, while hordes of slaves ministered to his wants and that of his fellow aristocrats.

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[37] Ibid., p. 199.

[38] The Outline of History—Wells, pp. 136, 185, 198, 200, 235.

[39] The Politics—Aristotle, Book I, p. 3.

This fastidious thinker of antiquity enumerates nine classes essential to the existence of the Greek state whose flower and glory are the aristocratic statesmen.[40] A slave is part of the household property. "Thus too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments. . . . Indeed the use made of slaves and tame animals is not very different. . . . But this does not hold universally, for some slaves have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. . . . It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right. . . . There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention, according to which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors." [41]

It is the latter remark which deserves attention. The highly moral Greeks, whose cultural achievements will delight mankind for untold generations to come, are among the very few people history records who did not cavil at enslaving their own kind until the reforms enacted by Solon. The Aztec civilization was much inferior to the glory of the ancient world, yet while they had slaves no Mexican could be a slave, and no one, not even the child of a slave, could be born to slavery in Mexico; "an honorable distinction," says Prescott, "not known I believe, in any civilized community where slavery has been sanctioned." [42]

Hildreth tells us that the first colonists soon discovered that the proud Indian nature would not yield to slavery and after many ineffectual attempts were compelled to desist.[43] Man's natural state rebels against subjection and he yields only to superior force.[44]

Slavery as an institution is superior to savagery where the captives were killed and often roasted. It is only when man's productive powers have developed to the point where it is more advantageous to make the captive work than to slay him; that is, when he produces by his labor more than is necessary to sustain his life and to leave a surplus for the support of his master that slavery as an institution is established, and the state as a repressive organ of society is developed.

This basic consideration for the substitution of slavery for cannibalism as frequently practiced theretofor is emphasized by Landtman in a recent work. "The experience acquired regarding the usefulness of putting prisoners to compulsory labor—in the first hand, possibly, for their own sustenance—may, no doubt, be regarded as one of the principal inducements to enslaving them once for all. Utility has made its influence felt in this instance also, and we notice how the fate of captives of war frequently varies according to the particular interest they may have to offer to the capturer in each case. If captives are spared it is from the consideration that their future labor and services will be more advantageous to the conqueror." [45]

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[40] Ibid., Book IV, pp. 91-3.

[41] The Politics—Aristotle, pp. 5, 7, 8, Book I.

[42] The Conquest of Mexico—Prescott, p. 27.

[43] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. II, p. 270.

[44] The Origin of the Family and the State—Engels, p. 117.

That the state with its means of enforcement with which history deals is not coterminus with the amalgamation of kindred tribes into a nation is amply demonstrated by Lewis H. Morgan in his extraordinary investigations on the constitution of the Iroquois Confederation. At its institution fifty permanent sachemships were created and made perpetual in the gentes to which they were assigned. The tribes occupied positions of entire equality as to rights, privileges and obligations. While representation was unequal, each tribe had but one vote,[46] and unanimity was required; a fatal weakness of a civilized organ like the Polish Diet when a similar provision obtained, resulting in the eventual ruin of that nation. The Iroquois, however, were ruined not by their own disagreements, but by the onslaught of white civilization. At the beginning of the American Revolution the Iroquois were unable to agree upon a declaration of war against either side.

ANTHROPOLOGY'S VIEW OF THE STATE

Morgan's study of ancient society amongst Indians, Greeks and Romans led him to a profound conclusion concerning the origin of the State: "The Iroquois Confederacy is an excellent exemplification of a gentile society under this form of organization. It seems to realize all the capabilities of gentile institutions in the Lower Status of barbarism; leaving an opportunity for further development, but no subsequent plan of government until the institutions of political society, founded upon territory and property, with the establishment of which the gentile organization would be overthrown." [47] American Indian society had not developed to that point before its fatal contact with the Europeans, but the Greece of

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[45] The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes—Landtman (1938), p. 260.

[46] Ancient Society—Morgan, pp. 131-150.

[47] Ibid., p. 152.

Homer and the Rome of Romulus ended with the institution of the private ownership of the means of production—chiefly, land.

"The state differs from gentilism," wrote Engels, "in that it first divided its members by territories. . . . It seems natural to us now. But we have seen what long and hard fighting was required before it could take, in Athens and Rome, the place of the old organization by blood kinship. In the second place, the state created a public power of coercion that did no longer coincide with the old self-organized and armed population. . . . The state is the result of the desire to keep down class conflicts. But having arisen amid these conflicts, it is as a rule the state of the most powerful economic class that by force of its economic supremacy becomes also the ruling political class and thus acquires new means of subduing and exploiting the oppressed masses. The antique state was, therefore, the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding the slaves in check. The feudal state was the organ of the nobility for the oppression of the serfs and dependent farmers. The modern representative state is the tool of the capitalist exploiters of wage labor." [48]

It will be one of the consequences of this work to have proven that Marx and Engels were mistaken, tragically and woefully mistaken, in their evaluation of the nature and significance of the American Revolution and the democratic state to which it gave birth; an error of analysis which vitiated all their conclusions affecting the character of democratic states in general and of the American democratic state in particular; and as a direct consequence led their followers to adopt tactics resulting in part, in the debacle which now engulfs Europe and measurably slowed down the progressive development in the United States of a virile Socialist and labor movement grounded in the American milieu. Since the nature of the state, and particularly, for us, of the American state, is basic to the science of history, it will be worth while to pursue further the investigation into its origin.

CLASSICAL HISTORIANS ON THE NATURE OF THE STATE IN ANTIQUITY

Gibbon is typical of the unphilosophical historian who rationalizes the facts as he comes in contact with them without attempting their critical analysis. "Civil governments," he says, "in their first institutions, are voluntary associations for mutual defense. To obtain the desired end, it is absolutely necessary that each individual should conceive himself obliged to submit his private opinion and actions to the judgment of the greater number of his associates." [49] Here he speaks of civil government among rude German tribes gathered in the accoutrements of war where "the magistrates might deliberate and persuade, the people only could resolve and execute." [50]

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[48] The Origin of the Family and the State—Engels, pp. 206-9.

His authority is Tacitus who cannot be blamed for not grasping the significance of tribal institutions which were still beyond the ken of historians eighteen hundred years after him. Morgan correctly describes the Roman analogue of that social system under the constitution of Romulus and the legislation of Servius Tullius, before the Roman state had destroyed that system of military democracy.[51]

Modern writers are more critical of their material. The class nature of the state function is frankly recognized, and its repressive role clearly understood by Mommsen in his comparison of the Old Republic and the New Monarchy.[52] Even the degenerated Roman proletariat functioned as part of the slavocracy, contributing thereby toward the decay of that mighty empire.

Kautsky, the recognized Marxian theoretician of the Second International and successor to Marx and Engels as the leader of International Socialism has this to say concerning ancient Rome: "But the more the various modes of purchasing votes increased the prospects of gain from the sale of the privileges of citizenship by the Lumpen-proletariat, the greater was the temptation for those peasants who held the rights of Roman citizens to give up their wretched, laborious and oppressed condition in the country and travel to Rome. This tendency in turn increased the numbers of the rabble holding the franchise, and also the demands made on the candidates. In the time of Caesar there were not less than 320,000 Roman citizens in Rome who were receiving grain gratis from the state; the number of votes that could be purchased was therefore probably about 320,000." [53] That is indeed a far different proposition from the idyllic picture of classical writers on the state as organized for justice and mutual protection.

How modern, how universal is the note sung by the immortal Greek poet, Hesiod against social oppression by the exercise of state power in the interests of a particular class: "Apart from the value of his poem as a social picture, Hesiod has a great significance as the first spokesman of the common folk. In the history of Europe, his is the first voice raised from among the toiling classes and claiming the interest of mankind in their lot. It is a voice of acquiescence, counselling fellow-toilers to make the best of an evil case; the stage of revolt had not yet been reached. But the grievances are aired, and the lords who wield the power are exhorted to deal just judgments, that the land may prosper." [54]

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[49] The Decline and Fall of Rome—Gibbon, Vol. I, p. 196.

[50] Ibid., p. 196.

[51] Ancient Society—Morgan, p. 288.

[52] History of Rome—Mommsen, Vol. IV, pp. 562-571.

[53] Foundations of Christianity—Kautsky, pp. 102-3.

Landless Spartans automatically lost their citizenship, until in this land of Helots only 1500 full citizens were left.[55] The universal verdict of history is that states will rather perish than reform, and for Sparta the world acknowledges the courage she showed in the last dark days of her adversity. Curtius' tribute is frank and deserved: "Degenerate and ossified as Spartan life was, yet there still survived in it a remnant of the ancient greatness, which proved itself most manifestly in times of trouble. The idea of the State had still more vitality in the shrunken nucleus of the Spartans, than in the remaining communities, decomposed as these were by the spirit of party; and however untrustworthy the individual citizens of Sparta might prove abroad, yet the civic body had in it a fixed consciousness of inner cohesion, and a resolute assurance in action, whereby it put all other Hellenes to shame." [56]

NATURE OF THE FEUDAL STATE

Guizot and Hallam are among our best authorities on the Middle Ages. As faithful reporters their works abound with facts illustrative of our theme concerning the class nature of the state. Guizot has a special fondness for generalizations, some of which have been discussed before. However, he is more reliable as to his data.

He reports the terms of a grievance voiced by the nobles and the commons against the usurpations of Philip IV. Among them are protests against "the imposition of various taxes, subsidies, undue exactions, depreciation of the coinage, whereby and by several other things which have been done, the nobles and commons have been sorely aggrieved and impoverished, and great evils have ensued and are still taking place." Whereupon they have sworn for themselves and their successors to resist the undue exactions, "always provided, that in doing so we preserve entire and unimpaired all lawful obedience, fealty, homage, sworn or not sworn, and all other rights justly due from us and our successors to the king of France and his successors." [57]

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[54] History of Greece—Bury, p. 100.

[55] Ibid., p. 589.

[56] History of Greece—Curtius, Vol. V, pp. 464-5.

A great many historical factors were lacking to prevent that firm remonstrance from ending in else than such a tame conclusion. When the time for effective protest came the successors of those humble commons stood upright with torches, pikes and muskets, while the puissant nobility now re-united by common terror with their king scurried for the nearest frontier to safety; some with ill-success.

Hallam shows how similar conditions in England brought forth a comparable reaction. He describes the growth of merchant guilds and how, with increasing wealth, their powerful influence was used first with the barons against their common enemy the king, and later a reversal of the policy in order to curb the barons. "Their numbers, the enjoyment of privileges, and the consciousness of strength, infused a free and even mutinous spirit in their conduct. The Londoners were always on the barons' side in their contests with the crown. They bore a part in deposing William Longchamp, the chancellor and justiciary of Richard I. They were distinguished in the great struggle for Magna Charta; the privileges of their city are expressly confirmed in it; and the mayor of London was one of the twenty-five barons to whom the maintenance of its provisions was delegated. In the subsequent reign the citizens of London were regarded with much dislike and jealousy by the court and sometimes suffered severely at its hands, especially after the battle of Evesham." [58]

Here we see no evidence of that mechanical process of social evolution in a progressive order where form develops in parallel lines with function according to the logical system of Spencer.[59] In place of gradual development we see mutation, a going forward and backward, a becoming and an ending with internal conflict, and also mutual help for limited ends among natural enemies. Only in the works of such sociologists as Giddings do we find the state coming into existence by the voluntary, intelligent co-operation of men for the furtherance of their mutual interests.

LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE STATE

Perhaps the most striking contrast in the evolution of the theory of the state is evidenced by the standpoints of two outstanding protagonists of the existing economic system, Adam Smith and John D. Rockefeller Jr., the one speaking out boldly for laissez-faire at the very beginning of the industrial revolution, the other with premonitory fears at the end of its development.

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[57] History of Civilization in France—Guizot, Vol. III, pp. 282-3.

[58] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam, Vol. II, pp. 288-9.

[59] Principles of Sociology—Spencer, Vol. II, pp. 244-8.

Smith laid down the theses for many a tedious discourse in the following trenchant sentences: "All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings; first, the duty of protecting the society from violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society." [60]

Here is the essence of the political philosophy of rugged individualism—a fair field, no favors, with the survival of the fittest. The state? That state is best which governs least. Soldiers, police, prisons, that summed up the proper sphere of governmental activity, with the grudging concession of public works only for those common enterprises from which no profit could be exacted. It was a splendid system—for its time.

But many vital transformations in the social order have since come to pass. More and more private enterprise looked to government for assistance of a financial, legislative, and diplomatic nature. Government subsidies, tariffs, imperialist dollar diplomacy, and

[60] The Wealth of Nations—Smith, p. 651.

diverse other programs of a similar character were gradually enacted under the pressure of unfolding circumstances.

An awakened social conscience began to resist ruthless human exploitation under the beneficent rule of the freedom of contract. Ameliorative measures for sheer protection of the human stock were made imperative in the sphere of factory regulations over conditions and hours of employment. The vices of ruthless competition compelled adoption of standards in purity and quality of commodities. The ravages of monopoly capital brought forth ineffectual antitrust laws. Recurrent crises and the ensuing depression of the last industrial debacle compelled the assumption of social responsibility for the alleviation of human want that followed in its wake, after the failure of the first response to help one's neighbor with a charitable offering, the last refuge of that great engineer-President, Herbert Hoover.

Social developments during the past one hundred and fifty years now reflect themselves in vastly different political needs. But not so in the minds of leaders of society who have been too much absorbed in the pursuit of personal fortunes to adapt their thought processes to changes that have crept in surreptitiously about them. Their mental reactions are of their student days of fifty years ago, and the lessons they then imbibed were from pedagogues who faithfully repeated what they in turn had learned fifty years before from political philosophers who had developed their ideas from the teachings of Adam Smith. This, in brief, is the genealogy of the political wisdom of Herbert Hoover and his type of rugged individualists.

John D. Rockefeller Jr. represents the third generation of accumulated wealth. His father before him really lived two remarkable lives during the long span of one. The first was devoted to the amassing of a tremendous fortune; the second was spent in a long retirement devoted both to watching his pile grow by accretion and manipulation, and then to derive pleasure through its partial diversion into various philanthropies.

The present head of the fortune undoubtedly learned much from both phases of the family history. Upon the completion of the Rockefeller Center construction in the city of New York involving the expenditure of over $100,000,000 John D. Rockefeller Jr. made the following remarks: "We believe that the ultimate object of all activities in a republic should be the development of the manhood of its citizens; that such manhood can be developed to the fullest degree only under conditions of freedom for the individual, and that industrial enterprises can and should be conducted in accordance with these principles. We believe that a prime consideration in the carrying out of industry should be the well-being of the men and women engaged in it, and that the soundest industrial policy is that which has constantly in mind the welfare of the employees as well as the making of profits." [61]

The last phrase is demagogical and platitudinous, because it binds together two irreconcilable forces as if they were an inherently harmonious whole. No one questions the sound polity of that pronouncement. In this Rockefeller as a capitalist stands out boldly. But the Rockefeller of enlightened economic statesmanship is seen in the declaration that the first duty of the state is towards its citizens. The point on which the platitude must break is in the following situation: If private industry cannot operate at a profit due to lack of a suitable market for its products, should industry be allowed to languish, to gradually close down and fold up in some cases, throwing millions of people out of work, or should big industry be taken over by the government and operated for the benefit of its citizens?

On this issue there is no real middle ground and there is no question where Rockefeller and his class stand despite all their fine phraseology. That does not mean that public leaders do not attempt a middle course by straddling the question.

Let us assume the following conditions: Rockefeller, Willkie, the National Manufacturers Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce, all representatives of private enterprise in large industry will work out their program, assuming they could agree on one, as to just what the government is to do, and is not to do, for private industry; and after all has been faithfully executed, private industry cannot employ all employables at a living wage. Which is to prevail, the public welfare, which demands continued operation of industry, or private interests which dictate partial operation or a shut-down?

Of course, this problem will never present itself in that manner outside of professorial lecture rooms where it may be balanced with meticulous nicety. The situation raised by Rockefeller is of historical interest only insofar as it reflects a change in the phraseology concerning the role of the state as between the blunt-spoken champion of laissez-faire in the eighteenth century, and the soft-spoken representative of the same basic philosophy to-day, but who feels that he must trim his ideas according to the political necessities of the times.

John Jay typified the attitude of our constitution framers toward the state. Imbued with the rationalizations of Montesquieu and

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[61] The New York Times, Nov. 2, 1939.

Rousseau he wrote: "Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable that, whenever and however instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers." [62]

Hamilton could speak of the scheme of representative government as being imperfectly known to ancient polity,[63] a defect which in his opinion is now amply remedied due to the progressive character of our development in the course of twenty-three centuries. The distinct impression is left that if only the ancients would have known of the representative form of government, they would not have hesitated to adopt it. The facts clearly demonstrate that no portion of European society or American society in Hamilton's time had reached the intellectual heights Greece had attained during the age of her glory. The state rests on something more substantial than the common consent of enlightened mankind.

Bancroft's approach to historical problems is in the grand manner of a benign Providence, destiny and the immutable workings of mysterious forces beyond our ken. "The Power which enchains the destinies of states, over-ruling the decisions of sovereigns and the forethought of statesmen, often deduces the greatest events from the least considered causes." [64] The state, for him, "has for its life-giving principle the idea of right," [65] and Providence, with a kindly hand always leads this great country to the right path despite the blundering of our leaders. For this great partiality of Heaven the Pilgrim Fathers had good reason to believe they had a prescriptive right, because they actually established on American soil and sustained for seventy years a theocratic state based on the principles of the Bible.[66]

Religious leaders ruled among the early Puritans as the Judges did of old. These judges assumed absolute power, and one of them, Winthrop, expostulated about the "unwarrantableness and unsafeness of referring matter of counsel or judicature to the body of the people, quia the best part is always the least, and of the best part the wiser part is always the lesser. The old law was, Thou shalt bring the matter to the judge. . . . This was the practice of the Jewish church, and the approved experience of the best ordered states." [67]

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[62] The Federalist—Paper No. II; by John Jay.
[63] Ibid., Paper No. LI, by Hamilton.
[64] History of the United States—Bancroft, Vol. I, p. 203.
[65] Ibid., Vol. V, p. 71.
[66] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 309, 317, 318, 320.
[67] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 317-8.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Fifty years after Adam Smith had published his epochal work another great economist, David Ricardo, began to voice misgivings concerning the social consequences of laissez-faire and the so-called freedom of private enterprise from governmental regulation, particularly for the protection of the workers in the sale of their labor-power for wages. Already the developing antagonism between the expanding industrial capitalist class and its workers was beginning to manifest itself.

Ricardo pleads for more humane poor relief as a matter of right and honor instead of a ground for opprobrium and contempt.[68] The state is being called upon to intervene upon humanitarian considerations, but the conflict between the English landed aristocracy and the industrial capitalists for the control of the state had not yet been fought out to a conclusion, as it was ultimately by the Reform Bill of 1832 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Idyllic concepts of the state power and the scope of its authority yield before the grim struggle of hidden social forces whose effects all saw, but of whose nature they have not formed any definite idea.

Ricardo is important to us because he occupies a middle ground in the development of the extremes of English political thought as represented by Smith and John Stuart Mill. Marx, too, is deeply indebted to the social development of early 19th century England. The study of his works will prove conclusively that his theories have beneath them the granite basis of English historical development, as mustered in his ponderous style after spending thirty years in study of official blue-books in the British Museum. It is curious to see how Ricardo in 1823 during his discussion of currency and banks was already considering on how far the policy of allowing the Bank of England to issue paper currency could be safely transferred to a Parliamentary committee.[69]

WILSON ON THE STATE

American political thought on the state in its formal aspect even to this day is summed up by Woodrow Wilson. "The modern idea is this: the state no longer absorbs the individual, it only serves him. The state as it appears in its organ, the government, is the

[68] Political Economy and Taxation—Ricardo, Ch. V. on wages.
[69] Political Economy and Taxation—Ricardo, Ch. XXVII, pp. 243-5.

representative of the individual, and not his representative even except within the definite commission of constitutions; while for the rest each man makes his own social relations. 'The individual for the State,' has been reversed and made to read, 'The State for the individual.' "[70] Another soporific phrase which sounds profound but which upon analysis is found to be devoid of meaning.

For the extreme of governmental indifference to social problems Wilson recognizes the need for cautious approach toward eliminating, if possible, the grosser obstacles resulting in social friction. "Every means, therefore, by which society may be perfected through the instrumentality of government, every means by which individual rights can be fitly adjusted and harmonized with public duties, by which individual self-development may be made at once to serve and supplement social development, ought certainly to be diligently sought, and, when found, sedulously fostered by every friend of society."[71]

All these innocuous expressions are fitted for the ivy tower and not for life as it is actually lived. When the scholar became the statesman he discovered to his own sorrow and the greater detriment of the world that society to-day is ruled not by rational dialectics where the logical essay carries off the prize, but by the preponderance of social forces which carry the day regardless of our notions on eternal justice, eternal truth, and the other eternalities of existence.

Since our discussion of the state had for its aim the single purpose of demonstrating that it is a variable power created by men, reacting to their impulses and serving definite needs at a given time, we shall leave to its proper place the analysis of some recent state concepts, such as the Marxian theory of the state, and the modern Soviet, Fascist and Nazi state organizations.

C. The Function of the Economy in the Social Structure

Historians and sociologists to-day are agreed upon the intimate connection existing between the manner in which man gets his living and the social structure which is reared upon that prime condition of existence. Man's progress up to now has followed two main courses; first, the development of the arts of subsistence; secondly, the development of the art of living by the labor of others. Morgan in his great work on ancient society denotes five phases in

[70] The State—Wilson, p. 619.
[71] Ibid., pp. 631-2.

man's eternal quest for food. They are in the order stated, the natural subsistence upon fruits and roots; fish subsistence; farinaceous subsistence through cultivation; meat and milk subsistence; and finally unlimited subsistence through field agriculture.[72]

The evolution of these phases was not successive, and they are sometimes interlocked, but all of them profoundly affected the nature of society. "The acquisition of farinaceous food in America and of domestic animals in Asia and Europe, were the means of delivering the advanced tribes, thus provided, from the scourge of cannibalism, which as elsewhere stated, there are reasons for believing was practiced universally throughout the period of savagery upon captured enemies, and, in time of famine, upon friends and kindred." [73]

ROLE OF MONEY AS A MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE

With the dawn of recorded history we find already in a high stage of perfection that significant inter-change of products between the town and country. This social division is of the highest historic importance. It already indicates that man has conquered the problem of mere existence as an animal, and begun the long process of realizing the capabilities of his species. Trade meant a common meeting ground between buyer and seller and eventually the need for a medium of exchange.

That incorrigible romanticist, H. G. Wells—and this is said without disparagement of his great historical work which is an outstanding intellectual achievement of our time, an opinion which, we are happy to state, is shared by Professor Robinson [74]—Wells may speak of money, "like most other inventions, had 'happened' to mankind." [75] The scientific approach to the problem of money will demonstrate not only its inherent necessity, but how it developed as a vital factor in social progress. The evolution of the art of exchange is a key to the evolution of civilization.

Cattle have been used for money. So have been used wampum, pelts, tobacco, cacao, tin, mulberry leaves (in the accounts of Marco Polo), besides iron, copper, silver and gold. Man has used man himself as a medium of exchange. Notes supported by public lands were so employed in Pennsylvania, and the French Revolution made land itself a means of payment through assignats. It is curious to note that of the many remarkable civilizations known to history the Peruvian Inca State did not develop a common medium of exchange. Transfer was effected by barter at fairs held three times a month in populous centers.[76] The Aztecs used as a measure of value bags of cacao containing a specified number of grains.[77]

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[72] Ancient Society—Morgan, pp. 19-27.

[73] Ancient Society—Morgan, p. 24.

[74] The Human Comedy—Robinson (1937), p. 382.

[75] Outline of History—Wells, p. 428.

The historical role of money led to the levying of taxes payable in money or in kind, and laid the foundation for the amassing of concentrated wealth in the hands of public and private persons. Overseas commerce was the concomitant of overland trade, and both resulted in the development of commodity production in agriculture, instead of merely for the personal use of the immediate dependents. This again reacted upon the creation of town arts and artisans, the growth of population, increase of wealth, the rise of a rich ruling class, and the application of surpluses for ideological institutions of various sorts—theological, literary, artistic, statecraft and the like.

CHANGING ROLE OF WAR IN CIVILIZATION

Man's conquest of the material world was completed thousands of years ago, but his conquest of himself, while far advanced, is still incomplete. As befits a modern professor of sociology Bushee engages in reflections on the nature of wars in the past as being grounded in man's economic needs. "Aside from all social and ethical considerations, the economic conditions previously outlined persist as incentives to war; and many are of the opinion that they cannot be overcome. They believe that the struggle for food will always continue, and that therefore economic wars will always be a part of the great social process. As economic conditions are the chief causes of war their nature deserves careful consideration." [78] Then follows the usual professorial narration of half assertions, half negations about future wars and the ending of wars culminating in tedious and innocuous social theories which mutually cancel each other.

In the brief quotation Bushee sums up all the pusillanimous muddle-headedness of the intellectual stipendiary concerning wars. First of all, modern wars are not about obtaining food, but rather about the disposal of surpluses, and the getting of raw material for producing more surpluses to dump on markets themselves suffering from surfeit—an economic not a social surfeit. Second, there is a heaven-wide distinction between "economic conditions," "economic interests" and the "material basis of production," and that under different social systems it is possible for opposite causes like a deficiency or a superfluity, to lead nations to war. Third, that little cavalier aside of social and ethical considerations exhibits a remarkable lack of consideration of the social and ethical basis of modern civilization, and therefore no understanding of its history. Consequently, there is a quixotic belief in such magic potions as international institutions for the measuring out of justice, and childish humor concerning the absurdity of trade and tariff wars, and why quarrels between the states cannot be composed with the same felicity as that of individuals within the state. The sheer imbecility of the international professoriat is in itself a powerful contributing factor to war.

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[76] Conquest of Peru—Prescott, p. 801.

[77] Conquest of Mexico—Prescott, p. 84.

[78] Principles of Sociology—Bushee, p. 135.

A striking illustration of the relation between the economy and the state organization is presented by the social forms developed by the nomads and city people. Wells has a particular fondness for the virile mountain people as against the effete plain dwellers whom they continually despoiled and frequently supplanted. Yet even the mighty Mongols of Ghengis, Kublai and Tamerlane who were not degenerated were themselves absorbed by the Chinese and the Hindus. "Naturally enough under the circumstances the nomadic peoples were always supplying the civilizations with fresh rulers and new aristocracies," wrote Wells. "That is the rhythm of early history. It was only after thousands of years of cyclic changes between refreshment by nomadic conquest, civilization, decadence and fresh conquest that the present process of a mutual blending of 'civilized' and 'free' tendencies into a new type of community, that now demands our attention and which is the substance of contemporary history, began."[79]

To the nomad, animals offer at once food, clothing and shelter in tents. With a more developed economy, the increased returns of field, forest and the waters made possible the sustenance of artisans and a ruling class. Political institutions followed closely the economy which supported them. The city citadel took the place of the temporary camp.

Slavery supplanted that horrible massacre of captives which so offend modern sensibilities, but which were perfectly proper to nomads who looked upon civilized men as cowardly and therefore worthless caricatures of the human race. "The most casual provocation," wrote Gibbon, "the slightest motive of caprice or convenience, often provoked them to involve a whole people in an indiscriminate massacre; and the ruin of some flourishing cities was executed with such unrelenting perserverance, that according to their own expression, horses might run without stumbling over the ground where they had once stood. The three great capitals of Khorasan, namely Maru, Neisabour and Herat, were destroyed by the armies of Ghengis; and the exact account which was taken of the slain amounted to four million three hundred and forty-seven thousand persons." [80]

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[79] The Outline of History—Wells, p. 702.

Tamerlane, Gibbon remarks, used to boast, and with reason, that under his regime a child could go, fearlessly and unhurt, with a purse of gold in its hand from one end of his domain in Europe to the other end in China. There indeed was law and order to satisfy our most relentless one-hundred per cent anti-labor Vigilante; "yet the ground which had been occupied by flourishing cities was often marked by his abominable trophies, by columns, or pyramids, of human heads." [81] Apparently the above-mentioned fearless child was walking through a depopulated country, or where the fearful inhabitants had taken to the hills.

NATURE OF THE SLAVE ECONOMY

Slavery in its early days was of a patriarchal character. To the pastoral Romans everyone not of their blood or kin was a stranger, and if conquered was enslaved and put to work in fields of the household. Patriarchal relations with men and maid servants were of a benign nature, dependent naturally upon the character of the master. "For the Romans treated their slaves with great humanity in these times, when, working and laboring themselves, and living together among them, they naturally were more gentle and familiar with them." [82]

With the development of commodity exchange first between town and country and then with lands far away and over the seas, the productivity of the slave entered as a calculable factor. Then it became a question of price and how much profit was to be obtained from the product of their labor. This led to the close differentiation between the proud Roman conqueror, who even if penniless himself, would not deign to labor "fit only for a slave." Thus developed the Roman proletariat, their bread and circuses, the buying of votes and the sale of the imperial purple, to the decay of the vitals of the empire which contributed toward its epochal collapse.[83]

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[80] The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon, Vol. I, pp. 1209-10.

[81] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1254.

[82] Plutarch's Lives—Coriolanus, p. 279.

The Roman system of economy led toward the accumulation of vast fortunes, the entry of rich men for the highest honors at a price, and the inauguration of that ruthless system of exploitation beginning at first with the provinces, then working inwards toward the center like some irresistible contagion until its pernicious effects vitiated the head, which lost its grip on the provinces and led toward the incursion of the barbarian.

RELATION BETWEEN THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE UNDER FEUDALISM

It is not our purpose to argue the primacy of the state or the economy. It is rather their inter-dependence, their inter-action within a definite historical field which is the lesson to be deduced from history. The study of nomadic peoples show conclusively that social and ethnic factors determined their economy, and the fact that they were unable to improve their hereditary way of living did not prevent them from conquering nations with a much more highly developed mode of life.

Feudalism had its origin in the collapse of a mighty civilization and ruled intermittently during the interregnum of two absolutisms, that of the Roman Imperators and the great emperors who began to emerge on the European scene with the sixteenth century. Wells describes that period with the limpid simplicity and broad understanding which marks his writings: "It was a time of confusion, of brigandage, of crimes unpunished and universal insecurity. It is very interesting to trace how, out of universal melee, the beginnings of a new order appeared. In a modern breakdown there would probably be the formation of local vigilance societies, which would combine and restore a police administration and a roughly democratic rule. But in the broken-down western empire of the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries, men's ideas turned rather to leaders than committees, and the centers about which affairs crystallized were here barbaric chiefs, here a vigorous bishop or some surviving claimant to a Roman official position, here a long-recognized landowner or man of ancient family, and here again some vigorous usurper of power. No solitary man was safe. So men were forced to link themselves with others preferably people stronger than themselves. . . . This process speedily took on technical forms and laws of its own. In such a country as Gaul it was already well in progress in the days of insecurity before the barbarian tribes broke into the empire as conquerors. The Franks when they came into Gaul brought with them an institution which we have already noted in the case of the Macedonians." [84]

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[83] Foundations of Christianity—Kautsky, Part Two, Chapters one and two.

CAPITALIST ECONOMY AND ITS SOCIAL REACTIONS

The Middle Ages are with justice referred to as the Dark Ages despite the iconoclasm of some modern writers on this epoch. The obvious evidence of decay is a declining population, and Europe had become woefully decimated. The political institutions governed the economy which was based primarily on the need for sustaining the inmates of the manor and its dependent retainers. The seed of progress, for Europe, was in the towns, as already discussed.

On this point Wilson says: "It was in the towns that the law of Rome had its strongholds. There it had a centered and lively influence: and there it was long undisturbed by the conquerors. It took the Teuton a long time to learn how to live in a town within limiting walls and amidst crowded houses. . . . Meanwhile not only Roman private law, but also Roman municipal traditions, were preparing the cities for the power and independence which they were to claim and enjoy during the Middle Ages." [85]

The seed for the development of modern capitalism was nurtured in the womb of these towns, and the powerful impulse of the profit motive led its agents to the corners of the known earth, and finally to that great enterprise which led to the discovery of the New World and the transplantation of European civilization to the virgin soil of America. Since the history of the economic development of the colonies and its reaction upon their political institution is the burden of our effort these will be carefully considered at the proper time. All that we desire now to establish is that the state and the economy are interdependent and closely allied in their evolution of form and function.

D. THE IDEOLOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE

TRADITION AS A CONSERVATOR OF SOCIETY

Man is not only a bundle of needs; he is also a composite of custom and tradition. Upon him weigh heavily the tremendous inertia of a social system to which he was born, to which he must conform during his life-time upon the severest penalties, and of which his progeny in turn will become a part. That unsubstantial thing we call ideas are the firmest bulwark of social existence. The forces of heredity are always more powerful than those of variation, because they are chiefly automatic and instinctive. It is always easier to conform than to resist.

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[84] Outline of History—Wells, pp. 607-8.

[85] The State—Wilson, p. 169.

This is no indirect panegyric for modification. Life instinctively clings to the certain and the known, and is properly cautious about the unknown. That is why custom and tradition are society's most powerful means for self-preservation and perpetuation. For these very reasons they are the principal factors in social stultification, stagnation, decay and ultimate disappearance of that unchanging type of social organization, before the onslaught of more virile forms.

Ideologies are great conservators. They are also great destroyers. History so far does not record a single society that consciously modified its internal structure to meet the requirements of a new era. But before one is justified in preparing the epitaph for American civilization, it must be recorded that no mode of social organization except our American democracy possessed to such a high degree both the will and the means for its reconstitution and self reconstruction.

Nothing in society changes more slowly than man's ideas. The Japanese factory girl is still indentured by her parents to some vast cotton mill operated by an impersonal corporate entity. In the midst of whirling machinery of most modern design, because most recently introduced or adapted, she will pause with her fellow workers at stated intervals to perform some ancient religious ritual. The bustling Japanese business man is still the Shintoist under his modern garment.

It would take two or three generations of intensive capitalist development to eradicate the vestigial remains of medievalism long after the Japanese state had adopted and perfected the technique of western civilization, industrially and imperialistically. Hugh Byas, the very capable American correspondent in Japan, describes that country as a half evolved form of representative government and a survival of feudal oligarchy.[86]

Hubbard in his recent work on Japanese industrialization says: "Commenting on the dualism in Japan's economic structure which results from the co-existence of large-scale modern industry with primitive handicraft and trade conducted along traditional lines, the author of a series of articles recently published by the Spectator writes as follows: 'The old structure of agriculture, primitive handicraft and petty trade, in which far the greatest part of the population still lives its economic life to-day, could not but lag more and more behind the hastily erected superstructure of modern industry, transport trade and banking. There has never been time to unify the two Japans, which live side by side all over the country. They are indeed drifting more and more apart.' "[87] But they cannot carry on a dual existence indefinitely. One or the other must succumb, and it will not be industrialism.

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[86] New York Times Magazine, Jan. 28, 1940.

TRADITION AS A DESTROYER OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS

Buddhism in its fundamental tenets as taught by Gautama properly ranks among the noblest religious conceptions of mankind. The Eightfold Path of Right Views, Right Aspirations, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, Right Rapture sums up the loftiest aims of human existence in all its manifestations. The desire of his disciples to capture the sublimity of these aspirations led inevitably toward attempts at concretization. The devoted early teachers form a sect, live in seclusion, adopt simple and holy lives and become objects of veneration.[88] After them come the priests, temples, rituals, mortification, the establishment of gradations of holiness, and therefore gradations of abasement. By insensible declension as well as by the design of punier minds formalism hardens into caste, and that into a religious and social stratification, which continues as the curse of India to this day.

China arrived at the same impasse but by a different road. Where India was dominated by the Brahmins, China developed her secular mandarinate. This class was selected by education and examination from amongst all social groups. While the Chinese mandarins possessed intellectual energy, their very training canalized these intellectual potentialities, for the basis of selection was proficiency in the teachings of the old masters, and devotion to the Emperor under whose aegis examinations were held, and from whose hands the coveted appointments were received.

Hegel tells us that high officers of the kingdom were commissioned to bring before the Emperor all the poems composed in their province during the year. "The Emperor in full court was the judge of these poems, and those recognized as good received public approbation." [89] A very gratifying arrangement, no doubt, for those so signally honored, but one most unlikely to lead toward protest or variation from type. While China attained to a very high civilization three thousand years ago, its ideological superstructure tied in a straight-jacket both its economy and its state forms, and that great people's present predicament is the direct result of its incapacity toward variation and further progress.

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[87] Eastern Industrialization and Its Effects on the West—Hubbard (1935), pp. 125-6.

[88] Outline of History—Wells, p. 365.

Confucius, as reported in the Analects recorded by his disciples after his death, taught the importance above all of propriety: "Let the superior man never fail reverentially to order his own conduct; and let him be respectful to others and observant of propriety. Then all within the four seas will be his brothers." [90] These admonitions developed politeness, but not the energy to withstand the impact of western life, even as practiced by their erstwhile pupils, the children of the Rising Sun.

"It is a good many centuries," says Ragozin, "since the Chinese have ceased to improve anything at all. Their language and writing are childishly imperfect, though the oldest in existence. In government, in the forms of social life, in their ideas generally, they follow rules laid down for them three thousand years ago or more, and from which to swerve a hair's breadth were blasphemy." [91]

The Chinese are superficially clever, and until defeat taught them humility, were too proud to learn from Europeans. They have shown what they can do when hermetically sealed from the outside world. Though often conquered, they ended in absorbing their conquerors. But Europe conquers only to exploit and Japan towards them functions as a Western Power. Against this strange weapon the Chinese protective armament proved powerless, and now they are paying the penalty for three thousand years of complacency.

Many Americans of the middle class intelligentsia, who feel themselves emancipated from the common beliefs of their intellectual inferiors among the rabbleate, have sought emotional and spiritual outlets in the religions of the Orient. They can quote Chinese and Hindu literature which oozes the tenderest emotions of love, humility, piety, and propriety. Fortunately they interpret them in the cultural background created by our grossly materialistic Western civilization. For in the milieu of the Oriental world they would soon discover those beautiful sentiments are only for the few. The great masses are ground down in bestial poverty.

The Hindu to whom a cow is a sacred animal will pass by a starving fellow human without the slightest compunction of fellow-feeling. He will carefully avoid stepping on an ant, but feels his very shadow defiled by crossing that of a low caste creature. "A nation sets up its religion as a standard embodying its loftiest and holiest ideals, worked out collectively and unconsciously by its members, and summed up by some great teacher and leader. By those ideals, by that standard a nation should be judged, its historical mission and influence appraised." [92] According to this standard established by Ragozin Hindu civilization should rank among the highest of the twentieth century. But the height attained by a great religious leader like Buddha offers no criterion for gauging the level of the civilization of his adherents.

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[89] Philosophy of History—Hegel, p. 117.

[90] The Conduct of Life—Confucius, p. 98.

[91] The Story of Chaldea—Ragozin, p. 140.

The dominant ideology of the dominant civilization of the twentieth century establishes its own foot-rule by which other cultures are measured. We have elevated to the dignity of a religion the cultus of the common man. That is the essence of Christianity as preached by Jesus. By that precept Socialism and Communism, to the extent that it remains true to its ideals, has conquered a place for itself in the modern world. By that criterion the ideological superstructure of India should be weighed and by its inherent defects it must, in a modern world, fall to the ground; but, we hope, not as a victim of Western imperialism.

There is an historical relativity to man's religious, philosophical, cultural, in short his ideological institutions, and the so-called materialism of the Western world ranks far above the alleged spirituality of the Oriental world, though we are frank to indicate the shortcomings of our own civilization.

DOMINANT IDEOLOGY OF GREEK CIVILIZATION

Dewey points out the enormous differences in the content and method of common sense in modes of life that are respectively dominantly nomadic, agricultural and industrial.[93] Referring to Greece he points out that at a definite period of its history, when slavery was in its prime and the state powers were completely under the domination of the Greek aristocracy, the pursuit of science and philosophy was the noblest occupation of the free citizen. Politics and war measured the extent of his duty to the state.

Though Dewey repudiates the Marxian materialist conception of history he points out that "the definitely socio-practical division

[92] History of Media—Ragozin, p. 167.

[93] Logic; The Theory of Inquiry—Dewey (1938), p. 64.

between workers and non-citizens who were servile, and the members of the leisure class who were free citizens, was converted by philosophic formulation into a division between practice and theory, experience and reason. Strictly scientific-philosophic knowledge and activity were finally conceived to be supra-social as well as supra-empirical. They connected those who pursued them with the divine and cut them off from their fellows." [94] Here is a frank admission of how the economic basis of the Greek world shaped and determined its ideological superstructure in the best manner of the orthodox Marxist.

It is not a question of primacy of the economic or ideologic; it is strictly a matter of relationship and the historical setting, where the ideology can compress the economic form as in China, or attach itself, leech-like as in India, keeping it in a state of chronic enervation, or superimpose itself on the economic as in Greece, or rationalize the social inequalities and injustices of the present economic order in the best manner of the laissez-faire school.

We are in thorough agreement with Dewey in establishing the nexus between the material basis of society and its ideology.[95] We leave to economic determinists to establish that self-interest is the all-impelling, or the chief impelling motive of human effort; a doctrine, by the way never—and this is said categorically—entertained by Marx himself.

Aristotle typified the aristocratic nature of Greek ideology in his political concepts. The great philosopher, in his view, is so pre-eminent in virtues that no law can apply to him. "Such a one may truly be deemed a god among men. Hence we see that legislation is concerned only with those who are equal in birth and power; and that for men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law—they are themselves a law. Anyone would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them; they would probably retort what in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions said to the hares, 'where are your claws,' when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and claiming equality for all." [96] In our age we can understand Aristotle's bitter denunciation of the flute and the dithyramb as the music suited to the Phrygian and lower social orders just like swing is to-day, while the Dorian music as the gravest and manliest is best fitted for the noble youth [97] of Greece.

Aristotelian philosophy dominated the European world throughout the Middle Ages; but that its ideology was unsuited for all times and places during his own day was best illustrated by the experience of Plato, his teacher. "Give me," says Plato himself, "a free city governed by a tyranny, and let the tyrant be young, with good brains, brave and generous, and let fortune bring in his way a good law giver." [98]

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[94] Ibid., p. 73.
[95] Logic; the Theory of Inquiry—Dewey (1938), p. 504.
[96] The Politics—Aristotle, Book III, p. 75.
[97] Ibid., Book VIII, pp. 207-8.

All these conditions strangely enough were fulfilled in the person of the younger Dionysius, absolute ruler or tyrant of Syracuse. His minister, Dion, had thoroughly imbued his charge with the political philosophy of his friend, Plato, and he even persuaded the great philosopher himself to visit Sicily and attend on the instruction of his young master. At their first meeting, Plutarch tells us, they discoursed in general on human virtue, during which Plato proved tyrants, of all men, had the least pretense to.

Dionysius became enraged at the admiration that discourse aroused among the auditors and asked, exceedingly exasperated, what business he had in Sicily. "To which Plato answered, 'I came to seek a virtuous man.' 'It seems, then,' replied Dionysius, 'you have lost your labor.' " [99] The minister knew his tyrant, and hastened to put the philosopher aboard a vessel bound for Greece.

But Dionysius' anger did not cool and he plotted with the ships' master to kill Plato en route, or at least to sell him as a slave. "Plato was accordingly landed at Aegina," Grote tells us, "and there sold. He was purchased, or repurchased by Annikeris of Kyrene, and sent back to Athens. This latter is the more probable story of the two; but it seems to be a certain fact that Plato was really sold, and became for a time a slave." [100]

Here was a practical demonstration that current ideologies, of which philosophy is a part, are kith and kin of their environment and social setting, and that it was just as absurd for Plato to engraft the political system of Greece on to a tyranny like Syracuse, as it was for Latin American republics in the nineteenth century to adopt caricatures of the American constitution; or for modern democratic Socialism to be established in a land like Russia where the masses were stranger to the simplest concepts of the democratic way of life.

SOCIAL INFLUENCES OF CHRISTIANITY

Christianity was, and still is, the profoundest ideological impulse affecting Western civilization. Its influence is exerted in every walk of life, and its ramifications incline our economics, politics, education, literature, art, music, architecture and the everyday affairs of ordinary existence. The sublime moral heights of its founder are alike the inspiration and the despair of its communicants. Consequently the history of Christianity involves every act of affirmation and contradiction of which the human heart is capable. The function of the historian after explaining his phenomena should be to praise much and blame little, conscious as he must be from the lessons taught by the vast human drama, and as exemplified in his own life, how man's actions invariably fall far short of his aspirations; for in his hopes he most often exercises the noblest qualities of his nature, while in his acts he is too often impelled by forces surmounting his control and frequently beyond his understanding. When mankind will finally have attained that level of civilization which already is implicit in his soul, then will we be in a position fully to evaluate the contribution rendered by Confucius, Gautama, Moses, Jesus and Mohammed in our plodding, stumbling ascent toward their moral heights.

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[98] Quoted by Bury, History of Greece, p. 653.

[99] Plutarch's Lives—Dion, p. 1157.

[100] History of Greece—Grote, Vol. XI, p. 39.

Gibbon, the cultured cynic and iconoclast, wrote one of his most brilliant sentences when he stated: "The various modes of worship, which prevailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful." [101] It is the duty of the historian to describe the facts of a religion's development within the scope of his inquiry, and not obtrude into the devious channels of theological controversy merely for the purpose of exposing, as he views it, the gross incongruities of preachment and practice.

Our chief, in fact our only, concern at this stage of the analysis is to demonstrate the profound influence exercised by the ideological superstructure on the state and the economy in the formation of the social structure at a given time; to show how they interpenetrate and influence each other; and to prove, how the separate divisions of the social structure may at different periods of history exercise a preponderant or a subsidiary influence, or be the creature of the other two.

CHRISTIANITY IN ROME

Early Christianity was predominantly the religion of the poor, the lowly and the oppressed. As such it was received, when noticed at all by the ruling classes, with disdainful contempt. With the increase of its adherents began the differentiation within its internal structure. "The beginnings of the Christian congregations were not unlike the circumstances attending every new proletarian organization. Its founders, the apostles, had to conduct all the work as well as organization and administration. But with the growth of the congregation, the need for a division of labor became felt, the necessity to assign certain functions to definite functionaries." [102] Even Lenin, the architect of the Soviet State, pays tribute to "primitive Christianity with its democratic-revolutionary spirit." [103] In this, as always, he is the faithful disciple of Marx.

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[101] The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon, Vol. I, pp. 25-6.

Properly enough, one of the earliest bishops of Rome was the Christian slave of a Christian freedman. In the early organization of the Church the bishop of each center stood on an equal footing with each other, though the Patriarchs of Rome, Alexandria and Antioch were singled out for especial distinction among the metropolitan cities. But the centripetal power of imperial Rome exercised its influence on the church organization, and as the world was accustomed to look there for the source of political power, so did the early Christians seek there the font of spiritual guidance.

"If Rome be the Queen of cities," wrote D'Aubigne, "why should not her pastor be the King of Bishops? Why should not the Roman church be the mother of Christendom? Why should not all nations be her children, and her authority be the universal law? It was natural to the heart of man to reason thus. Ambitious Rome did so. Hence it was that when heathen Rome fell, she bequeathed to the humble minister of the God of Peace, seated in the midst of her own ruins, the proud titles which her invincible sword had won from the nations of the earth." [104] In these rhetorical gestures D'Aubigne, the critic of the Catholic Church, expresses a deep historical truth.

With the regularization of the creed came schisms, and then the authority to interpret and enforce decisions as rendered by the hierarchy. Excommunication is an awful power over life in the present and the hereafter, and ecclesiasts are not the least to forego the enhancement of temporal authority, and even into the world beyond if they can. [105] The original democratic election of the bishop by the congregation became the selective function of a self-perpetuating priesthood. The blood of the martyr may have been the seed of the church, but there is no doubt that the blood of Christian schismatics cemented the authority of the hierarchy.

[102] Foundations of Christianity—Kautsky, p. 433.
[103] State and Revolution—Lenin, p. 38.
[104] Reformation in Germany and Switzerland—D'Aubigne, Vol. I, p. 19.
[105] The Middle Ages—Hallam, Vol. II, pp. 101-5.

Gibbon estimates, however, that the number of Christian martyrs was grossly exaggerated for the purposes of the church, and that during the worst persecutions experienced by the sect in the reigns of Galerius and Maximin, the whole might amount to about fifteen hundred; a number which, if equally divided between the ten years of the persecution, will allow an annual toll one hundred and fifty martyrs. "In the Netherlands alone," Gibbon adds sardonically, "more than one hundred thousand of the subjects of Charles V are said to have suffered by the hands of the executioner; and this extraordinary number is attested to by Grotius, a man of genius and learning, who preserved his moderation amidst the fury of contending sects, and who composed the annals of his own age and country at a time when the invention of the printing press had facilitated the means of intelligence and increased the power of detection." [106]

The elevation of Christianity to the state church of the Roman Empire was a tremendous political success, but a great religious disaster. Constantine effectually crushed whatever was left of the early purity of the Christian faith, and the Nicaean Creed hardened the arteries of the church organization through which flowed the circumspect dogmas. The profession of the prince became the creed of his people. "The change of religion was accomplished, not by a popular tumult, but by the decrees of the emperors, of the senate and of the time. Of the Christian hierarchy, the bishops of Rome were commonly the most prudent and least fanatic." [107]

Anxious to spread the authority of the Roman Church, they reached out for the remnants of the power of the fallen Empire. Temporal aggrandizement led to political and personal debauchery and many of the wildest excesses too bestial here to record were committed in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost.

CHRISTIANITY DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

During the first half of the Middle Ages a large part of the power and a great deal of the wealth seemed to gravitate toward the Church. Through bequeathment, gift, tithe and conquest, by every artifice of fear, terror, cajolery and diplomacy she sucked in the resources of Christian Europe. Her wealth was limited only by losses sustained through internal extravagance and despoliation. "If it had not been for these drawbacks, the clergy must, one would imagine, have almost acquired the exclusive property of the soil.

[106] The Decline and Fall of Rome—Gibbon, Vol. I, pp. 503-4.
[107] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1444.

They did enjoy, according to some authorities, nearly one-half of England, and, I believe, a greater proportion in some countries of Europe. They had reached, perhaps, their zenith in respect of territorial property about the conclusion of the twelfth century." [108]

Through the right of sanctuary, the Church was a state within a state even in those few instances when she did not dominate the ruler through his minister, or the communicant through the confessional.

While corruption and other-worldliness was rampant at the head, the tentacles of the Church, the sincere monks and parish priests, still kept alive the imperishable flames of Jesus' teachings. Peter the Hermit was abroad preaching the salvation of Jerusalem from the infidel. The masses hearkened, the nobility responded to their infectious enthusiasm, and the Crusades were on. The Church adopted this movement for its own purposes. "From the very first this flaming enthusiasm was mixed with baser elements. There was the cold and calculated scheme of the free and ambitious Latin Church to subdue and replace the emperor-ruler Byzantine Church; there was the free booting instinct of the Normans, who were tearing Italy to pieces, which turned readily enough to a new and richer world of plunder." [109]

At the same time the flame of a much higher civilization was burning brightly in a now forgotten corner of Europe, the Iberian peninsula, then under Arab-Jewish-Moorish domination. "It is indeed difficult to say in the case of this Arabic culture where the Jew ends, and the Arab begins, so important and essential were the Jewish factors." [110] The various early Crusades temporarily resurrected the Church, but they ended in bringing it to the verge of disaster.

CHRISTIANITY DURING THE REFORMATION

The ensuing Renaissance of culture which those vast mass movements and clashes of different cultures had been instrumental in awakening gave rise to the Reformation, and the Church was saved from disintegration only through a Counter-Reformation and the heroic movement originated by Loyola. Europe was awakening from its long hibernation. The mind of man must be free to direct freely the movement of his body and the service of his interests. Italy itself was little affected by the audacious movement begun by Luther in Germany, but the western world was agog. England had severed the connections with Rome and while formally France remained the daughter of the Church, in essence she had emancipated herself from the political domination of the Papacy. This policy was fully confirmed later on by the brilliancy of two Cardinal-Ministers, Richelieu and Mazarin, and the state politics of an ambitious monarch, Louis XIV.

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[108] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam, Vol. II, p. 82.

[109] Outline of History—Wells, p. 640.

[110] Outline of History—Wells, pp. 600-1.

The lust for power, the degradation of personal debauchery, the sale of Infinite Compassion itself, long continued, unmolested, profligate, all had conspired to focus their deferred retribution in a tremendous outburst of long-repressed resentment.

To such depths had the Catholic Church sunk that, as a writer reports, a Dominican friar, Tetzel, could deliver from the pulpit in portly, dignified presence and sonorous voice the virtues of indulgences to be had at a price. "Indulgences," said he, "are the most precious and sublime of God's gifts. This cross"—pointing to the red cross—"has as much efficacy as the cross of Jesus Christ. I would not exchange my privileges for those of St. Peter in heaven, for I have saved more souls with my indulgences than he with his sermons. There is no sin so great that the indulgence cannot remit it, and even if one should (which is doubtless impossible) ravish the Holy Virgin Mother of God, let him pay,—let him only pay largely, and it shall be forgiven him." [111]

To modern ears such words, assuming they were uttered, are inconceivable, let alone the ideas they convey. Yet in its day they must have been effective, at least effective enough to impel Luther on a memorable day in Wittenberg to nail to the church his defiance of the Pope, papacy, debauchery, and including indulgences as number thirty-five of his epoch-making ninety-five theses.

The Counter-Reformation was the Church's reply to the Reformation. Through inner purification, through the revision of its doctrine and practices as an aftermath of the Tridentine Council, through the judicious employment of the silk glove and the iron Inquisition, through the devotion of that loyal band to whom Ignatius Loyola had confided his indomitable purpose and relentless energy, through downright military force, and by the timely combination of all these factors, the Catholic Church recoiled from the precipice to which it had been driven and survives to this day an ever potent and often beneficent power in the councils of the world.

[111] Quoted by D'Aubigne in his Reformation in Germany and Switzerland, Vol. I, p. 212.

CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN CIVILIZATION

Illustrative of the interdependence of ideology, politics and economics during different social epochs is the varying social attitudes toward the taking of interest, or usury, as it used to be called. Hume tells us that "by a lucky accident in language, which has a great effect on men's ideas, the invidious word usury, which formerly meant the taking of any interest for money, came now to express only the taking of exorbitant and illegal interest. An act of 1571 violently condemns all usury, but permits ten per cent interest to be paid." [112] Hume here exhibits the common defects of all attempts to rationalize history by ingenious reconstruction, rather than judgment derived by the analysis of facts and their contemporary significance.

It was no mere accident that the world interest took the place of usury. England was then developing a thriving commerce. Merchants engaged in ventures beyond their personal resources had recourse to loans, with a division of the gross profits going to the lender, who naturally obtained a mortgage security for his principle. Money-lending for productive enterprises stood on a far different footing than in medieval days when the principal was used chiefly for unproductive purposes.

Had Hume inquired of his great friend, Adam Smith, for the facts,[113] instead of ransacking his inner consciousness, he would have discovered that the feudal barons after wasting their patrimony in extravagance and lordly show, had recourse to the money-lender to meet their necessities. The woeful day of repayment was sometimes brightened by the torture chamber in the quest for the lender's remaining store, instead of the replenishment of that hoard. Besides, the study of comparative social institutions would have shown Hume that the employment of the term usury or interest depended upon the stage of development of a given society rather than upon the happy accident of usage.

Mankind has long quibbled over the distinction between the principal sum and the interest accrued. In modern times when economic forms are well established, the peculiar function of money as a means of purchase and as a means of payment is closely differentiated from money as a capital sum advanced by the lender to the borrower. For the use of that capital, payment is demanded according to the length of time at stipulated rates within the legal

[112] History of England—Hume, Vol. III. p. 574.

[113] Wealth of Nations—Smith, Bk. III, Ch. IV, p. 389.

limit. The ancient aristocratic Greeks, who like Aristotle, lived in idleness supported by the labor of others, were pleased to condemn all interest-taking as immoral because money is by itself unsusceptible of increase, is naturally barren and to extract any increase from it is contrary to nature.

"Of the two sorts of money-making," wrote Aristotle, "one is a part of household management, the other retail trade, the former necessary and honorable, the latter a kind of exchange which is justly censured, for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term usury, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of making money, that is the most unnatural." [114]

The greatest thinker of antiquity could well be excused for failing to analyze money as capital in a milieu where slavery was the dominant mode of production. Marx, who rarely was lenient with those with whom he disagreed, relents in the case of Aristotle, "the great thinker who was the first to analyze so many forms, whether of thought, society or nature." [115] But even the most generously disposed will find it difficult to forgive our American statesmen who during the regimes of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover succumbed to the subtle propaganda of the Allies of 1917 to scale down their debts due to the United States on the specious distinction between principal and interest [116]—and in these modern times! [117]

CHANGING VIEWS OF RELIGION ON USURY AND INTEREST

Obviously there must have been other times when the distinction between interest and usury was valid. The Koran prohibits all taking of interest. So did the Mosaic law as between Jew and fellow Jew, or even the resident stranger. These religious prohibitions were, of course, neglected with the change in the social structure of which they were originally a part. Usury was practiced even at the building of the second temple. So heavy were the taxes and the necessities of the poor in those days that money was habitually lent out at 12 per cent a year with mortgage security on vineyards, oliveyards and houses. Nehemiah had to invoke the wrath of God, together with the perhaps equally effective backing of the popular assembly in order to revoke the more burdensome of those exactions.[118]

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[114] The Politics—Aristotle, Bk. I, p. 16.
[115] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, p. 68.
[116] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. II, p. 706.
[117] America in Midpassage—Beard, p. 31.

We have already discussed the social background of Solon's relief-laws to prevent half of the Greeks from selling the other half into slavery for non-payment of usurious debts heavily secured by land mortgages. Plutarch describes in his lively, sympathetic fashion the plight of Roman debtors who having "had nothing more to be deprived of, these they led away in person and put their bodies under constraint notwithstanding the scars and wounds they could show in attestation of their public services in numerous campaigns." [119]

The reforms of Lucullus were drastic. Where interest exceeded principal he lopped it off. One per cent was established as the rate.[120] The creditor was to receive only one-fourth of the debtor's income. Caesar followed with drastic laws restraining usury and the treatment of debtors. Like his fellow aristocrats, Caesar himself had been heavily in debt, and he did not disguise the antipathy of his class to mere money-grubbers.

But Rome as a great commercial center was a far cry from the Rome of the old republic. "It is plain that Caesar wished by no means simply to renew that naive prohibition of interest by the old popular party, but on the contrary to allow the taking of interest within certain limits." [121] Rome was becoming the industrial and financial hub of the ancient world, and money-capital more than aristocratic blood or military achievements was the determing influence for power in the state.

However, Roman capitalism bears no analogy to the economic forms developed by modern society. Here the average rate of profit is a decisive factor and reproduction of capital on an enlarged scale is inherent in the laws of capitalist economy in a progressive state.[122] The rate of interest is an aliquot part of the gross profit and cannot be allowed except during the period of crisis to receive more than its share of the whole. In fact the sudden rise in the rate of interest is found at the tail end of a boom, and is the harbinger of the ensuing crash. The point is however, that interest or usury is not only an economic but a political category, and that one's ideological reactions toward it is determined by the specific role it plays in a definite historical period.

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[118] Referred to by Grote in his History of Greece, Vol. III, pp. 110-12.

[119] Plutarch's Lives—Coriolanus, p. 265.

[120] Ibid., Lucullus, p. 607.

[121] History of Rome—Mommsen, Vol. IV, p. 627.

[122] Foundations of Christianity—Kautsky, pp. 106-7.

Feudalism looked with disdain upon money-lender's capital which carried on a furtive existence in the interstices of society. The Church formally forbade all lending at interest. The creditor could get little, if any protection at courts of justice. But the need for accommodation existed, and the supply cautiously met the impecuniary requirement of the aristocracy. The Jew was often the money-lender, and after taking his cash the English did not refrain from expelling him from the kingdom. "But as the canon law, seconded by the municipal, permitted no Christian to take interest, all transactions of this kind must, after the banishment of the Jews, have become more secret and clandestine, and the lender, of consequence, be paid for the use of his money and for the infamy and danger which he incurred by lending it." [123]

Interest rates in England were consequently higher after the expulsion of the Jews. In the time of Charlemagne the rate used to be 100 per cent. In Zurich the official rate was 43 per cent, in Italy 40 per cent, although as the great commercial centers developed in the peninsula the rate fell with increasing wealth.

The Crusades were a powerful influence toward hastening the decline of feudalism. "Yet the more prudent of the crusaders, who were not sure that they should be fed from heaven with a shower of quails or manna, provided themselves with those precious metals which, in every country, are the representatives of every commodity. To defray, according to their rank, the expenses of the road, princes alienated their provinces, nobles their lands and castles, peasants their cattle and the implements of husbandry. . . . Those who remained at home with sense and money, were enriched by the epidemical disease; the sovereigns acquired at a cheap rate the domains of their vassals, and the ecclesiastical purchasers completed the payment by the assurance of their prayers." [124]

Gibbon relates that the crown of thorns which had been pressed upon the Savior's brow at Calvary, that most precious and authentic relic of Christendom, was mortgaged at usurious rates to the money lenders of Venice, and that the King of France expended twenty thousand marks for the reception of "a large authentic portion of the true cross; the baby-linen of the Son of God; the lance, the sponge and the chain of his Passion; the rod of Moses; and part of the skull of St. John the Baptist." [125]

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[123] History of England—Hume, Vol. I, p. 558.

[124] The Decline and Fall of Rome—Gibbon, Vol. II, p. 1007.

[125] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1139.

Faith of such type was driving Europe back to barbarism, while usury was the lever of progress that was effectively uprooting the base of the feudal system. The impoverishment of the nobility was the occasion for the aggrandizement of the power of the Church on one hand, and of the towns on the other, with the king as the central authority emerging as the master of both. Such was the origin of the modern national state.

PROTESTANTISM AS AN IDEOLOGICAL BULWARK OF MODERN CAPITALISM

With the regularization of trade and commerce furtive usury was stabilized into a legal rate of interest. "It is not easy to determine the average rate of profit; but we know that the interest of money was exceedingly high throughout the Middle Ages. At Verona in 1228 it was fixed by law at twelve and a half per cent, at Modena in 1270, it seems to have been as high as twenty. The republic of Genoa, towards the end of the fourteenth century, when Italy had grown wealthy, paid only from seven to 10 per cent to her creditors. An ordinance of Philip the Fair, in 1311, allows twenty per cent after the first year of the loan. Under Henry III, according to Matthew Paris, the debtor paid ten per cent every two months; but this is absolutely incredible as a general practice."[126]

Incredible, as Hallam says, to the historian who instinctively lapses from the economic methods of the nineteenth century to those of the thirteenth. So, with the same ease he speaks of establishing the general rate of profit for an epoch when there could be no general rate of profit, committing thereby the historical anachronism of seeing his beloved Middle Ages, in that respect, through the statistical charts current during modern capitalism at its prime. The laws of the average rate of profit manifest themselves only under a highly developed capitalism to which the rate of interest bears an inherent relation.

Toward the end of the Middle Ages Luther was still carrying on the purist's crusade against money-lending. "The heathen were able to conclude that a usurer is a double-dyed thief and murderer. We Christians, however, hold them in such honor, that we fairly worship them for the sake of their money. . . . Whoever eats up, robs, and steals the nourishment of another, that man commits as great a murder (so far as in him lies) as he who starves a man or utterly undoes him. Such does a usurer, and sits the while safe on his stool, when he ought rather to be hanging on the gallows." [127]

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[126] History of the Middle Ages—Hallam, Vol. III, p. 65.

The indomitable Luther, unconscious of the fact that he was standing at the dawn of a new epoch of Civilization, Modern Capitalism, vows by the Eternal to put an end to usury, and Marx sardonically adds "after judgment day."

In our present economic system finance-capital has wrested supremacy from industrial capital, just as around Luther's time industrial capital was on the way toward displacing merchant capital from the center of the stage. Nothing to-day is worshipped with such sincere adoration as capital in its purest form, money, and the banker, the personification of that capital of which he is legally only the trustee, though puffed with the pride and power which is commonly associated with ownership, has long since usurped the role of the minister of God in passing judgment upon the acts and delinquencies of poor mortals, if they be connected with his world of business.

SUMMARY

In closing this phase of our analysis it must be emphasized that all other questions dealt with are merely illustrative of the main theme, namely, that the social structure is an aggregate consisting of three divisions, the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure; that all three are in constant flux, are inter-dependent and mutually affect each other; that the actual condition of a society at a given time will determine the respective roles assumed by these divisions of the social structure. No matter how one may disagree concerning conclusions expressed on the particular facts presented, upon these propositions all ought to be in substantial agreement: There are no absolute forms in the political organization, nor in the mode of production and exchange of wealth, nor in the religious beliefs, practices, cultural institutions and ideas, of organized society. Our next problem is to discover how the social forces operate to bring about these transformations in the divisions of the social structure, and consequently in society itself, which history so painstakingly records.

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[127] Quoted from the writings of Luther by Marx in Capital, Vol. I, pp. 649-50.

CHAPTER IV

Law in Social Movement

A. PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS TO A SCIENCE OF HISTORY

DEWEY ON WHY A SCIENCE OF HISTORY IS IMPOSSIBLE

DURING the course of the analysis up to this point, the underlying theme has been that history deals with movement, with being and becoming, with form and function in continuous relation, reaction, modification and transition; that quantity and quality are not stable and indestructible but are mutable and interpenetrating; that heterogeneity is but a form of manifestation of a fundamentally homogeneous social structure whose divisions, while arbitrary for purposes of analysis are no less real. We have attempted to define, as well as to explain, the nature of the social structure, not as something absolute and determinative without regard to time and space, but as a living entity whose parts are in continuous relation with each other, affect each other, change each other and themselves in finite time and space, thereby performing that ancient miracle of transubstantiation long the despair of the alchemists, but a commonplace achievement of the priesthood.

History up to now [1] has not emancipated itself from the thraldom of Aristotelian logic, nor from the absolutism and simultaneity of Newtonian conceptions of being and of motion. Of course, powerful advances have been made by Comte, Hegel, Buckle, Marx and Spencer, to mention but a few of the great students of society and its laws of motion. But always there has been a reaction toward the ancient moorings by the authoritative scholars of the day. Invidious comparisons are odious and if criticism has been indulged in, sight has not been lost of their genuine contributions to our knowledge and our developing culture. Up to now we have discussed form, function and movement. There has yet to be established the laws of their relation and motion, which must be of universal application within the historical field, if history is to emerge from an art to the dignity of a science.

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[1] The reader is referred to the preface where full acknowledgment is made to the great thinkers to whose ideas he is so much indebted.

Science desires above all to establish unitary principles amidst an apparent bewildering diversity. It required an intellect of extraordinary penetration to observe that laws develop from the relations of phenomena and are not engrafted upon them. Such was the great contribution of Einstein and the Relativist School. "Science forces us to create new ideas, new theories. Their aim is to break down the wall of contradictions which frequently blocks the way of scientific progress. All the essential ideas in science were born in a dramatic conflict between reality and our attempts at understanding."[2] Science can never be a closed book[3] and contradictory theories of apparently equal merit often yield in synthesis a higher truth.[4] The result is that we observe old truths on a higher level.[5] But the ultimate and absolute tests of all theory is in its agreement with reality. In history as in every science, the theory must agree with the facts, with all the pertinent facts.

Now the logician comes in the person of John Dewey to tell us why history can never reach the status of a science. His reasons for this conclusion are carefully set forth in a recent work.[6] It goes without question that any considered judgment emanating from the outstanding American thinker of his time must be carefully weighed not only for its intrinsic validity, but in due consideration of its source. Otherwise we would be in the position of merely offering an opinion of dubious validity against the judgment of a respected authority. We recall the truth enounced by Kant when he said: "Opinion is consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as objectively insufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself), objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all)."[7] Any theory of history which claims to be scientific must not only be subjectively sufficient for its promulgator, but objectively of sufficient adequacy to answer all its critics. Therefore, we must first meet the objections raised by Dewey because they sum up in an extraordinary degree the intellectual position of present-day writers, both historians and philosophers, like Beard, Schlesinger, Teggart and Santayana and numerous others upon the possibility of history emerging as a science.

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[2] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld (1938), p. 280.

[3] Ibid., p. 308.

[4] Ibid., p. 294.

[5] Ibid., p. 158.

[6] Logic, the Theory of Inquiry—Dewey (1938), pp. 229-244 and 442-449.

[7] Critique of Pure Reason—Kant, p. 461.

CROCE'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION ON HISTORY

Before undertaking the presentation and analysis of Dewey's position, it is important to note that a quarter of a century earlier Croce had arrived at fundamentally similar epistemological conclusions. This great Italian thinker concedes that a hundred or a thousand narratives lacking authenticity are not equal to the poorest authentic document. But, he contends, the more authentic the document, so much the less is it a trustworthy guide for historical construction. It suffers from two irremediable infirmities: The first condition of history is an act of cognition that is intuited and thereby transformed into the subject of individual judgment; the second is the impossibility of letting things speak for themselves, since they must pass through the logical element of what is the historian's judgment. (Logic—Croce, pp. 280-5.)

History, Croce continues, is nothing, and can be nothing more than a story woven from the passions of men. Historians construct a theory of historical factors; a table of values which serve as their foundation for historical narrative. Empirical division by means of concepts arbitrarily classifies facts into a history of the State, or society, or philosophy; or into Oriental, or European, or Roman, or of the Middle Ages. Styles of interpretation change also, as we notice in the narratives of the older historians who devoted themselves almost exclusively to rulers, and wars, and diplomatic negotiations, and mention by merest advertence the domestic and social life of the people. (Logic—Croce pp. 297-308.)

But we are debarred by the laws of thought, Croce contends, from knowing what the future state of reality will be in their determined physiognomy and succession. Knowledge of the action and of the deed follows, and does not precede, the action and the deed. That is the inherent infirmity of every philosophy of history which undertakes to portray the plan of Providence and to determine the formula of progress. (Philosophy of the Practical—Croce pp. 259-69.) As the reader will note below, Dewey's philosophical reasoning stems from the same basic strain, and an effective reply to one, is similarly conclusive as against the other.

SUMMARY OF DEWEY'S THEORIES ON HISTORY

Herein are summarized Dewey's conclusions from the pages already noted. Since every summary lays itself open to the objection that it presents only the writer's views of the ideas thus compressed, the obvious answer is that the original pages are convenient for inspection and comparison.

But of preponderant importance is the following: This is not a polemic against Professor Dewey. Certain views to which he gives utterance are represented to be the quintessence of a school of thought which opposes on logical grounds the possibility of history establishing itself as a science. The clear, concise and adequate presentation of those views are the principal desideratum. Therefore they are presented without comment, so that the reader may consider for himself their due significance, and after that an effort will be made to meet the issues presented, conscious that the stronger the case of the opposition is put, the greater will be the opportunity for an effective reply. The following is in substance Professor Dewey's position.

1. No historical proposition possesses probative force unless temporal continuity can be reasonably established between past facts and facts now present which serve as the means to the formation of this historic narrative judgment. In themselves these facts are so many separate items; they are not complete and final; moreover, the history under determination extends into the future.

2. Propositions about the things which can be contemporaneously observed are the ultimate data from which to infer the happenings of the past. The historian cannot overcome the differences of time in which he writes, and the time about which he writes, due to the illusion of perspective. At best he can, in the products of his inferential inquiry, reconstruct with dramatic imagination an absorbing mental picture, creating the counterfeit of reality, just as in a well-constructed novel.

3. The historian at every point must exercise his judgment in the selection of relevant data and must therefore form some subjective criterion for conceptual principles in estimating the weight and importance of the data he proposed to employ. The first task in historical inquiry, as in any inquiry, is that of controlled observation, both extensive and intensive—the collection of data and their confirmation as authentic in accordance with a theory for locating and delimiting a problem; as serving to point an inference with some degree of probability; and as supporting some conclusion hypothetically made.

4. The historian selects his data that are relative to a theory or assist in the solution of a problem previously formulated. His material is isolated from their historical connections. Strictly speaking, they are not in their isolation historical propositions at all. They

are historical only in their function since they serve as material data for inferential construction. Like all data they are selected and weighed in reference to their capacity to fulfill the demands that are imposed by the evidential function.

5. Since ideas and meanings, as hypotheses are necessary to the construction of historical determinations as they are in any physical inquiry that leads to a definite conclusion, the formation of historical judgments lags behind that of physical judgments, not only because of greater complexity and scantiness of the data, but because of inability to subject their conclusions to standard scientific tests. Besides, historians have not developed the habit of taking the public into their confidence, as do scientists by stating the systematic conceptual structures which they employ in organizing their data, at least not to the extent in which physical inquirers expose their conceptual framework. Too often the conceptual framework is left as an implicit presupposition.

6. The conceptual material employed in writing history is that of the period in which a history is written. There is no material available for leading principles and hypotheses save that of the historic present. As culture changes, the conceptions that are dominant in a culture change. Of necessity new standpoints for viewing, appraising and ordering data arise. History must then be rewritten by every generation, as some writers assert. An extensive doctrinal apparatus is required in order to correlate the varied data of paleontology, anthropology, geography, with their rich variety of social institutions. This doctrinal apparatus is itself the child of its time.

7. Recognition of change in social states and institutions is a precondition of the existence of historical judgment. Annals are materials for history, but hardly history itself. Since the idea of history involves cumulative continuity of movement in a given direction toward stated outcomes, the fundamental conception that controls determination of subject-matter as historical is that of a direction of movement. History cannot be written en masse. Strains of change have to be selected and material sequentially ordered according to the direction of change defining the strain which is selected. All historical construction is necessarily selective, and a great deal depends upon, and varies with, the personality of the selector.

8. Selection must operate through material already pre-selected through the idiosyncrasies of recorders, narrators, legends, literature and monuments that survived time and whose significance is again subject to various interpretations. Memory is selective. The memories that are public and enduring, not private and transitory, are

the primary material with which conscientious and deliberate historians do their work.

9. The historiographer adds a further principle of selection. He elects to write the history of a dynasty, of an enduring struggle, of the formation and growth of a science, an art or a religion, or the technology of production. In doing so he postulates a career, a course and cycle of change. From this there follow selective appraisals as to the relative weight and relevancy of materials at his disposal, and as to the way they are to be ordered in connection with one another. There is no event which ever happened that was merely dynastic, merely scientific, merely technological. An act of judgment has loosened it from the total complex of which it was a part, and has given it a place in a new context not native to the properties of original existence. Probably nowhere else is the work of judgment in discriminating between phenomena and in creation of syntheses, as marked as in historical evocations. For historical inquiry is an affair of selection and arrangement, and is controlled by the dominant problems and conceptions of the culture of the period in which it is written.

10. The writing of history is in itself an historical event in which the writer takes part. The acute nationalism of the present era, for example, cannot be accounted for without reckoning with this aspect of historical writing, The Marxian conception of the part played in the past by forces of production in determining property relations and of the role of class struggles in social life has itself accelerated the power of the forces of production to determine future social relations, and has increased the significance of class struggles. The fact that history as inquiry which issues in reconstruction of the past, is itself part of what happens historically.

11. If we derive our logical idea of history from what is contained within the covers of books, we reach the conclusion that history is exclusively of the past. That which is now past was once a living present, just as the living present is in course of becoming part of another present. But the past is a logical necessity of the past-of-the-present, and the present is the past-of-a-future-living present. The idea of the continuity of history entails this conclusion necessarily. But the selection by the historian of the end or outcome marks an interest, and the interest reaches into the future and vitiates his conclusions. No historic present is a mere redistribution, by means of permutations and combinations, of the elements of the past. History cannot escape its own process. It will, therefore, always be rewritten. As the new present arises, the past is the past of a different present.

12. Events do not occur as an abstraction, but in a definite historical setting. The terms of the description are evidential marks. Whatever is the literary or esthetic office of description, its sole logical function is to enable identification to be made for the sake of determining the relevancy of this and that proposition. In modern science, proper description is strictly a means of identification, and any historical predication is a requalification, or operational means of instituting a requalification, and so involves a change, which, when stated, is temporal-narrational.

13. Descriptions are existential propositions which are means to judgment, but are not themselves final or complete. These involve determinations of traits, which involve differences of opinion as to the nature of the thing explained, and the interpretation of evidence relied on, and conclusions adduced.

14. A law as a factual generalization has a set of interactions for its content. These ways of interaction are selected, affirmatively and negatively, in any given case, so that they will have as their potential consequences the traits which inclusively and exclusively determine a relation of kinds to one another. The term "causal laws," is accordingly, in spite of its general use, a figure of speech. It is a case of metonymy in which a law is designated not in terms of its own content but in terms of consequences of execution of its function. Basic confusion has arisen, and is bound to arise, in logical theory when the existential orders so determined are taken to be literal constituents of the laws themselves. The historian often arbitrarily selects his materials in such manner as to possess the aspect of an historical continuum and so demonstrates the validity of both his theory and its inherent causal connection with the production of phenomena previously selected.

REPLY TO DEWEY'S POSITION

This work by its very construction meets one of the objections raised by Professor Dewey, by endeavoring to take the public into its confidence in stating the systematic conceptual structures employed in the organization of its data. Its entire lay-out meets four-square the issues raised in point number five of Dewey's criticism. Every hypothesis that is here postulated is intended to meet, and must meet the same kind of proof as is required of any other physical inquiry that leads to a definite conclusion. We go a step further in making our proofs even more rigid than those required by

Dewey. Far from hiding behind that bulwark of self-confessed inadequacy in pleading the necessity of perspective for gauging historical phenomena, if the Historical Field Theory is truly scientific, the more near and recent the events, the more readily ought they to lend themselves to scientific organization, analysis and understanding. Contemporary events are matters of widest general concern. The study and criticism to which they are subjected is constant and ubiquitous. Besides this, it must meet that supremest of tests, the ability to forecast the future on the basis of known phenomena and the laws which govern its development. Physical science meets this test unhesitatingly. So must history if it is to acquire the rank of a science.

THE FUNCTIONAL ADAPTATION OF THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

History, like any other scientific inquiry which establishes its field of operation, must begin with factors which are independent of particular changing circumstances. We stated in the previous chapter that society is the independent variable, while the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure of a civilization are the dependent variables. An effort was made to establish the proposition that while the social structure is at all times undergoing readjustments and modifications due to the interplay of its component aggregates, the structure itself is relatively stable as regards any one of its divisions.

To this proposition Dewey dissents in point number six. He contends that the historian is limited by the conceptual material of his time; that there are no leading principles or hypotheses save the living present; that as culture changes, ideas change and the extensive doctrinal apparatus previously employed no longer meet the new conditions, and history must again be re-written.

The issue, then, is clearly joined. Are there any factors present in human society, more specifically, in different civilizations, which carry over from epoch to epoch, and, even in modified form, are clearly recognizable as the independent factors of a particular human existence regardless of the type of state, the nature of its economy, and the character of its ideological superstructure? Obviously, if we can discover such factors, then they must be like the golden threads running through the warp and woof of history, and while participating in the formation of a particular pattern, are distinctly recognizable despite the variety of the material.

RELATIVE STABILITY OF HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS IN CIVILIZATION

There are fundamental human characteristics which maintain a relatively stable significance despite infinite variety in mode of expression. We are dealing here not with an alleged "human nature" that does not change, just like the elements in the chemistry of a former generation, but with a human nature that is readily understood despite the type of civilization into whose combination it enters. Human nature changes, but these changes are themselves the product of human reactions to a given situation where the pressure of forces is long sustained and sufficiently powerful to effect such modifications. Human nature in history functions as an independent variable. To it all other factors are related. The real problem of history is not the study of human nature in the abstract but rather the study of the operation of the dependent variables in a given field of which the particular manifestation of the human qualities are a necessary part.

Everybody knows of the driving power inherent in the fundamental biological instincts of existence—hunger, love, shelter and the complex of elements making for human gregariousness. The sociologist deals with four divisions of the social structure, the addition being the development of the moral foundations of civilization.

When Durant in the first chapters of his history of civilization undertakes to discuss the development of moral conceptions, he treats of the subject from a sociological, rather than an historical point of view.[8] For, as will be discussed immediately following, there is nothing which one civilization grasps more readily than the moral conceptions of another civilization. Means may change, ends may differ, but we have a shrewd knowledge of those means and a solemn respect for its ends, if only because the elements contained therein of honor, gain, enjoyment, envy, hatred and downright human maliciousness contrasted to the exaltation of self-sacrifice are so much within the range of our own experiences.

"The relations between means and ends thus traced," says Spencer, "throughout the earlier stages of evolving conduct, are traceable throughout later stages; and hold true of human conduct, even up to its highest forms. As fast as, for the better maintenance of life, the simpler sets of means and the pleasures accompanying the uses of them, come to be supplemented by the more complex sets of means and pleasures, these begin to take precedence in time and imperativeness. To use effectually each more complex set of means becomes the proximate end, and the accompanying feeling becomes the immediate gratification sought; though there may be, and habitually is, an associated consciousness of the remoter ends and remoter gratification."[9]

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[8] The Foundations of Civilization—Durant (1936), Chap. IV.

Dewey himself has written considerably on the relative stability of human nature of civilized man as we know him. He properly differentiates between instincts and habits or customs. "As a matter of fact it is precisely custom which has the greatest inertia, which is least susceptible of alteration; while instincts are most readily modifiable through use, most subject to educative direction. The conservative who begs scientific support from the psychology of instincts is the victim of an outgrown psychology which derived its notion of instinct from an exaggeration of the fixity and certainty of the operation of instincts among the lower animals. He is the victim of a popular zoology of the bird, bee and beaver, which are largely framed to the greater glory of God. . . . But the short-cut revolutionist fails to realize the full force of the things about which he talks most, namely institutions as embodied habits. Any one with knowledge of the stability and force of habit will hesitate to propose or prophesy rapid and sweeping social changes. A social revolution may effect abrupt and deep alterations in external customs, in legal and political institutions. But the habits that are behind these institutions and that have, willy-nilly, been shaped by objective conditions, the habits of thought and feeling, are not so easily modified."[10]

In this profound analysis Dewey the philosopher stands far above Dewey, the historical logician. Were it not for the stability of custom and the habits of thought and action which are so slow to change that long years must elapse before even the moral effects of great social revolutions can modify them, it would be impossible for us to understand the thoughts and actions of men of bygone civilizations. By the same token, it is quite possible for us to analyze the development of the Soviet Union and its present political construction, for without the stability of custom as a yardstick the gyrations of the so-called Communist regime would be quite impossible of analysis. Czar Stalin for Czar Nicholas make an understandable picture in the contemporary Russian milieu, and sincere Communists themselves regretfully admit that the Russian nature still leans more on the Bolshevik Little Father than on the

[9] The Data of Ethics—Spencer, p. 185.

[10] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey, pp. 107-8.

glorious Constitution of 1936, though they stoutly maintain Stalin is merely enacting a role, not actually living it.

HUMAN NATURE, CUSTOM AND INSTINCT

Human nature is a combination of custom and instinct. Instincts are readily modifiable, customs much slower of change because they have behind them the tremendous inertia of habit, tradition, moral and ethical concepts. Of the latter Buckle remarks with the remarkable perspicuity which makes his writings an outstanding achievement of the nineteenth century: "For there is, unquestionably, nothing to be found in the world which has undergone so little change as those great dogmas of which moral systems are composed. To do good to others; to sacrifice for their benefit your wishes; to love your neighbor as yourself; to forgive your enemies; to restrain your passions; to honor your parents; to respect those who are set over you: these and a few others, are the sole essentials of morals; but they have been known for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been added to them by all the sermons, homilies and text-books which moralists and theologians have been able to produce. . . . In reference to our moral conduct there is not a single principle now known to the most cultivated Europeans, which was not likewise known to the ancients. In reference to the conduct of our intellect, the moderns have not only made the most important additions to every department of knowledge that the ancients ever attempted to study, but besides this, they have upset and revolutionized the old method of inquiry." [11]

Buckle goes on to demonstrate why this is so by the statement that the intellectual principle is not only the more progressive than the moral principle but is also far more permanent in its results. The good deeds effected by our moral faculties are less capable of transmission; their motives the result of self-discipline; and that has to begin anew with each generation who derive but little benefit from the maxims of preceding experience. It is this fundamental continuity of human nature despite its modifications, which renders understandable to us the great religious systems of the past, and makes the Bible, for example, an ever-fresh depositary of living human emotion for succeeding generations of its students.

We read the writings of the immortal ancient masterpieces, such as the dramatic compositions of Sophocles, Aeschylus and Euripides and respond to the heart-beats of their characterizations; Demosthenes and Pericles are statesmen after our own heart—at least we can look into their souls with sympathetic understanding; Plutarch's characterizations scintillate and sparkle because we understand them; the theological debates at Nice have a deathless tone in the nicety of their differentiation of the unsubstantial; Luther stirs emotions even to this day; the solemn adjurations of Washington in his immortal Farewell Address very properly give rise to current political debate; while the humaneness of Abraham Lincoln will warm him to the succeeding generations after he has exercised his beneficent influence on our own.

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[11] History of Civilization in England—Buckle, Vol. I, pp. 129-131.

The material offered by similar immortals of every clime and every age form for us an inexhaustible storehouse from which to organize principles and hypotheses from the past, and give us the key to the understanding of the present. We are different from our ancestors and yet are their indissoluble blood offspring. The human species has been on this earth many hundreds of thousands of years. Our civilization is, comparatively, but of yesterday. The differences between us and the founders of the first civilization touches the surface, but not the essence of human nature.

MODERN VERSIONS OF ANCIENT MORAL PRINCIPLES

A "ham 'n' egg thirty dollars every Thursday" old-age pension plan is defeated in a California referendum. Is there really anything new in this movement? In so far as it is a genuine attempt to provide for old age, it is simply the recognition on the part of society that a problem heretofore left to the superannuated themselves, or to their children, has, under radically different conditions, become a problem of society acting through the state. Religion and morality from time immemorial lay the strict injunction of honoring, and later providing for, father and mother. The modern economic system based on industrialism makes it impossible for the great mass of wage-earners to perform that filial duty, and whether some like it or not, it is an obligation which society at large must in increasing measure assume, if only for the same protective principle which causes every European government to distribute free of charge gas masks to its population, instead of selling them only to those who can afford to pay. It is the same protective principle which led England four hundred years ago to institute measures of public relief for general distress.

Some people are inclined to add moral stature to the superior sensibilities of the present age because of our welfare system. The long history of the English Poor Laws are ample proof of the state assumption of a social obligation. Hume, with that singular aplomb, which is the despair of modern historical writers, tells us, quite incorrectly, that the first law for the relief of the poor was enacted in the fifth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth,[12] though he correctly describes its fundamental cause as due to the enclosures, the transformation of the immemorial common lands into private holdings and the extinction of the ancient privileges of the yeomanry to the soil.

Hallam who is meticulous as to his facts places the first relief law in 1535, while the principle of systematic exactions on the parish for its own poor relief was established in 1572.[13] Green narrates the brutal treatment to which the homeless poor, driven off their ancient lands and roaming through the countryside, were subjected in their aimless wandering while each parish pushed them further on to avoid the burden of their miserable support. "We find the magistrates of Somersetshire capturing a gang of a hundred at a stroke, hanging fifty at once to the gallows, and complaining bitterly to the Council of the necessity for waiting till the Assizes before they could enjoy the spectacle of the fifty others hanging beside them." [14]

Marx, by his laborious researches, has perpetuated for posterity the incredibly cruel and bloody legislation against the expropriated peasantry of England. They range through the entire field of torture, branding, hanging, imprisonment and being sold abroad into slavery, all with detailed particularization as to date and source [15] as should satisfy even the Rev. John Haynes Holmes as to Marx's humanity [16] and refute completely Teggart's statement that Marx was not acquainted with the mode of life nor with the conditions of labor in any other than the capitalist form of society.[17]

Sir Thomas Erskine May shows how the liberalizing influence of the nineteenth century gradually modified the early rigor of legislation against labor and involuntary poverty.[18] Lest some see in this a progressive development of our superior morality to flaunt before the past, it must be obvious to every student of political economy that, comparing the wealth and resources of the sixteenth century with that of the twentieth, the modern age is afflicted with the grosser evidences of demeaning penury, the more profligate waste of precious human resources, the more ostentatious display of unearned income in the face of the world's producers when they are allowed the blessed privilege of earning their pay.

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[12] History of England—Hume, Vol. III, p. 575.

[13] Constitutional History of England—Hallam, Vol. I, p. 82.

[14] History of the English People—Green, Vol. II, p. 368.

[15] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, pp. 788-808.

[16] Karl Marx; Fifty Years After—Holmes, p. 6.

[17] Processes of History—Teggart, pp. 15-16.

[18] The Constitutional History of England—May, Vol. II, pp. 562-8.

If once we concede the relative permanence of fundamental motivating factors which survive and continue despite radical transformations of the social organization, then we have achieved a great step forward toward making history scientific. No one pretends that this is an original discovery; what we do claim is the possibility of observing this ancient truth in a new light; that we are dealing here not with "dephlogisticed air" as thought those genuine pragmatists, Scheele and Priestley, but with oxygen as Lavoisier proved in laying the foundations of modern chemistry. History at last deals consciously with certain constants in relation to its own field of inquiry, not with absolute factors independent of time and space and mode of social organization. These motivating elements are strictly limited by the realities of its own sphere of operation, equating itself to the enormous diversity of its phenomenal manifestations among its finite units, changing themselves during the process of the equation, but necessarily and inevitably compelling that equation among its units.

Theoretically, each individual can go off by himself to some lonely, uninhabited, unclaimed spot somewhere on this earth and live his own life. Some have succeeded in doing so. To that extent they have eliminated themselves from that era of human development called Civilization, and therefore from its historical field of operation. But within that field they must respond to the enormous attraction of those social forces. That power varies inversely to their social remoteness, and is multiplied by the square of their involvement. The lonely hermit may exist in a great metropolis, but the metropolitan banker reacts to every variation of the social factors in industry, commerce, politics, international relations, science and even art, if it has wider implications of commercial significance, be that in the remotest corners of the earth.

SCIENTIFIC LAWS SUBSTITUTED FOR PRAGMATIC EXPERIENCE

History then rises from the purely pragmatical consideration of the known existing factors as interpreted from the standpoint of our own times, but deals with definite long-term factors which have their roots embedded deeply in the past, with tentacles reaching out toward the future and whose forms of motion should be as susceptible of analysis as those in any other sphere of physical inquiry. The nature and origin of these social forms should be subject to the same rigid scientific tests. The much abused term "pragmatic," is here used in the sense delimited by Dewey as "the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions, provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the specific problem evolving from the operations." [19]

The baneful influence of pragmatism as a method of inquiry is observed in the deplorable present state of our political and social sciences. Pragmatism must split two ways. Whatever merit there exists in its procedural operations it owes to the application of scientific principles. The rest degenerates into sheerest empiricism with its hit-or-miss methods and the shoddy assumption that appearance and reality are synonymous.

Among our intelligentsia it manifests itself as a neglect of scientific education, a ceaseless ruminating among current superficialities for a grain of truth, and the cynical assumption that the "truth" thus found will not survive the appearance of the latest book.

Pragmatism has dignified through pompous phrases and pretended erudition the "common sense" methods of the average man who despises theory—the hardest of intellectual efforts—for the experiences of everyday life which he interprets in a so-called practical manner. Such men cannot be expected to realize that they are dealing with social factors of overwhelming significance in our civilization. Such men, disguised as statesmen resolve great wars into a "lasting" peace, as at Versailles. Because they are intensely practical lawyers and business men, they are supposed to know what it is all about from a multitude of acute observations garnered during a busy life-time, and so are considered competent to concoct out of their capacious intellects a treaty which, violating basic social laws, must result in another outbreak of hostilities.[20] Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando and Wilson were all eminently successful, practical men, and Wilson was a pragmatist philosopher in the bargain.

Our modern economists, following the same tack, gather monuments of statistics with which they can do nothing, because they lack the essential knowledge of the underlying, social laws, whose existence they previously denied as part of their protective intellectual armament. Modern scholars neglect the old classical studies in history and political economy for the omnivorous gathering of current data, which they must attempt to piece together by some process, usually simplified to one or two factors, of absurd subjective rationalization.

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[19] Logic; The Theory of Inquiry—Dewey (1938), p. iv.

[20] Twenty-five years ago in a series of articles I proved, at least to my own satisfaction, why the Versailles Peace had to result only in a truce.

Every latest theory is hailed as the last word. They read everything and understand nothing in its fundamental character. Hence, for example, the pitiable, tragic gyrations of the pragmatical New Deal physicians who were ready to try anything once, in the hope it would work, though they were always quick to retreat if the patient showed evidence of succumbing to their ministrations. As a counterpart, stand the equally eminent pragmatical reactionaries who, having nothing concrete to advance, must content themselves with vituperative criticism on the one hand and empty promises on the other.

All this is the inevitable result of that superficiality which parades as "common sense" before the average man, and as "pragmatism" before an intelligentsia who have lost the art of constructive thought in the face of the actual world crisis.

THE HISTORIAN'S FRAME OF REFERENCE

Dewey insists in point number one outlined above that no historical proposition possesses probative force unless temporal continuity can be reasonably established between past and present facts. To this contention we agree. But such continuity has already been established by the very genuine kinship and sympathetic understanding we feel for homo sapiens in recorded civilizations. We have now to answer the argument in point number two that the historian cannot overcome the differences of time in which he writes and the time about which he writes, and that, therefore, he can only create an illusion of reality by reconstructing through the imagination at best what is an absorbing and dramatic picture of the past.

First of all, let us rid ourselves of that learned jargon which one field of knowledge tries to superimpose mechanically upon another field of knowledge thereby conveying meanings which, though perfectly clear in its original field, are surreptitiously smuggled into the other, and pass muster without further attempt at critical examination.

We will have occasion later on to discuss the social philosophies of some really great physicists when they deign to pass judgment on social questions. Here we are concerned with an attempt to engraft "relativist" history through the medium of relativist phraseology. The frame of reference, lines of force in a gravitational field, the time-space continuum, all these are noble conceptions in physics where they are endowed with precise meaning and have been subjected to experimental proof. Writers have attempted to smuggle these conceptions into history by the simple expedient of employing the same idioms. They sound the same, but have not the same meaning. Let them use facts instead of phrases, proof instead of analogies.

What do they mean by the differences in time between the writer of history and his subject matter? Obviously one cannot transform himself into a colonist merely by writing about the American colonial period. If that is the burden of their proof, the mountain has indeed labored in vain. But the danger lies in giving a tautology the semblance of an analysis. Do they contend that because one cannot transplant himself into the colonial period of which he writes, that therefore he is debarred from its thorough analysis? Why so? Is it because we do not understand their intellectual bents, the course of their mental operations, their inner motivations, the conditions of their material existence, the political ties and conflicts between them and the mother country, the character of their statesmen, the subtle blending of complex influences of ethical, moral and religious beliefs?

Is one tempted to quibble concerning what constitutes a complete analysis? Then, one will have to repeat the labors of Carlyle and the others who contended that the knowledge of every act and thought of every individual of a given time must be clearly analyzed, and their permutations understood in order to write history. But by the same token we could never understand the time in which we write. Is a metallurgist in a steel mill debarred from understanding the nature of the processes he himself starts, regulates and controls because he cannot give a graphic chart depicting the actions of every electron of every atom of all the materials he works with, and therefore cannot predict the end result of his operation? But we have gone over this ground before. Dewey's argument stands on the difference in historical time. It is up to him to prove why it is impossible to understand the historical events of a given period in the past, whose people we know in our innermost soul and who have left their records behind them in imperishable works.

By the very processes of his own logic Dewey is compelled to argue that an historian writing of his own period, with all its data before him, with the rich complex of its culture about him, who is himself a product of his time, understanding its mental and emotional reactions, a recondite and conscientious student besides, a keen observer of men and events;—such an historian ought to produce the very paragon of histories. Yet it is precisely as we approach the present that classical historians become evasive, apologetic, employ weasel words with tepid meaning and leave ample trap-doors for escape while they hide behind the pretext of perspective. First they cannot understand the past because they live in the present; now they cannot understand the present because they live too close to the present. Thus all history becomes impossible. Pragmatists have been led by an easy analogy between physical and historical laws to this ultimate dilemma.

History deals necessarily with actions which are limited and finite as to time and space. The essential fundamentals of the social record are known, together with the nature of the human beings who made that record, and the physical world of which they were a component part. The present and the past are interwoven as part of our historical system through the medium of acquired custom, and the evolutionary nature of our culture and institutions. Nature still abhors a multiplicity of causes where a single cause is sufficient, and a unitary, consistent conception of history must take precedence over the attitude that each historian is locked up in his own petty frame of reference and becomes by some subtility never clearly explained a law for himself.

THE HISTORIAN'S PRECONCEPTIONS

Dewey asks, What do you mean by the essential fundamentals of the human record? Are you not indulging in an act of judgment wherein you select what fits into your conceptual principles of what is important in history? Do you not use this purely personal method of evaluation, no matter how you may defend its rationality, in accordance with which you select your data? This is the substance of his points number three and four.

Every thinker, it is true, approaches his material with some preconceived notions. He may think them ever so well grounded, he may be ever so cautious in their application; but the fact remains that by the very processes of his task he cannot start his investigation without some form of prior intellectualization. All one can fairly ask of him is that he consider his problem with the open-mindedness of an honest juror, and the intellectual honesty expected of the work-a-day scientist.

Very often a scientist resorts to a convention and the deliberate employment of an hypothesis. This is a perfectly valid procedure if kept within bounds. Einstein and Infeld explain the uses of the former by an example from physics. "By convention," they say, "we regard the potential corresponding to a negative charge as lower than that corresponding to a positive charge. . . . Does the positive fluid flow to the negative body, or the negative fluid to the positive body? In the material presented here we have no basis for deciding between these two alternatives. We can assume either of the two possibilities, or that the flow is simultaneous in both directions. It it only a matter of adopting a convention, and no significance can be attached to the choice, for we know no method of deciding the question experimentally." [21] It is different with an hypothesis which is provisional in nature and must be verified by the actual facts if it is to survive.

Dewey lays down three conditions that an hypothesis must meet. First, it must possess the property of verifiable existence in some domain, and it cannot have any standing if drawn from the void and offered ad hoc. Second, it must be able to order and account for the proximate subject matter. Third, the hypothesis must be such as to account for the arguments advanced in support of other theories.[22] "The operations that prepare the material must be so directed by ideas (as hypotheses), as to satisfy, conjunctively and disjunctively, the functions of affirmation-negation. This satisfaction is obtained only through operational comparisons and contrasts. These operations, experimentally performed, disclose agreements in phenomena that are materially or existentially independent of one another, and they check the agreements (identities) obtained by systematic eliminations, or ascertainment of differences." [23]

Let us take the case of a writer on American history. This historian begins with some theory of history—we assume he is a philosophically-inclined historian. His subject, let us say, is the American Revolution. Of course he approaches the subject with preconceived ideas. Being a reasonable man, as all philosophers are presumed to be, these ideas have been confirmed, modified, and are added to during the course of his investigations. He has had recourse to recognized source materials, and has probably contributed a grain or two to the vast accumulated store. This storehouse of knowledge consists of the most diverse accumulation of data. His greatest problem really is to select his material. This he does in accordance with a theory, and the selected material presumably supports his theory.

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[21] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, pp. 81-2.

[22] Logic; The Theory of Inquiry—Dewey, p. 3.

[23] Logic; The Theory of Inquiry—Dewey, p. 432.

So far his procedure has been exactly as laid down by Dewey in the above point nine.

Now let us see if the conclusion Dewey draws from that is a valid one. How does a physical scientist proceed about his business? Does he also not approach his subject with certain ideas in mind, with theories to support or test, material to be sifted and analyzed, and conclusions to be drawn or disproved? Not all conclusions are susceptible of physical experiment. Frequently an inference drawn by rigid logic from factors themselves thoroughly understood, and operating in a controlled medium subjected to every test, offer the most exact and conclusive results which every scientist would be glad to accept. We can dismiss from serious consideration the type of mind which considers the physical senses as the penultimate of logical proof.

THE HISTORIAN'S PROBLEM OF PAST AND PRESENT TIME

But, it is contended, the physical scientist can check his theories with the realities of existence. And why cannot the historian? Because, argues Dewey in point number eleven, history deals exclusively with the past; the historian writes of the past in his own present time, which in itself becomes the past of a future time. Does not this objection exist necessarily in every other branch of human knowledge? The physical scientist in the study of his phenomena deals with certain relations. What is now, becomes the past of the succeeding moment in the history of that phenomena. Its present is constantly becoming the past of the future present. How does the scientist know that he is speaking of the same thing from moment to moment? In fact, he is not speaking exactly of the same thing, if by the property of sameness one means the exact relation of position and motion of its internal structure from moment to moment. Physical phenomena in the gross is not concerned with the internal structure of each atom in each successive moment, nor is history with the relation of each individual being every moment of time. History is vitally interested in the laws of continuity in finite space and definite time. Were it not for the existence of these laws developed from definite relations subsisting among the mass, all science would be impossible.

These propositions are fundamental in physics, and they apply with equal force in history. Society is a definite reality. All we have to do is to look about us to be conscious of its ubiquitous presence though no one yet has examined it under the microscope or tested it in the chemist's retort. We also know from our own experience that society existed yesterday, and a year ago, and so on as far back as we desire to go in our recollections. Then we stop for sufficient proof of existence anterior to our own conscious contact with this reality. The existence of parents helps. Their authentic experiences we are willing to accept as sufficient. Then we go further back to the established records, to histories, to sociology, anthropology and so forth. From them we desire, for the purposes of this discussion, proof only of the existence of a past society.

By means of definite controls we establish that American society goes back to a certain time which by convention we call the Revolutionary Period. If one so desires, the process can be repeated as to whether we of the fourth decade of the twentieth century can understand a society in the eighth decade of the eighteenth century. The metallurgist will, without hesitancy concede, that as far as he is concerned, the iron ore mined by the colonists for the casting of their artillery used at Yorktown was of the same general nature as the iron ore mined from a similar deposit the day before yesterday; and if there have been any changes in its composition, he will give you, or search for, sufficient reasons adequately to account for that difference.

The retort will be that we are comparing inert matter, iron, with a living reality, society. First of all, matter is not so terribly inert. Secondly, and of primary importance, the issue now is, not one of logical impossibility, as Dewey contends, but of practical inability to understand historical times different than our own. As a matter of fact, classical historians loudly contend to the contrary; that with the aid of blessed perspective all doubts are resolved and truth shines crystal-clear the further they are removed from the reality which is under their very noses. The classical historian yearns for perspective, while the pragmatical philosopher urges that the more we see of a thing the more likely we are to understand its operations. The scientist will want to know as much as possible of both the past and the present, but he will recognize that without knowledge of their laws of motion, all these facts are mere data, and all functional observation becomes mere empiricism.

Our philosophic historian, we presume, has his nose hidden not only in the books of the past, but occasionally lifts it up for sniffling at events transpiring about him. He has even noted among his papers on contemporary affairs several abortive progressive political movements with which the name of John Dewey has been variously associated, and surely not as an ornament. He knows that, true to his own pragmatic philosophy, Dewey has tried this political tack, and dabbled in that movement, and has eminently succeeded with other Progressives in leaving nothing but wreck and uncertainty in the ranks of American liberalism. Therefore our historian may be justified in the conclusion that the greatest living pragmatist of his time has met with no better success than himself in clearing the muddle of present-day social bewilderment.

The cause of this pragmatical predicament is clear. Having taught so long that there is no such thing as science in history, and having proclaimed the impossibility of establishing social laws to account for social movement, pragmatists have succeeded admirably in stopping further progress in social science from where it left off fifty years ago. This they now find is a tremendous handicap in a fast-moving world, and that accounts for the typical liberal attitude of one-step-forward, two-steps-backward, with the right-about-face gyrations characteristic of our leading Progressives.

This discussion will have served a fruitful purpose, if we shall have succeeded in establishing the proposition that every mode of thought is an act of the present and deals with events of the past with the object of discovering their internal laws of motion for future guidance. These valid laws must apply to phenomena of the past, the present, and under similar conditions, in the future after due consideration of the variable factors which are inherent in, and are governed by, the laws of motion of the given phenomena.

Such predictions are indeed commonplace. Government statisticians can make amazingly accurate estimates as to certain tax yields for the coming fiscal year. Upon the continuity of definite social factors depends the reliability of insurance company statistics. The New York City Water Supply System figures on a daily current consumption of nine hundred million gallons of water, and the rapid transit system supplies equipment, power, and labor sufficient to haul approximately five million sardine-like passengers a week from Wednesday next. Dewey and his school have built up the impossibility of a social science called history because they have denied both the existence and necessarily the persistence of social forces; or what amounts to the same thing, the impossibility of our ever understanding them, if they do exist. Yet ordinary, every-day civilized existence is predicated upon their reality.

LIFE THE CORRECTIVE OF HISTORICAL BIAS

Dewey's argument that the selection by the historian of the end or outcome of his material marks an interest, and consequently vitiates his conclusions, for the reasons already stated, applies to every other branch of knowledge, and would operate to render all science impossible. If a scientific investigator cannot learn to modify his end or outcome according to the laws of the material which he observes, then so much the worse for his so-called science. Unfortunately, this obvious common sense procedure has not been adopted by present-day historians.

In his most recent work Beard writes: "On another flank James Harvey Robinson created a commotion by asserting that it was one of the prime functions of historiography to throw light upon our present quandaries by tracing the rise and development of the circumstances from which they sprang. Historical research and construction done in this spirit, with due respect for the authenticity of documents and for scientific exactitude in respect of details, was bound, in the nature of things, to give a different appearance to the past and the present. Although when expressed without adornment, this idea seemed heretical to keepers of orthodoxy, what it actually suggested was that historians do consciously what they have been doing more or less unconsciously." [24] All this commotion was started by Robinson's appeal for common sense in history based on commonplace scientific procedural methods. He actually committed the egregious error of urging his fellow historians, to their horror, that they consider the utilitarian aspect of their art, and not be content only with history as an intellectual adornment.

One can express only commiseration for the plight of our professoriate when their limitations compel them to "pull up abruptly" when approaching their own time. Thus wrote West: "While I have been toiling over the concluding chapters of this volume my respect for this judicious procedure has been unexpectedly enhanced. On so recent a period as the years since the World War the most impartial conclusions are at the mercy of fresh evidence daily to be expected." [25] Thus weighty social questions are decided by the latest bulletin chalked up on a scoreboard like the figures of a sandlot baseball game. It is a sorry condition for historical theory if every latest fact disclosed must result in a complete turn-about, or at least in a radical revision of previously announced conclusions. Imagine the fundamental principles of physical science fluctuating with the latest news from nowhere, and modified with every vagary of somebody's intellectual brainstorm!

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[24] America In Midpassage—Beard (1939), p. 914.

[25] American Democracy—West, p. V.

ESSENTIAL SIMILARITY OF ALL SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE

Our supposititious philosophical historian, careful soul that he is, now sets about the task of writing about the American Revolution. Immediately he hears as in a nightmare Dewey chuckle: What do you mean by this revolution business? You can't by an act of judgment tear out from the total complex of events certain happenings in that great episode which you arbitrarily label key circumstances according to your theory, and denominate the whole as the American Revolution. Others have different theories, and all are entitled to equal respect, or lack of it, because they all suffer from the same inherent defect. This is the burden of the latter part of Dewey's point number nine. Our historian may well pause. Few events are born labeled with their due significance. It is only later on that we apply a certain tag to them, and upon that there is seldom unanimity.

However, our historian is not easily baffled and returns to the attack. Is every fact in physical science labeled pure chemistry, or pure astronomy, or pure anything you please? By an act of judgment we classify certain phenomena; we make ideal abstraction from certain conflicting or disturbing elements; and finally after studying their laws under ideal conditions we refer those conclusions back to the real world for check-up and for the necessary modifications. This is the perfectly legitimate and highly successful scientific technique. Why can not we use it in the field of history, with, of course, necessary adaptations peculiar to its phenomena? The ultimate test in history must be the same as in any science—the theory must give a full and satisfactory explanation of the laws governing its phenomena. Exceptions, if any, cannot go contrary to the theory, but must be subjected to further study and clarification. In this process of intellectual development the theory itself may be modified, or overthrown. But as long as it stands its ground on the basis of the level attained by its contemporary culture, if it can meet the attacks upon it successfully, and adequately explain all the essential elements in its sphere of operation, then that theory has fulfilled all that science can ask of it.

One merit of Dewey's argument our conscientious historian will concede, or soon be compelled to admit, as he proceeds with his analysis. No philosophical interpretation of the American Revolution is possible, no broad generalizations can be drawn as to its nature and the course of its development unless a scientifically valid theory of history is already formulated, at least in his mind. The

American Revolution is a mighty episode reaching far back into the innermost recesses of the social structure for centuries preceding the events to which it gave rise, and whose effects are still felt in full force throughout the entire world-extent of contemporary happenings.

In short, a thorough understanding of any segment of history arbitrarily selected by the writer must ultimately relate back to fundamental social forces which in their mutual operation have been instrumental in creating the given social structure, and are in turn produced by it, giving rise to the historical material now selected by the writer.

THE SELECTED HISTORICAL DATA MUST SAMPLE THE REST

Dewey points out what is to him another insuperable obstacle toward the scientific analysis of historical phenomena in the fact that the selector of data must necessarily operate with materials which had themselves previously undergone a process of selection. The historian must depend on the work of other recorders who naturally made note only of what to them appeared significant and important. This is the burden of point number eight.

To really know what was going on during the Revolutionary Period, for example, our philosophic historian would have to know every detail of those times of all people in all walks of life, public and private, in religious, political, economic, and cultural affairs and in every other phase of human activity. Clearly that is impossible. Obvious, too, it must be that our historian would be overwhelmed with the material of a single day; and were he to have even that brief moment of history before him he must be compelled out of sheer intellectual sanity, to select that which is vital from the mass of trivialities.

Dewey can be seen, metaphorically, rubbing his hands in high glee at this fatal admission of a selecting process. But is not all knowledge, even in the most exact of sciences, selective in its procedure? Do we ask a chemist to present the data of every single chemical reaction of every single moment of each day in order to prove the correctness of his theories? Of course not. By methods of control universally recognized a single fundamental reaction will establish the truth of a proposition not only for the time and place of its occurrence, but for every time and place where similar conditions prevail. The glory of science lies in its ability to generalize the fundamental laws of its phenomena. It does not rely on mere empiricism which depends on the fact that somehow the thing in question works, leaving open the door to the possibility that it may not work later, but then again if not here, perhaps somewhere else.

The ground of attack must now be shifted. There is no comparison, it is argued, between the complexity of social life and the relative simplicity of physical laws. No doubt physicists will have something to say on that score. However, that argument puts matters in a far different light. The issue of simplicity versus complexity, while grave, is not one of inherent impossibility. Scientific technique has learned a trick or two in resolving an apparently complex incomprehensible phenomenon through the establishment of organization, regularity and definite relations in modifications, which we denominate laws.

But, it is asserted, there are no social laws. That is the very bone of contention. It may not be necessary for our historian of the American Revolution to know in the minutest detail every single thought, every shifting whim, every peculiar turn and twist of every mind during every moment of the period that he studies. And despite that he is not necessarily debarred from the adequate knowledge of his phenomena. It must be plain that scientific history is not concerned with the mass of inconsequential daily happenings. Dewey's contention is an amazing demonstration of the fact that the human mind in the main progresses rather slowly, for despite all the modernistic jargon of the literati, the essence of his position is not a single whit further advanced than that of Carlyle who wrote a hundred years before him about history being an immense biography, and of the impossibility of comprehending fully a single biography, even our own. This theory is still the basis of Sir Charles Oman's position in a work recently published.[26]

Our great contemporaries lose sight of the fact that history deals with the mass and not the individual, and that continuity rather than change is the fundamental law of social existence. Having initially denied the existence of laws, they are consequently absolved from undertaking a painstaking search with the view of determining their nature. The secret of historical movement lies in the discovery of the essential forces of social relations, and these will also disclose the laws of their modification and transformation.

These so-called moderns are back-numbers after all. They do not appear to realize that to explain thoroughly, completely and in essence the history of but a single day, nay a single hour, assuming they had all the facts before them—which is impossible—they would be overwhelmed by their sheer mass, not of variety, but of mere

[26] On the Writing of History—Oman (1939).

repetition. They could not proceed without a scientifically valid theory of history which would order, classify and systematize their phenomena.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE OBSERVER ON HIS SUBJECT

There is a logical similarity in the theoretical position of Dewey and Heisenberg in their respective fields. The latter in his classic defense of the Uncertainty Principle stresses the indeterminateness of the concept "observation." Heisenberg writes: "It is not possible to decide, other than arbitrarily, what objects are to be considered as part of the observed system and what as part of the observer's apparatus. In the formulas of the theory this arbitrariness often makes it possible to use quite different analytical methods for the treatment of a single physical experiment. Even when this arbitrariness is taken into account the concept 'observation' belongs, strictly speaking, to the class of ideas borrowed from everyday life." [27]

Dewey translates that proposition to the domain of history in point number ten. Therein he asserts that the historian by the very influence of his labor cannot be a scientifically impartial, or neutral, observer of his own time. He cites the acute nationalism of the present era as reflected in the historical writing of to-day. Again, he refers to the powerful influence the Marxian conceptions of the past have had in bringing about the very conditions concerning which he is supposed to be an impersonal, or rather an impervious, observer.

If this contention is to be something more than a purely subjective logical construction, it is incumbent upon Dewey to show just exactly how it is that the writer of history must affect the history of his own time sufficiently to vitiate his judgment or modify the times about which he writes. Fortunately or otherwise, not all who write history are of Marx's calibre. Most of them, far from wanting to make history, are only too happy if the educational purse-holders leave them severely alone.

The most conclusive answer to Dewey, who leaned heavily on Heisenberg, is the answer that Einstein made to that distinguished physicist-theoretician. In his Pittsburgh address referring to causality Einstein said: "Heisenberg has shown that this is not the case, for we cannot observe the initial state without influencing the state of the system in a way unknown to us, and that makes it impossible to know the initial state, and likewise the final state, and consequently you cannot verify the law of causality experimentally. With this the question is not answered, because you can ask whether the final state has a determinate form or only a probability form." [28] In a book published during the previous year Einstein had stated: "On the other hand it seems to me certain that we must give up the idea of a complete localization of the particle in a theoretical model. This seems to me to be the permanent upshot of Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty." [29]

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[27] The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory—Heisenberg, pp. 63-4.

In history the same principle applies, because we are no longer concerned with the movement of the particular individual, but rather with the movement of the mass. The historical individual, the great leader, we have seen, plays a role in society, is subject to the influence of social laws upon which he exercises his potent power, but it is only by virtue of the social relations of which he is a part that he is enabled to act. Not every writer of history is an historical personality, and the irony of the matter is that neither was Marx at the time when he produced his great creative work. Like many other geniuses, world influence came to him posthumously. But the matter would not be changed a single iota if he were alive to-day. His ideas have become a potent force; not his works, which nobody reads amongst the proletariat, but few among the intelligentsia, and hardly any among the professoriate. The Marxian ideas apparently express a deep truth concerning the existing social structure to account for their recognized world influence.

Instead of floundering around with analogies between historical and physical theory, Dewey could have attempted to explain why it is that present-day writers reflect the intense nationalism of their time. The unremitting logical application of the theory of inquiry might have led him to connect current history with current economic, political and social problems. Perhaps he would have discerned the indissoluble bond between the events recorded and the social forces which gave origin to those events. No great leader makes history by himself, not even a great historian. He enacts an historic role in the complex of a vast array of forces and circumstances with himself included as an integral factor in the process.

PRAGMATISM FAILS TO EXPLAIN THE CAUSES OF CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

How is it possible to form an adequate conception of our own times unless we know why acute nationalism characterizes the present era? We did not need Dewey, the pragmatic philosopher, to tell us what every non-philosophical observer sees for himself. The average man has every justification for expecting from the leaders of thought the why, and not merely the what, of things. No theory of social science, no grandiose verbal scheme parading as philosophy is worth the effort unless it can give a scientifically rational explanation for the causes of rampant nationalism and its by-product, war. That is the crucial test of a theory of history, or of a system of social philosophy, and Dewey's patently has failed.

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[28] Address by Prof. Einstein in Pittsburgh, Dec. 28, 1934, reported in the New York Times, Dec. 29, 1934.

[29] The World As I See It—Einstein; Covici-Friede ed., 1934, p. 39.

For to analyze modern nationalism fully is to write the history of modern civilization during the past four hundred years. This Dewey, the logician, says cannot be done. Therefore Dewey the social philosopher who bemoans the phenomena of war must content himself with such soul-saving generalities that it is horrible, and not much can be done about it unless men of better will with a wiser social pattern are placed at the helm.

Writes Dewey: "The argument for the abiding necessity of war turns out, accordingly, to have this much value. It makes us wisely suspicious of all cheap and easy equivalences. It convinces us of the folly of striving to eliminate war by agencies which leave other institutions of society pretty much unchanged. History does not prove the inevitability of war, but it does prove that customs and institutions which organize native powers into certain patterns in politics and economics will also generate the war-pattern. The problem of war is difficult because it is serious. It is none other than the wider problem of the effective moralizing or humanizing of native impulses in times of peace." [30] Why did not Dewey explain the nature of those certain patterns in politics and history which he concedes are the cause of war instead of moralizing about them?

If the incomparable Preacher of the Sermon on the Mount with his myriad present disciples has been unable to accomplish that task, one may venture to question the ability of the philosophical, fence-straddling champion of pragmatism to achieve that Utopian end. But genuine science, the kind of inquiry which goes beyond appearances in the quest of underlying causes, must result in a positive acquisition to our social store of knowledge which, when properly directed, will abolish the kind of war which plagues mankind to-day.

This puttering around with functional consequences of propositions operationally instituted is the functional pretext for neglecting the classics, past and present, and the study of why things came to be what they are, before undertaking the task of doing something to, with, or about them.

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[30] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey, p. 115.

The most glaring example of this neglect is seen in Dewey's treatment of Marx, that most penetrating inquirer into the nature of existing social forms. It is not a question of whether Marx was right or wrong. When one rises to a certain intellectual height that question is replaced by, What does Marx really teach? There is no justification for a thinker of Dewey's calibre not to have first-hand knowledge of Marx's views on capitalist economy. One can sympathize with that horde of critical mediocrities who tackled "Capital" and gave it up as a task beyond their powers. Everyone recognizes in Dewey one of the few great thinkers of our time. Therefore it is tragic to see him flounder around with such phrases as "the role of class struggles in social life has itself, through the activities it set up, accelerated the power of forces of production to determine future social relations." [31]

He, above all, realizes the significance of words and the meaning to be attached to scientific phraseology. Or when he charges Marx with "the exaggeration of production due to its isolation from ignored consumption so hypnotizes attention that even would-be reformers, like Marxian socialists, assert that the entire social problem focuses at the point of production." [32] As a matter of simple fact Marx in volume two of Capital, from page 260 on through to page 611 is engaged in a most thoroughly painstaking and minute investigation of the entire process of production, circulation, consumption and reproduction in order to develop his theory of economic crises. Further, Part Seven of volume three of Capital is taken up completely with the revenues of the classes and their consumptive expenditure.

This astounding lack of knowledge on the part of Dewey concerning an epoch-making work which he undertakes to discuss and upon whose merits he passes judgment is typical of the pragmatical approach to current social problems of the gravest importance to the whole of mankind. This miserable "functional approach" to the consequences of capitalist economy is cavalierly justified by Dewey in his giving a mere "authority" for his judgment. This authority upon whom he relies is Maurice William's "The Social Interpretation of History," [33] a work whose petty scholarship in Marxism would disgrace a college sophomore. Not having studied Marx, Dewey would not know the difference.

[31] Logic; The Theory of Inquiry—Dewey, p. 237.

[32] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey, p. 273.

[33] Social Interpretation of History—William (1920).

We have now discussed the first eleven points raised by Dewey on the impossibility of a science of history. Of the remaining three points, twelve and thirteen deal with the uses of words and terms in descriptions employed at a given time, while the fourteenth touches the problem of causality directly. Both these questions will be discussed fully in the succeeding chapter where they fit into the lay-out of this work.

REPLICATION OF DEWEY'S POSITION AND REPLY THERETO

Dewey's Position	*Reply*
The historian cannot establish a temporal continuity between past facts and present facts which serve as the means for the formation of historic narrative judgment.	Human nature and the existing social structure are independent variables in relation to the historian. Between the two, the former is more constant. For this reason in the light of authentic records it is possible for us to understand the ideas, the motives, the customs, traditions, in short, the effective ideological reactions of man to his environment and toward his particular problems.
The historian cannot overcome the differences of time, and at best can succeed in reconstructing a dramatic counterfeit of reality.	The inevitable differences in time present objections which are more logical than real. Every moment is unique and can never be recaptured if only because of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Even the most theoretical of physicists does not always speak of exactly the same thing from moment to moment; yet somehow reality persists in recognizable form. The scientific historian does not seek to reconstruct a past reality, but to explain how it functioned in view of our definite knowledge concerning the nature of society and the social forces operating in a definite medium.
The historian selects relevant facts in accordance with some subjective conceptual principles by which he estimates their weight. There is lacking controls for the objective confirmation of the theory.	The scientific historian, like any other scientist, may select his facts in accordance with some subjective scheme. But his liberty of action ends right there. The social forces which produced those facts are in-

Dewey's Position	*Reply*
	exorable correctives of the theory, while the laws of motion as ultimately established will confirm, modify or overthrow the theory itself. In the final analysis, the conceptual principles must mirror the objective reality of the actual world.
The historian by the process of selection isolates his material from their actual connection. This data is historical only in their function since they serve as material for inferential construction.	Every scientist arbitrarily isolates his material from its actual relations, but only for the purpose of investigation. There is no such thing as pure physics or pure chemistry, or pure physiology. After the more or less isolated investigation has fulfilled its purpose, the entire matter must be related back to the actual world of functional relations from which it was temporarily separated. Here the reality itself will determine the ultimate mold of our ideas. What Dewey speaks of is the procedural method of classical history. Scientific history must consider the inter-connections of all relevant material employed.
Ideas and meanings are necessary in the construction of historical determinations, as they are in any physical inquiry. The historian, unlike the scientist does not take the public into his confidence by presenting the systematic conceptual structures which are the framework for organizing the data.	This is a valid objection to the historical methods adopted by the classical school, which proceeds upon the basis of certain subjective assumptions toward which their data is related. The scientific historian must make plain not only his procedural operation, but their validity must be subjected to the same rigid tests which are applied to all other physical determinations.
The historian's conceptual material is viewed necessarily from the standpoint of the historic present. As culture changes, conceptions change. This doctrinal apparatus is itself the child of its time and history must be re-written by every generation.	The fact that we live in the historic present does not debar us from grasping the essence of the historic past, if we know the nature of the social structure and the laws of social motion developed from the internal relations of the component aggregates. The question of past and present time as it applies to history

Dewey's Position	*Reply*
	is a mechanical transference of current ideas in physics and philosophy by sheer assumption and analogy. If classical history has constantly to be re-written, it is not because of implicit theoretical limitations as of procedural imperfections. The entire problem of the time element will be considered in greater detail in the chapter on Causality.
Annals are the materials of history, but not history itself whose characteristic is movement. Strains of change are selected and the material sequentially ordered according to the direction of change suitable for the particular analysis.	All the subject-matter of science, be it physical or historical, must deal with existent fact. But that does not prevent the observation of movement in a definite direction in the phenomena itself. Dewey's objection holds for the classical school, but not for the scientific historian who would no more think of arbitrarily arranging his laws of motion than would the physical scientist.
The historian's selection of material is from data already pre-selected, and its significance, as well as that material which is ignored, is dependent upon the personality of the selector.	As long as history is a mere record of events, and its significance is to be determined by deductions from the events, this objection presents an insuperable obstacle to a science of history. But the science of history must deal not only with events in society, but with the laws or social forces which brought those events into existence. Once we deal with laws, history becomes very much simplified because most happenings take on the order of repetition in essence, while the modifications themselves become the subject of inquiry. Through the parsimony principle in laws the scientist as well as the historian approaches Carlyle's goal of infinite compression.
The historian himself adds a further principle of selection, according to the period, dynasty or particular segment which he chooses for his subject. An act of judgment loosens from the total complex a	The scientific historian will find, as the physical scientist has found, that the adequate explanation of a segment of reality must embody the principles of the whole. It is impossible to write of any period or phase

Dewey's Position	*Reply*
particular part and gives it a homogeneity it did not possess as actual happenings.	of history without employing all the laws of social motion which hold for the rest. The same principles would apply for a century as for a decade or for a day. Descriptions are logical arrangements, and possess historical validity only if it is a fair sample of the whole. Classifications are merely aids to analysis.
The writing of history is itself an historical event and is subject to the limitations of the time in which it is written. Thus the inquiry into the past is itself part of what is happening historically. The acute nationalism of the present era, for example, must color the analysis of past history.	No historian should be expected to perform the miracle of divesting himself of his relations with all temporal existence; nor is it necessary that any scientist should do so, to discover the laws of his phenomena. It is precisely the application of scientific methods to history which will establish why nationalism plays so great a role at the present time, while it was a sentiment practically unknown during feudalism.
No historic present is a mere redistribution, by means of permutations and combinations of the elements of the past. Every such rearrangement marks an interest and therefore vitiates the conclusion. Each historical past is a past of the now present, and can never be the same for different times.	The science of history does not attempt to re-create the past, but to understand and explain it. No physicist ever succeeded in re-creating the reality of the past, but that does not prevent him from analyzing the laws of motion which produced it, and its successor in time. The historical scientist does not have to re-arrange past or present phenomena, or future relations in accordance with his subjective requirements.
Historical description is the result of the logical function as a means of identification. Any historical predication is a re-qualification, and this operational procedure involves a temporal-narrational change.	No science is certain that its word-pictures are an exact reproduction of the 'thing-in-itself.' Science is interested rather in its relations, and is certain of its methods to the extent that it can re-produce these relations or predict some future occurrence under definite controls. Historical events do not occur as an abstraction, but as the result of definite social forces operating in a definite field. Once that field is un-

Dewey's Position	*Reply*
	derstood, the historian is freed from the theoretical limitations imposed by his temporal relation. The human race has not changed and will not change overnight in any fundamental respect.
Descriptions are existential propositions which are not final, because they involve determinations of traits, which vary as to opinion and the interpretation relied on, and conclusions adduced.	Scientific history is concerned primarily with social forces and the medium in which they operate. Descriptions of events may vary, but never the decisive results. This rules out all differences of opinion as to the fact, and in science that would mean also their interpretation, to the extent that the laws of motion are understood.
Laws as a factual generalization are developed from the inter-action of phenomena. These ways of interaction are selected so that their potential consequences will possess the qualities which co-incide with the theory whose validity it is desired to establish. 'Causal law' is a sheer metonymy.	The question of law in history is so fundamental that a complete chapter in this work has been devoted to its exhaustive treatment. Dewey's contention that the term 'causal law' is a metonymy since no valid relation can be established between historical events in past and present time, would be a fatal defect to all science. It is precisely the fact that laws operate independently of the influence exerted by the particular observer and the particular observation that forms the basis of existing knowledge, irrespective of whether these laws are causal or indeterminate in character.

INFLUENCE OF DEWEY ON CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN THOUGHT

How influential are the logical objections raised by Dewey to a science of history is observed in their reiteration almost in the same terms by the president of the American Historical Association in 1933.[34] They permeate the thinking processes of almost all contemporary writers.

Teggart has recourse to the same processes of reasoning. "The first and most deeply rooted of the obstacles which lie in the way of a scientific approach to the study of man," says he, "consists in the traditional practice by which the utilization of the results of historical investigation has been restricted to the construction of historical narratives. Whatever the aim of the inquiry may be, historical investigation presupposes the employment of a critical technique."[35] Here we have what by this time is the familiar picture of an historian who approaches his subject burdened with three fatal handicaps. First, he has a problem to solve. Second, he looks around for material which casts light on his problem. Third, he employs his purely personal critical technique in the handling of his material, and consequently there is nothing surprising in the fact that his conclusions appear to be miraculously confirmed by the facts of history as he adduced them.

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[34] America In Midpassage—Beard (1939), p. 913.

This ancient epistemological dodge would fool nobody but a modern thinker. Somewhere somebody ought to pass a law that no one should be allowed to write on any scientific subject until he had previously passed through the purgatory of a thorough grounding in philosophy. For historians an additional punishment should be prescribed in the form of a complete training in political economy. In both cases only the original work of the great masters should be studied with the object of knowing what they contain before one is allowed to say what they taught.

Teggart continues further: "History is the narrative statement of happenings in the past. No annalist, no historian attempts to set down all that has taken place. Not everything that has happened is known to the historian, however well informed."[36] We see practiced by the professional historian what is preached by the great logician. Who would want to go to the trouble of collecting all those facts when he wouldn't know what to do with them after he got them? Scientists are a hardy and persistent breed, and they have been known to devote half a century to the consistent running down of their clues. Only they have learned to save themselves a lot of unnecessary labor by the process of generalizing established principles. They have learned to distinguish the vital from the inconsequential, the important from the unnecessary, and the laws governing their generalizations are derived not from the hidden recesses of their unconscious, but from the relations of the phenomena in the external world.

Teggart has another ace up his sleeve, an old trick to us by this time. "It is a selection," he contends, "from the available data so arranged as to convey to the reader, not the actual complexity of happenings, but such happenings as the historian considers of importance in a period or in a series of occurrences. The 'synthesis' of the modern historian is theirs, as much a personal presentation of what has happened as the narrative of the earlier historian; the academic historian, no less than his predecessor, is engaged in the construction of a work of art." [37] So far Dewey supports Teggart and Teggart returns the compliment.

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[35] Theory of History—Teggart (1925), p. 3.
[36] Theory of History—Teggart, p. 10.

All scientific work is developed by a process of selection. The scientist, however, is soon checked by very definite and effective procedural methods. The problem arises, how can the historian check the results of his own theories? The reply is, simply, by the same methods that science in general has found so necessary and salutary. But science deals with laws whose operations can be observed frequently under ideal conditions. So can history. It has before it the most perfect and ideal of laboratories, society itself, life itself.

History will never be a science to the workers in that field until they recognize the existence of social forces. That is the first step for them in their pilgrim's progress from practicing an art to developing a science.

B. The Fundamental Similarity of All Scientific Procedure

PARSIMONY IN PRINCIPLES THE GOAL OF SCIENTIFIC HISTORY

Consistency is the forte of logic, and Teggart is logically consistent after having made his fundamental erroneous assumptions. "The infinite variety of the theories advanced," he writes, "in the effort to arrive at a basis for a synthesis of world history, leads to the recognition of the fact that our concept of the 'whole' of history must proceed out of our own philosophy of life." [38] The scientific method has no objection to an infinite variety of theories—at the beginning of an analysis. In fact, that is a rather welcome evidence of an intensely active intellectual life, where contradictory theories stoutly maintained are the essential conditions for further progress. But the greater that progress, the less are the number of those theories, and consequently so much fewer are the fundamental assumptions not yet susceptible of proof. The ideal is attained when there are no assumptions and all agree to the validity of a single theory.

How is this agreement brought about? Leaving out the relatively simple process of effecting agreement by liquidation or concentration as either process is found expedient in certain European States, free science—and there is no and can be no other—follows the method of analysis where the conclusion is supported by the reality. "The grand aim of all science," says Einstein, "is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms. Meanwhile the train of thought leading from the axioms to the empirical facts or verifiable consequences get steadily longer and more subtle. . . . Such a theoretical structure needs to be very thoroughly elaborated before it can lead to conclusions which can be compared with experience. Here too the observed fact is undoubtedly the supreme arbiter; but it cannot pronounce sentence until the wide chasm separating the axioms from their verifiable consequences has been bridged by much intense, hard thinking." [39] This great physicist who typifies the highest in scientific decorum is still engaged in resolving into a higher synthesis the apparently contradictory results of the quantum theory and electrodynamics.[40]

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[37] Theory of History—Teggart, p. 28.

[38] Theory of History—Teggart, p. 43.

Parsimony in principles is the controlling law of nature and of intellectual activity. "All these endeavors are based on the belief that existence should have a completely harmonious structure. Today we have less ground than ever before for allowing ourselves to be forced away from this wonderful belief." [41] Einstein further explains: "By the 'simplest' system we do not mean the one which the student will have the least trouble in assimilating, but the one which contains the fewest possible mutually independent postulates or axioms; since the content of these logical, mutually independent axioms represents that remainder which is not comprehended." [42]

When Teggart speaks of the infinite variety of historical theories advanced, he merely gives evidence of the deplorable state in which that study now finds itself. But when he undertakes to show that a philosophy of history must proceed out of one's own philosophy of life, and consequently must be purely subjective in its synthesis, then he is merely translating a personal incapacity into a fundamental law of life. However, Teggart stumbles back to the main road with the significant admission that "the initial step toward a scientific attitude is taken when men reach the point of eliminating the notion that the results given in experience are dictated by personal caprice or extra-natural interference." [43] From this meagre logical in-field hit he depends upon others to shove him around the bases toward the home plate goal.

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[39] The World As I See It—Einstein, pp. 91-2.

[40] Ibid., p. 24.

[41] Ibid., p. 139.

[42] Ibid., p. 138.

[43] Theory of History—Teggart, p. 159.

TEGGART ON DANGERS IN HISTORICAL ANALOGIES

With one of Teggart's conclusions we are in hearty accord, when he insists that in the employment of analogies "they are enlisting a dangerous ally, for in thus assimilating the unknown to the known a specious assurance is given by the familiarity of the latter element." [44] An interesting announcement of Will Durant's new book, "The Life of Greece" holds out the enticing bait to the prospective purchaser that he will find himself understanding more and more about what is happening in America to-day as he sees Greek problems resembling ours in every detail but machinery: [45] the same class wars, the same conflict between religion and science, between democracy and dictatorship. It would be a ticklish problem for even Teggart to decide which is the unknown being assimilated to the known, the problems of Greece, or the problems of America.

That is a trifling exception, the one about machinery. The fact that the machine age is an offspring of a highly developed industrial technique, dependent upon every corner of the globe first for its supplies and then for its market, that there is required a highly developed credit apparatus extremely sensitive to every trade variation, that the money-lenders of Greece agree with the money-lenders of to-day only in name, since the modern banker seldom advances hard cash—all this and myriad other differences are forgotten or slurred over in the fact that Greeks too—those remarkable creatures! —ate, slept, drank, built homes, hovels and palaces, sang, played, loved and hated like the rest of mankind.

The basic difference, that of slavery upon which the Greek system was founded, is lost sight of as something incidental to their civilization. "I shall discover only minor differences between the Solonian and the Roosevelt revolutions," the announcement continues. Perhaps that marvelous tale will also show, concerning those wonderful Greeks, that their males seldom bore children though often burdened with the carrying of them.

In the concluding pages of his work Teggart criticized the "old" history as conservative, while the "new" is liberal with the impulse of nature, and acts in co-operation with the vital principles of betterment.[46] These phrases are mere platitudes devoid of intellectual content. Our great historians have had their day in molding the present generation, and they failed miserably on the job. Not a little of the bedevilment of our present times is due to their cultural ministrations, whether of the old or the new school. It is a little incongruous for them to assume grand airs and preach homilies to the rest of us when they have failed so patently in their own field, which is the business of understanding and explaining the reasons for the events they record.

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[44] Ibid., p. 161.

[45] New York Times, Nov. 14, 1939.

ROBINSON ON USES OF SCIENCE IN HISTORY

Among our present-day historians James Harvey Robinson carries on the grand tradition most commendably. He is gentle, urbane, philosophic, and gives every indication of being securely ensconced in an institutional ivory tower from which he looks down upon the panorama of the human comedy. He indulges himself in many lofty reflections in the best Puckian manner, and after he is through, one can see him retire to his study with every evidence of glowing self-satisfaction. His self-analysis is a fine intellectual whimsy, while his criticism of the historian's craft never passes beyond the bounds of genteel raillery.

"The historian," says he, "usually has had a feeble power of discrimination. He humbly reported what his sources happened to include, with little attention to whether his readers or even he himself had any obvious reason for being interested in what he selected. What onlookers call 'impartial' history and professionals call 'objective' is merely history without an object. This is no implied excuse on my part for slipshod work. History may be both true and useful, since nothing is more scientific than showing how things as they are have come about." [47] History, if scientific, *must* be true if it is to describe correctly how things came about, and *will* be exceedingly useful if it shows that the human agencies through whom those things came to pass are not merely the blind instruments of inscrutable destiny, but that they have a great deal to do in shaping that destiny once they understand the laws of social movement.

What Professor Robinson started out so bravely to do at the beginning of his book he abandons toward the end. "Objective history is supposed to be a search for facts regardless of any preferences or aims, except the discovery of the raw truth. It is history without an objective. I have come to think that no such thing as objective history is possible. One has always to make some kind of a selection in saying anything about the past. All writers consciously or unconsciously have to pick and choose from the inchoate mass at their disposal. They have, moreover, many unrecognized assumptions underlying their procedure. It cannot be otherwise. . . . . As I write this I have a vision of the Anaconda Copper Mills where a selected variety of dirt is hauled over in cars from Butte. . . . Even so with the raw materials of history, which have to undergo successive sortings and refinement to meet the various needs of the ultimate consumers. The problem of smelting history has preoccupied me for years. How is human experience to be presented so as to do the most good in the case of school children, college students and the public? The past is a mine full of precious ore and as yet there is not any machinery adequate to save much of it." [48]

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[46] Theory of History—Teggart, p. 202.

[47] The Human Comedy—Robinson (1937), p. 15.

That there exists no adequate machinery is no argument that it cannot be created. No machinery is produced except by exact knowledge of certain means to definite ends. History is no more an inchoate mass, once its laws are understood, than is that pile of copper ore to the metallurgists at Butte; though, true enough, it may appear so to the casual observer.

The fundamental distinction between the historian, Robinson, and the metallurgist at Butte is this: the latter speaks not of a pile of dirt but of copper ore, and he knows the properties of his material; while the historian confesses at the outset that he knows little, and is very doubtful of the little he knows. All the necromancy of the metal worker's skill is derived from the study of the properties of his material, their laws of affinity and how best to utilize them after a close study of the laws of nature and their suitable application to the problem at hand.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL LAWS

Robinson brings us once more to the problem of the historian exercising his individual judgment in the selection of his material. No scientific historian can exercise more discretion in this selection than the scientific metallurgist. He can be no more arbitrary in its uses than the worker of metals. He must bend his idiosyncrasies to the study of the laws of the phenomena with which he operates, and while he has great discretion in the working out of his subject, ultimately its own internal laws will establish the limit of his vagaries. No one has yet made a cheese cake out of copper, though the metallurgist might well have assisted in supplying the accessories for the baking process.

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[48] The Human Comedy—Robinson (1937), pp. 380-2.

Analogies, as we saw, are inherently defective. The analogy in this case is of Professor Robinson's making. There is no harm in following it out as long as we keep in mind the limitations of the analogy. Copper is a product of nature and is amenable to ultimate natural laws. History is a product of society and created by the movement of social factors.

But man himself is an active agent in the making of his own history. On this vital point Marx says: "Labor is, in the first place, a process in which both man and nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature. He opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body to appropriate nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labor that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labor-power to market for sale as a commodity, from the state in which human labor was still in its first instinctive stage. We presuppose labor in a form that stamps it exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality."[49] Marxism is the antithesis of mechanism. Man himself is the prime factor in the making of his history.

Robinson and his school, by denying the existence of objective historical laws which exist independently of the observer, continuing to function long after the observer has passed through the judgment gates, is absolved from the further investigation along that line. Therefore they are reduced to subjective rationalization concerning their field, and to the preachment of homilies from a self-devised text. Not only that; they are even led to deny the existence of history as an objective reality, and no better proof is required of that fact than the solemn demeanor with which Robinson cogitates upon how to teach history that will do most good to children, college students and the public at large.

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[49] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, pp. 197-8.

What does he mean by that qualifying phrase "to do the most good"? No one questions the reality of the problem of *how* to teach history to the various age groups. But as to the *substance* of history there can be, or rather should be, no question, unless one is prepared to substitute fable, dogma, and propaganda for the fact.

Professor Robinson complacently admits that the new kind of historian must utilize the information amassed by his predecessors, since our problems are often inherited and can best be met by a fuller knowledge of their origin and development.[50] He recognizes that "it is so difficult a task to form any correct estimate of one's own surroundings, largely on account of our very familiarity with them, that historical students have generally evaded this responsibility. They have often declared that it was impossible to do so satisfactorily. And yet no one will ever know more than we do about what is going on now. Some secrets may be revealed to coming generations, but plenty of other circumstances will obscure them." [51]

The defects of Robinson's historical method become most glaring when he speaks of our modern economic order, of nationalism, imperialism and war. After pointing out the world-penetrating ramifications of modern capitalism he writes: "All these unprecedented conditions have conspired to give business for business' sake a fascination and overwhelming importance it has never had before. We no longer make things for the sake of making them, but for money. The chair is not made to sit on, but for profit; the soap is no longer prepared for purposes of cleanliness, but sold for a profit. Practically nothing catches our eye in the way of writing that was written for its own sake and not for money. . . . When houses were built to live in, and wheat and cattle grown to eat, these essential industries took care of themselves. But now that profit is the motive for building houses and raising grain, if the promised returns are greater from manufacturing automobiles or embroidered lingerie, one is tempted to ask if there are any longer compelling reasons for building houses, or raising food?" [52] One may well pause in despair over such a query coming from a distinguished teacher of history, who, as Barnes tells us in the preface, has done so much to bring our historical thinking up to date! [53]

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[50] The Human Comedy—Robinson (1937), p. 17.

[51] Ibid., pp. 219-20.

[52] The Human Comedy—Robinson, pp. 193-4.

[53] Ibid., pp. XIV and XV.

ABSTRACT MORALITY APPLIED TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

There is no possible analogy between an economy for use and the modern capitalist economy of production for exchange at a profit. Contrary to what Robinson says, chairs under all forms of economy were made to sit on. Even commodities produced under capitalist auspices must possess a use-value for their buyer. But on the basis of capitalist economy costs of production and the realization of the average rate of profit are decisive elements. On the basis of the profit system, production already functioning will continue for some time at a loss, but in the hope of better times.

Even if capitalist producers would all take Professor Robinson's strictures to heart, they could not unwind themselves from the complex of factors determinative in capitalist economy, without changing the social order itself. Robinson points out the absurdities of the present system without analyzing how they came about. For that he would have to rely on social laws. Capitalism knows no business for business' sake, and modern business in the historical meaning of that term did not exist under other modes of production. Hence our problems of nationalism, world markets and modern imperialism are specific to the mode of production in the forms under which we know them, and all of Robinson's strictures are just so much cultural persiflage.

Greeks also prized beautiful things and made them to sell, as Robinson tells us,[54] but the laws operating in the formation of an average rate of profit were unknown in those days. Production was often carried on by slave labor; a condition which long ago proved itself economically impossible under the laws operating in an industrial capitalist system.

Not understanding those laws, even denying that they exist, or that they can be grasped by our intellect, Robinson must, perforce, fall back upon the old escape of soliloquy and a homily as the sufficient field for the historian. "The burden of our civilization," he writes, "is not merely, as many suppose, that the product of industry is ill-distributed, or its conduct tyrannical, or its operation interrupted by bitter disagreements. It is that industry itself has come to hold a position of exclusive predominance among human interests, which no single interest, and least of all the provision of the material means of existence, is fit to occupy. Like a hypochondriac who is so absorbed in the processes of his own digestion that he goes to the grave before he has begun to live, industrial communities neglect the very objects for which it is worth while to acquire riches in their feverish preoccupation with the means by which riches can be acquired." [55] It is indeed a great misfortune that our industrial leaders did not all have the benefits of Professor Robinson's elevated economics, and it is a greater source of regret that those future captains of industry who did imbibe that sage advice in the university soon reverted back to type. In the maelstrom of the actual battle crude economic laws play havoc with genteel professorial philosophy.

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[54] The Human Comedy—Robinson, p. 200.

BREAKDOWN OF MODERN CLASSICAL HISTORY

The complete break-down of contemporary theories of history can be adduced from the uncertain and fumbling manner in which it approaches current vital problems. Robinson's discussion of nationalism and war clearly proves that. He argues that present conceptions of nationality are of very recent origin, going back scarcely a hundred years.[56] Germany and Italy were then "geographical expressions." British imperial policy then was still molded on the same colonial-industrial pattern which had refused to hold the inertial mass of the Atlantic seaboard.

Through inventions, discoveries, the printing press and the inordinately pervasive commerce two novel elements called, vaguely, "democracy" and "nationality" were evolved. "In this way," argues Robinson, "the inhabitants of an extensive territory embracing hundreds of thousands of square miles are brought as close together as the people of Athens in former days. Man is surely a gregarious animal who dislikes solitude. He is, moreover, given to the most exaggerated estimate of his tribe; and on these ancient foundations modern nationality has been built up by means of the printing press, the telegraph, and cheap postage. So it has fallen out that just when the world was becoming effectively cosmopolitan in its economic interdependence, its scientific research, and its exchange of books and art, the ancient tribal insolence has been developed on a stupendous scale." [57] There are more historical absurdities in this short quotation than could be answered in a book.

To those who recognize no law in nature things happen only through whim or caprice, or some perverse irony of fate. We forego comment on that peculiar sociology which makes war the natural state of man, just as we can leave to the Mussolini type of intellect both the argument and the proof that armed struggle brings forth the noblest qualities in man, physically, morally and spiritually.

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[55] The Human Comedy—Robinson, p. 225.

[56] Ibid., p. 195.

[57] The Human Comedy—Robinson, pp. 195-6.

We are here dealing with the proposition that modern nationalism is a form of exaggerated tribalism. This contention would not merit further investigation if it were only of scholastic importance. As a matter of fact, the proper understanding of modern nationalism goes to the very core of contemporary world problems with all its armament, imperialism, crises and wars. Robinson undertakes to probe beneath the modern sophisticated theories about superior racial characteristics of particular peoples. "Underlying it, however, is the never-dying primitive impulse of tribal solidarity to which it can be traced back step by step, a crude, uncritical, instinctive thing, shared in all probability by all the peoples now existing on the face of the globe whatever their stage of civilization, common to Bushmen and aboriginal Australians and to Germans, French, and English of the most highly educated classes." [58]

If one desires to look for common human traits, one will not go very far before concluding that all humans, regardless of race, are pretty much alike; and if one goes farther, so are most forms of biologic existence. In fact, all matter is built on a singularly unitary principle. By analogies one can demonstrate almost anything, which scientifically speaking, proves nothing.

Modern nations are not organized on a tribal basis, whatever their origin might have been. Modern nations are even composed of diverse racial combinations, and even historically antagonistic combinations. Russia and India exhibit that in profusion. It was not so long ago that your German was non-existent; he knew only of an Hanoverian, a Hessian, a Wurtenburger and so forth.

Modern nationalism is a product of those social forces which compelled either political coalescence or political annihilation. A nation is a political, not an ethnological entity. It was therefore incumbent upon Professor Robinson to analyze the social factors of modern society which drove peoples of different ethnic strains, but with geographical propinquity and mutuality of economic interests to unite, or succumb by absorption into a less desirable form of political organization. Nationalism is dictated fundamentally by geography, not by blood. The ideological superstructure is an afterproduct, though this does not minimize its importance as an essential unifying force. The common postal and telegraph system is a result of, not a cause of nationalism.

Since Robinson and his school of historians do not recognize the existence of definite social forces operating in a given historical period they are debarred by that fact from the further rational analysis of the objective historical realities of their own time. Therefore they are driven back into subjective rationalization. As a consequence, Robinson argues: "The chief quarrel with patriotism is its innate tendency to precipitate war with other groups upon the most trivial pretenses. It is, in short, touchy and ugly in its most constant and characteristic manifestation. So long as war was accepted by every one as man's noblest preoccupation, this would naturally be no objection to patriotism. War might even be degraded to the status of a necessary evil without leading to any criticism of patriotism, but if warfare is to be viewed as a wholly gratuitous abomination, the way will be opened for a recognition of the common nature and interests of humanity which it is the chief business of patriotism to forget or obscure." [59]

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[58] Ibid., pp. 268-9.

A greater collection of historical inaccuracies could hardly be compressed in so short a paragraph. Every historian should be careful to localize his references to time and place. The patriotism of a people struggling for national unity and independence, like the Chinese and the Hindus, stand on a far different plane than the patriotic chauvinism-imperialism of England and France, or that brutal expression of the same spirit, more obvious because more denied, in Germany. No modern nation, not even the allegedly irresponsible Hitlerized Germany, goes to war "upon the most trivial pretenses." The pretext, it is true, may be trivial, but the real cause is deep and underlying, which it is the real burden of the historian to disclose.

Nor should one in protest fall back upon the too-simple explanation of economic interests. That no nation profits by war has been amply demonstrated during the past twenty years. For the same reason, no nation now engaged in the gripping struggle has any illusions as to the gains to be gotten out of the conflict. It is a question of fighting to survive, and Germany, Italy and Japan knew they could not survive as First Class Powers on the basis of the world organization as it existed under the old division as made by imperial England and France.

In a later chapter we will go more fully into the fallacies of "economic determinism." There is a far cry from that to the recognition of definite forces developed out of the womb of our social system which makes war inevitable, though almost universally regretted by all the peoples of the world. Yet war "in general" is not a wholly gratuitous abomination. There have been progressive wars in the sense that social progress was advanced immeasurably as their direct consequence. We need only refer to our own Revolutionary and Civil Wars.

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[59] The Human Comedy—Robinson, pp. 280-1.

Patriotism is not an unmitigated evil, except to these broad-minded, internationally-conscious members of the professoriate who, by Robinson's own admission,[60] become the most narrow-minded weak-kneed and vicious protagonists of the war mania once the die is irrevocably cast.

The distinguished professor admits that businessmen exercise a dominant influence in domestic and foreign policy; that as a class they occupy a pre-eminent position in social life which under the historical conditions of previous social systems was reserved for military or religious leaders. Some writers toy with the generalization that in Greece statesmen dominated the scene, while during the Middle Ages it was the Church. Still, no social system can exist either by politics or by interminable theological dissertations.

As is frequently the case when subjective rationalization is the chief recourse, Robinson fears that scientists and inventors have created a Frankenstein monster quite capable of destroying modern civilization, losing sight of the fact that society can always control the monster of business it creates, once it discovers the internal laws of motion of its creature, instead of helplessly yielding to the domination of its own handiwork, fetish-like. Society creates businessmen, not businessmen society. Many forms of social control, both in democratic and totalitarian states, have eliminated the private businessman from certain fields, while in others this so-called Frankenstein is kept alive only through the medium of government subsidies.

LAWS, NOT RATIONALIZATION, MUST APPLY TO CURRENT AFFAIRS

This astounding lack of present historical perspective is the logical offspring of inability to gauge the historical processes of the past. There is no weird dualism in history, the present which is and must remain inscrutable to the very ones who ought to know most about it, while this mystery is miraculously solved for our successors who must necessarily know less about these circumstances. How absurd this theory is can be attested by the contradictory analyses extant concerning past events, examples of which have been cited in the preceding pages.

Perhaps as excellent a "horrible example" as any is furnished by Professor Robinson himself, and with this final exhibit we will take

[60] The Human Comedy—Robinson, p. 279.

a regretful leave of his work. "The establishment of an aristocratic republic in America in the closing years of the eighteenth century marked an important step in the development of democracy. While American society and politics as the beginning of our national history abounded in undemocratic features the new state had been founded on revolution from established authority." [61] In reality, ours was a democracy governed at first by an aristocracy, which is a fundamental distinction, since it left avenues open for development of popular control without the necessity of armed revolt by the masses against the established authority of another class state.

But the really amazing thing about this is Robinson's proposed remedy for the defects of present-day democracy by the conscious organization of a new aristocracy! Here is what he says: "Fascism and Communism are the two alternatives which are currently suggested as a substitute for democracy, but we may doubt that either is the final solution of the problem. We do not know what the future can produce as a result of a juncture of superior knowledge and experience. Probably the most desirable immediate reforms are weighted suffrage, based upon the results of intelligence tests given to the whole population, the requirement of scientific and professional training for all candidates for office, introduction of a combination of proportional vocational representation, and the extension of the civil service to the legislative and judicial branches of the government." [62] Of course, a great deal would depend upon before whom Professor Robinson will submit himself for examination as to competency in his own field. The good professor presents us here with nothing less than all the trimmings of a Fascist state for the United States as a solution for our democratic ills, and of his own inability to diagnose them.

LIMITED APPLICATION TO HISTORY OF THE SECOND LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS

Modesty, we all recognize, is a seemly virtue, and it is pleasant for a professor of history at Columbia University to refer to himself as an amateur in history, so long as he does not write like one. When Allan Nevins writes of history as the creator of nations, not its product, one merely raises an eyebrow; but when a little later he speaks of enduring the present crisis better if we know the history of the crises of 1837 and 1873,[63] one feels after this analogy that he must be on his guard; for the only thing in common between those crises is their name.

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[61] The Human Comedy—Robinson, p. 245; see also pp. 213-14.

[62] Ibid., p. 260.

[63] Gateway to History—Nevins, p. 14.

Nevins, too, is added to the long list who contend that, strictly speaking, history cannot be a science, if only because its phenomena cannot be repeated and tested as a chemist does his compounds. Historical events never precisely duplicate themselves. "Hence it is," he writes, "that we can have no precise laws in history as we have precise laws in physics, chemistry and mathematics; that history can never be a science in that highly rigid sense. The historian labors under heavy difficulties as compared with some physical scientists. The chemist, for example, can boast a superior apparatus for ascertaining truth. In formulating the laws which govern an element, he can repeat his experiments thousands of times with all the factors precisely the same, or with endless variations of factors. The historian has no control of phenomena in the blowpipe or test tube sense. He may be greatly puzzled by Stephen A. Douglas' motives in hastening on the Civil War by introducing the Kansas-Nebraska Act; but he cannot call Douglas before another Congress of 1854 to test his theories." [64]

First, as to the chemical analogy. Professor Nevins is somewhat antiquated in his illustration. The same time element which he says militates against history becoming a science because of Time's Arrow, also operates in chemistry. Nature knows no duality of law as to the flow of time—one for physics, the other for that physical state we call society, and its historical phenomena.

Does the chemist reproduce *exactly* the same experiment? He does not. Each successive operation takes place in different time. Each moment, in all existence, is unique. The relationship of all elements in their internal structure is not the same for each test. Eddington has shown conclusively that entropy is always on the job, just like God, and that the Second Law of Thermodynamics cannot be circumvented, even by an historian.[65] But like the physicist, the historian is not concerned with the detailed process of organization wherein the individual human unit in society is asked to play the role of the individual electron in the atomic organization of matter. The organization of society stands on a far different plane than the problems affecting the organization of matter, and consequently, physical laws cannot be carried over bodily to the sphere of social laws. Henry Adams failed completely in his attempt to graft the Second Law of Thermodynamics onto historical phenomena.

What the chemist really does is to show that definite relations exist between the masses of his phenomena, and knowing the laws of their manifestation he can repeat new experiments to illustrate the principles demonstrated in the old. In history, too, we deal with facts or events. These are created by the concatenation of certain forces at a given time operating in a social medium. This moment is unique in history, and cannot be repeated. What can be repeated, and does happen so often that the very commonplace nature of the experiment has dulled the appreciation of its significance, is the carrying on of activity based on the certainty of the recurrence of phenomena for the limited purpose of man. Did not social organization recur in recognizable fashion from day to day, civilization would be impossible. The fundamental error of Nevins consists in his arbitrary translation of certain well-known problems in physics to the field of social organization.

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[64] Ibid., pp. 29 and 30.

[65] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, pp. 70-1 and pp. 244-5.

What does vary is this. In chemistry we deal with masses in relatively simple operations subject, if scientific, to complete control by the human will. In society we deal with more complicated, because more important, relations where the human will itself enters as a vital principle in the reaction. In history we are confronted not only with the vagaries of a single individual, though he be of the magnitude of Stephen A. Douglas, but with a multitude of individual wills in which the individual plays a role, often a decisive role, but never an exclusive one. Even the wonder-working Charles V had to have a Diet of Worms before whom Luther could be summoned for examination. The chemist, too, does not deal with the individual electron. He leaves that to quantum physics. But the chemist, no matter how poor, is superior to the historian in that he recognizes what the other denies, namely, the existence of laws developed from the relations of his elements in a suitable medium for their operation.

Repetition is the mother of existence in history as it is in chemistry; but repetition does not preclude development and change, nor is it essential that every minutest detail be an exact replica in its innermost structure. Even Marx, the so-called champion of mechanistic laws in society, speaks of all economic laws as a tendency,[66] not as an absolute schematic relationship. General tendencies become more definite as their internal laws of motion are understood. The chemist is even less certain about the individual particles in his materials than Nevins is of the individual in society, though the chemist does not thereby feel precluded from making practical and sometimes profitable deductions in his particular field concerning the masses of units under his observation.

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[66] Capital—Marx, Vol. III, p. 206.

NEVINS ON IMPOSSIBILITY OF IMPARTIAL HISTORY

Nevins quotes Theodore Roosevelt as saying that if McMaster's chapters were changed around promiscuously it would not injure the thread of his argument in the least.[67] The reason, of course, is that McMaster wrote a chronicle and not a history. For the essence of history is compression, the finding of a main thread, and following that out to its vital connections. All this implies an observer, and consequently the interjection of his personality, whether he admits it or not, into the problem. In this, however, he does not differ a single iota from that of every other scientific investigator.

Historical problems, argues Nevins, do not present themselves as neat logical exercises.[68] Neither do the problems of physics or chemistry. One has to recognize the problem and follow it through. But here the physicist and the historian part roads. A self-respecting scientist will look up in amazement should you direct a query as to whether he will pursue the laws of his phenomena or the vagaries of his inner consciousness. The historian is more complacent. He will smile with professorial self-satisfaction and tell you it is all a matter of taste; and some are not abashed in letting you understand, if you please, that their taste runs toward the Ritz-Carlton in history, while others, historically speaking, follow their natural inclination toward the ham 'n egg beanery.

"Impartial analysts," writes Nevins, "and monograph-writers we may have; but the impartial historian, using the noun in its highest significance, does not exist. If history became impartial in the sense of lacking conviction it would be a poor affair. The only completely unbiased historian is one whose works are not on the shelves of libraries—the Recording Angel; and doubtless he has convictions which to Satan, as Mark Twain irreverently suggested, would seem prejudices." [69] Even St. Peter has his standard of reference—a phrase Nevins pretends not to understand—which is hardly the same as that of the Mohammedan keeper of the pearly gates, if their theology makes provision for one.

The scientist in history exercises as much freedom as the physicist in the selection of his field of operation, but once chosen, he, just like the physicist, is limited by the laws of his phenomena. History to be scientific need not necessarily be dull and lifeless as Von Ranke would have it. One might put into it all the sparkle and brilliance of a Carlyle—and be just as wrong as he was in the interpretation of his subject.[70]

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[67] Gateway to History—Nevins, p. 357.

[68] Ibid., p. 216.

[69] Gateway to History—Nevins, pp. 41-2.

It is quite possible to be scientific and interesting; they are not by any means incompatible terms. Dullness is merely unimaginative mediocrity hiding behind drab verbosity for self-protection. Once the laws of social movement are recognized there is an easy and infallible check upon uncontrolled imagination. No one can pretend to read Washington's inmost thoughts at a solemn historic occasion, but frequently there exist definite indices in action, expression and policy which are more certain than speculation upon his Unconscious of which he himself must have been unaware. Therefore Nevins' conjectures upon the unsolved "problems of history" [71] will beguile the historian only as an indoor parlor guessing game, but never engage his more serious moments.

Those problems as posited by Nevins are endless; for example, what led Davis and Lee to give up the struggle in the Spring of 1865; why did McKinley send his war message on April 11, 1898; who was it and why, did a Supreme Court Justice shift his income tax vote in 1895; why did the Roman Empire collapse, and Shakespeare write his plays—or did he? One problem Nevins overlooked: How many toothpicks were distributed at the farewell banquet given by Washington to his officers? Or was there a banquet, or were interdental cleavers distributed, and if so, by whom manufactured and why? In fact, the world is actually filled with similar unsolved problems, and here is an excellent opportunity for some university to appeal for a fat endowment so that aspiring Ph. D.'s may pursue their solution undisturbed till doomsday.

One evil pointed out by Nevins is the tendency of modern historians to over-simplify their problems by ascribing to a single factor historical effects which patently are the resultant of numerous contributing elements. There is a certain type of mind, ubiquitous in every field of endeavor, which hits upon one principle and works it to death in a futile effort to make it work for all the rest. Another danger emphasized by Nevins is that excessively clever pest who rejects the obvious for the ingenious, and whose subtle involutions, upon analysis, do not pass beyond the mental range of parlor-game anagrams.

"The office of the historian," insists Nevins, "is not to select one or two explanations, excluding or minimizing all others, but to ascertain all the factors and assign to each its proportionate weight." [72]

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[70] Ibid., p. IV.

[71] Ibid., Ch. 8.

[72] Gateway to History—Nevins, p. 225.

But he lays down no infallible rule for their guidance. The historian's discretion is closely circumscribed by the laws he deduces, and the difference between a great and a mediocre historian will always be the same gauge by which we measure a great scientist as against an insignificant bungler.

There is much in Nevins' work which is unexceptionable. Most of his ideas on history are as trite as the Ten Commandments; they give the general outline, but fall down in the detailed application. To warn against over-simplification in history does not preclude the possibility of a vast generalization such as we have in other fields of scientific inquiry. Any phenomena which is repetitive as to essentials is the proper field for investigation into the factors impelling that essential repetition, and therefore to the establishing of inherent laws.

We have already observed that repetition does not preclude adaptation, modification, mutation and revolution. But all these phases can be made explicable only if we understand the basic process of re-production. Nevins can see the beam in McMaster's and Oberholtzer's eye, but he has a sizeable mote in his own. He justly criticizes their lack of integration and unification, but he himself is not so certain as to his own success. At best he can only hope and pray. "Historians of the future," he writes, "will hardly go as far as he (Lamprecht) did in trying to find a unifying state of mind for each period, for that leads to over-simplification. Nevertheless such historians will undoubtedly turn to sociology for aid in analyzing the immense mass of facts upon the life and mind of the people more accurately. By applying the principles of sociology, they will be able to understand a little better the morphology of peoples, the workings of the mass mind, and the ways in which society has changed and developed; they will be able to achieve a more valid synthesis of social factors." [73]

If sociology is the anatomy of history, then political economy is its physiology. Nevertheless neither sociology, which deals with the generalized structure of society, nor political economy which deals with the production, distribution and reproduction of wealth, can take the place of history which deals with the significance of events that modify and in time transform both form and function in society.

The time is not far off, we hope, when those quacks of history, the politicians and newspaper editors, will be treated with the same contempt as formerly was meted out to medical charlatans. The historic role of the state as the instrument by which the dominant class maintains itself in power is the sufficient explanation for the persistence of outmoded ideologies and the existence of shibboleths and taboos in history which have long ago been exorcised in other fields of science. The enlightened among the professoriate recognize the problem; they cannot, or will not search for its solution.

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[73] Gateway to History—Nevins, pp. 316-17.

CHEYNEY'S SEARCH FOR LAW IN HISTORY

Professor Cheyney is among the few contemporary teachers of history who approach their subject with a broad philosophic view. He is modern, yet of the old school in the best sense of that term. He does not swallow the jargon of present-day physics and apply it indiscriminately to his chosen field. Laws still mean something to him, and accident, indeterminacy and chance are not as fortuitous as they appear. "Examined closely," he writes, "weighed and measured carefully, set in true perspective, the personal, the causal, the individual influences sink in insignificance and great cyclical forces loom up. Events come of themselves, so to speak; that is, they come so consistently and unavoidably as to rule out as causes not only physical phenomena but voluntary human action. So arises the conception of law in history. History, the great course of human affairs, has not been the result of voluntary effort on the part of individuals or groups of individuals, much less of chance; but has been subject to law." [74] Without conceding the duality of his conception of the relations between the individual and society, nor of their respective roles, it is encouraging to have the weight of Cheyney's authority behind the proposition that historic movements are not the result of mere random elements but of definite laws.

Cheyney recognizes what he calls the six laws of history.[75] They are the law of historical continuity, the law of impermanence or mutability of society, the law of interdependence of individuals, classes, tribes and nations, the law of democracy tending toward popular control of government, the law of free consent for the authority of government, and lastly the law of moral progress, where the people are always more moral than their rulers. The utter inadequacy of these observations, which cannot properly be called laws, has already been demonstrated.

Some are mere statement of fact which is purely empirical, but not scientific. Take the first so-called law concerning continuity. The present generations of Chinese are undoubtedly in the direct

[74] Law in History—Cheyney, p. 7.

[75] Ibid., pp. 10-27.

line of their ancestors, but their mere biologic continuity will not advance us a step toward the understanding of their institutions, their culture and their present political predicament. Modern Persia and Egypt are sorry adumbrations of their former greatness, while the pitiable plight of Spain brings forcibly to mind the sixteenth century when Europe trembled before its legions.

The same criticism applies to the fact of impermanence. We see evidences of that in every nook and cranny of this globe. What is important is to uncover the how and why of change, and that Cheyney has not done. As to the law of increasing spread of democratic control, a mere twelve years after this profound "law" was enunciated, finds the alleged democracies in a death-grapple with the obvious dictatorships.

And finally the claim for progressive moral development will scarcely bear examination. True, Cheyney presents what appears to be impressive evidence of moral progress: "The disappearance of slavery, of serfdom, of the whipping of soldiers and sailors, criminals, apprentices, and of school children, the diminution of man's physical and legal power over women, of the greater advantages granted by the law to employers over employees and to landlords over tenants, the spread of sympathy, of mercy, of helpfulness, are just so many proofs of the existence of a law of moral progress." [76]

If we consider the course of contemporary history during the last twenty years, if we recall the millions of lives sacrificed to the Soviet Union's politics, the British terror in India, the Japanese despoliation of China, the German transformation of Europe into a concentration camp, and the physical and social horrors of the recent economic depression in America, then the gains to which Cheyney adverts are more apparent than real.

Consider also the enormous development of our capacity for the production of wealth. As against that proposition, the mass of grinding poverty, of misery and want in the face of superfluity; of countless millions uncertain of the morrow, with gripping fear on the part of so great a mass even here in the United States as to their future; consider not so long ago during the Great Depression the millions of unemployed, the hungry school children at their desks in New York while surplus food was dumped into the harbor to keep up the price; make a cross-section of the homes in this great nation and see underneath their empty gayety, their nervous, meaningless laughter; and then in the light of all this, let us analyze this claim for our superior morality.

Consider, too, our priests and rabbis and ethical preachers of all sorts mumbling and sniffling their artificial phrases which disgrace religion and the very name of God, as millions of sick go without care, while doctors worry more about their accumulating bills than of the ills of society; consider the millions throughout the world with the most lethal weapons of destruction at their command while the labor of other millions is devoted to their production; and after weighing all this we may ask the professor in his beautiful ivory tower to tell us a little more about his law of moral progress in an ever ascending curve.

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[76] Law in History—Cheyney, pp. 23-24.

FALLACY OF MAN'S PROGRESSIVE PERFECTIBILITY

Cheyney's difficulty is that of all straight-line evolutionists of the nineteenth century who have not accommodated their thinking to the scientific developments of the twentieth. The best they can do is to concede zig-zags, dips and peaks in progress, but they must stoutly maintain the general tendency is "upward," wherever that is, or whatever it may mean.

Modern thinkers of mature years suffer from an inherent defect in training of which few can successfully rid themselves. In their own particular sphere they may be the leaders of their time. When they try to apply their specialized achievements to a larger field they must fall back on the generalized education of their youth. That is why, as will later be shown, Einstein in his social philosophy is two generations behind his physics, and why Cheyney in his conception of laws in history is still a Newtonian, and in his sociology a Spencerian.

Whatever may be said about Cheyney's laws in history, no one after reading his chapter on The Agitators in History [77] can question his deep humanity, his profound fellow-feeling and the earnestness of his zeal for social improvement. But in science we ask for laws derived from the relations of phenomena and not for emotional enthusiasm, no matter how exalted. If preachment alone could have elevated the moral level of the world, religion, and particularly Christianity as taught by the apostles, would have achieved that desirable result long ago.

Yet Cheyney could utter from the overflowing bitterness of his heart: "Neither the lion, nor the cobra, nor the crocodile was the most dreaded enemy of the negro in Africa, but the Christian slave-trader." [78] He inveighs against the curse of unemployment in modern civilization and asks: "Why does such extreme inequality still continue? Why should a bread line be formed every winter on one street while there is a long line of automobiles standing before luxurious hotels, club houses and dwelling houses on another?" [79] He speaks in the plaintive tone of the historical neophyte where he ought to thunder with the prophetic wrath of the historical scientist. All he can ascribe that to, is ignorance of the facts and to indifference.[80] The fact is that today we are neither ignorant of nor indifferent to the problem.

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[77] Law in History—Cheyney, Chapter Two.

[78] Ibid., p. 36.

Solutions there are, effective ones, democratic ones, where the dignity of the individual is conserved and not sacrificed. But the scientific analysis of history will show why they cannot be applied to-day, and that kind of history will—it must—point out the only effective remedy for these admitted evils when once society, or rather that segment of it whose conscience is sufficiently determined to rid itself of these self-created abominations, is prepared for action. "I have rather more hope," Cheyney says, "as I have tried to demonstrate in another connection, of the discovery of prevailing tendencies or 'laws' in human affairs that may suggest the normal course of events. If we know what has been some trend of the past, we may perhaps be able to conform ourselves to that tendency in the present, and thus act more wisely." [81]

Those milk-and-water views are the ultimate result of classical Spencerian evolutionism. What does he mean by "the normal course of events?" There is no such yardstick by which to gauge historical phenomena. Unemployment, hunger and war are as much the inevitable and normal consequence of capitalist economy as are railroads, the banking system, billionaires and Bowery bums. It requires a detailed knowledge of economic laws to establish their inner relation. Few historians possess that knowledge. Therefore they content themselves with pointing out their incongruity, and wringing their hands in pathetic remonstrance over the ignorance or brutality of men.

Some historical minds which possess a remarkable sense for the obvious insist that these evils existed before capitalism. So did men eat for thousands of years without the beneficent intervention of a Chicago grain exchange, commission merchants and government stabilization boards. Social forms of limited historical validity are confused with human affairs which transcend limited law and custom; yet under definite social relations these forms are governed by them.

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[79] Ibid., p. 56.

[80] Ibid., p. 57.

[81] Law in History—Cheyney, p. 170.

Cheyney and his school do not possess within the matrix of their historic souls an abiding consciousness of historical relativity. That is why they resort to purely subjective yardsticks such as moral principles, right and justice, normal courses and inevitable trends. Trends are excellent criteria, but what are the forces which give rise to them? Of transcendant importance, how far back must one go for these trends? If there are no definite boundary lines, then the door is open wide for Teggart's and Robinson's and other myriad theories on trends.

Trends are an excellent face-saving phrase. But the trends of modern economy are not those of feudalism, or of ancient history, or of Asiatic civilization. For that matter the economic trends of capitalism in its early industrial expansion period are not comparable to that of modern monopoly and finance capitalism. Therefore Cheyney, with the best intentions in the world could at best only imitate Rodin's famous figure in thinking, thinking about unemployment, and eating his heart out unavailingly during the process.

Cheyney thinks history may yet help to solve these grave social problems. Hitler has shown one way out for the problem of unemployment and the United States, among others, has been compelled to follow suit. After pointing out the inconclusiveness of the struggles between capital and labor, and the sterility of the remedies proposed by politicians and economists, Cheyney adds "It is just possible the historians will one time be asked whether they have a message, and their message when given be listened to." [82] Our good professor will be well on the way to becoming a museum piece if he will sit around waiting for that summons. And, frankly, we question seriously whether he will have anything worth while to say if by some miracle the summons comes. There is no particular evil demon as he suggests [83] which prevents historians from speaking out if they really had something worth while to offer, thereby performing a great public service and save themselves from utter innocuousness.

Cheyney's poetry, as published in his book, is often better than his history. It is all very well for him to repeat the trite arguments that physical laws are comparatively easier to ascertain than the phenomena of human society.[84] The phenomena of nature are around us all the time, he argues, but even the physical traces of man in his earlier stages are surprisingly and disappointingly few. There is no occasion for tears. Historians have not learned to do much with the wealth of material they do possess, while physicists will be justified in contributing their derisive comments concerning the simplicity of their phenomena which is always about us. When historical laws are denied, or looked for from the inverted end of a telescope, not much can be expected and very little is obtained. Cheyney's work is important only for pointing out the road, rather than in assisting us toward the goal.

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[82] Law in History—Cheyney, p. 171.

[83] Ibid., pp. 172-3.

[84] Ibid., pp. 85-6.

BARNES, THE ICONOCLASTIC HISTORIAN

Historical iconoclasts are as necessary a part of the social milieu as are the social image builders, but they usually suffer from the defect of their calling. They leave wreckage and ruin behind them, preparing the ground perhaps for another system, but never undertaking the construction itself. This reflection is called forth by Barnes' recent work of magnificent proportions and painstaking scholarship.

There are two infallible tests by which to gauge the product of an historian; first, how does he employ his method in the analysis of the past; second, how does his system aid in the clarification of the present and assist in forecasting the immediate future? This is no more than is required of any discipline that pretends to the rank of a science, and to this standard Barnes himself subscribes.

In social science, however, he discerns grave difficulties due to the mystic influence of words as the medium for the expression of ideas. "Words," says he, "in co-operation with various other forms of symbolism, serve to delude mankind into accepting the most absurd anachronisms and imbecilities. In religion and ethics the attitudes are still more primitive. Supernaturalism holds the fort, and whatever outworks of logic are thrown up are merely to prevent too close an approach to the sacred citadel. The outlook for civilization depends mainly on whether our institutions can be brought within the realm of reason, or are destined to be forever the prey of ill-disguised passions and superstitions." [85]

These are the words of a disillusioned man. What words have done, they can undo. It only remains for Barnes to discover the open sesame to human hearts and minds. Talking cynically of humanity as being prey to superstitions for the rest of time is no state of mind with which an historian should take up his burden. The fact is that few among mankind are historically inclined, just as few among them are poets, musicians, or even good plumbers and plasterers. That is no reason for despairing of good workmanlike poetry, music and houses.

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[85] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, pp. 1204-5.

Despite Barnes' enormous output of historical writing, he is eminently a critic and not a creator. The critic compares, analyzes, teases, twists and turns, generally succeeding in tearing the object of his acidulous solicitude apart, but in the end leaves the scene of carnage without his reader being much the wiser. So in his "History of Historical Writing," Barnes undertakes a compendious criticism of the achievements of his great predecessors. Obviously he is much pleased with his work, and broadcasts a challenge to the rest of the literati to improve upon his labors—if they can.[86]

The world will scarcely suffer from the challenge remaining unanswered.[87] For the entire work is nothing more than an extended bibliography. Lacking a valid scientific theory of history of his own, he surmises that we shall always be confined to ruminating over the products of the past writers from whatever frame of reference that may suit the particular fancy. Thus he criticizes Corey, who, he admits has shown great acumen in analyzing finance capitalism, for using Marx rather than Berle and Means as his general frame of reference.[88]

In this pseudo-scientific jargon which is carried over uncritically from the realm of modern physics to that of history, the writer is privileged to select whatever frame of reference may suit his purpose. Even physicists are not free to do that in their own sphere, for whether they like it or not they are tied down to the gravitational field of the inertial system of which they are a part.[89] In history one cannot take to Berle and Means or to Marx simply because one or the other strikes one's fancy. One can no more carry through a bias in history than in any other field of scientific investigation. Even Barnes admits that as an abstract proposition,[89a] but he fails lamentably in his own application of that wise maxim.

For the rest, ninety per cent of his work is a review of the historical schools in the fruitless hope that perhaps some leading clues will be discovered toward making a science of history. The review of all the works on alchemy will scarcely make the chemist. It is not surprising, therefore, that Barnes rejects causality in history for a pluralistic outlook empirically determined from the writers frame of reference. Historical science, he contends, no more than any other science, need be based upon a single causal factor. But every science is based upon the recognition of specific laws developed out of definite relationships. Empiricism may hit upon a workable practice, but never upon fundamental laws; for once it observes general relationships independent of the observer it ceases to be empiricism and attains to the level of science.

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[86] History of Historical Writing—Barnes (1937), p. X.

[87] Ibid., p. 397.

[88] Ibid., p. 396.

[89] Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld (1938), pp. 201-3.

[89a] History of Historical Writing—Barnes, pp. 394-5.

After laboring over almost four hundred pages Barnes evolves eight rules for the modern historian's practical recipes, and if you don't like them, you are at liberty to evolve better rules—if you can! As a matter of fact, Barnes' work partakes of the same sweeping superficial nature as Spengler's, where great names are familiarly bandied about without having mastered what they stand for. He laughs maliciously at the absurdities of Eddington, Millikan, Jeans and the rest when they leave their particular field in which they are recognized experts to bedevil the intelligentsia by "their infantile and immature musings on religion and philosophy." [90]

Let him rather look to his own reputation when he leaves his occupation as the omnivorous gatherer of facts, to the interpretation of their significance. We propose to indicate their insufficiency by analyzing some of the defects of Barnes' historical method. For it is only a method, not a philosophy. By philosophy in the scientific sense we mean a body of laws which binds together the observed phenomena and gives a rational, objective explanation of their nature and mode of operation.

Let us consider Barnes' analysis of the transition of modern times, since that leads to our second test, the understanding of the present and the forecasting of the immediate future. First he undertakes to destroy the Renaissance Myth. He charges Symonds, among others, with picturing the Middle Ages as "a period of uniform stagnation, and that the paralyzing shell or envelope of medievalism was burst asunder by the potent forces associated with the new appreciation of classical literature and the remarkable development of chromatic and plastic arts between 1350 and 1550. A vernal green spread over Europe in this cultural springtime when civilization emerged from the snow-blanket of a thousand years of desolate medievalism. To this cultural 'rebirth' were assigned the most diverse results, including the rise of natural science, rationalism, and the national-state system." [91]

The sheer inconoclasticism of this analysis is obvious. What is worse, Barnes is fighting windmills of his own imagination. Many responsible writers long before him and contemporaries like Thorndike and Preserved Smith appreciated the significance of the constructive elements within the womb of medieval society. Some of them have been quoted here, such as Guizot, Hallam, Marx and Buckle. None is more generous than the very Symonds whom he criticizes, in paying tribute to the political genius of the merchants in the free cities of Italy, many of whom made great statesmen when intrusted with the powers of government.[92]

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[90] Ibid., p. 394.

[91] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 549.

Far from supporting the theory of a sudden cultural explosion after long repression, or even a gradual evolution, Symonds proves conclusively that for Italy the Renaissance resulted in its political extinction as a progressive social force, which it had been for three centuries, until resuscitated by Mazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi in the second half of the nineteenth century. "It was in this way," writes Symonds, "that the private cupidities and spites of princes brought woe on Italy. Lodovico's determination to secure himself in the usurped Duchy of Milan, Ercole d'Este's concealed hatred, and Alexander's unholy eagerness to aggrandize his bastards, were the vile and trivial causes of an event which, however inevitable, ought to have been as long as possible deferred by all true patriots in Italy. But in Italy there was no zeal for freedom left, no honor among princes, no virtue in the Church. Italy, which in the thirteenth century numbered 1,800,000 citizens—that is members of free cities, exercising the franchise in the government of their own states—could show in the fifteenth only about 18,000 such burghers, and these in Venice were subject to the tyranny of the Council of Ten, in Florence had been enervated by the Medici, in Siena were reduced by party feuds and vulgar despotism to political imbecility." [93]

Barnes reveals to us that the most important single factor in the decline of the feudal system was the growth of towns, trade and commercialism.[94] This astounding achievement of contemporary scholarship was written about and discussed fully a hundred years before him. What really is, or ought to be, the subject of inquiry is this sudden renaissance of twentieth century learning as exhibited by Barnes, this modern marvel of development from scholasticism to humanism in abbreviated form, in accordance with the biogenetic, or should we say, sociogenetic process of development!

Barnes points out certain patent incongruities in the claim that the Protestant revolt was purely a progressive step ahead for western civilization. Luther and Melanchthon, he claims, were reactionary both in their science and in their theology. The fact that the movement started as a reformation within the Catholic Church and ended in a revolution and secession [95] is no recent discovery, for in Symonds' very work we have noted no less than seventy-two distinct references to that fact.

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[92] Renaissance In Italy—Symonds, Vol. I, p. 302.

[93] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 274-5.

[94] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 481.

But Barnes at this late date cannot claim that the secession was "caused by Luther's fiery and violent tactics, and the obstinacy and tactlessness of the Catholic leaders who resisted moderate reform." [96] It was a question of the material forces of existence having outgrown their bonds, and the ideological superstructure reflected both the decay of the old order and the strivings of the new. Economic determinism has nothing, or very little to do with historical materialism in which ideas themselves often play a preponderant role in determining the course of history at a critical point.

It is therefore no recourse to crude materialism to say that, Luther or no Luther, feudal society between 1500 and 1650 had burst its bounds at the seams and was rapidly falling apart. To have asked or to have expected the Catholic Church then to loosen voluntarily its grip on society is equivalent to the plaintive bleatings of modern Utopians who think that capitalism can rescue itself from its inherent contradictions by a little increase in wages, a polishing up of brass fittings at the front door and a larger contribution to the Salvation Army. Barnes cannot help tying up Protestantism with expanding capitalism, but he does so by some weird aberration of logic, and a stranger concoction of economics with introverted sexual psychoanalysis in the best Freudian manner, with the same bewildering consequence of having started something he cannot finish.[97]

Barnes' recognition of the underlying material basis of the Reformation is not enough. It is one thing to state facts; it is a far different matter to appreciate the relationship subsisting between facts, for therein is the essential requirement for the discovery of laws of motion. Emphasis on the material basis does not militate against the recognition of powerful ideological impulses. Towns, commerce and industry did not spring magically into existence. The love of freedom, the will to maintain it, and the energy necessary to preserve it, together with the all-absorbing struggle for physical maintenance, were the essential ingredients for the development of towns as centers of resistance against both baron and king.

Barnes' work is concerned primarily with the cultural progress of western civilization. Necessarily he deals with its material basis. But this he does empirically, functionally, pragmatically. He expects no fundamental laws of motion and therefore discovers none. He may write of the great influence exercised by Hegel on later social thought. He even states that "the ideas of Hegel still live in most of the basic attitudes and concepts of social science,"[98] but his work gives no evidence that the idea of social forms and laws of motion have exercised much influence upon himself. Barnes suffers from the inherent vice of all encyclopedic writers who feel that they must touch upon everything, and generally succeed in muddling what they touch, leaving the reader with a feeling of vastness and helplessness and emptiness.

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[95] Ibid., p. 582.

[96] Ibid., p. 582.

[97] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, pp. 589-91.

His treatment of the Hegelian dialectic, which is that great thinker's genuine contribution to human thought, follows the best traditions of scholastic treatment, that is, in its worst form—is an intellectual atrocity. All he tells us is the bare formula—thesis, antithesis, synthesis; affirmation, negation, negation of the negation.[99] Marx, who made the greatest use of the Hegelian dialectic, laughed scornfully at those who repeat that "sacramental formula"[100] without understanding its content.

It is incumbent upon Barnes to show just how Hegel's influence still lives in our basic attitudes on social science. To begin with, he ought to have analyzed just what the modern adepts with dialectics mean by that much-abused term; abused because this senseless toying with a profound philosophic concept has brought it into deserved ill-repute as the refuge of obscurantists and charlatans.

Seventy years ago Engels said quite frankly that the Hegelian method was absolutely unusable in its available form and modern thinkers outside of a few scientific Marxians have done little with it. As promulgated, it was essentially idealistic, and the problem was that of developing a world outlook more materialistic than that which Hegel advanced. The Hegelian method started out from pure thinking, and one had to start from stubborn facts. A method which, according to its own admission, "came from nothing, through nothing, to nothing," was in this form completely out of place in a new world being reared on technology.

Yet Hegel was the first who attempted to show an evolution, and inner coherence, in history; and "while today much in his Philosophy of History may seem peculiar to us, yet the grandeur of the basis of his basic outlook is admirable even today, whether one makes comparison with his predecessors, or with anyone who, since his time, has taken the liberty of reflecting in general concerning history." [101]

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[98] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 851.

[99] Ibid., pp. 839-40.

[100] The Poverty of Philosophy—Marx, p. 115.

Barnes' lack of a scientifically valid theory of history compels him to fall back upon those convenient concoctions of the historian, subjective rationalization and moral preachments. He borrows from Marx—as does the present writer—the division of capitalist economy into four developmental phases (1) mercantile capitalism, (2) industrial capitalism, (3) monopoly capitalism, and (4) finance capitalism,[102] but unlike the present writer, he has not attempted to penetrate into the vitals of the theoretical system of Karl Marx.

The clearest proof of that is in his treatment of business psychology, the profit motive, production and crises. "Business psychology," says Barnes, "underwent a revolutionary change. Materialism and the profit motive triumphed completely. Volume of profit, immediate profit, was the dominant point of view of this new competitive system, rather than quality of the product or its adaptability to the actual needs of the population." [103]

Had Barnes studied the tendency of the rate of profit he would have discovered definite laws in capitalist economy which regulate the conduct of business instead of searching into the recesses of men's hearts. Any technologist would laugh to scorn this academic glorification of ancient thoroughness in production as compared to present-day slipshod production upon the acid test of quality itself. True, capitalism produces no Rembrandts, but capitalism is not interested in such commodities outside of dealing in them.

He would have known that the rate of profit was much higher in feudal times than in colonial days; and higher then than it is to-day. All this talk of immediate profit as the current rage is sheerest nonsense. A profit of 100 per cent to your old-time merchant on a single turn-over was considered quite ordinary. If modern capitalism is distinguished for one thing, it is the sinking of vast sums for a long-time investment where security of the principal compels an inverse ratio of the rate of interest.

Concerning the indifferent character and inutility of capitalist production, Barnes dignifies with his acceptance the rantings of guild socialists and worshipers of the medieval. Let any engineer tell you of the workmanship of a modern machine. The automobile to-day is better than its relative of five, ten, and surely twenty years ago in quality and design. A suit of clothes to-day from a ready-made store

[101] Ludwig Feuerbach—Engels, pp. 97-8.

[102] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 1088.

[103] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 948.

will last as long and look smarter than the product of fifty years ago. All this weeping over the glories of hand-made things is befitting to the old women in history who dabble with modern social problems; and the age of this inglorious tribe does not depend upon their years, nor upon their sex.

ECLECTICISM APPLIED TO WORLD PROBLEMS

Not understanding the mechanism of modern economy Barnes must repeat the platitudes of every superficial observer upon the nature of modern imperialism. "The accumulation of commodities which resulted from the improved mechanical techniques and factory system encouraged a feverish search for markets and raw materials. Capital too sought lucrative investment abroad. The net result was the growth of imperialism. By imperialism is meant the control of capitalistic states over undeveloped and weaker peoples. To accomplish their ends the great states resorted to armed intervention." [104]

This is a mechanical washing out of a profound Marxian doctrine. Capitalism at all times labors under the impelling necessity of selling its products. Markets are relative expressions. The home market is as bitterly contested as the foreign; only domestically the state acts as an umpire, presumably, to see that the rules are observed. Our federal courts and commerce commissions show to what extent capitalists will go in order to get around their competitors.

Marx treats of capitalist economy as global, and its laws become effective wherever it predominates. Lenin in his book on Imperialism carries that doctrine out into those parts of the world where capitalist interests, backed by their governments,[105] will fight it out with the same ferocity they have always exhibited in the home market, but with different weapons. This time it is no longer the sheriff with his warrant for the loser in the struggle, but the armed forces of the respective national interests locked in combat.

Plans for reform, for regularization of the problem, for World Courts and League of Nations as indulged in by liberals are Utopian attempts to translate intra-national judicature to the international field. That cannot be done without an international armed force, and consequently the destruction of the national state as we know it. But the national state is the very bulwark of modern capitalism. Under its aegis it has grown to its present proportions.

[104] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 955.

[105] Imperialism—Lenin, Chapter VI.

To advocate the self-effacement of the national state is to ask capitalism to commit hara-kiri. Yet that is exactly what Barnes does. "The typical political institutions of the twentieth century—the national-state and democracy—are now in a critical condition because we have failed to modernize political thinking in the last century. The national-state challenges orderly and efficient civilization in the twentieth century in three ways. First the great national-states, covering large areas and created in the age of relative simplicity, are now overgrown political entities with all the new and complex problems of administration. Second, by means of modern mechanical methods of communication, the old neighborhood psychology—smugness, provincialism, suspicion of strangers, and aggressive hostility towards other neighborhoods—has in our era been transferred to great national-states. And third, the nation-state, by its attitude of economic nationalism, intensifies economic conflicts among nations. The national-state system must be brought under intelligent control if civilization is to be saved."[106]

That is, indeed, a very commendable objective. But how is he going to do it? By recrudescence of the League of Nations in a United Nations garb with all its adjuncts and paraphernalia? Many of those who studied this subject foretold the doom of the previous effort when Wilson promulgated his plan, but what is more important, they gave the reasons then for its inevitable failure, which have since been corroborated by developments. These factors are still operative. Later in the work this phase of the subject will be gone into exhaustively, but here it is sufficient to state that capitalism and an international state organization—for that is what it must amount to since judgments which cannot be enforced are not worth the breath with which they are uttered—are mutually contradictory and irreconcilable principles.

Barnes' "middle-way system" of reformed capitalism and co-operation[107] is a utopian scheme of half-saint, half-devil. It is a purely synthetic subjective concoction of desirables, but impossibles. When we shall know more of the laws of social motion we will see that there is a practical, an historical way out, one involving a transformation of our economy, it is true, but without sacrifice of our blessed heritage of democracy in a National State. All the world loves the middle-of-the-roader, so long as he does not get in its way. To the intellectually lazy or incompetent, the easiest solution of a dispute is to split the difference. Very often this is the most practical procedure under the circumstances. Unfortunately, the day of compromise and appeasement of irreconcilables is now definitely past.

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[106] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 1087.

[107] Ibid., pp. 1092, 1205, 1214.

Generalities in the analysis of political forms, national and international, are the reflex of generalities in the analysis of economic forms. To Barnes, as to Berle, Means, Arnold, Lundberg and a host of others, the evils of capitalism are traced to the evil intent of the capitalists. A truly scientific approach must consider that factor only as a disturbing, though no less a real element, in the analysis. History will never make progress so long as it is content with the personal devil theory instead of searching for the fundamental factors which brought these ogres to the surface.

If all that is wrong with our present order is leaders of ill-will, that might be rectified by getting leaders of better will. But if it can be demonstrated, irrefutably, that even with leaders of the best will, modern capitalism must result in periodic crises, unemployment, hunger amidst plenty, and finally and inevitably in recurrent world war, then we have developed a factor of the highest practical social significance.

These reflections are called forth by Barnes' discussion of crises. For this, one cannot be too harsh. The stream does not rise above its headwaters. Nonetheless, Barnes' analysis only proves the contention previously urged that no historian can do justice to his subject without mastery of political economy, which is the physiology of modern society, if he is to understand its pathology.

This analogy of a social and physical organism is rhetorical, for it can be demonstrated that crises are just as normal a product of capitalist economy as are its very commodities themselves. It makes all the difference in the world whether we are dealing with economic aberrations inherent in the system, or a pathological condition which is foreign to the normal, and may be conquered by adequate precaution, or is susceptible of therapeutic or surgical treatment.

But Barnes contends that it is not capitalist economy, but rather its abuses by unscrupulous men that have resulted in the present state of its disorganization. Our earlier industrial capitalists, he contends, were instrumental in building up our country through their development of gigantic enterprises. To-day the manipulations of bankers take the place of creative activity. "In finance capitalism," writes Barnes, "the investment banker replaced the industrialist as the controlling figure in economic life. The process of industrial consolidation launched by monopoly capitalism continued, but was directed by bankers rather than by industrialists. The holding company replaced the outlawed trusts. Control and management were increasingly divorced from ownership, and absentee ownership became all but universal. This has been the outstanding revolution produced by finance capitalism. Productivity and service, as dominating economic motives, were supplanted by the desire for profits through speculative manipulations, the latter often definitely opposed to the permanent welfare of the industries and transportation systems involved."[108]

According to this tale, the early industrial capitalists were good capitalists whose only concern, God bless them, was to build industries and produce commodities for the enjoyment of the people; then the bold, bad bankers came on the scene and ruined everything by their greedy appetites for profits. If people who talk that trash would study history more instead of writing about it, they would encounter the greatest difficulty in justifying their thesis, namely, that capitalist production in the past was mainly for use, while to-day it is for profit, and the more the better.

Macaulay had a good deal to say about the nature of capitalist crises as far back as 1696;[109] and as for speculative schemes, the plans of William Patterson and the Darien bubble of 1699 concerning which "even now, after the lapse of a century and a half, feelings hardly compatible with temperate examination will not be stirred up in many minds by the name of Darien,"[110] could teach a lesson or two to our modern worshipers of the golden calf.

Barnes must recognize that the profit motive is inherent and inescapable in capitalist economy, and that the manner in which profits are realized is not determined by the good or bad intent of the individual capitalist, but by laws basic in its economy which the individual cannot transcend. As far back as 1863-67 when Marx had completed the first draft of the last two volumes of Capital, there was demonstrated the necessary operation of economic laws which make crises inevitable.[111] Capital, the product of society, becomes the master over its creator and operates as a social force independent of individual control.

Barnes can only see ill-will of a few scheming, unscrupulous bankers. Ambassador Gerard can see only fifty-nine malevolent individual men and women who manipulate the strings of our economic destiny in the United States.[112] Lundberg stretches that concept to include the dominant family groups of America who derive their incomes from the control of the national resources.[113] But none of them put their finger on the specific cause of the evils they disclose, namely, the operation of the internal laws of capitalist economy which create the conditions they condemn.

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[108] The Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 1088.

[109] History of England—Macaulay, Vol. VII, pp. 358-9, 362, 382-3, 395-6.

[110] Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 210.

[111] Capital—Marx, Vol. III, preface by Engels, p. 11.

[112] Statement by James W. Gerard, former Ambassador to Germany in the press, August 1930.

History will never become a science as long as it is content to exorcise personal devils instead of searching for necessary laws. It is a mordant commentary upon the state of our scholarship that eighty years after the causes of economic crises were elaborated by a mind generally conceded to rank among the most brilliant of that remarkable nineteenth century, his theories are discussed, but not studied, while the current crop of intellectual luminaries advance explanations concerning economic phenomena akin to that of a savage before the marvel of a total eclipse.

OBSCURANTIST SCHOOL AMONG MODERN HISTORIANS—SPENGLER AND KYSERLING

Among the pernicious pests to be found among modern dilettante intellectuals, none has created more mischief than the obscurantist school of historian as typified by Spengler and Kyserling. The very fact that they have played such a large, though fortunately an evanescent role shows how fundamentally weak is the present development of historical writing. It is all very well for Barnes to-day to denounce Spengler "as an impostor and charlatan," [114] but only a few years ago his name was to conjure with among the cognoscenti. How his nonsense could have gained current among them is a sad commentary on their gullibility. In any other branch of knowledge laying pretense to some rational basis, he would have been laughed off the stage, as a none-too-clever mountebank; in history, Spengler remained suspended above for ten years like some brilliant star before his light finally burned out.

Spengler's entire system unwinds from a simple subjective, unproved and unprovable proposition, namely that as organic beings undergo the processes of birth, youth, age and death, so do all world-cultures undergo a similar rhythm of growth, development, maturity and decline; that during its springtime it is given to tales or myths on the grand style; during its summer there develop the internal reformations; during its autumn the enlightenment of reason and the cult of nature; while its winter brings forth a materialistic world-outlook with completed systems of thought and hardening of science to utility.

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[113] America's Sixty Families—Lundberg, Chapter II (1936).

[114] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 1143.

Having laid down these propositions as axioms which commend themselves to the logical faculty without need for proof except Goethe's poetic insight,[115] Spengler searched around for analogies with which to fill in the blank spaces. This he did with some ludicrous results.

The termite type of scholarship which cannot perceive the whole, but feels entirely at home with the minutiae, soon found egregious errors in his facts and absurdities in his analogies. At first these were brushed aside by the intelligentsia as the inevitable flaws of a gigantic philosophic concept, but further investigation proved without doubt that the whole business was a consciously synthetic product with ready reference to the encyclopedia instead of painstaking development of facts and principles.

Spengler is compelled in one breath to admit the weakness of analogies: "That the secret of historical form does not lie on the surface, that it cannot be grasped by means of similarities of costume and setting, and that in the history of men as in that of animals and plants there occur phenomena showing deceptive similarity but inwardly without connection," [116] is conceded by him. Yet later on he is driven to announce: "I hope to show that without exception all great creations and forms in religion, art, politics, social life, economy and science appear, fulfill themselves and die down contemporaneously in all the Cultures; that the inner structure of one corresponds strictly with that of all the others; and that there is not a single phenomenon of deep physiognomic importance in the record of one for which we could not find a counter-part in the record of every other; and that this counter-part is to be found under a characteristic form and in a perfectly chronological position." [117]

By this homology of structure, in contradistinction to analogy which relates to functional equivalence, Spengler undertakes to predict the future course of the still uncompleted stages of our western history, as well as to reconstruct long-vanished and unknown epochs of past Cultures by means of morphological connections. Spengler's hodge-podge jumping around from one point in a Culture to a different point in another Culture so bewildered and confused his disciples that they were compelled to argue the privileges accorded to an intellectual colossus, instead of laying the blame where it really belonged, to their lack of definite scientific guide-posts to gauge the significance of historical phenomena which Spengler cited with such careless abandon.

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[115] The Decline of the West—Spengler, p. 140.

[116] The Decline of the West—Spengler, p. 38.

[117] Ibid., p. 112.

Furthermore, he grappled them with their own fantastic nomenclature and muddled them with their own curious phraseology; with history as art,[118] with causality being related to death, destiny to life,[119] with history as independent of period and observer,[120] yet interpreted according to the observer; [121] that history and biography are the same,[122] and yet not the same; [123] that science is limited to nature and not to history,[124] and yet nature is a function of the particular Culture.[125]

Still, contrariwise, the significance of a thing lies not in the thing, but the way it is used.[126] "When, therefore, in the present work also, precedence is consistently given to Time, Direction and Destiny over Space and Causality, this must not be supposed to be the result of reasoned proofs. It is the outcome of (quite unconscious) tendencies of life-feeling—the only mode of origin of philosophic ideas." [127] That is the protective armament of every intellectual weakling or philosophic charlatan. Science has learned long ago how to deal with the gentry of the subtle life-feeling which none can grasp but themselves in their own peculiar and absorbing fashion.

Here is a typical example of how Spengler set the world of history spinning on its collective ear: "What we call Statics, Chemistry and Dynamics—words that as used in modern science are merely traditional distinctions without deeper meaning—are really the respective physical systems of the Appolinian, Magian and Faustian soul, each of which grew up in its own Culture and was limited as to validity to the same. Corresponding to these sciences, each to each, we have the mathematics of the Euclidean geometry, Algebra and Higher Analysis, and the arts of statue, arabesque and fugue. We may differentiate these three kinds of physics (bearing in mind of course that other cultures may and in fact do give rise to other kinds) by their standpoints towards the problem of motion, and call them mechanical orderings of states, secret forces and processes respectively." [128]

When Spengler's work—after the first crushing stupor induced by its impressive learning had passed off—was finally subjected to scientific tests as to his knowledge of states and dynamics, the unanimous conviction of physicists was in strange accord with the verdict of historians and philosophers, namely, that as far as their respective fields were concerned, Spengler simply did not know what he was talking about. Once more obscurantism was exposed as the easy resort of astute but shallow minds in a field of investigation where the personal equation rather than impersonal principles are the decisive measuring-rods, which means no measuring-rod at all.

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[118] The Decline of the West—Spengler, p. 96.

[119] Ibid., p. 118. [120] Ibid., p. 93. [121] Ibid., p. 96. [122] Ibid., p. 131. [123] Ibid., p. 140.

[124] Ibid., p. 153. [125] Ibid., p. 169. [126] Ibid., p. 238. [127] Ibid., p. 308. [128] Ibid., p. 384.

Kyserling in his own distinctive way resorts to the plausibilities of subjective generalizations deduced from comparisons of social and political systems. The obfuscation of this thinker is best seen in the application he himself makes of his ideas.

Bolshevist ideologies, Kyserling contends, are the vitalized true roots of the spirit-essence of Hegelianism transmitted through Marx.[129] Hegel, he says, was incomprehensible in his own time, and no longer intelligible to the generations after his death. That, of course, gave him carte blanche with the generations of our century. Operating through Marxist ideologies, he contends, the historico-philosophic antinomies realized themselves. However, logical development is not itself the exponent of historic realities; for this reason every ideology must come to nothing, he concludes.

It is all very simple, or it should be; and if it is not, it is one's patent admission of inability to follow the processes of a great intellect, which no one of course would admit. Therefore, the greater the obscurity of meaning, the profounder the truth. Ergo, Kyserling is a great thinker, and the reader is a sap. However, we will pursue our inquiry a little further to see what really is in this world-shaking profundity of the obscurantist intellect.

Many people suffer from that hangover of their school days, where difficulty of apprehending established propositions is carried over in their maturity as of the same nature as present propositions that are unclear or of questionable validity. Scientists are unabashed in saying they do not understand, but no self-respecting historian would dare make that admission. All one has to do is to label his stuff as idealism, or mysticism, or as the conscious conception of the unconscious inconceivable, and instantly its utterer gains top-rank recognition as among the world's outstanding thinkers.

Therefore Kyserling could unbosom himself of the following: "In whatever fashion we choose to understand the logic of history, there cannot be any doubt that it is spirit which works itself out in accordance with its own laws. But it is equally certain that the given leaders of a time, i.e., the real historic personalities, have employed the ideas which men believed in only as a means to ends fixed in the last analysis by their irrational impulses, and that those who have looked upon ideas as the ultimate reference points, i.e., the theoreticians and ideologists, have always come to grief. The solution of this discord may be found in the following: An idea does not rise to historic power on the potency of its truth, but on the basis of its representative character."[130]

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[129] The World In The Making—Kyserling, pp. 211-12.

Kyserling's statement that there cannot be any doubt concerning the above propositions partakes of the same nature as the Supreme Court's ruling which stoutly maintains that its interpretation of the law is incontrovertible, and its contrary inconceivable in a case decided by five votes to four. Nowhere does Keyserling prove the nature of that mysterious spirit which works out its destiny in accordance with its own laws; neither does he establish its mode of operation, nor why or by what process it selects certain personalities for its mode of manifestation. We want to know more about those irrational impulses, how they get that way, and by what talisman they are differentiated from their rational brothers. We have a right to inquire as to those ends of history and how they can be recognized on a dark night, or in broad daylight for that matter. We are entitled to clarification upon the distinction between historic truth and unhistoric error, or maybe it's the other way around.

He makes a profound analogy between the incomprehensible but real compulsions of woman's fashion and the art-style of historic ideology.[131] In self-defense we maintain that if the compulsions of history were as variable and uncertain a factor as woman's fashion, we would never have dared venture into that field.

No doubt an oceanful of meaning can be discovered in the following words, as full of significance as the dimpled cheek and blue eyes of an auburn-haired siren: "The degree to which the meaningfulness of life corresponds to that which man envisages under the concept of reason is naturally proportional to the degree of development of his intellectual functions and to the extent to which the emphasis of significance of the totality of life rests on these. Where these remain undeveloped, the logic of history can be conceived only in the same sense as in the case of fashions; i.e., that which may in this connection, too, be called logic, amounts psychologically, in such a case—for the reason that the process is full of meaning—to the evolution of impulse, sensation and feeling."[132]

While considerable doubt may exist as to whether or not the above is full of meaning, no doubt can exist as to its circumlocutions. We have a right to demand clarification on man's given fate, on destiny,[133] and on his methods of communion with the mystic deep. "Current ideas are essentially symbols of reality," and in this some physicists steeped in mysticism seem to bear him out, like Jeans,

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[130] The World In The Making—Keyserling, p. 209.

[131] Ibid., pp. 209-12.

[132] Ibid., pp. 219-20.

[133] Ibid., p. 246.

Eddington and Whitehead. But they are at least apologetic about that belief, and don't ask us to accept that fiat on their say-so.

EXALTATION OF THE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE IN HISTORY

Once Keyserling descends to the actual world about him, as even a mystic must at times do, we catch him on the hip. Russia became Bolshevist, he asserts, because of the immutable will of Lenin. "It became so because a supreme spirit, possessed of a supreme knowledge of the psychological, logical, and material means, built with supreme consistency, into the perfectly clearly recognized reality, that which he desired to have thus and not otherwise." [134] Lenin has something to say about this supreme knowledge with which Keyserling endows him, but which he never claimed for himself.

As a matter of historic fact, Lenin was a master at the art of backtracking when the reality did not coincide with his judgment. Here is what Lenin wrote at the end of 1918: "Not only the European, but the world proletarian revolution is maturing before the eyes of all, and it has been assisted, has been accelerated, has been supported, by the victory of the proletariat in Russia. Is all this enough for the complete victory of Socialism? Certainly not. One country cannot do more. But thanks to the Soviet government, this one country has nevertheless done so much that even if the Russian Soviet government is crushed by the world imperialism to-morrow, as a result of an agreement between German and Anglo-French imperialism for example—even in this worst possible case, Bolshevik tactics will still have brought enormous benefit to Socialism and will have assisted the growth of the invincible world revolution." [135] By Keyserling's own testimony we have established the inanity, to say the least, of the mystic school of history, besides establishing how an historic figure of truly gigantic proportions operated when he had the power.

Since Lenin wrote that passage he carried through a tremendous strategic retreat from the World Revolution concept through his New Economic Policy where a modified form of private capitalism was allowed to rebuild an exhausted Russia. Lenin was the first to observe his errors of judgment concerning the development of the international situation as it then existed and as it subsequently unfolded itself. In short, we have a supreme realist who knew in a general way what he wanted, and was ready to adjust practical policies to definite situations sometimes beyond his control, and partly created by his own blunders in judgment of men and conditions. As a Marxist, he himself would have been the first to subscribe to the conclusion that social forces transcend the power of any individual genius to master them.

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[134] The World In The Making—Keyserling, pp. 214-15.

[135] The Proletarian Revolution—Lenin, p. 73.

But Kyserling is driven by his own position to exaggerate the historic role of the individual leader. His case is not rendered easier by his over-generous coupling of Jesus Christ and Lenin.[136] Christians and Communists of the Latter-Day Saint type, the Stalinists, will have much to say on that score.

That is exactly what Kyserling anticipated. He had a mission, a preachment to offer, the cult of the historical elite, the role of the great leader to advance and to defend before the world. Progress, whatever that may mean—he uses the word without explaining it[137]—is the work of the elite, not of the masses.[138] From this he arrives inevitably at that ultimate of progressive development from among the elite, the Feuhrer-principle. "One thing remains to be done," he argues, "to organize all our forces to the end that there shall be produced, from within the elite, as soon as possible, a determinant type who, as the carrier and embodiment of a meaning capable of animating all life—the depths as well as the surface, the metaphysician as well as the chauffeur—shall involuntarily exercise a universal power of attraction. . . . We repeat, then; the task of Europe is to breed the new, determinant culture-type."[139]

Kyserling and his ilk have assisted in calling forth the genii. Some of them, like Herr Thuyssen, recently a distinguished Ruhr magnate and patron of Hitler, are no longer enamored with the product their labors assisted in creating.

It is astonishing how in the field of history anyone and everyone is entitled to make whatever assumptions he pleases in the manner he listeth. Of course among liberals everybody is entitled to his opinion, but among responsible people we expect some sort of rational defense of opinions publicly expressed. In science assumptions must be discarded unless the realities support them. The very fact that one can state the most arrant nonsense in history and still be acclaimed a great scholar is the most conclusive evidence of the sad state to which modern historians have brought their subject.

Kyserling can seriously proclaim: "There is indeed, such a thing as destiny. Entirely apart from the cosmic dispensation (a thing not to be denied), every man finds himself burdened by the karma of past generations and of his own record, every free decision being made on the basis of a given situation—so that to this extent each one must work out his own destiny." [140] There are, according to him, three cross-interfering, yet completely independent chains of causation: cosmic influences, heredity, and spirit-born self-determination.[145]

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[136] The World In The Making—Kyserling, pp. 248-9.

[137] Ibid., pp. 226-7.

[138] Ibid., p. 159.

[139] Ibid., pp. 265-7.

Having first-hand private knowledge of the cosmic and other historical influences Kyserling predicts the coming of the ecumenic, or universal, state. "The state in its present sense, which has not always existed, will mean relatively little in the ecumenic state; it will serve, above all, the welfare of the nations; it will take as its province the justice and the fairness of the relations between individuals, groups and the total mass. The nation will no longer be the ultimate expression of the human community, any more than the clan or the municipality is today." [142]

As a moral preachment, it is no better or worse than countless other pious sermons from the pulpits of every religious faith since time immemorial. No one can object to its high purposes. But it is incumbent upon the historian to investigate the concrete proposals by which that much-sought-for goal is to be brought about and sustained. The world has been infested with so-called idealists whose egregious errors of judgment and practical blunders have led the world so often to disaster.

We have a right to protest that pious assumption of self-exalted morality on the part of those who preach a virulent internationalism during peace, and as virulent a national-chauvinism during war. The blunders of Versailles were the major product of their handiwork, and it is our solemn duty to try and avert such blunders in the future. The ecumenic state will never be the result of the inchoate longing of the collective human soul,[143] but of the conscious, deliberate resolve of mankind once it is enlightened upon the nature of the social forces in history, and the true function of the modern state on the basis of the existing dominant economy. We deny the right of these master bunglers in history to continue undisturbed in the creation of further bedevilment in human affairs.

Not so long ago those noble idealists rampant in Oxford University were the champions of a world-embracing pacifism. Their own ignorance of historical realities contributed to the present debacle. Buchmanism, which began as a strange combination of sexualism, respectability and culture,[144] evolved the slogan of Moral Re-armament, ostensibly to save a world hovering at the brink of

[140] The World In The Making—Kyserling, p. 253.

[141] Ibid., pp. 163-4.

[142] Ibid., p. 194.

[143] Ibid., p. 201.

[144] Confusion of Tongues—Ferguson (1928), p. 89.

collapse, while themselves hovering on the brink of desuetude, utterly blinded to the facts of life and of history; or rather by the magic of phrases which induced a state of moral and intellectual decrepitude and rendered them incapable of balanced judgment in the face of the concrete problems which mankind must solve. These problems cannot be fended off by the magic of a sonorous slogan. We can no longer afford to leave the future of the human race in the hands of these word witch-doctors, the effects of whose arrogance and stupidity is now being made manifest in the gripping horror of this most unnecessary of all wars.

RELIGION AS AN ACTIVE PRINCIPLE IN HISTORY

Religious theories of history offered by spiritual writers like Berdyaev stand on a far different plane than those of the deliberate obscurantists. For one cannot read the products of Spengler and Kyserling without the definite impression of deliberate intent on their part to disguise a paucity of intellectual content behind the murky screen of phraseological camouflage. The few ideas of respectable worth in their airy structures were developed by honest thinkers far above their level, and are standard theories in every idealistic school of philosophy.

Berdyaev protests against the possibility of perceiving the inner content of history by analysis of dead forms wherein its inner mysteries are annihilated. All they do succeed in revealing, he argues, is not so much the mystery of the historical process as merely its external factual manifestations, while allowing the essence of the human spirit to escape. History, like every other sphere of human knowledge ought to possess its own gnosiology, or specific theory of knowledge applicable to its own special field.[145]

Material elements are only part of spiritual historical reality. The whole of man's economic life reposes upon a spiritual basis.[146] A purely objective history would be incomprehensible. We must seek an inner profound and mysterious tie with the historical object, and it is in proportion to the discovery of this inner spiritual content that we apprehend the significance of the periods of history.[147]

Each man, Berdyaev continues, represents by virtue of his inner nature a sort of microcosm in which the whole world of reality and all the great historical epochs combine and coexist. Historical myths are the mysterious tie which bind us with our ancestors.[148] A tie therefore with our ancestors, with our native land, with all that is sacred, is one with the creative and dynamic processes which is addressing itself to the future, and effecting the union of the present, the past and the future, thereby knitting together terrestrial and celestial history.

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[145] Meaning of History—Berdyaev (1936), p. 12.

[146] Ibid., p. 15.

[147] Ibid., p. 22.

"What do we understand by celestial history?" asks Berdyaev. "In it, in the depths of the inner life of the spirit, resides that predetermination which reveals and manifests itself in the terrestrial life, destiny and history of mankind. This heavenly prologue is analogous to that which opens Goethe's Faust. Faust's destiny is that of man; and this heavenly prologue predetermines the terrestrial destiny of mankind. The philosophy of history ought to be the metaphysics of history; it has its origin in that heavenly prologue which predetermines historical destinies and in the revelation of the inner spiritual history; for heaven is our inner spiritual heaven."[149]

Human destiny, in the philosophy of Berdyaev, is both terrestrial and celestial. It is not only an historical but also a metaphysical, not only a human but also a divine, destiny. Unfortunately, nowhere in his work does Berdyaev undertake to prove, in the scientific meaning of that term, any of his basic assumptions. They are merely assertions and must be accepted on faith.

He does not, to begin with, endeavor to establish why history and every other branch of knowledge must possess its own distinctive epistemology. The painfully plodding course of intellectual development has established one basic truth, which one must either accept or reject in its totality; namely, that there is a fundamental unity in existence which underlies all apparent plurality, and that diversity is merely a mode of manifestation of this unitary principle. This must be the elemental starting point of philosophy, as of physics; of laws of thought, as of laws of motion.

Why did not Berdyaev attempt to prove his thesis that historical theory must proceed along a path different from that in any other branch of knowledge? What is the nature of his spiritual elements? Surely at this late date Berdyaev will not attempt to prove that only pure ideas are the active principles in history.

Our work up to now has afforded ample proof of the significant, and at times the overwhelming role, ideas play in history. The decisive distinction between Berdyaev and ourselves is that he endows ideas with supernatural, metaphysical and other-worldly properties, which he cannot prove, whereas we deem it the function of the historian to describe the earthly core and origin of man's ideas, and how they operate in actuating man to act as he does in the creation of those events which form the substance of history.

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[148] Ibid., p. 23.

[149] Meaning of History—Berdyaev, pp. 39-40.

Berdyaev asserts, but does attempt to substantiate his assertion, that every man is a microcosm of the entire world of reality. Let him not add a cubit to his physical stature by assuming an idealistic attitude. So-called materialists yield to none in estimating man's ideological capacities, nor in underestimating their potent power for good or evil, using those terms in an historical and relative, not in an absolute, sense. We only point out what must be evident to every unbiased inquirer, the material basis of man's social structure and that it is susceptible of enormous development; that man's ideological responses, if properly directed by scientific understanding, can change and modify the material basis to form the foundation of a nobler civilization in the fullest meaning of that term. Man's ideas are as much a part of this material world as is the air he breathes, the music he hears, and the religious preachments which often spur him on to deeds of highest self-sacrifice.

When Berdyaev writes of destiny and predetermination, we are justified in asking how one is to recognize destiny when he meets it face to face in the present, not with the sublime wisdom which generally follows after the event. The destiny-preachers are numerous in the land, and no one of them has passed beyond the tale of the obvious when looking backward. People who claim intimate acquaintance with the sublime designs of God have generally lost all contact with the actual designs of men.

That is why Berdyaev can write with such assurance: "History is in truth the path to another world. It is in this sense that its content is religious. But the perfect state is impossible within history itself; it can only be realized outside its framework. This is the fundamental conclusion of the metaphysics of history and the secret of the historical process itself. In its perpetual transition from one epoch to another, mankind struggles in vain to resolve its destiny within history. Disappointed in its expectations, feeling itself imprisoned within the circle of history, it realizes that its problems cannot be solved within the process of history itself, but only on a transcendental plane." [150]

By what authority does Berdyaev undertake to speak with such assurance concerning the perpetual, the celestial and the transcendental? If this is intended for Sunday school consumption, we admit ignorance as to the kind of ideas most suitable for that market. We know, however, that not a small portion of the world's ills are due to the Sunday school trade. Should Berdyaev seriously project those ideas for currency among the world of mature sinners, many are sufficiently unrepentant as to ask rather embarrassing questions of the kind here briefly indicated.

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[150] Meaning of History—Berdyaev, p. 197.

The Archbishop of York may "regard Berdyaev as one of the most important writers of the time," [151] but unfortunately not every one is ready to accept opinions on faith without inquiry as to the basis of that opinion, despite the imprimatur of even that high ecclesiastical authority.

When Berdyaev is compelled to give details upon the nature of this tempero-celestial history, he must fall back upon the framework of abstract monism as contained in the Spinozistic and the Hegelian systems, though he must, perforce, give them his own peculiar shape. "The knowledge of the divine life is not attainable by means of abstract philosophical thought based upon the principles of formalist or rationalistic logic, but only by means of a concrete myth which conceives the divine life as a passionate destiny of concrete and active persons, the divine Hypostases. This is, therefore, not a philosophy, but a mythology. The Gnostics had such a mythology. And that explains their success in apprehending, in spite of certain deficiencies and confusions in their thought, the divine mysteries as those of an historical destiny better than the abstract philosophers, who were content to remain within the framework of their philosophies." [152]

There is only one answer to claims of this character. Can these people who pretend to possess the key not only to historical destiny, but also the open sesame to the divine mystery, will they kindly oblige by giving us the solution to world wars, widespread poverty, general uncertainty and universal misery? Upon second thought, this question should never have been asked. It is an open invitation toward the consideration of a few hundred thousand solutions proposed for economic crises and unemployment, and an infinite number of other schemes for the ending of all wars in the universal brotherhood of man. Not a few of these if put into practice would sooner result in his universal extinction.

Doubtless there is great consolation in the thought that "the greatest contribution of Christianity, although it is not fully recognized by the Christian world, consisted in that it liberated man from the power of the baser elemental nature and demons. It did so through the agency of Christ and the mystery of Redemption." [153]

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[151] Meaning of History—Berdyaev, opposite title page.

[152] Ibid., p. 52.

[153] Meaning of History—Berdyaev, p. 113.

It seems that, after all, Berdyaev is not a Christian despite his fervent protestations, but a Spenglerian. It is amazing what influence that mountebank had acquired among the literati. Spengler at his best could not improve on the following: "To understand the destiny of culture it is necessary to perceive its dynamic principles and fatal dialectic. Culture is the living process and destiny of peoples. But it becomes evident that it cannot maintain itself at the high peak of its efflorescence. Every type of culture known to history demonstrates its liability to disintegrate and be transformed into another state to which the term 'culture' is no longer applicable. And that is due to the fact that it develops a will to a new 'life,' to power and domination at all costs. The will to power at all costs is the principle of civilization. . . . Civilization is the passage from culture, contemplation and the creation of values, to the experience of life itself whose torrent threatens to engulf man." [154]

Civilization is a fact, not a passage, and the "passage" is due not to the fact in itself, but to the human inheritors of, and manipulators with the civilization of their time. Civilization as opposed to culture is the final contradiction of the spiritualistic type of history as taught by Berdyaev. Civilization is no more bourgeois,[155] than it is communistic, or Moslem. It is people who give it concrete form. And the same humanity can re-make it, transform it, or even destroy it, as has happened so often in the past. The present torrent of ruin is of man's making. It is not machinery and technology that are sapping the organic foundations of our civilization.[156] If "the machine acquires a magic power over man," [157] it is because man has allowed himself to become the victim of the laws of motion which control the economic operations of which the machine is a part. What these laws of social motion are, Berdyaev has not the slightest conception, as we have abundantly proved, yet that patent fact does not hamper his style in setting forth for all time to come the hidden meaning of terrestrial history, and celestial history to boot.

Fosdick's work on whether civilization is essentially religious in conception is written in the style of the practical idealist. It is predicated on faith, hope and a fair admixture of common sense. He admits that he asks questions to which he cannot supply an answer.[158] Since the religious, when in doubt, fall back upon "a little child shall lead them," the mature Fosdick posits his problems before the not-so-mature college students.

Our economy has gotten the best of us so far, Fosdick concedes, but he hopes that the international interweaving of the economic pattern will lead to the terrestrial organization of humanity in an effective League of Nations.[159] "If standardization works in one field, why is it not applicable in another? If men have the same types of automobiles and food and furniture, why should they not have the same beliefs?" [160] Since Fosdick asks that question in all seriousness, a reply is appropriate only in the form of another question: "Why do the same vitamins nourish both the philosopher and the fool?"

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[154] Meaning of History—Berdyaev, pp. 213-14.

[155] Ibid., p. 218. [156] Ibid., p. 216. [157] Ibid., p. 217.

[158] Old Savage in the New Civilization—Fosdick (1929), p. VI.

"The world of to-day constitutes a single economic organization," Fosdick asserts. Does it? It all depends upon what one means by the phrase. A family is a single unit, but the units can and do live separate lives. World realities cannot be solved by empty platitudes and cheap generalizations. Fosdick's work of current historical problems betrays the bewilderment of the more than average intelligent man who is too busy to search problems to their root, but not too busy to roam about the country's universities shedding panaceas with the ease of a moulting bird. Perhaps it is unfair to criticize a work ten years old. The professoriate have an easy system. No historic work is scientific five years after the date on the title page. For the same year, obviously the book published in September displaces the ancient work of the month before.

There is one thing about Fosdick's work which has a modern appeal—he is still looking for the moral equivalent of war.[161] That, indeed required courage of the highest order. This was seven years after Dewey had established by irrefutable logic the impossibility of such a quest.[162] Let us leave this Knight of the Holy Grail undisturbed in his pious act. He at least expresses misgivings about the successful outcome of his search, and so is reconciled to the acceptance of a fair substitute. This he terms: "Wanted: An Aristotle." [163]

This new Aristotle who will set our askew world to rights will be in the form of a collective intelligence,[164] Fosdick asserts. From this it is but a single step to some gigantic individual intelligence; another gradation leads to an over-mastering individual will, and from that it is but a hair-breadth to the great individual leader. Fosdick's solution leads toward a totalitarianism to which he most heartily objects, but is the logical consequence of the failure to think historical phenomenon through, instead of being content with wishing it through.

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[159] Ibid., p. 215.
[160] Ibid., pp. 71-2.
[161] Old Savage in the New Civilization—Fosdick, p. 191.
[162] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey, pp. 112-16.
[163] Old Savage in the New Civilization—Fosdick, Chapter VI.
[164] Ibid., p. 178.

C. Contribution of Sociology to Social Law

It is a relief to return once again to the solid ground of science in the search of social laws underlying the events of history. Modern sociology offers a fruitful field for the further pursuit of our inquiry, which lead us to consider the historical theories of Goldenweiser, Sorokin and their associates. More than ever is one convinced that the ultimate establishment of history as a science will depend upon the fusion of anthropology, sociology, political economy and philosophy. By philosophy is meant an inquiry into the laws of human thought and action, and its ultimate objective must be the establishment of a valid epistemology for which the scientific method, slowly evolving during the past two hundred years, has already laid the foundation.

While sociology will always be a rich source material for history there is a fundamental distinction between the two fields in their methodology. Sociology deals with the results, history with the process, of social development. Naturally this is no hard-and-fast demarcation. One must inter-lock with the other.

An excellent case in point is offered by Goldenweiser regarding Japan's remarkable development during the span of a fairly long life-time from the role of the Hermit Kingdom to that of taking over the white man's burden in the Far East, and perhaps also in other places. Sociology will trace the development of the Japanese social structure, while history will show the why and how of that development. Both sciences dovetail, yet are distinct in their respective fields.

Goldenweiser gives the result, history must detail the process of Japan's meteoric rise among the world's Great Powers. "A generation ago," he writes, "the Japanese stood no higher in the estimation of their white brethren than the Chinese stand today. Then came the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian eagle was forced to eat dust at the feet of its yellow conquerors. And out of the ashes of the war Japan arose a full-fledged member of the family of nations. If today we still discriminate against the Japanese—and, to our shame be it said, we do—it is no longer on the ground of racial inferiority." [165] History of necessity must operate with something more than the "ashes of war" to give a valid explanation for Japan's present position, and to account for existing American-Japanese international relations.

Goldenweiser expresses the deepest sympathy, both for himself and for the scientific world, in Teggart's attempt to establish historical constants so necessary to a science of history.[166] "In the facts and successions constituting the subject-matter of the natural-historical sciences there also are discernible certain constants as well as certain variants; but it so happens that the variants in these cases do not interest us, or do so but slightly; fortunately so, for, as the author notes, we lack the means of reconstructing the minutiae of these processes or of chronologizing them. Not so in history. Without attempting to raise from well-deserved historical obscurity the proverbial death of a neighbor's cat, it is but fair to doubt whether the historical constants—if disclosed—would cover all that is theoretically interesting and humanly significant." [167] After this it is needless to remark that he successfully demolishes Teggart's so-called constants which that writer had made to apply to all history for all time.[168] We have already shown that these constants do not exist.

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[165] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser (1933), pp. 411-12.

But in one respect our analysis has gone a step further than Goldenweiser. He states that "the author's—Teggart's—future demonstrations may serve to reinforce some additional elements of his theory. In its present form, at any rate, the theory must be rejected: it has failed to reveal the 'processes of history,' or to demonstrate its 'homogeneity.' " [169] Our position is that these constants do not exist, have never existed, and that it is a waste of time not only to talk about your neighbor's dead cat, but to look for a cat that was never there, and of no consequence if it was.

The phenomena of history is unique. Despite the poet, history does not repeat itself. Hegel, too, stated that upon the stage of universal history, all great events and personalities reappear in one fashion or another. Marx attaches to that dictum the mordant comment: "He forgot to add that, on the first occasion, they appear as tragedy; on the second, as farce." [170] The only constant element in history is change, which affects even the historically-conditioned constants, human nature and the social structure, and the function of history is to discover, if any, the laws which impel historic transformations.

The sociologist preponderates in Goldenweiser when he looks for historical constants; the historian deals with functional relations as determined by definite social laws, which necessarily must operate through existing social forms and be conditioned by them. There is, however, one historical "constant" to which we have adverted; namely, the inherent stability of human nature over a long period of time, which, despite its mutability, is still easily recognized and warmly understood by the present generation of men in all past generations concerning which we possess definite knowledge.

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[166] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser, p. 105.

[167] Ibid., p. 92.

[168] Ibid., p. 107.

[169] Ibid., p. 107.

[170] The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte—Marx, Chapter One, p. 23.

In the particular social structure of different epochs of Civilization, we have called human nature the independent variable, and human beings the dependent variable within the social continuum. Goldenweiser the sociologist, and Boas the anthropologist both lend the weight of their authority to that proposition.

"As to other psychological traits," writes Goldenweiser, "the consensus of opinion of unprejudiced mankind, among whom are some missionaries, travellers, and scientists, is to the effect that, for better or worse, man's mind works about the same the world over. Also, is it not fairly obvious that the psychological characteristics usually attributed to the races, are like national traits, acquired, not congenital? The stolidity of the Indian, the reserve of the Mongol, the emotionalism of the Negro, are in no way more inherent than the vindictiveness of the Italian; the logic of the French, the pedantry of the German, the sentimentality of the Russian, the denseness of the English, or the frankness of the American. Each and all, these traits, in so far as they exist, are cultural, acquired by education, and subject to change when social environment changes." [171]

Boas concludes his study of the same subject from the standpoint of the anthropologist: "Although, therefore, the distribution of faculty among the races of man is far from being known, we can say this much: the average faculty of the white race is found to the same degree in a large proportion of individuals of all other races, and, although it is probable that some of these races may not produce as large a proportion of great men as our own race, there is no reason to suppose they are unable to reach the level of civilization represented by the bulk of our own people." [172]

HUMAN CONSTANTS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY

Having this "constant" before us, Goldenweiser does not know what to do with it. The historian perhaps may be of some assistance. Fully strengthened by the conclusions of cognate sciences, he can, with fullest confidence, proceed to the investigation of the

[171] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser, pp. 409-10.

[172] The Mind of Primitive Man—Boas (1931), p. 123.

historical data before him. He at least feels a kinship with the human beings with whom history deals. We have already seen that history is primarily concerned with the mass, and not with the individual components of society. By this we do not ignore the individual. We are conscious of the intimate reactions between the individual and society, and how they influence and modify each other. But every insurance company actuarian knows how it is possible to deal with the individual generally and yet ignore him specifically.

Everett Dean Martin and Goldenweiser both concede that crowd psychology is something far different than the average of their individual content.[173] "Basic forms of social organization," writes Goldenweiser, "do not fall from heaven ready made, nor do they arise full-fledged from the minds of genial savage lawgivers. The time may come when man will learn to conceive of new forms of social, political, or economic structure and to fit them so well into the living organism of society as to ensure their persistence and smooth working. But the past knows no such examples." [174]

We must note the wishful tone with which the sociologist speaks of historical movement. It is the duty of the historian not to wish but to explain, and to show why forms of social organization came into existence by the analysis of their laws of motion, and to demonstrate by the same means, why the past shows no examples of fundamental social changes effected by fitting them into the existing structure; or in other words, why mankind up to now has resorted to violent upheavals instead of to consciously-adopted modifications of the social structure through intelligent social forethought. It is necessary to point out the defects of Goldenweiser's historical methods which blind him to the processes of history, while his sociological methods give him a clear insight into its results.

Goldenweiser is remorseless in exposing the defects of evolutionism in sociology, that gradual, schematic and progressive development of a lower form into a higher in accordance with a set theory of evolution. In reality the stages of social development are so confused that they resemble a network rather than a ladder. The principle of convergence of cultures of dissimilar origin must be supplemented by the principle of parallelism in development.[175] To that should be added the principle of diffusion where cultural features of one development are super-imposed upon another. The alleged unpreparedness of the "inferior" race for the dominant culture is exploded by the facility with which the brown, black, yellow and other shades of the human family have absorbed the white man's culture.[176] To that Marx and his followers have added the principle of cataclysmic or revolutionary changes in the political, social and economic spheres of human development.[177]

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[173] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser, p. 64.

[174] Ibid., p. 174.

[175] Ibid., pp. 49, 136-7.

Similarly the theory of "progress" has suffered from the closer examination to which it has been subjected after the first flush of enthusiasm over the world-spread of our economic order had subsisted, and its results more closely studied.[178] Having demolished evolutionism in sociology, why should Goldenweiser assume its existence in history? Why should he look for historical constants conveniently placed along the historical roads with signs attached so that even the short-sighted could not miss their meaning?

For if historical constants mean anything at all, they must be sign-posts, and measuring-rods and chronological time-mechanisms by which history is to be gauged and catalogued. These do not exist, nor will they ever be found. History is a tangled skein of dominant forces impressing their will upon the weaker elements. The weak are not necessarily "inferior," nor the dominant "superior." Attila and Genghis were, from a certain standpoint, far below the calibre of the peoples whom they conquered. Vestigial remains of once noble civilizations still survive among decadent peoples of to-day to shame the memories of their heroic forebears.

FALLACY OF STRAIGHT-LINE EVOLUTIONISM

There is no straight-line development in history, any more than there is in sociology. Each historical epoch rests on its own structural foundation. Within the social structure the various forces molding the state, the economy and the ideological institutions assert the resultant of their mean; a mean, by the way, which is always fluctuating, yet supporting a social system of relative historical stability. The nature of these forces can be studied only in relation with the life about them through which they manifest themselves, and the results of these forces are recorded in the events which make the substance of history.

Can we reconstruct the events of a past day, or of a by-gone civilization? Certainly not. No phenomena, physical, organic or social, can be reconstructed in exactly the same way as it originally existed. We saw why the Second Law of Thermodynamics which deals with organization in time offers an insurmountable obstacle to that achievement. Yet this patent truth does not militate against our making very practical uses of all sorts of natural phenomena. To understand, it is not necessary that we reconstruct. No physical experiment ever was repeated in exactly the same manner, though this fact does not prevent us from possessing an abiding faith in the relative permanence of nature's laws.

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[176] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser, p. 137.

[177] Ibid., pp. 138, 177.

[178] Ibid., pp. 76, 139-40, 178.

If Goldenweiser would only have looked in the right direction for his historical "constants," he would have been astonished to find so many temporal sign-posts lying around unobserved and unused. It is truly amazing by how many past facts and the certainty of future happenings every one of us regulates his daily life in a matter-of-fact way; and it is this natural, instinctive recognition of law in social organization that makes us confident that we will demonstrate conclusively the existence of law in history.

GOLDENWEISER'S THEORY OF ACCIDENTAL AND DETERMINISTIC CATEGORIES IN HISTORY

Proof of the break-down of the sociological approach to history is evidenced by Goldenweiser's analysis of what he calls the accidental and deterministic categories in history. By "accidental" he does not mean uncaused, nor wholly outside the connected chain of events which constitute our conceptual universe. An accidental event or thing, he defines as one normally belonging to a different system from the one in which it makes its appearance.[179] "The driving power, the 'yeast' of history, is supplied by various accidental factors, in origin individual or socio-psychological; at any rate, external to a given system. . . . The accidental, then, appears, after all, as predominant in history, when it comes to the particular when, where, how, and to a degree even the what of events. The concept of the 'uniqueness of historical events' thus stands vindicated. Accident decrees whether anything will happen when and how it will happen, which one of several possibilities will be realized, whether the actualization of a potential event will occur through the maturing of certain elements within a system or through the ready acceptance of an appropriate element coming from without, by foreign contact. The accidental itself, on the other hand, is restricted by the deterministic factors. Certain things coming from without a system, or for that matter, from within, will not 'take.' The new element does not find a deterministic current strong enough to carry it to fruition, or it may be opposed to a contrary current."[180]

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[179] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser, p. 24.

[180] Ibid., pp. 30-1.

From the standpoint of the North African natives, Goldenweiser argues, the advent of Mohammedanism was such an accident; so also was the introduction of the horse among the Plain Indians by the Spaniards; equally so was iron among the Eskimos, and "fire-water" among all primitive natives thrown in contact, or forcibly contacted with the blessings of our civilization.[181]

This analysis of accident and determinism is a model of clarity. Obviously, the entire issue revolves on what is the normal and abnormal in a given system, and care must be taken to analyze this concept of a system. According to Goldenweiser, the Indians were going along with their system, hunting, squatting, gorging, starving, with occasional sprees of tribal dancing and tomahawking. Suddenly a new system is obtruded among them by white men, the "yeast" of subsequent North American history. With fire-water and fire-arms and other appurtenances of civilization they succeed in establishing a mastery over the Redman. Here we see diffusion of a culture with a vengeance.

The accidental intrusion of the white man broke down the native system, or modified it, or adapted it in manners with which we are not now concerned. From the white man's standpoint, however, his coming was not accidental, but deterministic, according to Goldenweiser. Being well acquainted with our history he could not contend otherwise.

If the white man's civilization "took," to use his term, it is because under the conditions then existing it prevailed over the native system. Force, cunning, stealth, the meanest betrayal of human trust, and the foulest episodes among the dark pages of history, all are duly recorded from the time of the haughty Conquistadors, to the formidable legal writ which took from the Indian his ancestral land in Oklahoma which happened to be oil-bearing.

There must be something wrong with Goldenweiser's "category" of systems. His historical categories[182]—there are eight in number, capable of almost infinite permutations as he shows in the discussion of The Theoretical Categories and Cultural Reality[183]—are almost as numerous, and equally as obscure, as the categories of Kant.[184] The categories he enumerated are as follows: objective-historical, objective-contemporaneous, psychological-historical, psychological-contemporaneous, deterministic-historical, deterministic-contemporaneous, accidental-historical, accidental-contemporaneous.

The facts of history are envisaged from the standpoint of level, time and linkage. The level may be objective or psychological; the time, successive or coexistential; the linkage, deterministic or accidental. In a cosmic sense, Goldenweiser contends, no event is accidental, undetermined or partially determined. But events of historical significance when examined from their linkage to other events may be accidental or deterministic. Hence follows the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of establishing historical "laws" of the same validity which we attach to that term in the physical sciences. We shall presently discuss in detail the merits of these abstract contentions.

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[181] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser, pp. 24-5.

[182] Ibid., pp. 7-28.

[183] Ibid., p. 28.

[184] Critique of Pure Reason—Kant, Book I, Section III.

Goldenweiser's conception of social systems is equally metaphysical. According to his theory, a system would be natural only as it exists. Modification, unless by its gradual evolution, must be accidental. The intrusion of the white man into Indian life was an accidental factor. But so would be the intrusion of a neighboring or distant tribe upon the local habitat. So would be a comet, a flood, fire, or any other natural phenomena which disturbed in any way the smooth flowing of the local existence.

Are disease and starvation accidental or deterministic? Goldenweiser would be the last to deny how vitally they affected Indian life. The fact is that there is no social "system" which exists separate and apart from contact with reality, and any influence of the external world upon the given system, no matter how naturalistic and deterministic its phenomena, would play the role of accident in its internal life from the viewpoint Goldenweiser adopts. The world must then be full of accidents, and Goldenweiser is compelled to follow out the logic of his conception by the statement, quoted above, that accident decrees whether anything will happen, when or where it will happen, and which of several possibilities will be realized.

MODERN IMPERIALISM AS AN ACCIDENT OF HISTORY, ACCORDING TO GOLDENWEISER

It is always a pleasant surprise when a writer using a highly generalized proposition comes down to cases. Goldenweiser is too much the scientist not to oblige in that respect. He does so in the following argument concerning the relative systems of France and North Africa. "To satisfy her imperialistic ambitions, France is at this time engaged in providing military training for vast numbers of her African subjects. These troops or those that will follow in their wake, may not always remain satisfied to lay their bones on the battlefields of Europe in the interests of a foreign and selfish power. Some day they may become the nucleus of an Africa for the Africans, armed vanguard in the struggle of the black world for racial emancipation. The fate that befell Russia at the hands of the yellow men of Asia may befall others when confronted with the black legions of Africa. Then we shall recognize them. Then we shall grant them the right to world citizenship. But must we wait so long? Might it not be fairer as well as wiser to proceed more expeditiously?"[185] Leaving aside for the moment the very laudable moral preachment contained in the conclusion, let us see what validity there is in the sociologist's application of his theory of history.

REPLY TO THE HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF GOLDENWEISER'S SOCIOLOGY

First, we are entitled to ask a few questions on our own account. Is the French incursion into North Africa an accident? No, Goldenweiser would reply, from France's standpoint it was deterministic, and he could probably recite as well as anyone the entire chain of circumstances which led the inheritors of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity into its imperialistic adventures. At the recent World's Fair in New York those who visited the French Colonial Pavilion saw displayed with consummate artistry the West-European defense for picking up the white man's burden. Speaking practically, every student of modern history and political economy can understand the rationale of France's African adventure.

But, argues Goldenweiser, it was an historical accident as far as the North African is concerned. A powerful social system of the white man's civilization obtruded itself, more or less forcibly, into the indigenous system, destroyed what it could not adapt, and then began molding it in accordance with French desires, or necessities. Now, was that really an accident? Is it all an accident that North Africa was in that state of comparative helplessness as to be readily brought under French sway? Was there not a time when France itself had a narrow escape from the Moorish domination which succeeded in gripping Spain for eight hundred years? Was it all an accident that North Africa deteriorated while France developed her own, and other's resources sufficiently to encompass the conquest of her African possessions?

Goldenweiser is willing to concede, because he cannot help himself, determinism as far as France is concerned. Why should he cavil at determinism from the African side? Even if the factors involved were mathematical and not strictly causal—a problem which will be discussed later—still they must have been governed by some law developed from within their own social system, and the social systems of the respective antagonists. Does mere 'success' establish determinism for France, and 'defeat' spell accident for Africa? Even the results of minor skirmishes in which the French suffered temporary defeat at the hands of the Moors were not accidental in nature.

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[185] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser, p. 412.

Furthermore, Goldenweiser warns that the black soldiers now being trained by France may some day turn upon their erstwhile masters. This, of course, is mere opinion. He is too much the scientist not to know that what is required is proof of an internal relationship necessarily existing between such training and the inevitability of the present victor's future discomfiture. May should be turned into must. Easy analogies about Rome training the barbarian hordes which later reduced it to ruins should be left to the clever intelligentsia who never really got through with digesting the material of their school days.

The social conditions of modern warfare make the technological organization of the rear more important than the courage of the soldier at the front. The immortal Gibbon whose judgment of historical phenomena will always command deepest respect, remarks that "the courage of a soldier is found to be the cheapest and most common quality of human nature." [186] North African independence from French domination will be won not by the armed might of the black world in a revolutionary struggle for racial emancipation, but by the consciously adopted policy of European society organized on a social basis differing from that which prevails to-day.

This statement is the challenge of historical science to the sociologist who dabbles in history. This emancipation will not even be won by French internal disintegration if it results as a consequence of German victory in the present war, for then Africa will merely experience a change of masters at best. [187]

If Goldenweiser pointed out the consequences of the Russo-Japanese war as a horrible example with which to frighten French imperialism, he has failed in his purpose; first, because France cannot get along without those colonies and survive as a First Class Power; and secondly, there is no possible analogy between the two situations from the standpoint of the historical development of Japan and North Africa respectively. It is needless to press this point further. Were anyone seriously inclined to urge that comparison, a hundred argu-

[186] The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon, Chapter XXVI, pp. 947-8.

[187] This was written some six months before the French collapse in June, 1940.

ments could be urged, each one valid in itself to destroy that contention.

First, and by no means the strongest, North Africa is not so situated where, like Japan, it could incubate a modern industrial system—assuming it had the resources, human and material—protected by a powerful ally, and centrally located in an economically undeveloped part of the world, where its strongest antagonists were many thousands of miles away, separated by internal animosities, while its nearest antagonist China was undergoing the throes of internal political dissolution. There is a world of history compressed in the above sentence, and after it is analyzed Goldenweiser would be compelled to admit that social law, and not mere whim or accidental clash of closed systems controls the unfolding of events which make the substance of history.

That admonishing finger Goldenweiser holds before an addled world, warning them of the high price of delaying racial justice, does more honor to his sense of decency than to his sense as an historian. No one pays attention to that sort of thing now-a-days, and the historian should leave moral preachments to ministers who have nothing else to do, and who probably would be deeply mortified were they to wake up one morning and find that the world had actually taken to heart all the fine things they had advised the Sunday before.

DEFECTS OF GOLDENWEISER'S THEORY OF INERTIAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Of course, one has a very shrewd suspicion concerning the origin of Goldenweiser's ideas on historic accident and determinism. This is a reflex of the current dispute in the field of physical theory concerning causality and indeterminacy. This point has been reserved for discussion in a later chapter because our present concern is to establish the validity of historical laws and their nature; for physicists, unlike historians, are already agreed upon the fact that laws control their phenomena, though vacillating between the causality once unequivocally upheld by Einstein, and the indeterminacy principle to which he has lately made important though unwilling concessions, albeit with reservations.

The same answer applies to Goldenweiser's contention of one system intruding upon another. This, too, is an improvisation in the realm of history of a proposition carried over from the physical theory of an inertial system. Goldenweiser will have to reconcile himself to a single inertial system as far as modern imperialism is concerned. He will have to admit that before the incursion of the white man into North America, for example, there was no possible relation between his system and that of the red man. Once they came into contact, an historical field was established. As long as that contact remained the field persisted. The internal struggles between the white and red men was decided by the respective forces, material and ideological, which they both brought into play respectively, and the issue was finally resolved, as is all historical conflict, by its internal resolution.

It is precisely the function of a philosophy of history to show how and by what means that struggle was carried on, and why it was resolved in the manner that history has recorded. It is further important to note that the straight-line evolutionism which Goldenweiser finds defective in sociology, he is compelled to resort to in history. That is why he protests against the white man's "intrusion" into the systems of other races, instead of letting them work out their own destinies.

Historical science refuses to recognize this duality, and urges that definite laws inherent in the social system of the dominant great capitalist powers impel them to spread their effects into every corner of the globe, and to bring under their sway every other people, regardless of their social system, that will feed its insatiable requirement for material resources in a competitive world. This is a thesis of far greater significance than Goldenweiser's "historical categories"; and what is more important, it is susceptible of proof because based on definite historical laws of motion developed from the actual relations of social existence.

There are three reasons for the failure of Goldenweiser's theoretical system. The first is his distinction between cosmic and historical determinism; second, his theory of closed, independent historical systems; third, that accident is the "yeast" of history. Obviously these assumptions are related to, and follow from each other.

"The concept of a system," he writes, "is essential for a proper estimate of the deterministic and accidental factors in the historic process. From a cosmic standpoint, as we saw, a historic event is no less irrevocably determined as to content, place and time than any other kind of event, nor is any event accidental. But if the interest centers on a particular historic complex of events, with its own system of specially intimate relations between its elements, then, within the limits of such a system, certain determinisms may also be observed. In the domain of historic phenomena such determinisms are, as will be shown, never absolute, but relative or limited. These determinisms are really tendencies the particular aspects of which are co-determined by things or events having their origin in other systems. The intrusion of such extraneously conditioned events or things into the first system must, from the point of view of that system, be regarded as accidental." [188]

In this lucid exposition of his ideas, Goldenweiser contends that while events within a system may be deterministic, events arising from the intrusion of one system into another must be accidental. Even if we were to grant this assumption, it would not militate against the effort to establish laws developed within a system, be they determinate or indeterminate; or of laws which manifest themselves when two or more systems, having collided, one becomes the satellite of the other, and while modifying the mutual course of that internal relationship, nevertheless the superior body determines the course of the weaker. But we are not here engaged in metaphysical disputes where one may give or take in generous good fellowship. In the attempt to establish scientific laws, nothing must be conceded which cannot be proved.

GOLDENWEISER ON CAUSALITY OR ACCIDENT IN HISTORY

Such an attempt at proof was made by Goldenweiser on a ground which was, apparently, most advantageous to his theory, namely, the clash between two unrelated social systems, that of the white man in the New World, and that of France in North Africa. On the surface all was accident. "If the white man had not come," begins an interminable series of conceptual possibilities.

But the white man did come. Goldenweiser is willing to admit that elements within his own system may have determined his coming. In that case, it is incumbent upon him to analyze those deterministic factors. The Indian did succumb before the white man's civilization. We know he did not do so without a struggle. But struggle or not, there were definite factors within his social system which rendered it impossible for the Indian to meet successfully this onslaught.

Prescott reports the following conversation between Cortes and Montezuma taken from the Spanish archives: "You, too, have been told, perhaps, that I am a god, and dwell in palaces of gold and silver. But you see it is false. My houses, though large, are of stone and wood like those of others, and as to my body, you see it is flesh and bone like yours. It is true, I have a great empire inherited from my ancestors; lands, and gold and silver. But your sovereign beyond the waters is, I know, the rightful lord of all. I rule in his name." [189] So spoke one of the noblest yet weakest characters in history, to one of the world's most audacious, and even to this day, after the lapse of over four hundred years, yet most contemptible of men.

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[188] History, Psychology and Culture—Goldenweiser, pp. 8-9.

[189] The Conquest of Mexico—Prescott, p. 306.

But throughout all that pitiable episode, there was law, not accident. Both men, in their way, and under the circumstances of their meeting, were typical representatives of their social systems. Under those conditions the weaker succumbed to the stronger, if not sooner, then later. Montezuma yielded sovereignty to an unknown lord beyond the water while yet lord of a hundred thousand warriors waiting to rend Cortes and his band to pieces. Later they did try, but failed.

Behind Cortes was Velasquez; behind the latter the power of Spain as represented in Cuba; behind both, the power of Charles V before whom both proud contestants yielded humble submission. But this does not mean that one has to trace the begats back to father Abraham who, concededly, was part of a system which had no relation to the Indian branch of God's children, though doubtless they could trace theirs back to Adam and Eve.

Wherever Goldenweiser looks he sees accident; wherever he goes he meets with causality. Spengler in comparison was on a higher, though trickier plane. He nonchalantly ascribed strict causality to the past and present, but destiny as regards the future.[190] The problems of history are of a different nature than those presented by individual free will or predestination. Schopenhauer contends that while man is free to will, he is not free to will what he wills. "Vain attempts have been made to make a bridge from one of these incompatibles to the other by means of the conception of moral freedom; but it always breaks down again. What is free must also be original. If our will is free, our will is also the original element, and conversely."[191]

No doubt, the Indian who was urged at the stake to embrace Christianity that his soul might find admission to heaven had the choice of acceptance. But he had the forethought to inquire if white men would go there. On being answered in the affirmative this benighted heathen exclaimed, "Then I will not be a Christian; for I would not go again to a place where I must find men so cruel!"[192] This Indian's nature seemed strangely determined to the sweet lambs of God, who must have been amazed at their own charity in freely offering to share the hereafter with a savage.

Determinism and accident are incidental to the problems raised by Goldenweiser. Of paramount importance is his contention relating to self-contained systems. "The driving power, the 'yeast' of history, is supplied by various accidental factors . . . external to a given system." [193] We want to know more about these "systems," how they are organized and how they operate. Turn and twist as one may, one cannot get away from the fact of internal organization, consequently differentiation, and inevitably streams of force operating between the internal bodies, which is the basis for the formulation of social laws, be they deterministic or mathematical. Our problem is now limited to the reality of social laws rather than whether they are causal or otherwise; that historical phenomena are the result of something inherently contained within the system and by the contacts of systems and not the mere flowing of a concatenation of accidents.

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[190] The Decline of the West—Spengler, pp. 28, 118, 119, 138, 141, 390.

[191] Free-Will and Fatalism—Schopenhauer, pp. 68, 70.

[192] The Conquest of Mexico—Prescott, p. 123.

Let us take a closed system, in which Goldenweiser says, events may be either causal or accidental. Let us see if that is so. Sorokin and his associates in their monumental work on rural sociology, tell us of the consequences following the development of the industrial "revolution" in England during the first third of the nineteenth century. Men found themselves gathered about the mine pits drawn from every corner of the country. Housing was wretched; moral conditions were worse. Women and children were torn from the home to work in the slimy depths. "Women were snatched from their domestic duties and children torn from their play; they were forced to seek employment in the coal mines and factories and to become 'hands.' Being thus separated during the long days, the father, mother and child ceased to constitute a family, and the disorganization of this true social unit led to that of the whole population. These social disorders attained their maximum development about 1830." [194]

Now how would Goldenweiser explain those events? The entire life of the nation was being transformed not by the impact of an external system, but by the internal development of their own. The word 'revolution' attached to this process is merely a convenient term, but even so, it was self-created from within the womb of the indigenous society. Steam-power generated by coal was displacing the uncertain power of wind and stream combined with that of the human frame. The workman's individual tool was now part of a machine in whose frame it was firmly held where, perfected and enlarged, it performed prodigious feats of tireless activity.

The frame of the machine itself was being changed from wood to iron, while transmission belts from a centrally located prime-mover endowed the machine, as it were, with perpetual motion. The hours of daily labor were often eighteen, and children of five were frequently employed.

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[193] Quoted from page 30 of Goldenweiser's work—History, Psychology, and Culture (1933).

[194] Source Book In Rural Sociology—Sorokin, Zimmerman, Galpin (1931), Vol. II, p. 83.

What would Goldenweiser say about this system? Was it accidental? The facts of industrial evolutionary development over seventy-five years preceding this period are against him. Would he claim it was the clash of a new system of production against the old within the same national integument? The obvious facts of the evolutionary development are against him, showing that frequently the same entrepreneurs adopted the use of steam power where before they depended upon the power of the elements or upon human power as a source of energy. By no scheme of metaphysical differentiation can he escape the fact that forces generated from within society at the time given, created both the need for modern industry and the means to satisfy that need.

But Goldenweiser must deny that definite forces create definite results within the mechanism of the given system. An external force must be searched for; and that he will never find. The man who denies straight-line evolutionism in sociology, meets with a corroboration of that in history, but finds that he cannot fall back upon a clash of different systems external to each other which he contends are the "yeast" for historical events.

Historical science, like any other, must establish directly the existence of law as controlling in its phenomena. It might be advanced that we have selected, in the above facts of English industrial development, a case admirably suited to our purpose, just as Goldenweiser's appeared to be for his. The reply is, that after our theory of history is formulated, it will be tested by every development of American history and must come through, not merely unscathed, but triumphant, if it is to be accorded the status of a scientific truth. Analogies, as we have observed, while often interesting and sometimes instructive, can never be conclusive.

However, since the "unusualness" of England's industrial history may be urged in mitigation, let us take one from the placid course of early American constitutional development in answer to the point that all historic events are "accidents" caused by the intrusion into a given system of forces external to that system.

PROOF THAT SOCIAL LAW IS DEVELOPED WITHIN THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

Constitutional authorities are agreed that the Charles River Bridge case decided in 1837 marks a significant turn in our national history. Every school boy remembers Webster's grand peroration in the Dartmouth College case which established the inviolability of contracts.

A charter is a contract, and legal contracts cannot be impaired by subsequent enactment of a State, according to a direct provision of the Federal Constitution.[195]

Here are the essential facts in that celebrated cause. In 1640 the Massachusetts Bay Colony granted to Harvard College the right to operate a ferry between Boston and Charlestown. In 1786 it was decided to build a bridge where the ferry was operating. The Massachusetts Legislature granted to a corporation a charter for the purpose of building a bridge, with the power to charge tolls, and the corporation was to pay 200 pounds a year to Harvard College for the loss of its ferry revenue. To this the college consented. The bridge company made enormous profits from this venture due to the growth of population and wealth. Shares originally worth $100 were selling at about $2000.

Meanwhile the city of Boston clamored for additional bridge facilities and a reduction of the tolls. The Legislature empowered a new corporation to build another bridge in the vicinity of the old one. After six years the bridge was to revert to the State. The old bridge corporation's charter privileges had still forty years to run. The whole circuitous scheme, of course, was to freeze out the old toll-gatherers because they had become an intolerable burden on the community by limiting its expansion due to the high tolls, and benefiting by unjust enrichment through their monopoly of a public utility.

Counsel for the company contended that a legislative grant was a contract; that a corporate charter was a contract; that the law must read into the charter an agreement by the State not to grant any other franchise which would diminish the revenue derived from the old franchise. The decision finally rendered was five to two in favor of the State.

"From a constitutional point of view," says Boudin, whose admirable and exhaustive treatise on the constitutional history of the United States supplies the facts for this argument, "the Charles River Bridge case is one of the most important ever decided, because of its direct bearing upon one of the gravest problems then before the people—namely, the question of the development of the country by means of railroads and other public improvements—and because of the fundamental principles of constitutional construction involved therein."[196] This view of the case is firmly upheld by Dean Alfange[197] and grudgingly conceded by Chief Justice Hughes.[198]

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[195] Article One, Section Ten of the United States Constitution.

[196] Government by Judiciary—Boudin (1932), Vol. I, pp. 387-8.

[197] The Supreme Court and the National Will—Alfange (1937), p. 207.

[198] The Supreme Court of the United States—Hughes (1936), pp. 202-3.

It is of moment to note that all the five judges who were ranged behind the protection of the national welfare against private greed were Jackson appointees. In view of the struggle then existing between the canal interests versus the railroad interests, a reversal might have temporarily halted, but it could not have stopped the upsurge of national development. Legislatures, as Hughes points out, found other ways of circumventing the constitutional provision, and while Boudin might over-stress the consequences of that decision, the fact remains that that was the decision.

If supporters of the "accident" theory of history might urge what would have happened if that particular decision had been otherwise, let them be assured that not only the recent history of Franklin D. Roosevelt's contest with the Supreme Court, but the entire history of that tribunal shows that the long-continued judicial tail wagging the national dog is too arduous a task even for the most determined of temporary majorities on that bench.

For our present purposes, the issue whether the Goldenweiser theory of events as due to external accidents upon a given system, or the theory that events are the consequences of happenings caused by movements within the social structure at a given time, must be resolved in favor of the latter. The horse and buggy gave way to the automobile, the privately owned Hudson River ferries to the under-river publicly-owned tunnels and magnificent bridges, and so on in a multitude of cases, all proving that events may be evolutionary, or cataclysmic, may be self-generated or impressed by outside forces, but that in all cases, internal social forces and not accident rules the processes of their operation.

But the concept of strict causality is ruled out by Goldenweiser's theory of closed systems and the "yeast" theory of history. Nor is it necessary to go to the other extreme of asserting predetermination, fatalism, and the other variations of automatism in history. Man himself is a factor in the making of his own history, and none defended this proposition with greater vigor than Marx, that arch-mechanist and determinist, in the opinion of those who never studied his works first-hand.

THE INDIVIDUAL IN RELATION TO SOCIAL LAW; MARX'S VIEWS

Modern writers cannot afford to ignore the classics. We share with the rest a whole-hearted resentment against the unfruitful display of pompous pedantry. But it is the duty of every vigorous thinker to master the outstanding intellectual achievements of his field, regardless of personal predilections; a defect, by the way, of which no scientific thinker can be guilty. Hegel and Marx are the only two men in the field of history who concerned themselves with the analysis of the internal laws of historic motion. In our judgment no further progress in that field can be made unless their theories are subjected to critical analysis in the light of all that has transpired since their time. If a thinker of John Dewey's rank relies upon his conception of Marxian economics upon the inanities of a Maurice William, perhaps Goldenweiser cannot be too severly censured for relying upon the products of the professoriate rather than of Marx himself for his ideas of what Marx taught on the role of the individual in society.

Referring to Durkheim's theory that social facts were things that descended upon the individual like the objective facts of nature and worked through him, unconsciously, but irresistibly, Goldenweiser continues: "The theoretical position of the Marxians pointed in the same general direction. To them the individual was nothing, society all. The individual may will, aspire, think, but he is a fragile shell tossed about by the mighty current of social forces. Causally he counts not at all. Individuals pass, culture persists. Individuals dream, while culture, society, does the work of history. In all this, there was, of course, much exaggeration, but as an antidote to the confident individualism of the classical anthropologists, Marxian social determinism performed a useful service."

One finds difficulty in characterizing these ideas which are seriously set forth as Marxian doctrine by a recognized scholar. It is not even a clumsy caricature; it is a gross intellectual abortion. The whole of Marx's work teaches the direct contrary. The least theoretical and easiest read portions of volume one of Capital, which therefore brings it within the intellectual range of even the professoriate, is a burning protest against the ruthless exploitation of the worker and a glorification of his active, effective protest against the abominations of the existing social order. Man is not an automaton who merely registers the impress of the external conditions. Man himself by appropriate action becomes one of the most determinate factors in the shaping of the existing society and in the molding of its future pattern.

If Marx taught one single thing it was that the individual lives in society as an integral part of the social structure; that within this structure he bears a social relation fundamentally determined by the relations of production; that this material basis establishes certain ideological forms wherein men become conscious of definite social antagonisms and deliberately go about the task of improving their conditions. Marx protests against this conception of 'society' as a category distinct from the individuals who compose it.[199] The social organization always has a definite form at a given time. This form is determined by the internal relations then existing, and the varied modes of the internal human reactions within society give ample evidence of the importance Marx attached to the workers' conscious determination to improve their status and the means best adapted for accomplishing that end. The very organization of the First International by Marx, and the Second by his collaborator Engels, are sufficient proof, if any were needed, of the role Marx assigned to man himself in the making of his own history. It is absurd to present any quotations in support of this thesis, for the whole of Marx's life-work is one immense quotation on this score. No one contends that Marx wrote the last word in social science. But patently it is incumbent upon men who lay claim to the dignity of scholarship to know what his words were, particularly when they feel called upon to criticize them.

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[199] Critique of Political Economy—Marx, pp. 292-3.

THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF EVENTS IN HISTORY

Without the knowledge of the laws of social motion a science of history is impossible. But these laws must develop out of the social relations existing at a given historical time. Consequently the social forms created by each historical era, epoch and period must be subjected to the analysis of the fundamental basis upon which they are constituted. The social forms of Greece and Rome differ from medieval society as those of modern capitalism differ from both. Yet they have many things in common, and it is this common nexus between modern man and his progenitors which makes it possible for us to form definite conceptions of prior types of social organizations. When definite types of social organizations limited as to time and place are denied, or what amounts to the same thing, are not recognized, then the possibility of law in history is displaced by shrewd guesses, and the artistic idiosyncrasies of the individual historian take the place of the impersonal calculations of the scientific method, which as we saw before, need not necessarily be dull, lifeless and uninspired.

It is not, therefore, surprising when Kroeber in his "Eighteen Professions" [200] on history, sociology and anthropology, having denied in his first profession of faith the distinctive nature of the social organization peculiar to a definite type of civilization, finds himself professing in the concluding article of his catechism, the impossibility of historical science due to the absence of historical law.

Kroeber's first pontifical profession is: "The aim of history is to know the relations of social facts to the whole of civilization." There

[200] Eighteen Professions—Kroeber in American Anthropologist, Vol. XVII, pp. 283-8.

is no such fanciful relation. The facts of history are evolved from definite relations at a definite time and place. Everybody admits that Hitler and the corner grocer in a general way are part of the same order of things as is the remotest inhabitant of the most insignificant South Seas Island.

It is not the function of the historian to weave weird concoctions out of speculative connections. The historian closest approaches the scientific method when he can explain rationally the role of Hitler in the midst of the world situation where he plays so significant a role; nor could he successfully negotiate that task without analyzing in detail the complex of social relations and the social forces arising therefrom to explain the historical facts surrounding Hitler and within which he perforce must limit his actions and be limited in turn by their reactions.

Profession number two of Kroeber states: "The material studied by history is not man, but his works." How one can differentiate between the two so that he can study the one without the other is a feat Kroeber himself did not negotiate, nor is it possible of achievement. Point number three is: "Civilization though carried by men and existing through them is an entity in itself, and of another order from life." He never took the trouble to establish the nature of this disembodied civilization which uses men merely as its carrier, instead of being the creation of men transmitted through their culture to their successors and undergoing modifications dictated by the material and ideological needs of the transmitters.

It would be futile to go through the entire list of Kroeber's encyclical issued with the tone of apodictic finality usually associated with papal bulls. We will briefly refer to the last four of the Professions. Number fifteen states: "There are no laws in history similar to the laws of physico-chemical science." Neither would the physical and chemical sciences have reached their present state of perfection if the workers in those fields went about their task with the same eighteen-layer bandage that the Professions would tie about the eyes of the historian.

Number sixteen: "History deals with conditions sine qua non, not with causes." The Washington public buildings housing the governmental archives consequently possess the most complete, if not the most lucid nor digestible compilation of data relative to the conditions sine qua non. "The causality of history is teleological." This mumbo-jumbo of medieval phraseology connecting causality with purpose in history is another evidence of that professorial phenomenon, where the body moves and breathes in the twentieth century, while the mind is five hundred years behind its time.

No modern thinker associates historic causality with a thing "in itself" but in association with a host of other things contemporaneous in time and place, and in which the causal element itself becomes the effect of its successor in time. Purpose in history will be discussed fully later, but for the present it is sufficient to remark that purpose pertains to man and not to nature. That there are definite tendencies in history even Goldenweiser, to whom accident is the sine qua non of events, is willing to concede. The appreciation of historic tendencies is the consequence of the operation of social movements observed in the external world and not the result of speculations concerning the world to come.

SOCIOLOGY DEALS WITH SOCIAL STRUCTURE, HISTORY WITH SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Historical problems appear to escape the methodology developed by modern sociology, which takes the results as they are observed and then begins to reason back for valid explanations of the phenomena under consideration. History must proceed in the reverse process. In order to understand the facts of contemporary life, history must go back a sufficient distance to get the feel of their origins and connections, trace them forward to the present time, search for the effective forces underlying events and establish, if possible, the law, or mode, of their operation.

Sorokin is a sociologist primarily, and incidentally essays a fling at the problems of history. In a recent discussion at Duke University on current affairs he laid down the following postulate: "In the field of social relationships the nineteenth century witnessed on both sides of the Atlantic a decline of familistic and compulsory relationships in all fields of social life in favor of contractual relationships. Since the war period on both continents we observe a decline of contractual relationships in favor of partly compulsory and partly familistic relationships. This formula is accurate."[201] A formula may be theoretically accurate, but still not true to life, nor offer a clue to the proper understanding of the historical phenomena under investigation.

Sorokin must first establish that the rise of contractual relationships and the decline of the familistic and compulsory relationships is the distinctive characteristic of the nineteenth century. For he contends: "The post-war period is marked on both continents by a profound crisis of contractualism. This decline of contractualism has shown itself on both continents, first in the crisis of capitalism, and second, in a decline of the individualistic Weltanschauung generally, and in economic life particularly. The wide diffusion of the philosophies of collectivism, communism, socialism, the corporate state, and racial collectivity is but another aspect of this crisis of individualism. This decline of contractualism has become apparent in an expansion of governmental control and regimentation on both continents." [202] One can accept Sorokin's analysis of existing society as tending to collectivism of some sort, while taking very serious exception to the decisive reason he ascribes for this development, namely, the decline of contractualism.

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[201] A Century of Social Thought—Duke University (1939), Lecture by P. A. Sorokin on Socio-Cultural Trends in Euro-American Culture During the Last Hundred Years, pp. 100-1.

Offhand, one might be inclined to say why quarrel about the cause if you are agreed upon the facts? That is the typical pragmatist attitude. The facts themselves cannot be understood unless we know what brought those facts into existence. Unless we get a clear conception of the social forces which produced them, we will not be in a position to do anything about those facts, or be limited to forming purely empirical judgments concerning them and then wait for time to see whether or not they are correct.

SOROKIN'S SOCIOLOGY AS RELATED TO HISTORICAL TENDENCIES

Contractualism, contends Sorokin, signified a growth of individualism generally. "As each citizen was assumed to be free and equal to the others in the contractual system, the nineteenth century was to a great extent the age of moral, social, economic and political individualism." [203] Sorokin knows as well as anyone that this equality was a moral, social, economic and political fiction. Fictions play a vital role in social life, and as such, are themselves part of the realities of existence. But that is the only recognition the historian should accord them. It would be the height of absurdity for himself to believe his own fictions and construct systems of social thought upon a fictional basis.

That is exactly what Sorokin has done. He defines contractual relationships as follows: "In the economic field the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the capitalistic system on both continents. The capitalistic system is but a contractual system of economic relationship between the parties involved. In contradistinction to a compulsory slavery or serfdom system, or the system of relationship of the members of one family, the capitalistic system rests upon a contract between the free parties, employer and employees. In this contract both parties agree, one to perform certain services, the other to pay a certain wage for them." [204]

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[202] Ibid., pp. 102-3.

[203] Socio-Cultural Trends—Sorokin, Duke University (1939), p. 102.

The superiority of the capitalist mode of production, Sorokin argues, resulted in the liquidation of other economies, in Europe and America, such as serfdom, slavery, the plantation system, the patriarchal and other coercive systems. Likewise capitalism brought in its wake free trade, laissez-faire, economic liberty, economic and social individualism, and a host of other consequences of triumphant contractualism. The standard of living was raised. In the 'overripe stage of capitalism' the trust and corporation was fully developed. "In the political field the growth of contractualism has led to the well-known phenomenon of replacement of the partly patriarchal, partly coercive autocratic regimes by the democratic political systems, with the government contractually elected, contractually limited in its power, and contractually obliged to respect the inalienable rights of man and citizen, his liberties, his equalities and his individualism." [205]

Then came the World War cataclysm. The post-war period saw the expansion of governmental power. Hundreds of economic, social and other relationships that in the nineteenth century were left to the decision of the individual are now compulsorily regulated by the government, Sorokin argues. The governmental bureaucrat is replacing more and more the free entrepreneur of the past. Business is being regimented. Obligatory regulations are being imposed upon every agent of the economic process. Various forms of collectivist philosophy are the official expressions of various forms of centrally intrenched government powers.

The impression left after reading Sorokin's essay is akin to that created by Herbert Spencer in his "Coming Slavery" of almost fifty years ago. Certain overwhelming social forces are at work, and while they are to be deprecated and condemned by all right-thinking men, still these are the necessary consequences of evolution and nothing much can be done about it. Sorokin goes a step further than the irascible Spencer and leaves a mere trace of a suggestion that perhaps it is for the best, though a distinct nostalgia for the blessings of nineteenth century contractualism is evident in his thinking.

Sorokin's entire social philosophy is gauged to the following propositions: Capitalism, based on the free agreement of the contracting parties, was the dominant economic philosophy of the nineteenth century. Freedom, individualism and competition resulted in a tremendous social development. Corporations and trusts marked the apogee of its economic processes and ushered in the period of its decline and decay.

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[204] Socio-Cultural Trends—Sorokin, p. 101.

[205] Socio-Cultural Trends—Sorokin, pp. 101-2.

To-day, Sorokin points out, we witness parallel political processes. We are viewing a great crisis of individualism and growing governmental control and regimentation in vital aspects of our economic, political and social life. Contractualism is succumbing before collectivism. Naturally this philosophy adds fuel to those who are determined to maintain a while longer the passing order. Its apparent objectivity and lack of emotionalism confirms the opinion of the uncritical as to its scientific validity. Since not all are fatalists or college professors who are resigned to the inevitable, powerful conservative social elements seize upon this analysis to support their program, in opposition to the collectivist trend.

Reactionaries assume a more positive position; they are determined to go back to the halcyon days of contractualism and business as usual. The romanticists sigh heavenward and bleat plaintively for the days when a gentleman was a gentleman, and art, poetry, music and literature was preserved to the classes for whom God in His Infinite Wisdom had reserved them. That is why the working classes and the leisure classes were created, in the enlightened view of the president of Columbia University,[206] as recent as 1940.

D. Defects in Sociological Approach to History

Now we will establish, first, that Sorokin's fundamental assumption of contractualism is wrong; second, that this error must vitiate his judgment as to the character of social trends; third, that his pessimism not only is unwarranted, but that on the contrary society is on the eve of the most important advance since the Magna Charta; and lastly, which affects our immediate inquiry most deeply, that the sociological approach to historical phenomena must yield to the methods of the science of history which this work desires to establish.

As to the first point, Sorokin's basic thesis is: Contractualism is the essence of nineteenth century capitalism. This is wrong, basically and fundamentally wrong. The essence of capitalism is the profit motive; its mainspring is the average rate of profit; and the driving power of it internal mechanism are the laws which determine, regulate and control the division of the gross profit into the categories of interest, rent and profit of enterprise.

All else is incidental thereto. Production is incidental; circulation is incidental; financing is incidental; contracts are incidental. The nature of the contractual relationship is established by the mode of production, but the contractual relationship is neither the decisive nor the distinctive element of that mode of economy.

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[206] Address by Nicholas Murray Butler; reported in The New York Times, Sept. 26, 1940.

Contracts were not foreign to Graeco-Roman civilization nor to the Middle Ages. The legal title to the product of labor was regulated by contractual forms distinctive to each system of social organization. The impelling, the motivating impulse of capitalism is profits, and if the process of profit-making can be shortened by reducing the cycle of production—circulation—reproduction to its most abbreviated form, the mere advance of money and the mere return of money plus an increment, without undergoing the trouble and risk of the productive cycle, the most powerful elements of the capitalist class will gravitate toward that field.

That is actually the case. Finance-capital indicates the parasitism of those who nurture from it. The money—capital of the entrepreneur is now the finance-capital of the banker. The distinction is of tremendous economic, and therefore of historic, significance. Technological advances require enormous outlays of constant capital far beyond the individual's means. The very reasons which make Henry Ford an outstanding exception prove this point conclusively. Recourse must then be had to group capital or partnerships. Even that is not sufficient. Associated, or corporate capital comes on the scene.

Gradually there springs up a differentiation between management and ownership; finance itself becomes a preponderant power, and cuts itself off from immediate concern with management. In time, with accumulation of vast reservoirs of capital through banking, savings and concentration of resources, finance capital itself assumes the directing influence. Control now becomes an all-important problem; control not for bigger and better things, but control for greater profit-making for those on the inside.

This is not the place for proving the point. Sorokin would probably concede this without further argument. Finance capital finds itself equally at home in copper as in bananas, steel and diaper-pins, coal, shoe-laces, bibles, gunpowder and milady's perfume. It is not unusual for these diverse products and more to be under the control of a single group. Those who stand in relation to money-capital as mere possessors of claims to revenues, and of course, legal title to ownership become a parasitic class in society so long as they derive the major part of their income from that relationship, and are under no necessity to contribute socially creative labor in values.

We notice a gleam in Sorokin's eye. "That is all very true," he says, figuratively of course, "but each and every one of the relations of capital are of a contractual nature." The contract is incidental, the profit the essential element. Contracts are reneged, violated, gotten around, but there is one thing which capitalism cannot get away from, the necessity for profit-making. Business may have to be carried on without profits, one, two, or more years; but business will not be carried on, cannot be carried on, indefinitely without profits.

Sometimes contracts are in the way; then the capitalist managers will sit down and in a very practical way consider which course is most advantageous, to continue or to surrender. Business is carried on even without contracts, express or implied, or in violation of contracts; business is gotten by every crooked and anti-social means which human ingenuity can devise and of which our court records now present a bountiful store; yet again the essence of capitalism is profits, not contracts.

CONFUSING THE FORM WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF CAPITAL-LABOR RELATIONS

When it comes to the human relations of capitalist economy, Sorokin's case is even more hopeless. Surely he cannot seriously press the formal relations of capital and labor as representative of the actual relations. Must one at this late stage of capitalism's history have to prove again the thoroughly hypocritical and philistine nature of labor's "freedom of contract?" Only in the law books and in the courts of justice is the laborer supposed to meet his employer eye to eye, and bargain in full view at arms length, and after the haggling of the market, "both parties agree, one to perform certain services, the other to pay a certain wage for them." [207]

We said only in the law-book and in courts of justice can that false, inhuman and hypocritical doctrine of labor's freedom of contract be found. That statement should be amended to read also in the sociologist's idea of what is contained in the latest pronouncement on substantive law. Since the United States Supreme Court laid down the doctrine of the law in its decision on the Wagner Labor Relations Act in 1937, the contractual relations theory of capital and labor finds solemn expression only in the work of a modern sociologist in the year 1939 A. D.

What an ironic commentary upon the intellectual and moral fibre of our professoriate when an outstanding leader among it could seriously assert as gospel truth an axiom which Chief Justice Hughes had painstakingly overthrown two years before! Speaking for the court in that decision, Hughes said: "Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wages for the maintenance of himself and his family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employer and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give labor opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer. . . . We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum."[208]

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[207] Quoted above from p. 101 of Sorokin's essay on Socio-Cultural Trends in a Century of Social Thought.

Where the Supreme Court refuses any longer to shut its eyes, the professor remains adamant in closing his mind to the plainest realities of contemporary existence in support of a purely intellectual concoction called contractualism. All lost would be the painful story of labor's struggle for over a century to replace a tragic legal fiction by the solemn fact that hunger and privation do not meet on an equal contractual relationship with capital. Not only was the power of capital ranged against the seller of labor-power, but behind it the voice of respectability, of authority and morality, with the curse of God invoked by his earthly vice-gerents upon those outlaws who would call into question an order of things established by Divine Will, sustained by Divine Grace, and concurred in by brilliant, modern sociologists.

We will not dwell upon the power of the state which at first was ranged against labor and attracted toward capital with that instinctive, natural affinity which won for it the designation of the capitalist state, and constituted for Marx one of the few major errors of that great intellect in his appraisal of the nature of the democratic state.

Who does not remember how labor unions were outlawed, strikes declared illegal conspiracies, its leaders jailed, its funds raided, while labor was spied upon and fired upon, and the anti-trust law firmly invoked, ironically enough, against the combination of labor for its self-protection where it was intended to be used against the unlawful combination in anti-social combinations in restraint of trade.

At the very moment when this complacent Harvard professor was unbosoming his thesis of labor's blessed contractual freedom under capitalism, labor's right of collective bargaining was being bitterly assailed in the courts, and undermined in the industries through the insidious device of company unions. While the distinguished savant was stating pontifically: "This formula is accurate," amidst the pleasant surroundings of the South's Duke University, this very formula was being torn to pieces in the South's bitter struggle against the twenty-five cents an hour minimum wage for its industrial workers.

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[208] Decision reported in full in the New York Times of April 13, 1937.

O blessed freedom of contract! How often was it invoked successfully by the employer against the widow and her orphans to defeat a just claim for compensation liability. Then indeed were trotted out in full legal panoply those famous four horsemen—Contributory Negligence, Assumed Risk, Fellow-Servant Fault, and the last, Stark Hunger. When the injustices of that creed rose to high heaven and was finally deflected to move the hearts of legislators, Sorokin's predecessors were invoking the doctrine of laissez-faire and praising God for the blessings of the freedom of contract.

That right never existed for labor.

Following out his theory of contractualism, Sorokin must in all consistency apply it to the problem of the state. The government is contractually elected, it powers contractually limited, and the inalienable rights of man contractually guaranteed. One pauses in astonishment, uncertain whether to marvel more at the simplicity or the gullibility of human nature. Here is a problem of government and popular rights which have absorbed the best brains of mankind for over two hundred years, and all is settled so simply and so sweetly by the ingenious theory of contractualism.

Or is it? Does not that theory of contractual rights have a familiar ring? It lacks little to two hundred years since Rousseau published his Social Contract. Our bright modernists will curl their lips at the comparison of a profound 1939 Harvard product with the speculative theories of the middle eighteenth century. For our part those earlier speculative theories stood on an infinitely higher plane and redounded to the greater glory of their promulgator. Rousseau's theory at least made history. The modern product is simply synthetic in nature, an improvisation for an occasion, and essentially apologetic in spirit.

A contract must be specific as to terms. Its provisions must be enforceable, and power must be had to enforce it. The power of the masses to enforce their rights in the early days of capitalism was nonexistent. Labor itself was a minority in the nineteenth-century United States. Political combinations with the agricultural West and alliances with the slave-holding South were temporary and its aims dictated by common, if evanescent, hates rather than by material affirmations. The laboring class then was practically disfranchised.

The government at first was placed out of direct popular control. Many of the reforms since effected were extra-constitutional, such as the popular influence, whatever it is to-day, over the selection of the Presidential candidate which, in the early days, was the function of the Congressional party caucuses. The entire history of our constitutional development proves that the 'inalienable rights of man' were an amorphous thing, as were his liberties, his equalities and his individualism.

The theory of the state itself is the result of an evolutionary process, tempered, as Jefferson observed, by rebellion and bloodshed.[209] The idea advanced that the government was contractually elected, meaning of course, in accordance with legal provisions therefor, and that the citizens scanned with jealous eye the actions of their agents, and visited sure condign electoral punishment upon their unfaithful servants, is a tale either for the nursery room, or the professorial lecture hall.

Sorokin is very careful to caution his hearers that the freedom and equality guaranteed by the contractual system is the result of the social relationship ushered in by capitalism, "in spite of fairly frequent assertions that American individualism is the product of the frontier and the pioneering spirit." [210] In this pompous fashion the Harvard professor makes plain that he failed to grasp the significance of the frontier in American life, just as the processes of its economy and the nature of its institutional development are beyond his ken.[211] Thus splendidly equipped, Sorokin is the ideal man to prescribe nostrums for our present social ills, and make sure-fire prognostications as to the nation's future course.

LIMITATION OF FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION IN ABSENCE OF LAW

It should be axiomatic that it is impossible to understand the course of contemporary events unless we understand how they came into being. Those who deny the possibility of their analysis must have recourse to pragmatical, empirical or observational operations, and not a few rely on hunches. Sorokin, however, is a scientist, and must establish a relation between the present and the forces which brought it into existence.

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[209] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, p. 141; Jefferson's reference is to Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786.

[210] Socio-Cultural Trends—Sorokin, p. 102.

[211] America In Mid-Passage—Beard (1939), p. 900.

Everyone, including those who oppose crude economic determinism as the motivating element in modern society, must concede the overwhelming influence of capitalist economy since the dawn of the nineteenth century. But it is a far cry from recognizing a fact and understanding its internal articulations and manner of operation. A non-technical observer can describe most accurately a locomotive as he views it without having the slightest idea of how its power is generated and transmitted. Unless one understands thoroughly the laws of motion of capitalist economy one cannot grasp the significance of the events, let us say, from the Treaty of Versailles to the German invasion of Poland. The wide diffusion of the philosophies of collectivism, communism, socialism, the corporate state and racialism is not, as Sorokin asserts, the result of the crisis and decline of individualism. The very opposite is the fact. It is the inchoate, instinctive and unconscious struggle of individualism to survive in a complex social mechanism, wherein it is entrapped and frustrates all efforts to reach a much higher stage of development through collective effort.

Straight-line evolutionists like Spencer cannot conceive how that is possible. Only those who understand the laws of internal social action which even Adam Smith perceived in his Wealth of Nations before Hegel, can grasp the fact that the fuller development of the individual in all his aspects, material, moral, spiritual, esthetic not only is not inhibited by rational collectivism, but is conditioned by it.

By rational collectivism we mean that form of constructive collective effort which rises from within the womb of society itself, and is based on the thorough understanding of the processes of social evolution consciously undertaken by organized social groups.

It is an anomaly, though not so strange on second thought, that the bitterest opponents of the Feuhrer-principle in political effort, as exemplified by Hitler and Mussolini, should be the stanchest supporters of the leadership principle in economic activity, as represented by Morgan, Ford and Kaiser. They assert firmly that political problems are a social product and must be socially dealt with, yet with equal firmness they contend that economic forces are a product of individual genius and therefore should be left to individual control. Indeed, that has been the policy up to now.

Too much in human welfare is at stake to allow the easy off-hand gesture that everything could be settled for the world if it would only choose between contractualism and collectivism. All that it is appropriate to state at this point is that Sorokin's conclusion that modern society must choose between collectivism with its governmental bureaucracy, regimentation, and individual automatism, or return to contractualism with its glorious formal liberties and equalities, is not a correct representation of the realities. The political liberty of the individual is an ideal not yet fully realized even in the United States to-day for vast masses of our population.

As to economic freedom, the growth of trusts and corporations was not the result of individual malevolism but the inevitable consequences of the laws of capitalist economy driving toward concentration and centralization in basic industries. Without an understanding of the economics of capitalism it is impossible to unravel the politics of its imperialistic era, nor can the present world situation be rationally analyzed upon the basis of its existent institutions.

Sorokin can see only contractualism and progress as against collectivism and stagnation. We will establish irrefutably that collectivism itself is the result of capitalist development; that economics and politics are equally social in origin, and can be made either constructive or devastating forces; and that this is dependent, first upon our knowledge of these social forces, and secondly upon whether society is to be dominated by forces of its own creation, or is to direct those forces in accordance with its collective will. Our aim will be to prove not only that collectivism is not necessarily opposed to individualism, but that only through democratic collectivism is it possible for the individual existing in a social milieu to realize the fullest capacity of his being, and attain the noblest aspirations of his spiritual longings.

Our chief purpose in the analysis of Sorokin's main thesis was to indicate the fallacies in his sociological approach to history. The science of sociology fundamentally concerns itself with the social structure, and its morphology. The science of history must concern itself with social movement and the laws of that motion. Obviously no hard-and-fast demarcation is possible between the two, nor is one necessary. Form and function are mutually inter-dependent. One modifies, and in turn is modified by the other. But the method of approach in both fields is radically different. Dynamics is as vital to sociology as structure is to history; nevertheless sociology must begin with the facts of existence, whereas the starting point of history must always be the events of a process definitely limited in the orbit of its movement.

Some great climactic event like the American or the French Revolution may be the end result of a long sociological process, yet the unraveling of its results or inner meaning must fall within the scope of history. If sociology undertakes that task it becomes history. When the long-time trend of historical processes is considered, then it tends to become sociology. Marx's work, regardless of one's judgment concerning its intrinsic merits, will always remain an ideal in its masterful combination of philosophy, political economy, history and sociology—the laws of thought, the laws of economic movement, the laws of historical movement, and the laws of social organization.

It will be noted that Marx differentiates between the laws of political economy and those of historical movement. Our economic determinist school of history cannot lay the paternity of their fatuous dogma at Marx's doorstep, for if Marx is anything, he is dialectical, which rules out straight-line theorizing in all its aspects.

Sorokin begins with the assumption: Society in the nineteenth century was dominated by laissez-faire capitalism, whereas modern capitalist society is being squeezed to the wall by collectivism in its various manifestations. Taking into consideration what is happening in Germany, Stalinist Russia, Italy—and certain opponents of Roosevelt would add the United States—the conclusion seems obvious: Let us go back to contractualism.

What J. P. Morgan, the elder, once said about trust-busting,—there is no unscrambling of an omelette—applies with equal force to other aspects of social development. Here Sorokin, the twentieth century scientist resorts to methods of reasoning which would do honor to the most obscure obscurantist of medieval days. In place of subjective rationalization we are entitled in this day and age to get clear-cut analyses of the actual movements within society.

The early capitalist supporters of Hitler have long since paid the penalty of assuming that Time's Arrow could be turned backward to the halcyon days of free and unrestricted capitalism. Hugenberg the movie magnate has joined Thyssen, the Ruhr Valley industrialist, in the more salubrious climate of France and Switzerland[212] in search of that ease which their own Frankenstein had once promised them. Sorokin points to the elysium of early contractualism. He is really opening the door invitingly toward Fascism. There is no going back in history.

AMERICAN HISTORY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SOCIOLOGY

That the sociological approach to society must be descriptive rather than historical Sorokin must concede in the great work on rural sociology of which he is the principal architect and for which he assumes responsibility.[213] "Since sociology," says he, "is interested primarily in the differences that are general in space and relatively constant in time—that is, those that appear in a more or less conspicuous form in the past and in the present, and in all the rural and the urban social worlds (Egypt, Assyria, Greece, Rome, Europe, America, etc.)—we shall take only the differential variables that correspond to these requirements. In other words, those variables that we study are typical not only for this or that particular city and its nearly rural aggregate, but for the city and the country generally whenever and wherever they occur." [214]

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[212] New York Times, Dec. 6, 1939.

[213] Systematic Source Book In Rural Sociology—Sorokin, Zimmerman, Galpin, Vol. I, p. X, published by University of Minnesota.

The historian must consider carefully the social setting of his phenomena in time and place. A bushel of wheat of a given grade is for practical purposes the same the world over. Historically it makes all the difference in the world whether it is produced by a Hindu ryot, a French peasant, an American farmer or on a Russian collective. There is a definite relation between the economy and the state of a given social structure. If one is willing to disregard these all-important social differences—whether production is carried on in a Hindu commune cursed by caste; or by a sturdy French landowner passionately republican because economically identified with the forces that crushed feudalism; or by the harried, surplus-cursed independent American farmer now a minion, in the eyes of anti-New Dealers, of the Washington bureaucracy; or by the Russian collectivized peasants who are made to like it by their unanimous vote in the local soviet—if one is ready to discount all that, then innumerable agreements will be found in their mode of life on the soil, which is regulated for all by the processes of Nature.

Yet history must disregard these likenesses. Sorokin and his associates complain that recent American rural sociologists have used the quantitative method almost exclusively in describing social phenomena.[215] Their aim is to measure and interpret.[216] But measurement implies a morphological identity and interpretation requires a theory of history.

There is no morphological identity in the indiscriminate lumping of nations, continents and civilizations of the most varied and diverse character. At best such a work must be factual and descriptive. Its dynamic aspects must deal with general human characteristics common to all ages and civilizations. Once they enter upon the why and wherefore of Hindu, French, American or Russian rural life, they could not go very far without recognizing the need of a valid theory or method of interpreting history which would present a rational explanation for the origin of the data employed by sociology.

Such a method Sorokin and his associates are perforce compelled to develop. And what is it? The very quantitative methods they had previously condemned. Take, for example, their discussion of tenant agriculture, farm ownership, and concentration of farms. Statistics are important, but in themselves they mean little.[217] Everything depends on interpretation. But to interpret agricultural statistics they must be read in connection with the entire national setting, and even the international set-up. That demands a scientifically valid method of historical interpretation, and this the authors have not developed.

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[214] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 186-7.

[215] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. II, p. V.

[216] Ibid., Vol. III, p. V.

To point out that 1,200,000,000 out of the total of our earth's inhabitants numbering 1,700,000,000 still obtain their living by means of agriculture [218] has little significance in the interpretation of history to-day. It is not numbers, but their specific gravity in the determination of events that decides the issue. It is not the rural but the urban population that rules the world to-day; and of the urban, a mere handful, figuratively speaking, compared to the world's total number.

The same principle applies in the interpretation of farm statistics. Some crumbs of comfort may be obtained from the fact that during the post-war period the agrarian tendency in some countries has been toward the breaking up of large estates; [219] or that the ratio of increase of tenant farming has declined a trifle,[220] or that the concentration of farms over one hundred acres is practically stationary over a period of twenty-five years.[221] All these are, and must remain important in the determination of an agricultural policy.

Yet it would be absurd to minimize the fact that industry's specific gravity in modern society has increased tremendously during the same past twenty-five years, and for the similar period preceding, and will continue to do so until, as these writers are compelled to admit, the future of the agricultural class is in a "rurbanized" society.[222] This is a new form of civilization now developing through the automobile, good roads, the radio, electricity and the mechanization of the farm which is bringing industry to the farm; while the effective decentralization of industry itself is a phenomenon of only the past twenty years, and, under a favorable social organization must revolutionize life as we now know it.

All that sociologists can give us are the facts, and the general, but necessarily superficial, conclusions which any inquiring mind must draw from them. But when it comes to the analysis of the reasons for this important social transformation, they fall back upon the makeshift theory of historical cycles.[223] Since in the following chapter this 'cycle theory of history' will be considered, it is sufficient at

[217] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. I, pp. 370-396.

[218] Ibid., Vol. III, p. 644.

[219] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 376.

[220] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 380.

[221] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 382-3.

[222] Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 642-9.

[223] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 370-6.

this point to state that they cite the facts, but are unable to show an internal relationship within the various social forms which produced those facts.

"A bird's-eye view of the history of many societies," they state, "especially those which have lived for a long period shows the existence of long-time cycles in which a wave of concentration of land (and consequently a growth of social stratification is replaced by a wave of deconcentration and a decrease of stratification), to be superseded by a new wave of concentration." [224] This merely factual description is about as informative as the statement that beggars eat when they can, and starve when they must, and this periodic wave of nutrition varies with the concentration or deconcentration of their food supply.

Sorokin and his associates go into vast detail concerning these cycles in the past and in the present; in ancient China and modern Europe, in Rome, Byzantine, and after the First World War. It is truly amazing how land-hungry peasants grab the land while the grabbing is good, and relinquish it to superior force when they have no other choice. Thus all history can be explained by this mysterious winding of the record about some cyclical process. Who will be heard to protest that modern economy is not similarly characterized by the business cycle? Thus all history is made clear. Everything is resolved by the phrase of waves and cycles.

This glaring illustration of the inherent deficiency of the sociological approach to history is made clear by these authors' analyses of the role of the city and the state. "When the cities were so much differentiated from the country that they became abodes of a permanently settled population, such early cities were economically consumption cities: they fed themselves at the cost of the rural population and did not give back an economic equivalent for the supplies taken from the country. These supplies were taken from the rural population in the form of taxes, levies, military booty, and similar duties, and they were collected by the agents of kings, princes, conquerors, religious bodies, landlords settled in the city, and other 'city-builders' and 'city-fillers.' These and similar sources furnished the subsistence basis of early Oriental and medieval cities. On this point all the competent investigators seem to be in substantial agreement." [225] Competent investigators, of course, are those who agree with you; all others are consigned to the outer darkness.

Grote may or may not be a competent authority, but his story about the early Greek cities does not show them as a band of parasites who lived by exploiting and plundering the country-side.[226] Bury emphasizes rather consanguinity and desire for protection.[227] One can well see how writers on rural sociology for a rural college dominated by rural trustees may even in this day and age repeat the physiocratic theory that city dwellers consistently live by exploiting agriculture, since all wealth in the final analysis comes from the land.

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[224] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. I, p. 370.

[225] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. I, pp. 150-1.

In the quotation above we have the bold assertion that the early cities fed themselves at the cost of the rural population and gave nothing in return. This is not the fact, Sorokin and his competent authorities notwithstanding. From the very earliest times we read of a regular inter-change of commodities between the producers of the city and those of the country. True, the country was exploited by means of taxation, military exaction, religious contributions and the like. But so were the mass of city inhabitants. Complaints against heavy taxation by city dwellers are as ancient as the collection of taxes themselves. There is no class struggle between town and country. There exists, decidedly, at the stage of development of which Sorokin and his associates write, a class struggle between the dominant powers within the state, the landlords, slave-holders and their appendages and the masses of the population, rural and urban.

It is truly astonishing how in the year 1931 A. D. when volume two of the Source Book appeared, men who lay claim to the scientific spirit could adopt the tone of some petty rural demagogues in their blasts against the iniquity of the city and in extolling the virtue of the rural community.[228] Again differences of civilization, culture, and periods in history are brushed aside in a grandiloquent sweep of the historic scene from Asia, Greece, Rome and South Carolina.

They feel called upon to defend the rural community against the charge that they are morbidly the centers of reaction. No such defense is necessary. Competent investigators as well as the incompetent members of the fraternity are agreed that there is nothing inherent in the rural nature which makes it habitually prefer a half a loaf when the whole is within reach, or to bend the neck beneath the yoke when they could just as well sit at ease in the comfort of their dwellings. The supporters of the "industrial proletariat" have sought earnestly, though ineffectually, the hand of their rural brothers. Often it was turned against them at the behest of the strongly entrenched nobility and the landlord class. Often also, as in the era of Jacksonian democracy, the rural West and South united with the city masses against their common exploiters. The Russian

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[226] History of Greece—Grote, Vol. II, pp. 257-61.

[227] History of Greece—Bury, p. 48.

[228] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. II, pp. 571-6.

Revolution during its glorious days was carried through by the exultant fusion of peasants' and workers' soviets.

The anxiety of those authors to remove the stigma of reaction from the rural element proves only one thing—their inability to perceive the true basis of class cleavage, and to recognize the origin of the vital spark in the course of historical development during the various epochs of our civilization. The American Revolution was carried through by independent farmers. They feel called upon to deny the degradation of the rural proletariat.[229] No responsible person seriously asserts it. They go to some trouble in disproving the theorem that "progress" is associated with urbanization and republicanism, and feel quite proud in their proof that monarchical England, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark can compare with such republics as the United States, Germany, France and China.

It is all carrying coal to Newcastle. When it comes to a real problem in history like the relative role of the city and rural communities in the Middle Ages, they get lost in typical medieval obfuscation. They indulge in polemics against city exploitation,[230] against the mass of parasitic cities, like governmental seats in the smaller centers, the residences of bishops, archbishops, counts, duces, margraves, dukes and kings.[231] Starting out with their laudable "rural interpretation of history" which they must uphold, like Don Quixote, against all comers, they cannot perceive that not all cities of the Middle Ages, but principally the commercial and industrial cities,[232] lent themselves toward the creation of that burgher class which eventually, with their allies, encompassed the destruction of the feudal class.

Nor is it surprising that having started out with rural glasses atop their noses everything they see has a rural aspect. The real marvel is that this sort of thing is accepted as the latest word in the science of sociology and as an invaluable aid toward the clarification of history.

The limit of endurance, perhaps, is reached in their theory of currency and territorial limits.[233] "The limit, then, of political union and extensive trade depends on the transmissibility of payments. Corn suffices for a city state, copper for a smal group of cities, silver for an isolated country, gold for an empire, paper for the relations between empires. Without the means of storing power by capital, a wide dominion can only rest on violence, and is merely a series of plunder raids; the dominion may exist, like that of the Huns or

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[229] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. I, pp. 375-87.

[230] Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 570-1.

[231] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 174.

[232] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 175.

[233] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 150.

Mongols or Bolshevists, but it is merely a temporary compulsion. No stable and united rule, levying and distributing currency, can be expected beyond the limits available for that currency." [234]

By employing the same method of reasoning, some future genius promulgating the "concrete-road theory of history" could easily establish, and by excavations too, the irrefragable proof that the reason why El Paso was a boundary city between the United States and Mexico was because the automobile highway ended there. The author of the circulating medium theory of history might profitably consider whether the boundary was established by the limit of the currency, or whether the limit of the currency was established by the political boundary.

One marvels at the emanation of these queer currency theories from a modern institution of higher learning. Silver was a world currency up to the latter part of the nineteenth century, and is still the common coin of the Orient. Petrie, Sorokin or anyone else has yet to prove that paper passed as currency between the great empires of antiquity. Bills of exchange which performed the function of international means of payment in settling of balances were known to Venice, Genoa and Amsterdam [235] long before paper currency as legal tender came into existence. Furthermore, paper to this day is not a legal tender in the economic relations between empires. Gold is the only basis of international settlements, and bills of exchange function only insofar and to the extent that they are more practical and convenient, and then only in the balancing of debits and credits. Behind every bill must lurk the shadow of hard cash.

This reference to money as capital is but another indication of their shallow distinctions between economic categories. Money by itself is no more capital than the imperial regalia of some fraternal order's Grand Noble Potentate makes him an emperor. Only under specific social conditions does money become capital, just as only under definite circumstances can the wafer and wine be transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ. To make of every possessor of money a capitalist is like endowing every good baker and vintner with the mysterious power of a priest.

After their pellucid explanation of past and present society, one's eye searches eagerly for their prognostication concerning the future of society. They state in all seriousness: "No one, of course, can predict what will happen in the course of thousands of years." [236] For this concession, many thanks. Only a fool—or some college professors —would seriously consider the possibility. A newspaper editor is brilliant if he is a day ahead of his news; a statesman exhibits the keenest powers if he can plan consistently one year ahead; an historian may foreshadow the inevitable tendency of a decade. What shall we say, therefore, of the superior wisdom of the sociologist who, while rejecting to forecast the coming millennia, thinks nothing of laying down the schematic outline for a few hundred years?

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[234] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 164; theories of W. M. Flinders Petrie.

[235] Wealth of Nations—Adam Smith, p. 447.

[236] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. III, p. 644.

To the very end Sorokin and his associates are determined to uphold the dignity of the embattled farmers of Minnesota and vicinity.[237] Their Non-Partisan League demagogic conception of the nature and origin of the state is seen not in their objection to the capitalist exploitation of the powers of state for their own purposes, but in emphasizing a purely artificial conflict between the farmers and city dwellers.

"The urban world," they insist, "has tended more and more to monopolize the functions involved in maintaining a state organization composed of many united communities. It has assumed responsibilities for the maintenance and expansion of the state, the creation of forms of social organization for all types of communities, and the regulation of their inter-relationships, as well as of the relationships betwen various states and countries. This division of functions has led to the concentration of governmental functions, functions of social control, and activities pertaining to organization in the cities. The cities have become the central seats of the military and civil governments and the headquarters of religious, educational, professional, industrial and commercial agencies and institutions. These numerous agencies have taken over most of the power of organization and control, not only in urban affairs and in the matter of the relationships among various urban, rural, and national groups but even in the affairs of the rural community itself. They have prescribed social, political, and other forms of organization for the rural communities, and have imposed upon them their own schemes, plans and regulations." [238]

It all sounds like the bill of complaint made out by the colonists against King George III in the Declaration of Independence, and all that is lacking is the final flourish that the rural communities do now and forever declare their inalienable right to separate themselves from the cities, and live their own life in their own way.

The only difficulty is that no sooner would Sorokin, Zimmerman and Galpin gather their cohorts about them in the holy war against Megalogolis than that they would proceed under inevitable compulsion to pitch their tents; the tents would become huts, the huts houses, the houses a village, and if Sorokin et al. are at all successful, their town would soon become the seat of their agrarian empire and the headquarters of religious, educational, professional, industrial and commercial agencies and institutions, created by the necessities of their imperial domain. They mistake the effect for the cause, and not being trained in historical dialectics they cannot see how the effect becomes the cause of its own transformation. The complete breakdown of the sociological approach to history is demonstrated by their going back behind the fact to rationalize subjectively the origins of that fact.

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[237] The Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology was published under the direction of the University of Minnesota.

[238] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. III, pp. 629-30.

With that same solemn distant professorial air which is the despair of all men who must face the practical realities of life, those noble sociologists conveniently ensconced in the pleasant environs of Minnesota University carry on a serious discussion concerning the state of the world in the same spirit as immortalized by the medieval problem of Buridan's Ass. They actually bring in a verdict, first that "a universal return to rural conditions would necessitate a great decrease in the populations of many countries, the decay of machine civilization and mechanical industries, and the abandonment of present agricultural methods based on the use of machinery." [239] One pauses to contemplate this marvelous exhibition of professorial profundity, uncertain whether to laugh, or just simply ignore them as the agricultural counter-part of big-city demagogues.

We note their second conclusion, namely "that a wholly urban society is an impossibility," [240] due to need for raw materials and mechanical replacements for the farms. While still transfixed at such wisdom we note their third conclusion, that the continued coexistence of the rural and urban worlds is a necessity of modern existence. Such a remarkable feat of intellectualization ought to be fittingly rewarded, and so it was when its chief architect was called to fill the chair in sociology at Harvard University.

E. CONTRIBUTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO LAW IN SOCIETY

Anthropology is eminently a science which deals with man as a group rather than as an individual. As such it has much to teach history concerning racial characteristics, capacities and impulses insofar as they affect the unfoldment of the human drama. Modern anthropology is not content to rattle the bones of comparative man, but also to consider him in his actual social relations, and therefore draws conclusions concerning the present and future tendencies of social development in which the historian must have the keenest interest.

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[239] Rural Sociology—Sorokin et al., Vol. III, p. 636.

[240] Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 637-8.

"When discussing the reactions of the individual to his fellows," writes Boas, "we are compelled to concentrate our attention upon the society in which he lives. In all these cases, we cannot treat the individual as an isolated unit. He must be studied in his social setting, and the question is relevant whether generalizations are possible by which a functional relation between generalized social data and the forms and expression of individual life can be discovered; in other words, whether any generally valid laws exist that govern the life of society." [241]

Boas contends that "the question of the usefulness of the knowledge is entirely irrelevant." To this we cannot agree. He still clings to the artificial division of scientific inquiry as "pure" and "applied" with which the historical investigator is not concerned. On the contrary, we have a vital interest in the problem as to whether or not the available data will support the contention for the existence of social laws, and whether they are amenable to social control, and in what manner, and to what extent.

Boas himself draws conclusions of deepest interest from the practical political viewpoint on problems of race and racialism, nations and nationalism, and the future of mankind generally in the light of present knowledge, with their particular application to the United States. He cannot escape, nor does he attempt to evade, the race problem in our country as it affects the Negro, the immigrant, the Oriental, the Jew, and even the one hundred per cent American.

We might as well state right now that Boas is very skeptical as to the possibility of establishing scientifically valid laws of social motion.[242] Prepared with this concluding phase of Boas' argument, the reader will be in a position to judge with some degree of impartiality why we believe that we have discovered in Boas' own work the very elements which contribute both toward the establishment of the existence of social laws and the reasons why Boas did not recognize them. For Boas is essentially a scientist, not a dogmatist. Being a scientist, he does not arrange his material to suit his dogma, but on the contrary, is prevented by methods of procedure which he inherited from the classical school from perceiving the nature of the laws whose processes he yet cannot help but describe in his work.

[241] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas (1928), pp. 15-16.
[242] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas (1928), pp. 208-23.

BOAS' VIEWS ON RACE AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Boas reaches conclusions of the highest significance to history in his discussion of race. "The idea of the great blond Aryan, the leader of mankind," he writes, "is the result of self-admiration that emotional thinkers have tried to sustain by imaginative reasoning. It has no foundation in observed fact. . . . Inferior by heredity? No. Socially different? Yes, on account of the environment in which they have lived, and therefore different from ourselves, and not easily subject to change provided they are allowed to cluster together indefinitely. Scientific investigation does not countenance the assumption that in one part of Europe a people of pure descent or of a pure racial type is found, and careful inquiry has failed completely to reveal any inferiority of mixed European types. . . . An identification of racial type, of language, and of nationality has been made, that has gained an exceedingly strong hold on our imagination. In vain sober scientific thought has remonstrated against this identification; the idea is too firmly rooted." [243]

Huxley and Haddon in their recent work on the ethnic groups comprising present-day Europe reach conclusions similar to that of Boas. "Racialism," they conclude, "is a myth, and a dangerous myth at that. It is a cloak for selfish economic aims which in their uncloaked nakedness would look ugly enough. And it is not scientifically grounded. The essence of science is the appeal to fact." [244]

Having demonstrated, at least to his own satisfaction and, we hope, to many others, the scientific absurdity of recent claims to racial superiority, which in the advanced cases of that disease justifies any efforts at effecting world domination for that race, Boas, the anthropologist must perforce become Boas the historian. That he has an instinctive and intellectual aversion to this task his work amply demonstrates. Yet he must follow out the implications of his own work and trench upon the historical significance of nationalism and politics.

"There are two kinds of nationalism," he writes, "one of nations, the other of nationalities. The two terms 'nation' and 'nationality' do no coincide. A nation is in most cases a nationality that is unified in political and economic organization; although there are also nations that embrace several nationalities, like Czecho-Slovakia and Poland." [245]

[243] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, pp. 80-2.

[244] We Europeans—Huxley and Haddon (1936), p. 236.

[245] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, p. 78.

His reference to those two at present temporarily defunct nations, is a grim commentary, as we will presently see, upon the anthropologist's failure to grasp the historic role of the modern national unit, although he knows the facts well enough. Boas admits the arbitrary nature of national boundaries; that the term race, as commonly used, is only a disguise of nationality which has little or nothing to do with racial descent; and that interracial relations are based on national enmities or friendships, and not on racial antipathies or sympathies.[246]

BOAS' INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN NATIONAL STATE

So far Boas is indubitably correct. Yet what is the historic basis of the modern national state? Boas weighs the community of language as the subtle, binding element. He finds that a common language is not a basic consideration for the modern nation. It is an idealized concept rather than a real bond. Similarity of language did not prevent wars among the Greeks, nor in medieval Europe, nor in the United States. Trilingual Switzerland and bilingual Canada and multilingual Soviet Russia are facts of modern life.[247] And here Boas' analysis rests.

Before the crucial problem of the role of the modern nation Boas breaks down. Why? Because it is impossible to understand the historical function of the modern nation without a comprehensive scientific theory of the role of the modern national state. He has successfully exposed the fallacies of the apologists of militant nationalism without searching for the mainspring which impel them to activity. This only a scientific theory of history, well buttressed by the cognate social sciences, could supply.

Boas has not discovered the key for the existence of modern nationalism with all that it means in conflicting national aspirations, militarism, imperialism, and war. Since he cannot pretend that these do not exist, he must content himself with showing how useless, stupid and futile it all is. There this eminent scientist in anthropology must perforce become the vapid moralist in history. He is compelled to resort to moral preachments by describing how the inter-tribal warfare of primitive man has been replaced gradually by association and fusion into larger, and more peaceful unions. "This process of enlargement of political units and the reduction of the number of those that were naturally at war with one another

[246] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, pp. 82-7.
[247] Ibid., pp. 87-95.

began in the earliest times, and has continued without interruption, almost always in the same direction. . . . We see the powers at work in antiquity, when the urban states of Greece and of Italy were gradually welded into larger wholes; we see it again at work after the breaking up of ancient society in the development of new states from the fragments of the old ones; and later on in the disappearance of the small feudal states. In the nations of our days in which law rules supreme we find the greatest numbers of people united in political units that the world has seen. In these war is excluded, because all members are subject to the same law, and excessive strains in the community, that lead to internal bloodshed, have decreased in frequency." [248]

From this it is but a single step to that ultimate of all noble dreamers, the "enlargement of circles of association," [249] into the League of Nations! Of all the pestiferous elements of modern times in bringing the world to its present state of chaos, few share a heavier responsibility than those "noble dreamers" of world organization during the past twenty years, who could not think their problem through beyond the second move, to consider the essential transformations in the social structures of the dominant World Powers before such an international association could be made to function effectively. They did not trouble to understand the mechanism of the real world, and thus laid the foundations of future wars in their fanciful world created by the Treaty of Versailles. Nor is this conclusion, for many, the wisdom that comes after the event.

It is true Boas' book was written eleven years before the outbreak of the Second World War, but not having had an appreciation of the circumstances within society which led to the First World War, he should not be too severely censured for hiding behind the cloud of his own theorizing, and thereby contributing in part toward the preparation of its sequel.

In the light of these events how inadequate, how pitifully inadequate, was the analysis of the truly scientific anthropologist turned indifferent historian: "It is obvious," wrote he, "that the standards of ethical conduct must be quite distinct between those who have grasped this ideal and those who still believe in the preservation of the isolated nationality in opposition to all others. Once we recognize this truth we are brought clearly face to face with those forces that will ultimately abolish warfare as well as legislative conflict between nations. . . . Conditions in modern states are intelligible only when we remember that by education patriotism is surrounded by a halo of sanctity and that national self-preservation is considered the first duty. Often the demands of national and international duty are hopelessly at variance. The interests of mankind are, therefore, ill served if we try to instill into the minds of the young a passionate desire for national power."[250]

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[248] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, pp. 96-7.
[249] Ibid., p. 99.

No doubt Boas was stirred by the loftiest motives when he penned those lines. No one, for that matter, questions the high-minded altruism of the medieval priest who went among the victims of the Black Plague breathing prayers and incantations, instead of having the faithful clean up their filth.

But, it is protested, they did not know in those days the relation between filth and disease. Precisely. What is excusable in a medieval priest is unpardonable in a modern scientist. Boas the internationalist, unlike his medieval spiritualist prototype, had at his command the accumulated learning of the world. International affairs are not clothed in mysticism, though they are indeed surrounded in mystery. Many able thinkers have penetrated into its innermost significance. They have analyzed the mechanism of modern society. They have disclosed what it is that makes it work, and do the things that it does. They have even speculated upon methods of effecting an international organization of society, but they have predicated that upon certain changes in its fundamental processes. Nowhere does Boas indicate a knowledge of the work of these great scholars in other fields so closely allied to his own.

Why does he, who destroys so masterfully straight-line evolutionism in anthropology[251] make humble obeisance before it in sociology and history? Upon what else, outside of maudlin sentimentality, did he predicate his theory, or rather his wish, that society having slowly integrated groups into tribes, and tribes into larger units based on geographical propinquity, and these having coalesced into nations, and nations into empires, that eventually there would evolve a world federation of nations, driven toward that desirable goal by the selfsame forces? This, he claims, has been so consistently the processes of past history, and the general tendency of human development that we may look forward confidently to the consummation of the international organization of society.[252] Boas does not tell us how, and by what means this much-desired goal is to be accomplished.

Let there be no misunderstanding. We, as much as Boas, or any other advocate of the international organization of human society, strongly believe that it is to the best interests of mankind to organize itself on a global basis.

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[250] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, pp.100-1.
[251] The Mind of Primitive Man—Boas, Ch. VII.
[252] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, pp. 93, 100.

It is one thing to believe; it is a far different matter to understand the laws of national organization and the basis of its world-politics. Such a world-wide organization, it can be said here apodictally, will never come into existence by preaching the fallacy of patriotism. What is more, there are certain fundamental re-organizations in the material basis of our present world-economy which must first be effected before such an organization of nations is possible.

Until Boas and other like-minded leaders of thought recognize that an effective league of nations must be predicated on such a radical transformation of world-economy, their hopes will be the merest chimeras, as they have been up to now, and the results of their labors will continue to be what they have been, recurrent outbursts of military nightmares whose most garish combinations are exceeded only by the grim realities themselves.

BOAS' DISCUSSION OF SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN ANTHROPOLOGY AND HISTORY

Boas cautions us that in scientific inquiries we should be clear in our own minds that we always embody a number of hypotheses and theories in our explanations, and that we do not carry the analysis of any given phenomenon to completion. In fact, if we were to do so, "progress would hardly be possible, because every phenomenon would require an endless amount of time for thorough treatment." [253] This does not excuse poor treatment.

However, this fundamental proposition that we employ highly symbolic ideas in the interpretation of phenomena was gone into exhaustively in our analysis of Dewey's similar contention. If a man pays his creditor five hundred dollars, the payee is not at all concerned about the denominations of the bills, so long as they total up to the required amount. Neither is he interested in their serial numbers, their date of issue, the hands through which they have passed, the chemical and physical composition of the paper and a host of other problems which one can readily conjure up concerning the mechanism of money. In that particular relationship of debtor-creditor, all that really matters is payment of debt in currency of the realm.

This same principle is carried over in all scientific inquiries. Just as a mass of details are compressed in that simple act of money transfer in the debtor-creditor relations, so is that process carried over in the field of historical inquiry. There is, however, one all-conclusive test science applies—Does the reality coincide with the theory? We, too, in history, must begin with a host of assumptions, each one of which, however, must be susceptible of proof. But we must know just what we are looking for. Certainly this means some inner scheme of arranging, of analyzing, of interpreting data.

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[253] The Mind of Primitive Man—Boas, p. 205.

The historian must do what every scientist is compelled to do, namely, to refer back his theory to the realities of life and see whether both jibe. This compels the historian, if he is scientific, to select a frame for the classification of his data. This frame, or theory, he cannot choose arbitrarily. He must first have developed this frame from out of nature's lumberyard, and he must be sure that this yard contained everything essential to the formation of society's structure besides wood, and wooden heads.

Boas himself tells us why in his opinion history cannot attain the status of an exact science. First, he insists "that in the practical application of social science absolute standards are lacking. It is of no use to say that we want to attain the greatest good for the greatest number, if we are not able to come to an agreement as to what constitutes the greatest good." [254]

In this brief statement Boas commits two errors in history of which he would not be guilty in anthropology. In asking for absolute standards by which to gauge the value of historical phenomena, he desires something which cannot be found because it has never existed, and moreover, never will. "Absolute standards" like the foot-rule of the greatest good for the greatest number are relative in origin and historical in nature. Even as a slogan, that came into prominence only at a definite period of historical development. There is nothing absolute in history any more than in the physical world. It is the function of the historian to show by what precise methods of social evolution the democratic ideal displaced the monarchic, or autocratic, or theocratic, or the "able few" theory of Plato and Aristotle in the Greek state.

Again, Boas urges that "a strictly scientific inquiry can be made only if we succeed in entering into each culture on its own basis, if we elaborate the ideals of each people and include in our general objective study cultural values as found among different branches of mankind." [255] Boas, of course, appreciates the nature of the average man's logic who insists that we cannot know anything of the composition of the sun, because nobody has ever been there and come back with au-

[254] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, p. 200.

[255] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, p. 201.

thentic proof of his journey. The whole aim of science is to discover conclusive intellectual short-cuts which enable us to circumvent the inevitable limitations of our nature. Physics has one convenient constant, the nature and speed of light. History, too, possesses one all-important constant, the basic stability of human nature as far back as its definite records go.

Some of the noblest passages in Boas' works which are most heartening to the scientific historian, are those wherein he brings the prestige of his great achievements in anthropology to support the proposition of the stability in fundamental human characteristics for over a long period of time regardless of race or creed. "Students of ethnology have always been so much impressed by the general similarity of fundamental traits of human culture that they have never found it necessary to take into account the racial descent of a people when discussing its culture. This is true of all schools of modern ethnology. . . . It does not matter from which point of view we consider culture, its forms are not dependent upon race." [256]

Again Boas writes: "Our brief consideration of some of the mental activities of man in civilized and in primitive society has led us to the conclusion that these functions of the human mind are common to the whole of humanity. . . . Although, therefore, the distribution of faculty among the races of man is far from being known, we can say this much: the average faculty of the white race is found to the same degree in a large proportion of individuals of all other races, and although it is probable that some of these races may not produce as large a proportion of great men as our own race, there is no reason to suppose that they are unable to reach the level of civilization represented by the bulk of our own people." [257]

It is our inherent kinship with the human species of other climes and times that makes it possible for us to evaluate the significance of their aims, hopes, aspirations, their loves and hates, their sorrows and moments of spiritual exaltation, and it is this ability to decipher the motives of their actions and the authenticity of the actions themselves, that makes it possible for us to aspire toward the establishment of a science of history.

But Boas fears, as did Dewey and others, that we are bound to approach the study of the past with the unconscious prejudices of our present culture. He cites as an example, that the prevailing fashion of modern culture is the scientific approach, whereas "the dialectics of the Middle Ages were as satisfying to the average scientific minds of those periods as is the aversion to dialectics and the insistence on observation in modern times." [258]

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[256] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, pp. 58-9.

[257] The Mind of Primitive Man—Boas, pp. 122-3.

The scientific historian is still true to his creed when he studies objectively why it was that metaphysics intrigued the best minds of medieval times, while the scientific method dominates the greatest minds of our day. Boas is not altogether correct in his sharp demarcation. Some of our best scientific minds like Jeans, Eddington and Whitehead in their philosophical generalizations approach the best—or worst—products of the Middle Age obscurantists.

Boas, himself, sturdy anthropologist that he is, exposes the reason for his deficiency as an historian in the following: "The technical development of electricity depended upon purely scientific work. The scientific discoveries depended upon the general advance of physics and of purely theoretical interests. They were seized upon by the tendency of our times to exploit every discovery technically. The modifications of our lives brought about by the use of the telephone, radio, Roentgen rays and the many other inventions are so little related to the scientific discovery itself that in relation to them it plays the role of an accident." [259]

His arbitrary division of science into purely practical and theoretical has no foundation in fact. There were definite historical conditions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which diverted so-called pure science into practical channels. The difference between pure and applied is not in content but in degree and in objectives. Remove the specific social background and you destroy the material basis of modern cultural development.

The Africans had no use for thermo-dynamics, although that is no reflection upon the innate ability of the Negro race as Boas has so splendidly proved.[260] Therefore he is mistaken when he impugns to the nature of our scientific discoveries the particular development of our social life. On the contrary, the character of civilization at a given time determines whether theology, metaphysics or mechanics will be the chief interest of the virile minds of its day. Of course, there is action and reaction between the ideological superstructure and the material basis of social existence. That is the problem of historical dialectics to evaluate, but, unfortunately, the only type of dialectics which Boas appears to have understood is its formal aspect as handed down by Aristotle, rather than in the manner formulated by Hegel, and the materialistic development of the dialectic processes in social life as exhaustively elaborated by Marx and his school.

[258] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, p. 201.

[259] Ibid., p. 211.

[260] The Mind of Primitive Man—Boas, Ch. X.

BOAS ON CLOSED SOCIAL SYSTEMS

It is purely academic to speculate upon whether Boas' historical theories preceded or followed that of Goldenweiser, or had an independent, spontaneous origin; but there is no doubt that in their theories of closed social systems and the role of accident in history they supplement or complement each other. A closed system among primitive men, Boas contends, was distinguished by consanguinity and similarity in speech, customs and superstitious beliefs. The tendency to form closed societies is not confined to primitive tribes. It exists to a marked extent in our own civilization, such as groupings of the old nobility, the gangs of our streets, or as Mohammedans and Infidels. Fundamentally the nation must be considered a closed society like those previously enumerated.[261]

"Social phenomena," Boas argues, "cannot be subjected to experiments. Controlled conditions, excluding disturbing outer influences, are unattainable. These complicate every process we desire to study." [262] He goes on to show how "accidental occurrences that are logically not related to the phenomena studied modify the sequence of events that might be determined if the conditions were absolutely controlled and protected against all outside interference. . . . Even a hasty consideration of the history of man shows that accidents of this kind are the rule in every society, for no society is isolated but exists in more or less intimate relations to its neighbors." [263]

So-called accidents are not wholly fortuitous. Many a boulder has crashed down a mountain side without causing a railroad derailment. Only under certain specific social conditions does that particular problem arise. From the standpoint of the passengers on that train it was an accident. From the standpoint of the physicist, it was another corroboration of inherent physical laws. From the standpoint of the railroad company, much as accidents are regretted, they are discounted in advance and financial provision made therefore, in their annual budget, outside of taking those ordinary precautions against such happenings established by the standard of railroad operation customary to the time.

Accidents are only in relation to a self-selected frame of reference; there is nothing inherent in that frame or system which makes that an absolute standard. The man who absent-mindedly walks off the roof of the Empire State Building will not be heard to complain—in this world, at least—that it was all an unintentional accident.

[261] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas. The above ideas are presented on pages 67, 68, 69, 93.

[262] Ibid., p. 205.

[263] Ibid., pp. 206-7.

Boas must admit, for example, "that we may recognize definite, causally determined relations between the economic conditions of a people and the density of population."[264] If Boas would be willing to go a little further, it could be readily established that a definite relation exists between the state of the market and the ratio of operation of the American steel industry, by way of illustration; consequently upon employment at the steel mills, the size of the aggregate weekly pay envelope, the amount of money spent for groceries and silk shirts in the community, the size of the corporation income tax, if any, and a host of other circumstances unnecessary here to elaborate.

Some might interject that the accident of the current World War has increased the ratio of operation for the steel industry from fifty to ninety-two and a half per cent,[265] but that leaves wide open the question whether or not the Second World War itself was such an unforeseeable accident. This is not to deny that many combinations within society are possible, but rather to affirm that the particular facts of a given situation will determine the issue, and that while man, theoretically, is free to will, that will is shaped, molded and determined by the dominant cultural background of the society of which he is a part. Man can dominate nature, but only by due observance of natural laws. So can collective man control his social processes, but first he must know the nature of those processes. He must realize that they are not accidental, or inevitable like some law of nature, but are social in origin, and therefore amenable to social control.

BOAS ON LAW OR ACCIDENT IN SOCIETY

In this sense, there are no social accidents, only social laws. That which often overwhelms man like some unutterable eruption of nature, is caused in reality by the indiscriminate consequences of man's ignorance or folly. The aerial bomb may explode over a fortification or over a hospital. In either case, natural laws will determine its direction and its effects. To the victims it may be an accident. The forces which impelled the bomber on its mission of destruction were causal, and even highly commendable, dependent upon where and whom the missile strikes.

Because it is impossible to establish with finality the specific relations between the component elements of historical and sociological phenomena at every moment, therefore, Boas contends, their generalizations cannot enable us to predict the actual happenings in a specific culture, and falls short of the essential requirement for a scientific law. For that matter, as we have seen, physicists are now agreed that it is neither possible nor necessary to know the location and motion of every individual electron, and yet that does not debar them from drawing highly satisfactory and exact conclusions concerning the actions of the physical mass. "Thus every change," says Boas, "in one aspect of social life acts as an accident in relation to others only remotely related to it. For these reasons anthropology will never become an exact science in the sense that the knowledge of the status of a society at a given moment will permit us to predict what is going to happen." [266] Therefore he doubts the establishment of laws, only of tendencies.

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[264] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, p. 210.

[265] New York Times, Dec. 11, 1939.

By a strange anomaly of human thought Boas in the early part of his work points the way out for the dilemma in which he finds himself at its close. History, like anthropology, is not concerned with the individual as such, but with the social group. No one makes history by himself, any more than one individual makes a race. History must differ from biography, although the most powerful leader Boas can imagine [267] cannot work his charms in a social vacuum.

Group forces are different in nature from the sum of the individual properties of its component parts. This does not mean that history must build its theories on arbitrary assumptions, and proceed, as do so many theoreticians, by reducing their motivating elements to one or two simple forces, like the effects of geography and economic determinism.[268] In criticizing this subterfuge, Boas is eminently correct.

Mere complexity of social phenomena is no absolute deterrent to its successful scientific determination. The manufacturers of hats are seldom philosophers, but they have long ago discovered the secret that however the current males of the species may vary in all other respects, they are alike in this—ninety per cent of them will buy either gray or brown felt hats despite the theoretical unlimited choice of indulging their color idiosyncrasies. Since the general sizes, if not the contents of men's heads, are amenable to measurement, these highly practical producers of headgear draw very profitable conclusions in a speculation where philosophers naturally fear to tread.

Boas speaks of the indefiniteness of the concept of progress. The size of the hat manufacturers' dividend is, under given social conditions, a more acceptable evidence of progress than the profoundest generalization of such a great thinker as Boas.

Before concluding with Boas' work, we desire to express our respect for his illuminating and—from an historical standpoint—profoundly moving analysis of the race problem in the United States.[269] The thoroughness of his investigations do honor to his scientific method. His demand for social justice for the Negro, the immigrant and other minority groups in American life is a tribute to his humanitarian instincts and to his profound sense of fellow-feeling.

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[266] Anthropology and Modern Life—Boas, p. 211.

[267] Ibid., p. 222.

[268] Ibid., p. 229.

Boas himself is a distinguished addition to our citizenship from European lands. Perhaps it was an accident, a very fortunate one for this country, that guided his ship to these hospitable shores. But the ship's captain will be heard to maintain stoutly that where the philosopher sees only accident, his log will demonstrate causality with absolute fidelity. But then account must be made for their respective "frames of reference." The ship's captain might consider it a lucky accident that he freighted so noteworthy a passenger. Boas' own log of his peregrinations when he embarked for these shores will dissipate that aspect of the accident theory in his respective closed system.

[269] The Mind of Primitive Man—Boas, Ch. X.

Theories of Historical Interpretation

A. ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

NO HARD and fast line can be drawn between the methods of modern and classical historical interpretation. Some of the latest works, like Beard's "America in Midpassage," Omans' "On the Writing of History," Taylor's "A Historian's Creed," and Tillich's "The Interpretation of History" are included in the category of classical interpretations, because of the methods they advocate and the techniques they employ.

BEARD'S ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

Among the classical theories, that of economic determinism is the latest in origin and possesses the widest degree of acceptance among our eclectic historians. Beard is generally recognized as the leader of that school of thought in America. The economic interpretation of history is applied most strikingly in his work on the American Constitutional Convention. Here he analyzes the social background of the delegates in relation to their stand on the basic polity of the new nation.

The following test is applied by Beard: "Did they have money out at interest? Did they own public securities? Did they hold western lands for appreciation? Were they interested in shipping and manufactures? The purpose of such an inquiry is not, of course, to show that the Constitution was made for the personal benefit of the members of the convention. Far from it . . . the only point here considered is: Did they represent distinct groups whose economic interests they understood and felt in concrete, definite form through their own personal experience with identical property rights, or were they working merely under the guidance of abstract principles of political science?" [1]

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[1] An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States—Beard. First published in 1913. Quotations are from 1935 ed. p. 73.

The form of the question is neither naïve nor disingenuous. Surely Beard is not writing for school children who have but recently discovered that there is no Santa Claus, and who have still to learn that Washington drank, swore and gambled, as Beard goes to considerable trouble to tell in a later work.[2] The questions propounded, despite all disclaimers to the contrary, carry a direct implication of delegates who had assembled to serve, consciously or unconsciously, the interest of a class and not of a nation as they then conceived it.

That this inference is logically drawn, Beard's entire work fully demonstrates. So many delegates had financial stakes in government bonds or other claims to payment; so many were interested in virgin lands, while others were identified with commerce, finance, shipping and similar business interests. Therefore, what?

In the original edition of 1913, Franklin was absolved from possessing a financial interest in the refunding of the Revolutionary War debt by the young republic. But by 1935, Beard had discovered through dint of painstaking research that, on the contrary, Franklin did possess such a financial stake to the extent of 3,000 pounds, which, Beard admits, Franklin had loaned in the form of hard cash to the Continental Congress. Therefore Franklin is cast down from among the pure and anointed Revolutionary saints to join the others who, as the great scholar meticulously proves, man by man, from page 73 to 151, had a financial interest in the war debt refunding.

Now this is not the place to defend Franklin or the other delegates from that malicious implication. At the proper time his services and sacrifices, as well as that of the majority of the delegates then assembled, to the cause of the Revolution will be recounted. The only question now pertinent is: Were they actuated by motives of financial self-interest during their deliberations? Were they the representatives of a class whose interests they deliberately served as against the larger welfare of the nation?

This Beard does not dare to assert, not because he lacks the courage—his public career during the First World War proved him to possess an uncommon store of that quality for a professor—but because his scholarship cannot adduce the proof to support that contention. The Constitutional Convention was composed of men who for their day were the representatives of the thought prevailing at that time. When they organized the framework of the government as they did, it was because as practical men of the world that was the best upon which the greatest number could agree as reasonably meeting the exigencies of the situation.

[2] Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, p. 142.

The Constitution in its separate parts could not, and did not, point by point, meet with the approval of the majority. It was a series of compromises from the beginning to end, and represented at its conclusion the best attainable collective product of reasonable men who rose to supreme heights in meeting a most unusual historic situation. The long public discussion which followed Hamilton's refunding proposals after the Constitution was adopted clearly indicated the viewpoint which dominated the Convention.

As society was then constituted, the young republic could not hope to get very far without establishing its credit on a firm basis. That these self-same founding fathers were not averse to resorting to questionable schemes for the financing of the Revolutionary War itself when circumstances drove them to it, the melancholy record of paper issues and inflation during that long struggle gives ample evidence of their determination to disregard dainty scruples. But the situation was far different when they met to lay the foundations for this government. Public credit was of preponderant importance, and that they were determined to establish and conserve if the national government was to survive and maintain its sovereignty within the limits of its powers.

It is unnecessary to enlarge on this point. Beard would be the first to admit it. He quotes Washington approvingly upon the nature of the compromises within the Convention needed to bring their labors to fruition.[3] Nor was Beard the first to point out the social background of the delegates who composed that Convention. Almost a hundred years before Beard, Hildreth had written: "The Convention, as a whole, represented in a marked manner, the talent, intelligence, and especially the conservative sentiment of the country. The democracy had no representatives, except so far as the universal American sentiment was imbued, to a certain degree, with the democratic spirit. Jefferson, the ablest and most enthusiastic defender of the capacity of the people for self-government, was absent in Europe, and that theory, of late, had been thrown a little into the shade by the existing condition of affairs, both state and national. The public creditors, especially, demanded some authority able to make the people pay; and among a certain class even monarchy began to be whispered of as a remedy for popular maladministration." [4]

The same fine writer whose work, unfortunately, is seldom read, and never referred to nowadays, gives as graphic an account of the internal struggles between the creditor-debtor groups as ever delighted the soul of the most rigid economic determinist, without, however, allowing his sense for genuine history to be stultified by the evil odor which is supposed to exude from mere money.[5]

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[3] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, p. 330.

[4] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. III, p. 484.

Beard, when taunted with adopting the Marxian creed of economic determinism, felt called upon to reply that Madison had expounded that doctrine long before in the tenth number of The Federalist.[6] We will, at present, overlook this libel on Marx. Beard had previously hidden behind Madison by a similar assertion in his main work.[7] Were he so minded he could have gone back to that font of all wisdom, the Bible, which proclaims among other things, that where a man's treasure is, there lies his heart. Fortunately the Good Book is full of authentic passages to the contrary, and so is every man's diary during the full course of a lifetime. If Marx ever fathered the doctrine of economic determinism—which he did not—his entire life was a singular and constant contradiction to what is generally supposed to be his principal tenet, applied either to the man individually or to his social philosophy.

If Beard's purpose in undertaking that erudite research into the station in life of the delegates composing the Convention was to prove that they were men of affairs in their day, it was moving a mountain for a mouse. If, however—the innocent soul—all he desired was to establish that they were not animated solely by abstract principles of political science, then he will find few responsible scholars who would contend otherwise. The Convention was dominated by intelligent, serious men who had gathered to perform a very practical task.

Beard prides himself on being a hard-headed realist, and he means by economic determinism just what that phrase implies, namely, the preponderance of the economic motive in the field of history. "As economic classes," he writes, "depend upon the character and distribution of property, and as the forms of state turn upon the predominance of classes, it would follow logically that alterations in the form of state must have some connection with the changing fortunes of classes." [8] After discussing the political philosophies of Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, Madison, Webster, Harrington and Calhoun, Beard concludes: "It is evident from this review that the six great thinkers we have brought under consideration were in substantial agreement on the subject in hand. They believed that the fundamental factors with which the statesman has to deal are the forms and distribution of property and the sentiments and views arising from the possession of different degrees and kinds of property." [9]

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[5] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, pp. 152-174, 340-352.

[6] An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States—Beard. Introduction (1935 ed.).

[7] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, p. 33; also The Economic Basis of Politics—Beard, pp. 29, 99.

[8] The Economic Basis of Politics—Beard, p. 17.

The mere possession of property determines the class, and the nature of the property determines the character of the class. This doctrine is seriously advanced by Beard. He recognizes "a landed interest, a transport interest, a railway interest, a shipping interest, an engineering interest, a manufacturing interest, a public-official interest, with many lesser interests grown up of necessity in all great societies and divide them into different classes actuated by different sentiments and view." [10] Classes, then, must be as numerous as the various types of property. The upshot of all this, he argues, seems to be that in modern industrial society, the problem of property, so vital in politics, is not so simple as it was in old agricultural societies.[11] The nature of agricultural society was not as simple as Beard's remark would indicate. They also had wide differences in property ownership such as merchants, hand manufacturers of various sorts, sheep grazers, marketmen, armorers, cloth producers, and so on with enough classifications to fill as many pages as there are in Beard's little volume.

This theory that property ownership makes the class was rather widely diffused from ten to twenty years ago when profit-sharing was the rage. The idea then was for the worker to be given a financial stake in the enterprise where he was employed, and this was accomplished through the device of stock distribution. Lo and behold! the steel-worker was now miraculously transformed into a stockholder, in fact a veritable Wall Street man, and the hello-girl had become overnight a partner in the telephone business. Statisticians, statesmen, politicians, and not infrequently historians, were trumpeting before the world that at last the long standing capital-versus-labor struggle was well on the way toward solution. Even labor unions went into banking and the real estate business, and many a hitherto despised labor leader was allowed to hob-nob with the mighty ones on the Federal Reserve Board.

Somehow this thing did not work out. The basic economic class struggle could not be downed by a subterfuge. The workers were assured, but in vain, that they were now property owners and had a material interest in the success of "their" enterprises. Workers generally are not philosophers, but that does not prevent them from thinking. Pretty soon they figured out that a two dollar raise per week meant much more to them than a two dollar dividend per year on the little stock which had been put in his name through one way or another.

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[9] Ibid. p. 44.

[10] Ibid. p. 99.

[11] The Economic Basis of Politics—Beard, p. 98.

Pretty soon the whole scheme fell through when it was discovered that mere titles to property are not enough; that it is the relations of production which are the all-important factor in modern society; the relations, namely, which determine the character of the claim to the product in values, and to how large a share of the annual product newly created will go to the worker as wages or salary, to the entrepreneur as profit of enterprise, to the money-lender as interest, and to the owner of real property as rent. While the masses are not social philosophers like Beard, they saw that mere ownership of property does not establish the class relation, but that the character of the title to revenues from the social usufruct was the decisive element in modern society. If mere property is the desideratum then every man who owns his breeches is a property holder, even if it is held up by safety pins.

Professors continuously are racking their brains as to where to draw the line between a worker and a capitalist on the basis of his income, with the discomfiting result that sometimes the owner of a million dollar concern at the end of the year makes less than his office boy, while a union bricklayer who strikes it rich by working on a job for a full year lands among the higher income brackets. To this sad state is history and political economy reduced by the inability to recognize differences in form and function. Beard looks to the static, the physical, the obvious in social life, instead of to its organic functioning and the relations of production established by the nature-imposed necessity on the part of man to feed, clothe and house himself. Only under definite historical conditons is it possible for one man to burden another with the labor of providing for his material and other means of existence. In that fact we have one of the significant clues to the science of history.

That famous Number Ten of The Federalist by Madison which Beard is constantly using as his bulwark for economic determinism is a platitudinous, though correct statement of the economic struggles which both unite and divide factions in civil life. In it Madison urges a republican form of government as superior to a pure democracy where popular passion, always penurious and consequently mean, will attempt to over-ride the virtuous holders of greater wealth. A representative form of government is most likely to bring forth men of wisdom, sobriety and patriotism. Madison's whole career is a denial of the economic motive as being the most powerful factor in the affairs of government, and none proved it more conclusively than he and his associates when they pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor in the uneven combat between a gangling string of Atlantic seaboard colonies against the mighty power of the British Empire.

INADEQUACY OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM IN HISTORY

Were the advocates of economic determinism content only with stressing the significant role of material motives as moving forces in history, there could be no valid objection to that. In fact, it is a decided gain for stability in the rational evaluation of human activity to appreciate that man lives by bread and meat, besides the spirit of the Holy Ghost.

But it is a far different story when the economic motive is placed on the center of the stage and the historian begins to perform a voodoo dance around it. "The task of a theory," says Hook, "is to organize the empirical propositions of its subject-matter into some systematic connection, so that the consequences deduced are either compatible with observed phenomena or capable of serving as a guide to the discovery of new phenomena." [12] From this logical standpoint, which commends itself both to reason and common sense, economic determinism as the preponderant factor in the making of history cannot withstand the scrutiny of scientific investigation.

The factors of race, creed, ideologies and emotionalism cannot be brushed aside. The strictest economic determinist cannot ignore them, nor is he always successful in his attempts to palliate their importance. These factors are themselves the product of given conditions, are shaped and molded by them, and in turn react upon the material conditions of existence. For when considering the state of the world at the time when America was first discovered, it would be impossible to explain the contrasting modes of life in China, Western Europe and among the Indians where the natural factors were about the same for all, unless we took into consideration their different social structures, which were the resultant at a given time of the inter-play of the existing political organization, the economy and the dominant ideology.

Mere empirical investigation is not enough, for unless we know the objective causal connection between the phenomena under consideration, one must fall back upon Machian emperio-criticism or Dewey's pragmatism, or some other variation of subjective rationalization. These philosophical considerations are foreign to Beard's theoretical standpoint, who as a sound, practical man, has no use for all that verbal nonsense. Yet when it comes to passing judgment upon the nature of the phenomena he has painstakingly gathered together, he must resort to some subjective scheme of cause and sequence in order to make his analysis stick together.

[12] Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx—Hook (1933) p. 191.

FALLACY OF THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CAUSES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

It does not stick together very long. Let us take Beard's analysis of the causes of the First World War, and his advice on what policy to pursue in the event of a second World War. He wrote a very illuminating little book on this subject three years ago,[13] based on the current revelations of the Nye munitions committee.[14] He rejects the "wicked person" or impersonal "forces" as the cause of war, and scorns the Utopians who believe that once the evil spirit is exorcised peace will reign on earth ever after.[15] So far, excellent. Like all good liberals he is splendid in pointing out the imperfections in the other fellow's house.

Now let us look into his own. The Allies needed money to pay for supplies purchased here. Their short term credits were exhausted, as was their ready cash. Bryan had clamped down on loans as the worst contraband of war, and were pronounced by the Secretary of State patently unneutral.[16] Now the mystery deepens. "A key person at the center acts promptly. That very night at 8:30, Robert Lansing called on President Wilson. Apparently he did not take up this vital issue with his chief, Secretary Bryan, but went behind the back of the State Department's head." [17] We are beginning to see personal devil number one emerging on the scene despite Beard's previous exorcism of these agents of Satan. We always thought that such evil spirits come out only at midnight but the following day saw Mr. Lansing again appearing at the same hour in the company of a gentleman from the House of Morgan.

However something must have gone wrong with this diplomatic witching hour, for Beard tells us the next scene of the drama occurred at exactly 10:30 in the morning with the dramatis personae this time being the ubiquitous Mr. Lansing and an agent from the National City Bank. So the back-door kept on opening and closing mysteriously on an assorted collection of ghostly figures yclept to the devil's trysting place.

Came the fatal day. Credits were stretched beyond endurance.[18] That was in August, 1915. In March, 1917 it was still stretched beyond endurance, which by all reckoning is something of a record for endurance. The submarine came on with its unrestricted sinking campaign. President Wilson's endurance broke at last. War was declared.

And what about these astute bankers? Why, bless their souls, having stretched credits beyond endurance, they began immediately extending stupendous other credits to the Allies. But some might say, the first credits were the bankers' money, the second belonged to the people. Beard himself is silent on this point, because he knows bankers never extend their own money, but other people's money of which they are the ostensible trustees. Bonds of most European countries are sold to vast sucker lists in every corner of the country, and seldom indeed is a banker caught holding his own lemons.

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[13] The Devil Theory of War—Beard (1936).

[14] Ibid. p. 11.

[15] Ibid. p. 19.

[16] Ibid., pp. 34-5.

[17] Ibid., p. 42.

[18] Ibid., p. 55.

Now Beard soliloquizes: "Did it 'pay' in the end—this promotion of business enterprise—in the economic terms so dear to bankers, business men and all hard-headed persons? Did it 'pay' the nation, as distinguished from profit-seeking bankers? According to estimates of the Morgan Company, busy Americans sold the Allies about $7,000,000,000 worth of goods prior to April 1, 1917. It was this selling that produced the big 'prosperity' which bankers and the Wilson administration tried so hard to hold up between 1914 and 1917. It was seven billion dollars' worth of prosperity. Well, according to the estimates of President Coolidge, participation in the World War cost the people of the United States, besides death and suffering, at least $100,000,000,000, counting outlays to come for pensions, bonuses and other war charges." [19]

Beard refuses to recognize the incongruity of his analysis. On the one side are bankers mauling and tugging at the chains of war. On the other side is the enormous cost of war, well known to bankers by the time April 1917 had rolled around, and who knew furthermore that the costs of war fall heaviest on the recipients of rent, interest and profit, while its suffering, naturally, is reserved for the masses. The only way the masses can pay for a war is in a decisive lowering of their standard of living, with the difference being siphoned off by the government to meet the war costs.

This has not been the case even in those European countries which suffered most heavily in the last struggle. Geoffrey Crowther, the editor of the London Economist, estimates that by 1924 the real income of the average British worker was above that of 1914. Regarding France, despite the limitations as to available statistics, he estimates a similar improvement in the actual living status of the masses. Professor James W. Angell in 1929 concluded that even in defeated Germany the income of the average German, including the workers as a class, was 15½ per cent higher in the real purchasing power than before the war.[20]

Yet each country, in its own way, was meeting its war obligations;

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[19] The Devil Theory of War—Beard, pp. 103-4.

[20] New York Times Magazine, Dec. 3, 1939, pp. 3, 21, 22. Article by Crowther.

one by repudiation, another by an extensive scaling down through inflation, the third, by dogged taxation. Since Beard denies social laws, only surface facts and tendencies, he will not perceive what is the underlying fact, that, barring the reduction of living standards for the masses, there are definite economic laws long ago analyzed by Ricardo and Marx which prove that all taxation, direct and indirect, is a deduction from surplus value; namely, from the recipients of that part of the annual usufruct in new values which is distributed in the form of rent, interest, and profit of enterprise.

Beard will not admit that it is the economic system which breeds modern wars, though he recognizes that imperialist rivalry was among the weighty influences behind the World War. Not having analyzed the internal processes of capitalist economy which makes modern wars inevitable, he falls back upon the advocacy of a continental policy for the United States.

Men like Captain Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and Albert J. Beveridge were bent on making us an imperialist sea power.[21] He agrees with General Smedley Butler that imperialism is a racket. So what does he propose? It is all very simple, if only people would listen to reason. Let us till our own splendid continental garden. We have so many problems of our own, what with unemployment, poverty, slums and degradation on every side. "Tilling it properly doubtless involves many drastic changes in capitalism as historically practiced. Well, with all due respect to the enterprise and virtues of capitalism, I never regarded that 'system' as sacred, unchanging and unchangeable." [22] Brave words, well spoken.

But will the good professor kindly particularize and tell us just what changes he would effect, and how he would set about doing it? By the time Beard will get down to cases, he will find his audience called off by the bugles announcing America's entrance into the Second World War. Of course, he would support a war "in the national interest" for some great good, and perhaps it is not beyond the range of possibility that this time he will be beating the tom-toms for "democracy and world liberation," where in 1917 he could not muster sufficient enthusiasm to join a similar band-wagon.

BEARD REJECTS HISTORICAL CAUSALITY

Beard's historical philosophy collapses because he refuses to recognize causality, only events. All the historian can do is to describe some of them in their more or less immediate relations.[23] How can we know the "primary and final cause" of the World War? Who can trace back the intricate chain of causation which dovetails and interlocks in a manner beyond the power of the human mind? Who can tell what went on in Woodrow Wilson's mind that made him decide in favor of war? [24] Obviously these questions cannot be answered for even diaries are not always exact, despite the best of intentions.

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[21] The Devil Theory of War—Beard, p. 119.
[22] Ibid. pp. 120-1.

Beard's difficulty lies in his foot-rule of causation. He argues with the following analogy: "Let a chemist take ten chemicals in a test tube. He adds an eleventh. A precipitation follows. Did the eleventh chemical 'cause' the precipitation? Or was it 'caused' by the reaction of the other ten to the event of addition? Why speak of cause at all in this connection? The chemist is likely to be content with mere description: Ten chemicals: the addition of the eleventh chemical: precipitation. It adds nothing to his knowledge to say that the eleventh chemical 'caused' precipitation." [25]

This chemist of Beard's goes about his business like an alchemist of old rather than as a modern scientist. Since Beard has chosen his analogy, he must stick to it. No modern chemist, if he is as vitally concerned with his experiment as Beard is in discovering the causes of war, would be content with the empirical knowledge that the eleventh chemical somehow did the trick, either by itself, or in activating the others. He would want to know just why and how the precipitation came about. He would want to know whether he must always use all of the eleven chemicals in the way that he did, or if simpler combinations could effect the desired result. It is unnecessary to pursue this line of reasoning further.

In history, Beard contends, we have an analogous situation. There are ten known factors. An eleventh, let us say, the German unrestricted submarine warfare is added. War is declared. Was that the cause of war? No one knows. Furthermore, it is impossible to know.[26]

Beard cannot get off so easily. Here is what we have a right to know: 1. What are those ten factors in the historical retort? 2. How did they get there; or rather, to put it more exactly, what were the circumstances which brought these ten factors together? 3. How do those factors operate, singly or individually? 4. Are there any factors left out, or too many included in? 5. Do those factors remain stable, patiently awaiting the addition of the eleventh? 6. How and why did the eleventh affect the others in the way that it did? 7. Did it have any such effect as is ascribed to it, or did all of them in co-operation produce the stated effect? After Beard gets through with these seven, his answers will suggest at least fifty-seven more.

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[23] The Devil Theory of War—Beard, p. 15.

[24] Ibid., p. 91.

[25] Ibid., p. 14.

[26] Ibid., p. 91.

It is apparent we are arguing in a vacuum. We want facts, not speculations; definite acts and logical consequences, not empty theorizing The whole "test-tube" theory of history is fallacious, because to begin with there is no such test-tube nor is there the possibility of creating one. The specific processes of investigation applicable to chemistry are not those of history. To begin the analysis of modern wars scientifically, Beard should go about his task first, by analyzing the very imperialism which he so heartily condemns; not merely how it operates, but why in the manner that it does. This would lead him inevitably to the examination of capitalist economy, and its internal laws of operation. To his amazement he would discover that while war is universally recognized as being opposed to the economic interests of all its participants, as Beard has so eloquently proven by the sheer statistics of the last one, yet the material basis of capitalist economy, its need for markets, for control of its basic raw materials, and for their exchange in their own valuta, are the final, the basic, the remote and the immediate causes of modern war. We have not ten speculative factors in a test-tube, but the realities of life itself. Beard has a suspicion of that fact. That is why he hopes capitalism can be reformed by pointing out its evils.

No better proof of the defects inherent in the merely factual development of historical phenomena can be asked than in Beard's volume on the development of American imperialism. All the pertinent facts are there, except the knowledge of the internal movement of capitalist economy which created the facts he painstakingly presents. But Beard denies laws in history. He sees only facts. For the rest he proceeds like a pragmatist in generalizing and moralizing.[27] We will go a step further.

We will prove to him, as a reasonable man, that all his moral persuasion must go for naught; that there comes a time in the life of a nation when development along a certain line becomes an impediment to further progress, and that this can be removed only by drastic changes in the social economy as it has evolved historically. The basic difference between Beard's method of historical approach and ours is this: Beard sees the problem; he senses what has to be done, but he does not know precisely how this problem developed, and consequently is debarred from understanding precisely how it is to be met.

Revolution and bloodshed is not a necessary element in the resolution of historical contradiction. In the United States, the people, after all, possess the power to effect peacefully, rationally and legally every change in our economic and social structure which they desire. But they must first be brought to see crystal-clear just why the present deplorable state of affairs arose, before they can be asked to support a proposed remedy. There is nothing inevitable about so-called progress. It depends to a very large extent upon our own efforts whether the goal of economic democracy can be as peacefully attained as was the growth of our political democracy since the fateful settlement at Appomattox.

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[27] The Idea of National Interest—Beard (1934), Chapters VI, VII, and VIII.

SELIGMAN'S VIEWS ON ECONOMIC DETERMINISM AND MARXISM

Over thirty-seven years ago, Seligman first published his Economic Interpretation of History. It has gone through several printings, editions and translations. In itself that work is a living example of the peculiar myopia which afflicts the intellectual world. Sometimes it takes about ten or fifteen years for that world to catch up with a Spengler. Kyserling was more transparent. Seligman himself in 1902 commented upon the fact that fifty years after Marxism had made its first appearance and had stirred to the depths economic, social and philosophical thought among European scholars, here in America Marx was scarcely known outside of a few obscure immigrant Socialists.[28]

The same astonishment which called forth Seligman's gentle protest is in order to-day but, however, with the significant addition of his own work which purports to give the essence of Marx's historical methods. That current writers like Dewey, Teggart, Goldenweiser, Sorokin and a host of others have accepted Seligman's representation of Marxism for the real thing without further analysis of original sources is plainly evident in their own writings. Nevins shows some evidence of independent study in that respect.

All that Seligman had done was to dress up crude economic determination in the garments of a philosophical concept. Whatever else it is, Seligman's ideas are not what they represent themselves to be, as the essence of historical Marxism. It is a striking commentary upon the scholarship of our professoriate that in their writings which have come to our attention, none has been able to detect the difference between the genuine contribution and the counterfeit representation.

This harsh judgment would be uncalled for were it not for the fact that Seligman, with the most laudable motives of an intellectual Samaritan, undertook to present Marxism to the world of American historical and philosophical thought. Let us first see what Seligman means by the economic interpretation of history. "We may state the thesis succinctly as follows," he writes. "The existence of man depends upon his ability to sustain himself; the economic life is, therefore, the fundamental condition of all life. Since human life however, is the life of man in society, individual existence moves within the framework of the social structure and is modified by it. What the conditions of maintenance are to the individual the similar relations of production and consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore, must be traced in the last instance those transformations in the structure of society which themselves condition the relations of social classes and the various manifestations of social life." [29]

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[28] Economic Interpretation of History—Seligman, p. 25.

That Seligman does not conceive of Marxism as crude economic determinism, but that moral, sentimental, ethical, in short ideological factors also play a role in history, is evident by his statement that the "economic interpretation of history means, not that the economic relations exert an exclusive influence, but that they exert a preponderant influence in shaping the progress of society." [30]

The fact that Seligman erected a straw man which he labeled Marxism,[31] and then proceeded to expose its shortcomings is no reflection upon Marx's dialectical materialism, but rather on the economic interpretation of history itself. "It does not explain all the niceties of human development," [32] he contends, "nor is it necessary to show that the individual is impelled by other motives than the economic one, and that the economic motive itself is not everywhere equally strong or equally free from the admixture of other influences. A full analysis of all the motives that influence men, even in their economic life, would test the powers of the social psychologist. There is no 'economic man' just as there is no 'theological man.' " [33]

Neither is there a "sociological" man upon whom the psychologist is to work his ingenious tricks. It never penetrated through Seligman and the rest that Marx always talks of social relations and social laws and that the individuals who are brought within their scope by the relations of production must act and re-act upon each other due to the mode of operation of the factors of production, circulation and reproduction on the basis of the dominant economy. That does not preclude individual idiosyncrasies, hopes, dreams, aspirations. It only means that the philosopher as well as the moron who are compelled by the necessities of their individual existence to apply to the Ford Motor Car Company for work as unskilled, common labor, must conform to the processes of its economy, and both will—probably the moron before the philosopher—re-act to the C.I.O. efforts to organize them for the betterment of the conditions of their employment as to wages, hours, speed-up and other problems of the job.

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[29] Economic Interpretation of History—Seligman, p. 3.

[30] Ibid., p. 67. [31] Ibid. p. 70. [32] Ibid. p. 157. [33] Ibid. p. 152.

Marx deals with masses, but he knows also they are not an amorphous, polyglot lot. He, too, strange as it may seem to our bright young moderns, was cognizant of the fact that man is not born a blank; that he has a rich heritage behind and before him which he inherits and acquires; that religion, morality, ethical conceptions, propaganda, race, politics, nationalism, prejudice, love, hatred, fear and all the rest are vital elements which enter into the motivations of that glorious complex we call man. Marx did not speak in terms of absolutes.

He would never be guilty of such nonsense as Seligman puts into his mouth; namely, that "the existence of man depends upon his ability to sustain himself." With the biting sarcasm of which he was master, Marx demonstrated that the physical bases for existence are alike the nature-imposed necessity of all living things, but as for man, only under definite social conditions, themselves the result of a long process of development, is the labor of providing the means of existence for certain groups within society relegated as the obligation of all the rest, and that this is effected by the relations of the respective classes in the productive processes.

This conception of Marx is infinitely richer in content than the mechanism of the straight-line evolutionists who deal with absolute processes independent of human will, be that intelligently or stupidly directed. Marx's whole political life showed him as deeply concerned with all the varied manifestations of human nature, as his correspondence with Engels amply proves.

Seligman writes that "there is not only an economic interpretation of history, but an ethical, an aesthetic, a political, a jural, a linguistic, a religious and a scientific interpretation of history." [34] Marx would have shown him, had he taken the trouble to master his writings, how our ethical, moral, political and jural concepts are shaped, molded, modified and determined by the relations of production which dominate a given society, as he so richly demonstrated by his and Engels' analysis of Greek, medieval and modern society. As for language, Marx would have proven that on the basis of capitalist economy, the language of Japanese, American, British, French, or German imperialism is the same whether it is expressed in yens, dollars, pounds, francs or marks together with their military accompaniments, their diplomacy, propaganda and excuses for war.

As for religion and science, both have long ago proven themselves the willing handmaiden of the dominant classes be it Shintoism, Catholicism or Judaism, and skepticism, atheism or mechanism. For one discovery Seligman is to be congratulated. The newer spirit of history emphasizes not so much the constitutional as the institutional side in development.[35] All he had to do was to show just how those institutions developed and he would have had little difficulty in explaining the rest with the aid of Marx's historical use of the dialectics of Hegel.

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[34] Economic Interpretation of History—Seligman, p. 153.

HISTORICAL SCIENCE RENDERS EXPLICABLE THE CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Sooner or later we must get down to the notion that at any given time society is an aggregate with a definite structure held together in a definite manner. Whether one begins with its institutions, its economy, its juridical and ideological superstructure, a scientific history of society, no matter with what particular aspect of its manifestations one begins, the process of analysis and consequently the results would have to be the same. Every beginning is arbitrary, as in a circle, yet the cycle, wherever it begins, would have to end at the starting point. No one could write a really scientific work on modern conceptions in religion, art, science or philosophy without involving himself in the material basis of our mode of existence.

Religion, art, science and the rest existed before capitalism became the dominant mode of production in the world economy, but it can readily be demonstrated how each and all of them have been modified by the requirements of capitalist economy; and conversely, it can be shown how tradition, religion and the other elements of a dominating culture in certain parts of the globe have hampered or inhibited the development of capitalism. The first test of a valid theory of history is to show how changes are brought about within the social structure, and what holds it together; in short, to explain the laws of motion which produce the particular events which it is the business of history to record.

At the very point where Seligman's analysis ought to begin, he washes his hands of the problem. He stoutly maintains that historical science differs in essence not a whit from any other science, except in degree of its complexity.[36] "No monistic interpretation of humanity is possible," he concludes, "until that most difficult of all studies—sociology—succeeds in finally elaborating the laws of its existence and their vindicating its claim to be a real science." [37] In that case our work would be fruitless, for there are no final, absolute laws of social existence but only laws of motion developed from definite conditions of historical development and are consequently of relative validity. Seligman did not know what to look for and it is not surprising that he did not meet face to face the substance of an elusive abstraction whose shadow he was chasing around the block.

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[35] Economic Interpretation of History—Seligman, p. 164.

[36] Ibid., pp. 102-3.

[37] Ibid., p. 159.

SELIGMAN ON HISTORICAL DIALECTICS

When he did meet something in the concrete in the shape of Marx's handling of the dialectical processes, he did not know what to do with it. Instead of admitting frankly his dilemma in not grasping the essence of the dialectical method, he blamed Marx for his own shortcomings, or at least his unwillingness to master the details of its very intricate, yet very real existence in the world of reality.

Nothing is more common among the intelligentsia than to write denunciations and caricatures of Marx's dialectical methods. That is the usual protective armament of lesser thinkers. It is so easy to poke fun at the ancient origin of this process of demonstration and at the old, medieval use of that method of disputation. Yet nothing in life is more real than the Hegel-Marx conception of the dialectical process in its universality. One cannot read a single page in a modern work of physics without discovering that it deals with polar bodies united by their antagonistic relations in a definite field.

Of course, it is all very obscure to those who do not care to master those writers. Nor are there lacking those who don't know, who deny there is anything to learn, and who denounce as obscurantists, fools, and worse, those who persist in proclaiming that to which they stubbornly close their eyes. Seligman does that very thing. At the very outset of his analysis he tells us Marx was a disciple of Hegel, and that "the fundamental conception of the Hegelian dialectic is that of process or development by the union of opposites—a method that advances from notion to notion through negation. In all logic we begin with a half truth, we proceed to its opposite, which is equally false; and we then combine them into a third, which shows that they are equally true, when considered as necessary constituents of the whole." [38]

One gnashes one's teeth at such consummate nonsense which has paraded for thirty-seven years as the acme of Marxian criticism. Let any one show where Hegel, Marx or any responsible thinker before or after them ever deliberately foisted upon the world the notion that if one begins with a half truth and combines it with an opposite which is equally false, the result is a truth of which a half truth and a falsehood are necessary ingredients! If any one could point to a single line in any passage of Marx's writings where he subscribed, let alone indulged in that species of idiocy, then we, for one, would be ready to vote Herr Hitler a hearty commendation for consigning Marx's works to be burned in the public square.

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[38] Economic Interpretation of History—Seligman, pp. 17-18.

To Marx, dialectics was essentially a form of internal motion created by bodies existing in a definite relation toward each other, and where in their reaction each underwent transformations within their own structure while affecting and modifying its opposite. Marx did not indulge in empty abstractions. Life itself was the ultimate test of his theories while the nature of these reactions was the absorbing topic of his monumental 'Capital.' If theory did not coincide with reality he modified his theories and not the other way around.

There was not a single element of his dialectical method which he did not develop out of the actual processes of society itself. But he did not label his conclusions as dialectical or anything else, although when Hegel was being kicked around by the intelligentsia of Germany, Marx, long after he had outgrown his master and assumed a stature of his own which surpassed in magnitude that of his great teacher, did not hesitate to proclaim himself a pupil of that mighty thinker.[39]

Marx did more than coquette with Hegelian formulae, as he puts it. His economic theories are based upon the analysis of the dialectical processes within capitalist economy. We have noted in his writing while dealing with the actual processes of production-exchange-reproduction no less than one hundred and ninety-five internal contradictions within capitalist economy which Marx points out, and he has not exhausted the count by any means. In that apparently simple propaganda pamphlet, The "Communist Manifesto" by Marx, to which most of the reading of the intelligentsia in Marxism is usually confined, twenty-two basic internal contradictions of capitalism are analyzed, only one of which is the class struggle. Marxism is not a cut-and-dried ritual with its peculiar sacramental formulae, but a living, throbbing reality deriving its ideas from the processes of life itself. Marx proclaimed in his Capital that "it is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society." [40] What Seligman gave us in his Economic Interpretation of History was Marxism without dialectics, and that is equivalent to presenting Shakespeare's "Hamlet" minus the Prince of Denmark.

FAILURE OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM TO EXPLAIN HISTORICAL MOVEMENT

People who are indifferent to modifications of form and function, so vital to every scientific analysis, cannot be heard to complain when the pseudo-philosophic economic interpretation of history, which Seligman assures us is synonymous with "historical materialism" or the "materialistic interpretation of history" [41] is washed down to pure and simple economic determinism. Despite all Beard's protests against that abomination,[42] that is what he himself ultimately resorts to in his simple formula: Look for the economic interest, and there you find the devil. His recent "America in Midpassage" is replete with instances where, to him, the establishment of an economic interest is the decisive factor because it is the all-important consideration of human activity.

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[39] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, p. 25.

[40] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, p. 14.

Here are a few typical illustrations: The opposition general among Southern Democrats in Congress against President Roosevelt's plan to reconstitute the Supreme Court was due principally to the New Deal's efforts to push through an hour and wage bill to abolish the low differentials of the South, which placed its developing industry in a more favorable competitive position toward the North with its entrenched labor unions, labor laws and labor standard commissions.[43] America's foreign policy is dominated by its economic interests, and war preparations and appropriations are stimulated principally by munitions manufacturers.[44] The bankers controlled American governmental lending, refunding and financing policies which drove this country into war, inflation, crisis and depression.[45] American trade and tariff policies were dominated by manufacturers and bankers.[46] American art faithfully reflected the whim, the mood and temperament of the prevailing economic state of the nation, whether in prosperity or in chaos.[47] American science similarly reacted in definite terms to the needs and requirements of American industry, prospering when it prospered, languishing when it languished.[48] Likewise American engineering and technical skill.[49]

That there exists an intimate relationship between the economy and the ideology is self-evident. But it is a far different proposition when the economic basis in that relationship is made the exclusive or all-determining element in the process. This straight-line historical mechanism cannot account for the fact that certain elements are at work within the component parts of the social organization which eventually transforms, under favorable conditions, the entire social structure.

Artists will produce moving and absorbing creations to stir man on

[41] Economic Interpretation of History—Seligman, p. 3.

[42] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, p. 124; and America in Midpassage, p. 915.

[43] America in Midpassage—Beard, pp. 351-2.

[44] Ibid. pp. 382-94.

[45] Ibid. pp. 417-20.

[46] Ibid. pp. 455-8; 481-5.

[47] Ibid. p. 802.

[48] Ibid. p. 822.

[49] Ibid. p. 839.

to unwonted exertions. Scientists will wrack their brains and devise processes in spite of red ink in corporation ledgers. Trade and tariff policies will still be shaped in a measure by statesmen who live with the sonorous phrases of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster. Southern statesmen, while not impervious to the needs of a resuscitated industrial South, still remember the scars of Civil War and Reconstruction, while the modern Monroe Doctrine, shaped and shifted far beyond the form of its originator, still bears a recognizable resemblance in the mental images conjured up by the leaders of contemporary thought.

Economic determinism is a tremendous factor, but the man who would not be done out of a dollar in a business deal, will still lay down his life in a war of whose origin or aim he does not possess the slightest conception. Boas properly warned us against the very oversimplification in history which is the end result of its economic interpretation.

B. Other Writers On the Economic Factor in History

PRESCOTT ON THE DECAY OF FEUDALISM

Not only does the economic interpretation of history fail to meet the essential test of a scientific theory in respect of its sufficiency in explaining the phenomena of its particular field; it does not even possess the intriguing merit of originality. For example, Prescott, who subscribed to the "great leader" formula of history, was nonetheless deeply aware of the underlying relationship subsisting between the material basis of society and its political reflexes.

Though not a philosophical historian in the particular sense, still Prescott saw and described the reasons for the decay of feudalism and the rise of modern society. "The close of the fifteenth century," he wrote, "presents, on the whole, the most striking point of view in modern history; one from which we may contemplate the consummation of an important revolution in the structure of political society, and the first application of several inventions destined to exercise the widest influence on human civilization. The feudal institutions or rather the feudal principle, which operated even where the institutions, strictly speaking, did not exist, after having wrought its appointed uses, had gradually fallen into decay; for it had not the power of accommodating itself to the increased demands and improved condition of society. However, well-suited to a barbarous age, it was found that the distribution of power among the members of an independent aristocracy, was unfavorable to that degree of personal security and tranquillity indispensable to great proficiency in the higher arts of civilization. It was equally repugnant to the principle of patriotism, so essential to national independence, but which must have operated feebly among a people, whose sympathies, instead of being concentrated on the state were claimed by a hundred masters, as was the case in every feudal community." [50]

No economic determinist or advocate of the materialist conception of history could add much to this description of why feudalism had to yield to a centralized nationalist state in the face of the developing mercantilism maturing into a capitalistic mode of production. Later Prescott adds: "This, indeed, was the direction in which all the governments of Europe, at this period, were tending. The people, wisely preferring a single master to a multitude, sustained the crown in its efforts to recover from the aristocracy the enormous powers it so grossly abused. This was the revolution of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The power thus deposited in a single hand, was found in time equally incompatible with the great ends of civil government; while it gradually accumulated to an extent which threatened to crush the monarchy by its own weight." [51] Here again we have the description, if not the recognition, of internal contradictions operating within a given historical field which would have delighted the dialectical heart of Marx had he been familiar with Prescott's writings.

BUCKLE ON THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

There is no question of Buckle recognizing the significance of the facts which demonstrated to him the material basis of historical phenomena. The great English Rebellion, he points out, was as much a war of classes as well as of factions, with the yeomanry and traders adhering to the parliament while the nobles and clergy rallied round the throne.[52] Even Cromwell admitted that the origin of the Civil War was not altogether religious in nature.[53]

This leads Buckle to soliloquize on the larger aspects of the economic forces in history. "This antagonism between the aristocratic and trading spirit, lies in the nature of things, and is essential, however it may be disguised at particular periods. Therefore, it is, that the history of trade has a philosophic importance in reference to the progress of society, quite independent of practical considerations." [54]

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[50] Ferdinand and Isabella—Prescott, Vol. II, p. 16.

[51] Ferdinand and Isabella—Prescott, Vol. II, p. 361.

[52] History of Civilization in England—Buckle, Vol. I, p. 469.

[53] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 259—note from Carlyle's Work on Cromwell.

[54] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 245.

As a sequel to this political revolution, he describes the development of that self-same English colonial trade policy which led eventually to our own revolutionary struggle.[55]

To Spencer modern imperialism, with its employment of force, meant a re-barbarization of society because it violated the sanctity of his evolutionary synthesis which called for a peaceful federation; [56] but both Buckle and Spencer agree on their recognition of the economic basis upon which were developed the various phases of imperialist world policy.

BANCROFT ON THE ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Even Bancroft, while assuring us that "all the stars in their courses were harbingers of American independence," [57] feels it necessary to submit further proof for the consideration of those who cannot hope to attain his proficiency in deciphering their configurations. Therefore, he submits conclusive evidence in the form of the economic conflict between American importers and producers as against English exporters and manufacturers as the effective and immediate cause of the conflict.[58] He even interposes evidence to prove that the English merchants whose trade was interrupted by the uncertainties preceding the actual outbreak of the conflict did time and again petition Parliament for a peaceful composure of their differences with the colonies.[59]

H. G. Wells gives us an economic interpretation of the growth of the powers of the Commons branch of Parliament and its gradual ascendancy to a position of dominance in English constitutional history.[60]

Professor Schlesinger, whose catholicity in paying equal respect to all theories of history, regardless of their merit, is akin to imperial Rome's recognition of all religions, regardless of their virtue, accepts economic determinism among a host of others.[61] The good professor, however, since he has little of sound theory to contribute, tries his hand at further mystification by devising a more intricate nomenclature. His reference to the South's economy as "a semi-feudal order of society based on slavery" [62] is jarring to ears attuned to the exactness, as well as to the logic, of scientific differentiation. At no time, before or after the Civil War did the legal and social relations of feudalism ever exist in the South even in modified form. If a Negro could be separated from the soil on which he was born and sold to another master, he was not a serf, and the social relations in the South were not feudal in nature. The wage-laborer may be tied down to a tiresome job for a life-time by a thousand and one circumstances without becoming a slave of his employer, though he may be a slave to his job. The fact of the Negro's sale to a different plantation, made him a slave, and not a serf, for the serf belonged to the land and could not be dissociated from it.

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[55] History of Civilization in England—Buckle, Vol. II, pp. 245-6.

[56] Facts and Comments—Spencer, p. 159.

[57] History of the United States—Bancroft, Vol. IV, p. 21.

[58] Ibid. Vol. IV, pp. 261, 307, 346, 407-10.

[59] Ibid. Vol. IV, pp. 428, 462, 562.

[60] Outline of History—Wells, pp. 774-83.

[61] New Viewpoints in American History—Schlesinger, Ch. III.

[62] Political and Social Growth of the United States—Schlesinger, p. 121.

Of the same order is Schlesinger's employment of the term "cotton capitalism" to the slave economy of the South before the Civil War,[63] when he knows, or ought to have known, that the prime consideration of the economic order denominated as capitalism is the private ownership of the means of production on the one hand, and the periodic sale of labor-power by the worker to the employer on the other. Under slavery, labor itself in the living form of the slave is part and parcel of the means of production and is purchased lock, stock and barrel instead of piecemeal by the day, as is the labor of the wage-worker.

Certain apologists of slavery were quick to point out that the beneficent slave-owner took care of his means of production in good times and bad, in sickness as in health, whereas the "free" laborer often walked the streets in fruitless search of a purchaser for his labor power. Yet this glittering analogy failed to impress Northern labor despite its philosophical subtlety, though white workers were not at all metaphysicians. Historians will have to learn to be as precise in the employment of their terms as is the mathematician and the physicist.

FISKE AND MCMASTER ON THE ECONOMIC FACTOR IN HISTORY

Such staid historians as Fiske and McMaster were not strangers to the economic factor in history.

Fiske points out that the conflicts over trade and jurisdiction between the states under the Articles of Confederation had brought about a condition of thirteen independent sovereignties before every one of which the Continental Congress appeared in the difficult dual role of a leader and a supplicant. From the standpoint of a cohesive nationality, we were drifting into anarchy.[64] States levied duties and erected tariffs against each other. Conflicting navigation laws were passed, applying both to foreign and coastal trade. The feeling of local patriotism was strong and jealousy among the states even stronger.

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[63] Ibid. p. 27; also used with a similar meaning on pages 31 and 100.

[64] The Critical Period of American History—Fiske, Ch. IV.

It was at this critical time that steps were taken to organize a national trade convention. "This was the beginning of that movement," writes McMaster, "which went on step by step in a direct and unbroken progression to the establishment of our present government. From this motion came the National Trade Convention at Annapolis in 1786. From the Annapolis Convention of 1786 came the Philadelphia Convention of May, 1787; and from the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 came the Constitution under which we live."[65] Here we have the plodding McMaster's answer in detail in 1883 to the question Beard asked in 1913 as to whether the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had definite knowledge of economic affairs, "or were working merely under the guidance of abstract principles of political science."[66]

No permanent political organization is possible, history amply demonstrates, unless it meets the definite social requirements of those forces which were instrumental in creating it, and maintaining it. There is too much vital to life at stake. The formation of a strong central government by the very men who had but recently won for it the boon of independence after an unprecedented struggle against a central authority, was something more than the organization of a national philosophical society for the abstract discussion of imponderables. The delegates to the Convention were, above all, practical men who reacted to the varied realities of the given historical situation.

McMaster was a painstaking and unimaginative student of the facts of American history. He could not help perceiving the close ties that subsisted between the economic needs of a changing empire and its constitutional forms. "That the financial, the industrial, the economic conditions through which the people were passing, that their changed ideas of the duties of the State, their juster conceptions of the social and political rights of man, their struggle for a better life, should find expression in their constitutions of government, as well as in the statute-books, was inevitable. The two decades from 1830 to 1850, and especially that from 1840 to 1850, therefore, make a period notable for constitutional reform."[67] His list of such reforms garnered from the various State constitutions is impressive evidence of the important fact that in a progressively developing society legal conceptions follow the modifications in the economic sub-structure of society, and do not precede it.

[65] History of the People of the United States—McMaster, Vol. I, p. 277.

[66] Previously quoted from Beard's work on the Constitutional Convention.

[67] History of the People of the United States—McMaster, Vol. VII, p. 162.

Had McMaster been equally endowed with the faculty of philosophic generalization, as he was with the infinite patience of the factual scholar, he would have observed that such progress in the economy and the adaptation of constitutional form do not proceed in parallel lines to eternity; that there comes a time when social forces meet and clash, and that the outcome of the struggle determines whether progress is to be continued on a higher synthesis, or whether a stalemate and stagnation is to set in, wherein historical processes are stopped or may even be reversed. The period of history which engaged his efforts afford ample proof of the development of internal clashes and stresses within the elements constituting American society, resulting in the climactic conflict of the Civil War. It is significant that his great work ends at the very threshold of the struggle toward which all the events of his eight volumes were pointing.

Another writer, as Rhodes actually did, could start the treadmill all over again, and build his work around the Civil War issues, but as we noted previously, those issues faded before the onrush of new streams of events dictated by a different mode of life in an expanding capitalist economy. Rhodes, too, was compelled to acknowledge first bewilderment, and then his defeat in the face of this new phenomena.

Despite the learned advice of Professor Fling on the writing of history, periods in history cannot be arbitrarily selected by the historian and developed in accordance with a subjective scheme. There must be recognized an inherent and coherent relationship within an historical period, a relationship which must be demonstrated by the facts themselves. Consequently, this eliminates the question of arbitrary selection. But most important of all, there must be discovered the internal laws of motion which govern the organization of the social structure if one is to develop a symphonic theme in history instead of a grotesque cacophony in the shape of an inchoate mass of events.

HILDRETH ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC MOTIVE

Hildreth was an historian of the classical mold. He had no theories to advance. He was strictly factual and thorough in the extent of his search for material, and withal, strongly partisan in his convictions. This is no offense in an historian, any more than in any other scientist who is faithful to his creed, provided it is well-grounded. Where partisanship is allowed to blur the judgment, it defeats its own ends. No historian can escape a deep interest in his subject, but any attempt to color his presentation must result in disaster through distortion of the factors involved.

Hildreth was what we would term rabidly anti-slavery, yet he gives a clear account of the economic factors which caused its introduction into the colonies. He cites an interesting ancient South Carolina statute on that subject: "Whereas the plantations and estates of this province cannot be well and sufficiently managed and brought into use without the labor and service of negro and other slaves; and forasmuch as the said negroes and other slaves brought unto the people of this province for that purpose are barbarous, wild, savage natures, and such as renders them wholly unqualified to be governed by the laws, customs, and practices of this province. . . ." [68] The basis of slavery is stated first quite frankly; its justification follows by the familiar process of subjective rationalization.

The very material conditions of life which caused slavery to flourish because it was profitable in the South, militated against its development on New England's infertile soil. "But though starting, in these respects, from a common basis," writes Hildreth, referring to the moral acceptance originally of the principle of slavery in both Puritanical New England and Cavalier Virginia, "the operation of different causes early produced different effects, resulting in a marked difference of local character. The want in New England of any staple product upon which hired or purchased labor could be profitably employed, discouraged immigration and the importation of indentured servants or slaves. Hence the population soon became, in a great measure, home-born and home-bred." [69] Hildreth wrote long before Beard, yet that sterling economic interpreter of history never penned more expressive or succinct lines.

Washington himself was not a stranger to the stimulating possibilities of economic determinism when the effects of profiteering by some of the revolutionary forefathers were brought to his attention. Writing to Reed, President of Pennsylvania in 1779, he stated: "It gives me very sincere pleasure to find that the Assembly is so well disposed to second your endeavors in bringing those murderers of our cause, the monopolizers, forestallers and engrossers, to condign punishment. It is much to be lamented that each state, long ere this, has not hunted them down as pests to society, and the greatest enemies we have to the happiness of America. I would to God that some one of the more atrocious in each state was hung in gibbets upon a gallows five times as high as the one prepared for Haman. No punishment, in my opinion, is too severe for the man who can build his greatness upon his country's ruin." [70]

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[68] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. II, pp. 271-2.

[69] Ibid. Vol. I, p. 508.

[70] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. III, p. 272.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF AMERICAN SECTIONALISM

All historians are agreed that the invention of the cotton gin together with the development of the power loom in the working up of the raw material produced a profound change in the divergent historical development of the North and the South.

McMaster gives us a faithful picture of the transformations which were effected. "To the many causes of misunderstanding," he writes, "which were thus springing up between the North and West on the one hand, and the South on the other, and were fast making them two separate nations, must be added yet another directly due to the industrial revolution through which the country was passing. Never before in our history had the contrast been so marked. The invention of the Whitney gin had made cotton-growing wonderfully profitable. The inventions of Hargreaves, Crompton and Arkwright had stimulated the demand for cotton, and these two conditions combined—the existence of a market and the possibility of supplying it with ease at a profit—had already made cotton-planting the one absorbing industry of the South."[71]

The South became a predominantly one-crop country. Everything depended on its success. All capital gravitated toward it. Arts and sciences were neglected. Her great natural resources of coal and iron and timber were left virtually untouched. One-third of its crop was sold to the North, the rest to Great Britain. If ever an ideal field was prepared for the investigation of the scientific historian, it existed in the South from 1800 to 1861, with the contemporary development in its own field for the North. No economic interpretation of their mutual antagonism could account for the depth of their cleavage, nor for the bitterness their conflicting ideologies engendered.

Bimba, in his Communist Party-sponsored history, gives the official orthodox account of the economic determinist school; the conflict between the wage-labor system of the North and the slavery system of the South for conquest of state power; manufacturing versus agricultural interests; protective tariff against free trade.[72]

The fact is that capitalist economy in the North during the years from 1830 to 1860 when the abolitionist movement began to make headway, was still in its infancy. By far the greater proportion of the population was employed in agriculture, chiefly on their own farms, or in petty industry. Mass production, of course, was non-existent; therefore, production was limited to the visible prospective market.

[71] History of the People of the United States—McMaster, Vol. V, p. 227.

[72] History of the American Working Class—Bimba, pp. 115-17.

The tariff was an issue, but not even the wildest-eyed Southerner would dream of war over it, nor would any of Clay's supporters of the American System for building up the nation's industries.

South Carolina threatened nullification of a Federal tariff act, and the Southerner Jackson was quick to resent nullification as secession. But the tariff issue cloaked far graver questions. All this was in 1832-33. By the time 1860 had arrived all other issues were swamped before the tremendous ground-swell generated by the slavery question.

It was a moral question, by that time, let economic determinists say what they will. Its antecedents were grounded in the conflicting ideologies of a capitalist economy and a slave economy. It was not in the economic interests of either of the contending parties to resort to war in the ultimate arbitrament of the "irrepressible conflict." Yet neither side shrank from the issue. Every possible compromise had been tried and exhausted, even the one of letting matters remain as they were for the rest of eternity by a proposed iron-clad constitutional amendment.

There is no eternity in history, and puny, mortal man, knowing his time on earth is limited, will ever attempt to mortgage the entire future in order to serve his limited present purpose. Succeeding generations seldom express gratitude for this forethought of their ancestors when these provisions are found to be inconsistent with the demands of their own time. No economic determinism can account for the Civil War. But a scientifically valid theory of history must do so or confess its inadequacy with the rest.

CARLYLE, THE IDEALIST, RECOGNIZED THE EXISTENCE OF ECONOMIC FACTORS

Even an idealist historian like Carlyle cannot ignore economic factors, but they are the superficial ripples he observes, neglecting the while the tremendous upsurge of social forces too long held in restraint by a decaying feudalism. He speaks of the frightful hailstorm in July of 1788 which completed the ruin of whatever crop had survived the drought.[73] A hard winter followed,[74] trade stagnated,[75] the public treasury was more than usually empty,[76] and the taxes more than usually crushing.[77] Carlyle is the supreme dramatist in history, and his gripping work should not be read after dinner by people with delicate digestions, or those who suffer from that type of insomnia

[73] The French Revolution—Carlyle, p. 87.

[74] Ibid. p. 96. [75] Ibid. p. 99. [76] Ibid. p. 53. [77] Ibid. p. 179.

which leads to nightmares. Yet, tense, dramatic narrative does not make a history, though that work supplies sufficient factual material to develop a tolerable understanding of that overwhelming event in the history of France and of the world in general.

Some sentimental historians would make of the monarch who was the victim of the French Revolution a gratuitous benefactor of the earlier American Revolution which his government had aided with men and money. Even mawkish sentimentality is a factor to be reckoned with in history, but it is too weak-kneed, too evanescent to furnish the staying qualities out of which the permanent record of man is cast.

It is one thing to recognize the significance of the economic factor in history; it is a far different thing to make that the explain-all of history. For the question still remains unanswered: How did those economic conditions arise? One soon comes up against a problem like the Civil War or the Revolutionary War, not to speak of events more recent, where the economic explanation ceases to explain anything, not the least being the surface froth of events which seem to entangle men in a hopeless maze.

A recent writer on the Supreme Court, Alfange, in discussing the decision on a case involving state control over economic enterprise, arrives at the conclusion in the best modernistic manner that "it was demonstrated once more that a principle of law can be put to varied uses and that constitutional interpretation cannot be dissociated from the economic and political realities of a given period of history." [78] If all that Alfange is trying to tell us is that the Supreme Court does not live in a vacuum, Chief Justice Hughes and others long ago observed that very fact. But if the learned commentator is attempting to convey the idea that economic forces are as effective in shaping the Court's outlook on life, as they do everybody else's, that laws are living realities despite the cold type of the statute books, and that they must be interpreted in the light of the phenomena through which they manifest themselves, he is simply repeating an oft-told tale.

C. Speculative Conceptions of History

THE "IF" INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

Foremost among the obstacles in the way of establishing the concept of law in history is the "if" theory of interpretation. One meets with it at every turning and in the most unexpected places. "If," says

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[78] The Supreme Court and the National Will—Alfange, p. 102.

Pascal, "Cleopatra's nose had been shorter, the whole face of the earth would have been different."[79] The world, then, is what it is today by a nose. If beauty is not skin deep, surely that method of interpreting history is.

There are many variations of the same theme. A staid financial writer states in the columns reserved for the cream of the American brain crop that if the Federal Reserve System had not existed during 1915-17, our whole economic fabric might have been rent asunder,[80] and were it not for Carter Glass, grass would probably by now be growing even in the subterranean passages where New York's subway trains thunder.

That astute American statesman, but commonplace historian, Alexander Hamilton, wrote learnedly on how the entire course of Greek history was modified by the influence of a prostitute over Pericles; how the ambition of Cardinal Wolsey diverted the course of England, and the bigotry of Madam de Maintenon that of France; and draws from his dissertation the conclusion that "to multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances, and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature, will not stand in need of such lights, to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency."[81]

Hamilton would have been much nearer the point if he had said that only those who possess but a superficial acquaintance with the sources of history would ascribe its deep-running currents to the whims, the foibles and the petty ambitions of the really great or the so-called great. No one denies the tremendous role played by individuals in history, but no one yet has played a symphony by himself, not even a Toscanini. Social factors may be a new concept in history, but society is of ancient standing, and more or less respectable in origin. The latter idea was only beginning to germinate at the time when Hamilton and his associates were writing their papers for The Federalist.

CONFLICTING VIEWS CONCERNING THE SAME "IF" IN HISTORY

McMaster, with all his unimaginative smugness cannot help but relapse into the "if" thinking current among the workers of his

[79] Quoted by Nordau in his Interpretation of History, p. 4.

[80] New York Times, Nov. 20, 1939.

[81] The Federalist—No. VI, by Hamilton, p. 23-4.

field. "One gun from Sumter would have changed the current of events,"[82] he declares, when discussing the circumstance which led to the surrender of that Federal fort to the troops of South Carolina in 1861. It is so easy to sit back and speculate upon possibilities, especially when one's imagination is free from limitations fixed by the concrete realities.

Neither McMaster nor any one else can tell just how the current of events would have been changed by an early show of Northern resistance to secession by force. Rhodes believes, quite contrary to McMaster, that "Davis had good reason to regret that matters so fell out that the South became the aggressor; while Lincoln might well thank his stars for that blunder, since it gave him in his time of trouble a united North."[83] The same event is to Rhodes a blessing, to McMaster a disaster. Toss a coin and take your choice. Of such is the present state of history.

Historical speculators are not concerned with the logic of their theoretical conceptions. Once admit their premise of accident, chance and indeterminacy, and they are no longer interested in the particular outcome of their speculations. But that is precisely what we are not willing to concede. Particular events may be within the absolute control of an individual, but historical events are too wide in their inter-connections to be absolutely determinable by individual will or caprice.

Whether the commander, Anderson, at Fort Sumter had fired an answering shot or not, the surrounding circumstances were such that it could not have made any difference as regards the immediate and ultimate issues involved—secession and slavery. The implications of those issues were too deep to have been resolved by whether or not an answering gun had been fired by the Federal fort at Charleston harbor at a critical moment in history.

In the present state of historical writing, it is not surprising to see the same writer ascribe opposite effects as emanating from the same cause. Henry Adams cannot refrain from the familiar soliloquy as to what would have been the course of history "if—." In this instance, the big "if" is Fulton and his steamboat. It is men like him, Adams asserts, who veritably "dragged society forward."[84] The 17th of August, 1807, marked "the beginning of a new era in America—a date which separated the colonial from the independent stage of growth, for on that day, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the steamboat

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[82] History of the People of the United States—McMaster, Vol. VIII, p. 508.

[83] History of the United States—Rhodes, Vol. III, p. 351.

[84] History of the United States—Adams, Vol. I, pp. 69-70.

Clermont with Robert Fulton in command started on her first voyage." [85]

Yet nothing is more certain to history than that, Fulton or no Fulton, the steamboat was on its way. Adams himself gives ample evidence of that fact [86] in the many independent sources on two continents where experiments in steam navigation were being pursued with that monomaniacal intensity which characterizes the inventor, and causes substantial citizens to look at him quizzically and tap their heads significantly.[87]

Twenty years before a Frenchman had steamed down the Saone in a little boat while about the same time a mechanically-propelled boat with paddle wheels was the object of John Fitch's labors on a small Pennsylvania stream. Yet Adams laments that the intellectual effort of appreciating the importance of the steamboat was beyond the capacity or genius of the people who went on their way with unconcern, or if concerned, went their way on the sailing packet or the flat boat.[88]

But when the material conditions of life in America called for speedy, safe and economical river transportation in bulk, Fulton's boat multiplied its progeny a thousand-fold, with the latest generation of the brood scarcely cognizant of its lineal descent in all but its common function. This is no belittling of Fulton's or anybody else's genius. It is simply a recognition of the fact that neither genius nor law develops in a vacuum. "History has nothing to do with law except to record the development of legal principles," [89] declared Adams. He himself tried, however, to do something more than merely record the facts of technological advancement.

Adams was unsuccessful in his professed goal as an historian because he did not perceive that underlying all its phenomena was the structure of society itself, which had not only to be described but understood, and the forces of its internal motion analyzed, before any deep-seated, rational interpretation could be attached to the events which are the common brick of history. Of course, when in a quandary, there is always the final resort of lifting one's eyes heavenward and uttering in guttural tones the sententious observation of Beard that "some things seem to be deeply rooted in the very constitution of the universe." [90] That is equivalent to a child's "because."

It is anomalous that the historian who does not hesitate to hide behind the screen of the inscrutable ways of Providence when in doubt, is very relentless in smoking out our modern scientists from the same refuge when they could not give him a satisfactory reply to his searching questions. "Indeed," Beard writes, "science was now so enthroned in America that it became a kind of dogmatic religion itself whose votaries often behaved in the manner of theologians, pretending to possess the one true key to the riddle of the universe." [91] We have already observed that his own famous pass-key to the riddle of history was an unsatisfactory contrivance, resulting in the final helpless surrender to that paragon of clarity, "those things deeply rooted in the very constitution of the universe."

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[85] Ibid. Vol. IV, pp. 134-5.

[86] Ibid. Vol. I, pp. 70-3.

[87] History of the People of the United States—McMaster, Vol. I, p. 222.

[88] History of the United States—Adams, Vol. IV, p. 135.

[89] Ibid. Vol. IV, p. 265.

[90] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. II, pp. 147-8.

DIVERSITY OF OPINION CONCERNING VARIOUS AMERICAN HISTORY POSSIBILITIES

One of the commonest speculations among pseudo-statesmen and the mediocre type of historian is upon the question whether or not, in the long run, it would not have been cheaper for the North to buy the slaves and freeing them, instead of emancipating them through the terrible arbitrament of civil war. With such minds it is useless to reason. They can show with quite a fluster of learning that the financial reckoning of the war cost for the North, leaving out the element of human lives lost and suffering entailed, was much greater than the value of the slaves who were ultimately freed. This indeed, is a lesson for economic determinists to ponder upon. The plain arithmetic of the problem is all on their side. But what they have not learned is that history is not dominated by the same principles which govern a double-entry business ledger.

It has been suggested that if the South could have known the ultimate outcome of the struggle, it would have been amenable to such a proposal. We are, however, in the fortunate position of speaking not with the sublime certainty which comes after the event, but from the actual record of the struggle itself, that such an offer was made by Congress in April, 1862.[92]

Lincoln, in a private letter suggested a flat price of four hundred dollars per head.[93] Money was appropriated by the House to compensate the loyal slave-holders of Missouri, though it failed of adoption in the Senate.[94] It can be stated with certainty that the South would have rejected such a compromise even if they had known in advance what the ultimate outcome of the struggle would be. Hopeless battles to the bitter end are not stranger to the pages of history in the past, or history now in the making.

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[91] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 416.

[92] Political and Social Growth of the United States—Schlesinger, p. 89.

[93] History of the United States—Rhodes, Vol. III, pp. 631-3.

[94] Ibid. Vol. IV, p. 216.

After referring to the proposal of Crittenden and Corwin for gradual, compensated emancipation as eminently wise and philosophic—a proposal earnestly supported by Horace Greeley and the New York Tribune [95]—Rhodes concludes: "There is no doubt whatever, that the North would have been glad to agree to such a measure, and apply it to the cotton as well as to the border States. Had the Southern people known what the next four years were destined to bring forth, they would have voted for it to a man, but to urge a project of that kind upon men in their temper of mind in the winter of 1861, would have been to increase their irritation." [96]

This entire method of argument is rejected by the scientific historian. It is wrong in its premise, in its analysis and necessarily in its conclusion. Neither Rhodes nor any one else can tell how the South would have voted if they had known what the future had in store for them. If we know human nature at all, it is a much safer wager to assume that Southerners of 1861 were endowed with at least as much hauteur as impelled the supporters of every other foredoomed cause in history. Rhodes estimates the cost of compensated emancipation in all the slave States of four million slaves at $1,000 each to be four billion dollars. Atkinson figured the cost of the war at eight billion dollars.

The problem of all war is thus arithmetically solved for economic determinists. Now all they have to do is to take out pencil and paper and prove, beyond a doubt, that all the profits England or Germany could reap from fifty years of undisturbed world hegemony following a victory in the present conflict will not equal the bare cost of the struggle. Unfortunately such decisive proof will not accomplish its purpose because its conclusion is not based on the decisive premise.

They will have to learn how to distinguish between economic determinism and historical materialism. They will have to see how it is that the material conditions under which capitalist economy operates, can create an ideological superstructure which makes resort to force inevitable and at a cost far outweighing any possible material gains. No one at this late date entertains any illusions as to the probable gains for the so-called victors in the present conflict. Here is a dialectical contradiction with a vengeance, if one knows what Hegel and Marx meant by that conception of the historical process. Despite all knowing criticism this Hegel-Marxian dialectics really couldn't possibly make less "sense" than the present order of things.

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[95] Ibid. Vol. III, pp. 269-70.

[96] History of the United States—Rhodes, Vol. III, p. 271.

ATTITUDE OF SCIENCE TOWARD "IF" IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD

Science has long ago discarded the "if" in its field. It deals with the realities as they actually exist. The very fact that one thing and not another really occurred is accepted as proof that the other could not, under the existing relationship, have taken place. Cheyney can seriously speculate as to what would have happened to England, to Europe, to the world, to us here today if Spain's invincible Armada had not been dispersed by the winds off the shore of the tight little island.[97] But the fact is, it was dispersed. Any scheme of fanciful possibilities as to what would have been the result if the contrary had occurred, with England invaded, with the invaders safely entrenched, with the English government finally overthrown and all the other innumerable host of happenings which the mind can conjure up, meet with one single, decisive answer—It did not occur.

Science deals with facts, not ideas developed out of suppositions. History must go a step further, just as modern physics does, and inquire about the forces which bring forth those events. Knowing something about social forces will tell us why some of the things imagined could not have taken place because they were impossible, and others were so remote as to be extremely improbable.

A case in point is Schlesinger's reference to Secretary of State Stimson's doctrine promulgated in January, 1932, announcing America's policy of non-recognition of conquests brought about in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact on the part of any of its signatories. This declaration was called forth by Japan's policy in Manchuria which it later transformed into its puppet, Manchukuo. "Whether the 'Stimson Doctrine' would prove effective in the long run, only the future could disclose," Schlesinger concluded.[98] A scientist in any other field would be ashamed to father such a statement. It is, or should be, the business of the historian to know with what he deals in his own particular field in his own time. All the elements of the problem were before him when Schlesinger published his work.

Some of us analyzed the workings of the Kellogg-Briand Pact when it was first announced and proved, to our own satisfaction, why it

[97] Law in History—Cheyney, pp. 1-4.

[98] Political and Social Growth of the United States—Schlesinger, p. 459.

was not only a useless, but a dangerous gesture, since some people actually were being taken in by its declaration of outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. The historian of standing should feel the same hesitancy about hiding behind "the future will tell," as would the physicist or chemist where positive knowledge is required as to future happenings where the control is definite and the laws certain.

It is pointless to deny the existence of laws simply because one does not know them, or refuses to recognize them when they are exposed to his view. Of course, we all know now what was the sequel to the Stimson Doctrine. It may be that, after all, past territorial changes effected by force will not be recognized, due to a victory for England and her Allies. But it will not be because "war is no longer an instrument of national policy." War itself will have established that outcome. Nor will the Allies, if victorious, not take a leaf out of the Versailles aftermath or be at all squeamish about effecting some territorial changes of their own, where that will accord with their concept of national interests under the given historical set-up.

If the brilliant historian fails, not much can be said for those Wall and Broad Street statesmen, those wizards of finance, those veritable pillars of society, those master speculators on the future in whose good keeping God has entrusted the care of our economic order. One of them, Alexander D. Noyes, is typical of the rest. His analysis of the market situation created by the war is full of guesses, hesitations, double negatives, with an occasional slight affirmation flanked by a ninety-nine per cent retraction.[99] But these gentlemen cannot well be blamed. The every-day world grubbing along on thirty dollars a week, if lucky enough to have the boon of a job before this doubtful blessing of a war boom, looks up with awe at those who lightly speak in terms of billions, and with world-finance as their ordinary field of operation.

But in fact, they know of their subject even less than the historian does concerning his own, and perhaps the best comment passed upon these incessant balancers of future probabilities, is that of the late Senator Fletcher before whose Committee on Banking the bankers were called on parade after the debacle of 1933. After listening to all the more important of them during many tedious months of the hearing, his final verdict upon their alleged acumen was that outside of the market being tight or the market being easy, they did not know beans about that very finance before whose altar they were the High Priests.

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[99] New York Times—Nov. 20, 1939.

PROVIDENCE IN HISTORY

Bancroft stands forth as the undisputed champion of Providence in history. Unfortunately for mankind this impressive writer did not leave any record of how Providence communicates His will to the instruments of His destiny. But the facts must speak for themselves; when in doubt, there is always the Inscrutable Hand which dictated Fate, inexorable and unalterable.

With genuine heart-throb, Bancroft writes: "Who will venture to measure the consequences of actions by the humility or remoteness of their origin? The Power which enchains the destinies of states, overruling the decisions of sovereigns and the forethought of statesmen, often deduces the greatest events from the least considered causes. A Genoese adventurer, discovering America, changed the commerce of the world; an obscure German, inventing the printing press, rendered possible the universal diffusion of increased intelligence; an Augustine monk, denouncing indulgences, introduced a schism in religion and changed the foundations of European politics; a young French refugee, skilled alike in theology and civil law, in the duties of magistrates and dialectics of religious controversy, entering the republic of Geneva, and conforming its ecclesiastical discipline to the principles of republican simplicity, established a party, of which Englishmen became members, and New England the asylum." [100]

In this quotation we have a magnificent synthesis of six principal theories of history—God, Fate, Manifest Destiny, Chance, Accident and the Great Man. Yet without disparaging the genius of Columbus, Gutenberg, Luther or Calvin whom Bancroft singles out as the especial agents of the Divine Will, no one today will seriously contend that these great men were unaffected by the times in which they lived, of which they were a part, and in which they operated. Perhaps a closer statement would be that no responsible student would give serious consideration to the contrary contention, for there are not lacking those who actually raise that in this day and age.

Nevertheless the fact remains that the works of the great men whom Bancroft enumerated were none of them original in the historic sense. The new world was discovered before Columbus, the Chinese used movable type before Gutenberg, and the issues raised by Luther and Calvin had been voiced long before their time.

What was new and original was the historic setting in which these great men acted, the social conditions which gave prominence to their deeds and poignancy to their words; conditions which they inherited, and which their deeds helped to transform. Take from them their social background, and their life-work would have been impossible, their actions but evanescent, perhaps even their very existence unknown to mankind which today justly accords them genuine reverence.

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[100] History of the United States—Bancroft, Vol. I, p. 203.

The function of the historian therefore, is not to deposit his ignorance in the lap of Providence, but to bestir himself and find out what was the relation between genius and the time in which it prospered; to describe why and how it worked its effects, and to analyze in detail the inter-action between the great man and the society of his time. To undertake such an investigation is to recognize order in social organization, and therefore, law in history. Whether one endeavors to unravel the significance of the medieval transition, or of the present World War, or plan, as statesmen in their bombastic way love to do, for the future on the basis of their present ignorance of social phenomena, one could not get very far without colliding with the problems of historical movement whose laws must form the basis of every rational analysis.

THE SCIENTIFIC AND PROVIDENTIAL METHOD OF HISTORICAL INQUIRY

Where science is proud to admit only ignorance, classic history concedes impenetrable mystery. This distinction is basic in their methodological procedure. Science is proud because it is confident in the efficacy of its processes, whereas in history's admission lurks the consciousness of its own fatal weakness. This is openly conceded by Bancroft's engaging reliance on the beneficence of Providence, at least as far as his beloved United States is concerned.

With Beard, it is something deeply rooted in the very constitution of the universe, though he is not averse to changing the constitution of the United States, to which he owns an attachment as deep as that of Bancroft or any other man ever felt. Only Beard tacitly recognizes that the beneficence of Providence—judging by the tortuous record of other societies—is not illimitable, and while the Almighty doubtless has an especially tender spot in His heart for us, He cannot forever withhold the hand of chastisement with which in the past He visited upon so many other civilizations.

We cannot go on from blunder to blunder indefinitely without escaping the just retribution of history; a fact apparently rooted in the very constitution of the universe. Therefore, Beard feels called upon to write many learned tomes, explaining, cautioning and admonishing. Unfortunately, he denies laws, and in doing thus, destroys the efficacy of his own preachment. For other sages explain, caution and admonish contrariwise, and a bewildered people are left to the only course which prudence and common sense seems to dictate, namely to try anything once and see how it works, in the best spirit of the pragmatic school.

History proves by abundant evidence that the rule of trial-and-error cannot go on indefinitely, but there is always the comforting Micawber-like thought that in the nick of time, something will turn up. It generally does, but not always to our liking. It is the duty of the historian in this day and age to take the guess and mystery out of history.

Helpless submission to inscrutable fate is placing upon the overburdened shoulders of God the responsibility for our own ignorance. Whatever excuse there might have been for that species of subjective rationalization in the past, that does not exist today. Yet men like Dewey, Robinson, Teggart, Cheyney and the others, as we saw, stand not a whit above the abject submission of the most ignorant savage to the inevitable when it comes to deciphering such a distinctly human and social product as historic phenomena.

Before "acts of God" like storm, earthquake, drought, we still stand in awe because we can do little about them. But hunger, overproduction, unemployment, the miserable curse of war, the even more miserable life which is the common lot of the great mass of human beings on this earth who struggle out their brief agony between two eternities, all this is man-made and therefore, susceptible to social control—if only we knew the mechanism which controls the movement of a given social order. The historical theory of accident, chance or destiny is the modern nomenclature for Bancroft's Inscrutable Providence.

BANCROFT'S HISTORICAL METHODS

Bancroft gave us the ghostly form of history with its facts, content to rest the laws of their manifestation with the Will of God. "The constitution of the human mind," he wrote, "varies only in details, its elements are the same always; and the multitude, possessing but a combination of the powers and passions of which each one is conscious, is subject to the same laws which control individuals. Humanity, constantly enriched and cultivated by the truths it develops and the inventions it amasses, has a life of its own, and yet possesses no element that is not common to each of its members. By comparison of document with document, by analysis of facts and the reference of each of them to the laws of intelligence which it illustrates; by separating the idea which inspires combined action from the form it assumes; by comparing events with the great movement of nations—historic truth may establish itself as a science; and the principles that govern human affairs, extending like a path of light from century to century, become the highest demonstration of the superintending providence of God." [101]

We have discussed the errors of this position in detail—the failure to differentiate between social laws and individual motivation; the alleged unchangeability of human nature, which, while equally recognizable in all forms of civilization known to us, still is modified within itself and by reaction to particular external conditions of life; and the mechanical reliance upon amassing of data which in and of itself is supposed to render crystal-clear its meaning to every impartial observer.

All of these are fallacies, and no one proves the insufficiency of this historical method more clearly than Bancroft himself. The present-day reader of his works does not go very far without being impressed by a singular defect of his presentation—the absence of notes or corroborative evidence. Throughout the complete Centenary Edition there are scarcely a score of references as to source material. This was not due to lack of scholarship on his part; the very opposite is the fact. For over fifty years, he kept on adding to and re-writing his work completely; he collected a valuable library; and as Secretary of the Navy under Polk, he had privileged access to the archives of the government.

"It is unfortunate for Bancroft's permanent fame," writes Hart, "that a considerable part of his work has no foot-notes; his reason was that other people followed him on his authorities, without giving him credit; he thus cut off not only a means of checking his conclusions, but also a useful aid to inquirers. Bancroft has often been charged with rearranging and docking his quotations. His habit of referring to many materials available only in his own collection of transcripts makes it difficult to examine this charge, but where he refers to printed materials, he does not seem consciously to have altered the sense of a quotation by omission or transposition." [102]

Bancroft apparently overlooked that science demands not only comparison of documents as he urged, but also access to the material for all others who are interested in making the same comparisons. This defect, while obvious in his work, is not fatal; but at the same time it is a significant warning which few after him have failed to heed. Whatever else modern historical works may lack, they are born into the world fully documented.

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[101] History of the United States—Bancroft, Vol. II, p. 545.

[102] Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History—Vol. I, p. xxxvi.

To Bancroft's patriotic soul, every American defeat was due to some temporary inadvertence; every positive act, if successful, was dictated by Providence's partiality for these glorious United States. Were German mercenaries bargained and paid for at so much per head? Divine retribution might be patient, but it was certain. "Did the future bring honor to the houses of the princes who refused to fight against America, or to those who sold their subjects to destroy the freedom of the New World?" he asks exultantly, and as quickly supplies the answer. "Every dynasty which furnished troops to England has ceased to reign, except one, which has now for its sole representative an aged and childless man. On the other hand, the three Saxon families remain, and in their states local self-government has continually increased, and the wisdom and the will of the inhabitants have been consulted and respected." [103]

Divine Will must have been asleep on the job during the advent of Hitler. Fortunately for us, it is always wide awake where America is concerned. Prussia could not send mercenaries because of the ill-will then subsisting between it and England. Why? Because Providence saw to it that the enlightened statesmanship of Pitt was not then at the helm with the result that both countries were temporarily at loggerheads. But here, as everywhere," Bancroft continues, "it is useless to ask what would have happened if the eternal Providence had for the moment suspended its rule." [104] However, we have Millikan's word for it that the creator is still on the job [105] and all good patriots are assured that He has us in His special charge.

There are obvious grave deficiencies in this spiritualized emotionalism which still passes for history. Francophiles among us take advantage of every critical opportunity to turn our sympathies toward that country because of our debt for their help during the Revolutionary War. Citizens whose study of history ceased with their last school examination cannot prevent a generous surge of warmth at that recollection. This rising lump in the throat during the days preceding April 6, 1917, had played a not insignificant role in saddling us to this day and for many days to come with the burden of that adventure in setting Europe and the world to rights.

The Bancroft type of uncritical history shares a large responsibility for that unreasoning devotion to France. Writing of France's final decision in 1778 to help the hard pressed colonies, he says with a flourish of spread-eagle emotionalism of which he was master: "To France, the years which followed are the most glorious in her history; for they were those in which she most consistently and disinterestedly fought for the liberties of mankind, and so prepared the way for her own regeneration and the overthrow of feudalism throughout Europe; but Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, when they embarked for the liberation of America, pleasure on the prow, and the uncertain hand of youth at the helm, might have cried out to the young republic which they fostered: 'The doomed to die salute thee.' "[106]

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[103] History of the United States—Bancroft, Vol. VI, p. 115.

[104] Ibid. Vol. VI, p. 109.

[105] Millikan quoted by Jean in his Mysterious Universe, p. 88 (1932).

It is all a very pretty and touching picture, but an eminently false and mischievous one. As will be amply demonstrated at the proper place, France embarked upon that venture in the proper service of her own interests, in which, for the moment, the struggle of the colonies against England served her purposes. It is no disparagement of that great nation to say this, but it is equally important to emphasize the central core of realpolitik in the relations between nations. In a bitter conflict with a dogged opponent, as Britain surely was, help from any source, with no questions asked concerning the motive which prompted it, was thrice blessed, and the United States will always remember with special gratefulness France's contribution to the common struggle. But in international affairs, relations among governments should be governed by the realities of the particular situation and not be clouded by mawkish sentimentality. The factors which influenced French intervention were well known to Bancroft, though his work deliberately tones them down.

The astute John Adams who negotiated with the French minister, Vergennes, about effecting a common peace with England in 1780 was prevented by that clever statesman from attempting immediate negotiations. America's interest, but not that of France, would have then been served by an early peace. Writing of Adams' efforts, Franklin said: "Adams thought that the Americans had been too free in their expressions of gratitude to France; that the obligation, in fact, was on the other side; and that aid ought to be demanded with spirit."[107]

Some years later the young republic was being importuned by the partisans of the French Revolution to enter as an ally in its struggle against England. The Federalists strongly opposed such a step and finally prevailed, but only after a bitter debate which left rancor and bitterness in its wake long afterward. During that debate, Lee adverted to the acknowledgment made in the French Convention itself "that the assistance then rendered to us had been not so much for our own sakes as to weaken a dangerous and powerful rival." [108] It was his opinion that generosity and gratitude were attributes belonging more to heaven than to earth, rarely seen among individual men, and still more rarely among nations. Plain truths are brutal only to weak minds.

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[106] History of the United States—Bancroft, Vol. VI, p. 85.
[107] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. III, p. 411.

D. Insufficiency of Abstract Logical Constructions

THE SEACH FOR LOGIC IN HISTORY

Among the commonest methods of historical interpretation, the most pertinacious, and perhaps the most pernicious, is the application of abstract logical deductions in the analysis of events and therefore in the determination of programs, principles, and policies.

The politician will rest his case on the immortal pronouncements of Washington or Jefferson or Hamilton or Lincoln as the exigencies of the case demand. The statesman relies confidently on the wisdom of Webster, Blaine or Wilson. The constitutional lawyer pronounces in caressing tones the precedents of all our legal saints before and after Marshall. Public leaders scan with anxious eye the uncertain horizon for definite signs which will indicate the direction established by the Founding Fathers, while hosts of editors, commentators and professors study the documents, both new and ancient, to establish by irrefragable logic the only true path to national well-being.

All these efforts at heuristic omniscience are dictated by that common human failing, their inability to reason things out on the basis of existing reality and unwillingness to confess that inability. Instead of searching for laws, they look for sign-posts. Nothing, of course, can be more infallible than the methods of the forefathers; we are here to testify to their unimpeachable wisdom. The real problem of history is whether future generations will bear equal testimony to our own. For nothing is so certain as the mutations of history. Every generation plans for an eternity, and each succeeding generation is confronted with the problem of maintaining its own segment of that chain intact. Young as we are as a nation, our existing form ranks among the oldest in the world today.

Boudin, whose constitutional history of the United States places him among the astutest intellects of our time, remarks in his dry way that "unfortunately, neither life in general, nor the growth of political institutions in particular, is governed by logic; " [109] and "if history were merely logical argument, the history of the United

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[108] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. IV, p. 466.

[109] Government By Judiciary—Boudin, Vol. I, p. 8.

States would have been quite different as far as the development of its form of government is concerned." [110]

To follow up the rules of scholastic reasoning, as he amply demonstrates from the innumerable reversals of judicial opinion,[111] all change would have been interdicted from following its inevitable course. While some nations, particularly in the Orient, have been able by social custom to slow down the processes of historic change, they have only succeeded in thrusting themselves into the rear of the march where for so many centuries they had been the undisputed leaders of civilization.

China is now paying a heavy price for its stagnation. India, at last, is getting restive underneath the chains of enslavement she herself was instrumental in forging. Japan has been able only by a sudden leap forward to cope successfully against the white man's domination, and that has been effected wholly by a drastic break with the logic of the past. In short, logic has a place in history only when its methods are applied in the analysis of the present. It becomes a strait-jacket when its forms are superimposed upon the realities of our time as a heritage from the past and where the dominant forces in our national life are powerful enough to compress history into its ready-made mold. Tradition is an essential element of national existence. It can also become the prolific factor of national decay.

Recent world developments afford an interesting display of the attempt to apply abstract logic to national policy. The rapprochement between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia affords Edwin L. James, the very able commentator of the New York Times on world problems, an opportunity to draw some deadly logical parallels. In a leading article [112] he runs side-by-side parallel columns showing what Hitler advocated in his "Mein Kampf" written in 1923 concerning Soviet Russia and what he did in August, 1939. To students of abstract logic, the discrepancies are truly appalling. Surely its perpetrator could never have hoped to pass the examination for village school teacher, let alone to be the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor of the superlatively trained and very methodical German people.

Nothing should be more obvious than that national policies are dictated by events, not by abstractions, although it requires the greatest degree of historical acumen to observe beneath the apparent chaos of events the underlying current which controls them. Such essentially propagandistic writings as James' comment and others in the same vein are themselves part of the events with which the scientific historian must cope, despite the often sincere protests of their authors that abstract devotion to truth and logic were the sole considerations that prompted their efforts.

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[110] Ibid. p. 174.
[111] Ibid. p. 509.
[112] New York Times, Sept. 24, 1939.

Of the same pattern is the opinion of former Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania when speaking of the repeal of the neutrality law of 1937 which forbade all trade with belligerents in supplies of war. Upon the outbreak of the present conflict, it was obvious that Germany would benefit enormously by the closing of American markets as a source of supply for the Allies. There is also not the slightest doubt that the underlying motive of the repeal of that embargo was to aid England and France in their struggle.

But Senator Pepper felt it incumbent upon himself, as an outstanding Republican statesman to oppose a program advocated by the Democrats. Therefore, he discovered a logical flaw in the Roosevelt program which he denounced as an unneutral act. "The fact that my sympathies," he says, "are strongly for dear friends in England, for example, and as strongly opposed to many of the precepts of the present German government cannot justify me in blinking at the clear implication of the law." [113]

That impeccable champion of logical consistency! As an outstanding member of the bar, Pepper knows better than most of us how the same law, if it can be neither changed nor ignored, can be interpreted and applied in a manner quite different from its spirit and, not infrequently, opposite to its original intent. In its appropriate place during our analysis we will have ample occasion to observe how constitutional authorities have been eminently successful in devising logical constructions which would baffle the dialectical genius of an Aristotle or a Kant.

ABSTRACT LOGIC APPLIED TO CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS

Recent world developments naturally offered a target for historians to point for a moral, or to view with premonitory misgivings in drawing their conclusions upon which our future policy should be based. Beard embodied his views in an extended essay entitled "Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels" in which he reiterated the advice that the United States would best mind its own business by cultivating its own extended continental garden, root out its domestic weeds and perfect the native crop.

To this so-called "isolationist" program a group of distinguished teachers of history drew up a manifesto of vehement dissent. This was published at length in the New York Times [114] above the signatures

[113] New York Times, Oct. 8, 1939.

[114] Under date of Nov. 12, 1939.

of Clarence A. Berdahl of the University of Illinois, Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University, Walter Rice Sharp of the University of Wisconsin and Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago. Since their analysis of the current situation should afford the best possible clinical material for the study of the methods of professional historians in the effort to diagnose a concrete case it would be profitable to our purpose to analyze their position in detail.

In answer to Beard's contention that powerful manipulators of public opinion, among them teachers, newspapermen and statesmen of various degrees of influence were attempting to maneuver the United States into wholesale interference with foreign quarrels and disturbances, the authors of the manifesto counter with the names of some prominent people, of doubtlessly unimpeachable morality "who happen to believe in international cooperation rather than in Mr. Beard's thesis of nationalistic isolation."

Now the words cooperation and isolation in themselves mean nothing, though from a demagogic viewpoint, knowing that people are ruled by phrases rather than by reason, they are both ear and eye-filling, thus rendering unnecessary all further thought on their part. One may believe in that form of international cooperation which manifests itself in an iceberg patrol, and still oppose that form of cooperation which manifests itself in a joint anti-submarine patrol in time of war. The implications of those forms of cooperation is all-important, not in the abstract logic of the advantages which lie in cooperation, the "thing in itself."

Isolation has many ugly, anti-social connotations. It also has its advantages in time of a contagious epidemic. The play upon words should be left to politicians, who presumably are devoid of anything more substantial, but should be left severely alone by men who are presumably scholars.

But what must arouse one's critical faculties instantly, is the professorial acceptance of the idea contained in their phrase "who happen to believe." Those words should be sure-fire in stimulating a scientist's risibilities. What right has one who holds himself out as an authority deserving of public attention to just "happen to believe" in the correctness of a national policy fraught with the profoundest significance to the welfare of millions of people today and to generations still unborn? What would we think of a surgeon or a physicist or a chemist who just happened to believe at a critical juncture of their practice? We have a right to expect from them a much higher type of affirmation than mere belief or opinion.

True, in a democracy, "every man is entitled to his opinion," but from a public man, we demand that his judgment be based on well-grounded knowledge which is susceptible of analysis and proof, and not mere say so. A scientist does not "happen to believe" in the same sense that one happens to be a Protestant, or a Republican or even red-headed. It is sufficient to assert that in no field of knowledge but history would its leading men dare come out in a public pronouncement urging a certain policy presumably well-grounded in facts and in reason with the statement that it is supported by people "who happen to believe" in it.

Their next contention in reply to Beard's isolationist policy is to show by the record innumerable instances of America's deep concern in European affairs, amounting at times to unwarranted intervention. When it comes to dates and figures, especially concerning past events, the professorial mind is delightfully in its own element. They begin with 1786 when Jefferson proposed a joint naval demonstration against the Barbary Coast pirates. They cite American protests against the persecution of the Jews in 1872, 1879, 1880, 1882, 1891, and a few other dates which we can skip for the present without flunking. They show how we have been dragged into three world wars during our history—The French Revolutionary Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1914-18. Then they conclude plaintively: "Surely it is not unpatriotic or un-American to suggest international collaboration for the avoidance of war."

What pitiful maladroitness! The bone of contention between Beard and themselves is not collaboration for the avoidance of war, but the kind of collaboration which, one argues, must involve us in the war. What is the logic behind this grammar school display of erudition about dates and names? What possible concrete relationship is there between those events and the issues with which we are now confronted? Why do they not develop their line of reasoning in defense of the measure they propose? One could consistently have approved intervention upon any, or all of the occasions mentioned by the manifestants against isolation, and still consistently support "isolation" today.

They cite American devotion to ideologies as evidenced by the Kossuth episode of 1851. Many things have happened since then. If those who advocate the same policy of standing by the "democracies" as against the "dictatorships" in fact if not in name, we would have a fair-sized war on our hands right now with almost every Latin-American republic. The question still remains unanswered: "What nation today is a real democracy?"

That our professorial authors of the Times Manifesto are not so naive is evident by the adroit manner in which they lead up to what is really closest to their hearts, American intervention on the side of the Allies. We are not now concerned with the advisability of that policy. What interests us very deeply at the moment is the logical processes by which a profoundly important national policy is being advocated, not with the frank outspokenness of men of science, but with the apologetic intent of the partisan who cloaks his purpose by assuming the role of the impartial student of events and history.

Let us observe how they develop their program step by step from noble platonic interest to simple collaboration, then to innocent consultation, followed by implementation of decisions, resulting in active participation, and ending finally in collective action by the employment of force. It sounds almost fantastic that in this day and age such obviously subterranean policies could be entertained, let alone openly avowed, by minds laying claim to subtlety and finesse.

ATTEMPTS AT DERIVING AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BY ABSTRACT LOGICAL DEDUCTION

This joint professorial manifesto discloses to somebody's discomfiture, no doubt, but surely not to Beard's, that the United States has often intervened actively in various parts of the world. Our sticklers for dates and names call off the roll beginning with the early China trade, the South Sea Islands, Samoa, Hawaii, Japan, the Open Door policy and the rest.

Space forbade them and us to give the rest. Beard generously supplies the deficiency in his recent work on American imperialism.[115] What did they propose to prove by that kind of argument? That the United States having intervened in the past, is in no position to raise scruples about intervening now? Why, even the most hard-hearted Puritan of the old stamp believed in redemption after sin. To assert by innuendo that having done not so badly in previous ventures—leaving out the inconvenient memory of the First World War—there is an excellent prospect of bettering the bargain in the future, is a fair gambler's proposition, but hardly befitting the dignity of staid professors in respectable universities. They have still to prove their main argument, incumbent upon them under the circumstances, which is, not that intervention is something new, but that it is not now profitable to the United States, as some contend, or that it is not compatible with the best interests of our people today as others hold.

With the professors' indignant denial of Beard's imputation that our great privately-endowed universities, deriving, as they do, a large part of their revenues from the income of their investments, are nothing more than propaganda agencies in international affairs of Great Britain, France and the League of Nations, we are content to leave that matter between Beard and themselves. "He ignores the possibility," the professors hotly retort, "that scientific investigation of the subject of war and peace may lead the majority of scholars in the field of international relations to the conclusion that American consultation in international affairs is probably the most immediate road to peace and justice." There are several important assertions of fact here which we must take note of immediately, as would any worker in the field of physics, chemistry or any other organized sphere of inquiry.

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[115] Idea of National Interest—Beard (1934) Ch. III, IV, & V.

They speak of scientific investigation of international affairs. The fact of the matter is that there has been no scientific examination of the basic problems of history undertaken in the universities, except the accumulation of data which must by now over-top the Washington monument. We have had opinions, dates, charts and graphs, but no scientific laws. We have not had scientific results because historians to this very day have not developed a scientific method of inquiry. All historians, without exception, deny the existence of scientifically demonstrable laws in history, as we have abundantly proved; or, if there are laws, the historian is debarred by the inherent nature of thought, from their study and analysis according to others.

To the mass of corroborative evidence already adduced by the leading authorities whose works we have analyzed, we will add the following conclusion from a typical writer. After showing how modern economics, psychology, sociology and anthropology have, each in their field, been unable to support the generalizations which they had attempted to establish, Parsons concludes: "The data of human actions and customs are exceedingly difficult to observe. Anthropologists have thus far devoted much of their time to speculative theories. Archaeology has furnished much raw material for both anthropologists and historians. Its spirit of patient digging might be recommended to workers in all the new sciences which have been handicapped by a plethora of theory and scarcity of facts. All these sciences are contributing to the data of modern history, a creation of the nineteenth century; but history, itself, remains as it began, essentially an art, not a science." [116]

At another point, Parsons tells, as so many others have done in the course of our study, why history cannot be a science: "The very words of history prevent a scientific detachment. They come to our minds trailing clouds of ancient passion and prejudice whether we will or not. Impersonal history is an impossibility. Many of the works best worth reading are intensely partisan and unfair. History is a science only in respect to a small substratum of demonstrable truth." [117] The authors of our Times Manifesto are part of this school of history. No study can reach the rank of a science until it has disclosed the laws of motion underlying its phenomena. This history has not yet been able to do.

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[116] The Stream of History—Parsons (1937) pp. 484-5.

INSTITUTIONAL METHODS OF HISTORICAL INQUIRY

Mere systematic classification of data, empirical observation and pragmatical conclusions which the events of the next day or next year may knock sky-high, can never assume the dignity of scientific rank. Our professors cannot lay claim to "scientific investigation" unless they have explained their method of procedure and expounded the laws of historic motion which possibly they have discovered. Until they have done so, they are indulging in expression of mere opinion, which we have already seen is consciously insufficient knowledge, both subjectively and objectively.

While opinion reigns in a field of investigation scientific inquiry is hampered necessarily by the fact that only certain types of opinions are acceptable to the endowed universities. The professor's opinion necessarily carries greater weight than that of an obscure scholar, while in politics and economics, the opinion of a successful Wall Street manipulator or a multi-millionaire boot-black manufacturer over-tops both.

We also note that the manifesto states that after scientific investigation a majority of scholars may be led to support a certain policy. Now this is a fundamentally erroneous method of procedure. So long as a study still dwells in the hazy world of opinion, the consensus of that opinion must carry great weight. Once a study is reduced to a science, we can very well dispense with the consensus. Scientific questions are not resolved by majority votes, but by the laws inherent within its phenomena. Establish laws and you create a science. Without laws the most distinguished opinion is not worth the effort. With knowledge of the laws of historic motion in one's possession he can successfully defy the honest, inquiring opposition of the entire intellectual world. Of such is the glory of science.

We must also note that the four professors of the Times Manifesto used the word "consultation" in international affairs. In the succeeding paragraph they make a very vital change in their program without apprising their readers of its significance. They state that hundreds of teachers of international relations in the leading universities of the country "after long study of the question, have concluded that world peace can probably be secured only by active participation of the United States with the other foreign powers."

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[117] Ibid. pp. V and VI.

Either the words consultation and participation are synonymous; then there is no need for using two words where one word suffices; or there is a decisive transformation of policy indicated by the gradual slide from one program to another. A score of important questions must be frankly and promptly answered, such as: What is the nature of this participation? Is it only for exchange of views between representatives? Then consultation is the proper and adequate description.

Does participation in international conferences bind the conferees to the support of their conclusions? Then how are those conclusions to be ratified; by the conferees, or by their respective executive authorities, or by legislative organs? To what extent, and in what form does such participation carry with it direct responsibility? The reader can follow out for himself the wide possibilities which inhere in that transition from mere consultation to active participation.

But the reader will not long remain in doubt as to the meaning which those four professors placed in that development from consultation to active participation. In the very next paragraph they say: "But if the extensive application of scholarship represented in these centers of learning lead to the hypothesis that war can be avoided only by collective action, this conclusion ought to carry some weight with persons who are seeking a remedy for war by thinking rather than by appeals to emotion."

One is justified in inquiring what sort of thinking is this? At the outset, the authors of the manifesto were entitled to every doubt being resolved in their favor. Consultation was transformed into active participation. But now we are faced by the prospect of collective action. At last, we are beginning to see what they are driving at. That phrase has a definite meaning not only in the language of international diplomacy, but in the language of everyday life.

Collective action means united action on the part of the active participants in the consultation. We must read the results of the professorial conclusions backward in order to get at their real significance. Collective action brings to mind the many possibilities involved in that policy. The professors are men of the world, not engaged in playing an international parlor game. If collective action is to be taken, it must be taken against somebody. In this case, of course, that somebody is a nation, or a group of nations which must be coerced into following the policy adopted by the group which proposes to enforce its collective will.

When treading on this dangerous ground, the professors should be honest with themselves and with the public whose judgment they are attempting to sway. It should not be ours to demand, rather it is their most solemn obligation to come forth with the fullest particulars concerning the possibilities inherent in this policy of collective action.

Action, not merely threat of action; decisive action, not mere grimace-making; or throwing of powder-puff notes; or even slaps on the wrist. Some people, and some nations get powerfully offended over that, especially when they possess the armed strength, and the possibility should always be faced, fully and frankly, that the only argument which really prevails is the one backed up by force and the full determination to employ it to the ultimate of their resources. All the shadow-boxing in which the professors engage with Beard as to whether or not the United States is "to act as a kind of arbiter in world affairs" is unconvincing because it is not frank. One might, after fully analyzing the import of their brief, say quite solemnly that it is not honest. It is not honest because the issues raised are a camouflage for their real intent. The only genuine question at stake, is namely, whether the United States is prepared by the logic of the international involvements by which it would be bound in accordance with the policy advocated, be prepared to use the full strength of its armed and material resources to carry out its part in the program of collective action?

Any other issue is beside the point. This is the only point, the critical point, around which revolves the future of our country and the well-being of its people. No red herring of pacifism should throw one off the trail. This nation has no constitutional aversion to bloodletting, as its history plainly indicates. The only issue here raised and which must be answered is whether a policy of international cooperation for the preservation of peace shall be enforced by arms against an offender of that peace?

FALSITY OF ANALOGY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW

This places the matter in the most favorable light for our embattled four professors. Nobody likes an offender against the public peace. We all support the peace officer against the malefactor. But international problems cannot be so easily settled by a simple analogy.

Municipal law bears only the most superficial resemblance to international law. In international relations, we deal with sovereigns, in municipal relations, we deal with citizens or subjects. In international law, we are faced with political, social, economic and ethnic relations fixed by national determinations based in the final analysis on the employment of force. In municipal law, we are faced with a multitude of relations that have gradually evolved through the centuries, having their support in the consciousness of a people developed over a long period and possessing infinite ramifications in their culture, creed, tradition and interest.

In local law force ordinarily is not employed in the name of the people against the offender, except in rare times of great public disturbance, where the authority of the law is supported actively, or sustained passively, by the acquiescence of the people. Any attempt to change the existing status quo in the international organization is met by hair-trigger resistance on the part of those whose interests are adversely affected. In municipal law, there is plenty of margin for effective re-arrangement without involving recourse to arms or to revolution. In international law, the slightest concession on the part of a sovereign is obtained, if at all, only after a painful parturition process following a protracted period of negotiation.

It is a comparatively simple thing to locate and brand an offender under municipal law. It is a far different matter to determine an offender under international law, and the branding process requires something more than the intervention of a judge and jury.

Who is to say that existing international arrangements—every one of them in their vital respects the product of force within recent history as time is there reckoned—shall remain inviolate in substance for all time to come, and any one who ventures upon their modification is an aggressor, an enemy of society, while the beneficiaries of the existing arrangements, with every interest in their maintenance, are clothed in the virtuous garments of the crusader upholding international law and order? It is all a question of whose ox is being gored, and the noble professors of the Times Manifesto cannot presume to add to their moral stature by pretending to speak in the name of the law's avenger against the enemy of the public peace.

But that is not the issue here involved. The real question before us is the preservation of peace, not the punishment of alleged aggressors against the peace. Of course, it requires no great subtlety to establish that peace cannot be preserved unless transgressors of the peace are to be punished. Such clever twists of logic in history is the very thing against which we are contending. Our entire discussion is based on the absurdity of applying the same logical forms of private life, or of domestic concern, to the world at large, past or present. Our position is not that of a pacifist or an isolationist, whatever that means. Under certain conditions, we would support pitting the entire armed force of the United States against an opponent, and leave to our military leaders the decision as to how, when and where that force could be most effectively employed.

All we desired to prove was that a group of professors, professing to aid in the maintaining of world peace, were actually engaged upon a policy which must inevitably lead this country into war. They may hide their intentions behind such ambiguous terms as cooperating with other democratic states, or any kind of states, "whether democracies or dictatorships, that desire to preserve peace and render justice." As to what constitutes justice will always remain a justiciable issue as long as man settles his problems by appeals to reason. In international affairs it has always been decided by an appeal to the ultimate power, in this case, the supreme arbitrament of war.

What our professors ought to have done, but did not, or could not do, was to disclose the basis upon which our existing national states rest, which give force and effect to its international policy. This would require from them a clear-cut analysis of the role of the state in modern times, and that would necessitate a theory of history based on social laws, the very thing which they declare does not exist, or what amount to the same thing, of whose knowledge we are debarred by the processes of our thought.

Some have been so bold as to advocate, after the conclusion of the present world conflict, a form of national state wherein the sovereign will surrender part of his sovereignty to an international organization for the sake of the common world welfare. All these nebulous words harbor policies which must result in another fiasco, for the basis of the existing world structure and its world economy is the national state. Here is a genuine historical problem whose existence is perceived by many, but whose effective resolution is impossible upon the present basis of historical inquiry.

ARISTOTELIAN DIALECTICS IN PLACE OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

If there should remain any lingering doubt concerning what was the real intentions of the authors of the Times Manifesto, that doubt must be resolved against them when they suggested the advisability of putting teeth into international agreements. "Some believe that this cooperation should be limited to consultation with a view to implementing the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Others would go so far as to join in economic and financial boycotts. Others would even have us participate in reviving the League of Nations or some other form of international organization. None of our colleagues has proposed that the United States should dictate, or that it has the power to dictate, the destiny of the family of nations."

Again they attempt to evade the clear implications of their policy by raising the false issue of dictation. If, as they advise, the United States is to exercise the balance of power for the kind of world peace we think best for world stability, that is not dictation, but determination. One dictates when he is ready to enforce a program with sufficient power. One determines an issue by shifting the preponderance of power to the side which it favors.

If there is one thing our professors of history will have to learn, it is to follow out realistically the practical consequences of their policies. In international affairs, there is no such thing as throwing powder puffs when hand grenades are called for. The only effective weight the United States can ever put into the scales is the instant readiness to back up its program by its preponderance of men and resources.

Let not the gentle professors think that by using such weasel words as economic and financial boycott they can escape the certainty of war involvement. Modern wars are fought, not declared. They are fought with gold, with boycotts, with economic sanctions, no less than with the preliminary battle of nerves followed up, if necessary, with planes, tanks and machine guns. If the United States should fail to renew the commercial treaty with Japan to the extent of cutting off its access to our markets, that employment of economic sanctions will have the same effect on the Japanese state as an open declaration of war. Only the practical exigencies of the situation will determine whether Japanese submarines will be used against American shipping, or other forms of military reprisal are to be undertaken singly or in cooperation with the Axis Powers, or whether she will keep her counsel and swallow her resentment.

Economic sanctions, where effective, have always been a form of hostilities, and only circumstances will dictate whether a state of actual war shall be declared to exist. The same holds for the recent repeal of the absurd neutrality law of 1937. For all practical purposes it is an economic sanction against Germany. Germany knows it, and resents it accordingly. Only the progress of the war will determine the extent of our involvement. Should the Allies fall into the same desperate straits which faced them in 1917, the United States will be compelled to go again to their assistance.

We cannot afford the risk of a victorious Germany if we are to remain supreme in the Western Hemisphere. Our actual entry into the war can be dated as Nov. 2, 1939 when the House ratified the Senate repeal of the Embargo Act.[118] As to the formal entry into the

[118] Written in Nov. 1939.

war, that no longer depends on our unfettered judgment but upon the necessities of the Allies. The propaganda of justification will be determined by the circumstances, or manufactured to meet the circumstances.

When the professors speak of "implementing" the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or any other form of international agreement, there are only two interpretations possible. Either they know what they are talking about, or they don't. There can be no circumlocution here. What do they mean exactly by implementing? In international affairs, as in human affairs, a certain amount of bluff enters into such relations. It is the extreme of absurdity, and in professors dealing with international problems, it would amount almost to insanity, to proceed on the assumption that a bluff would never be called.

First of all, such tactics are seldom resorted to in vital matters where the disparity of power is obvious. In a matter of deepest national concern the United States will not resort to empty gestures, say, against Cuba, or Central America, or Mexico. Both sides to the issue would know that abstract morality is not even skin deep. The question of power becomes transparently obvious where one of the antagonists is favorably situated.

Implementing an argument can mean only to strengthen it. To strengthen it, it must be made an effective instrument of their united will. Justice, right, world opinion, even the fear of God's punishment in the world to come is discounted in advance. The only effective implementing of international agreements is with the implements of war. There is no escaping that conclusion. Any attempt to disguise the realities of the situation is perpetrating a cruel and vicious fraud upon our own people. The only effective kind of international agreement is the one backed by the united and unstinted military might of the cooperators. That is the issue. The American people faced it squarely during the debate on the League of Nations in the Senate of 1919, and during the ensuing national elections. No amount of soft-soaping can cover the grim realities of the situation.

KNOWLEDGE OF SOCIAL LAW MUST GOVERN A VALID INTERNATIONAL POLICY

This is not a condemnation of international cooperation. This is a plea for clear thinking and an honest statement of policy. Historical questions cannot be resolved by appeals to abstract logic. Not that history itself is insusceptible of logical analysis, but rather that its processes cannot be confined within the limits of artificial intellectual constructions. A sound international policy must be based on the thorough understanding of the underlying forces which produce the historical situations this program is designed to meet.

If the League of Nations has failed, it is not because international cooperation is impossible in vital matters of national interest, but because the League of Nations was a misnomer from the very start. It was from its inception an alliance on a world scope dominated by the victorious Allies who sought the sanction of all eternity for their settlement effected at Versailles. A real League of Nations has yet to be formed, and that will never be possible until we modify the material basis upon which the modern national state exists. What that material basis is, and how it is to be modified has not yet received the serious attention of the modern historian.

That seems like a rash statement, but in view of our analysis up to this point, it is justified by the facts. Until the science of history is formulated, and the laws of motion within society are clearly understood, all schemes of international cooperation, no matter how praiseworthy, nor how exalted the motives of its advocates, are Utopias and must fail, because they are the products of subjective rationalization rather than the matured results of objective analysis. History is not directed by abstract logic for very long, if at all; and even then, only on the surface. Our logic must be derived from the exact knowledge of the laws of social movement.

Knowledge of the existence of such laws is not evidenced by such a purely subjective synthetic creation as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. From its very inception it was a fraud; a magnificent fraud, to some, but a disastrous fraud upon helpless mankind in the end. It sought to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. The very assumption upon which it was predicated was wrong, pitifully, tragically wrong. No nation grasps at war, a real war, a war with an equal, without reckoning the costs, but without knowing also, that mutual self-destruction of the respective antagonists is preferable to its own unilateral national extinction.

The pact bound its signatories to a pacific settlement of all disputes or conflicts whatever their nature or origin might be. The United States, at the very outset, reneged on this abstract statement of policy. It was clearly understood that our regional policy known as the Monroe Doctrine was not to be brought into question. Here again is proof that history is dominated, not by abstract principles of logic, but by the logic of historical events which man has not yet learned to dominate. Secretary Kellogg, himself, insisted that despite his own pact outlawing war, "every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." [119]

In essence that provision took the heart out of the so-called peace pact. It could not have been otherwise. Kellogg's difficulty, as that of every other statesman who must reconcile theories with realities, lay in the fact that the nation is the effective unit of modern world capitalist economy. That this dominant world-economy brings a nation into conflict with the national interests of its competitors is one of the necessary consequences of modern capitalism.

No nation while it has the means of self-protection dare surrender an iota of its sovereignty on the critical question of self-preservation. The conception of self-preservation is much broader than defense from attack or invasion. Any threat to England's "life-lines" will bring instant reprisal. Germany, as a modern capitalist power feels itself crushed so long as it does not stand on a basis of actual equality with England, and that Great Britain can never countenance if it is to remain the nerve-center of its particular world structure. Parity is too delicate a point upon which to balance the fate of the empire.

The United States would resent indignantly, and with something more effective than indignation if the circumstances called for it, should a foreign power endeavor to establish itself in that sphere which it claims as peculiarly its own, namely, the Western Hemisphere. The words "attack or invasion" mean something far more for us than repelling the enemy from actual assault upon the Atlantic or the Pacific seaboard, or even on our outlying possessions. When our professors, therefore, spoke of implementing an international agreement as being a measure less severe than economic or financial boycotts, they proved two things; first, they had not the slightest conception of the significance of economic boycotts; second, they deliberately closed their eyes to the meaning of implementing agreements. If anything, economic sanctions would be first employed against an aggressor, whatever the latter term means.

These professors "call attention to the inventions and social developments that are making this globe a smaller world with the result that no nation can live unto itself." Such platitudes are for the political nursery and for diplomats. All these inventions and developments simply hasten the speedy employment of the implements of national policy and make for more effective international alliances. Wars were not unknown in the days of the relative isolation of nations or cities or tribes. Propinquity does not necessarily enhance understanding; it quite as often breeds hatred. The causes of modern war are deeply rooted in the organization of our dominant social system, and while perhaps wars may never be totally eliminated among men, it is possible, by the rational reorganization of society based on the knowledge of its laws of internal motion, to eliminate that type of war which develops out of imperialistic policies bred by the prevailing mode of production. By reorganizing the material basis of our economy, not according to some fanciful scheme dictated by abstract logic, but in accord with the laws of motion developed by society, we can make such type of wars as antediluvian and as rare as instances of cannibalism are within the confines of a modern nation.

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[119] Quoted in Beard's Idea of National Interest, pp. 486-7.

HISTORICAL ABSTRACTIONS MUST FAIL BEFORE HISTORICAL REALITIES

Small minds love to point out the contradictions they detect in great ones. Usually these contradictions can be removed by a closer application to that thinker's method of reasoning. So, for example, the Great Contradiction which Boehm-Bawerk thought he discovered between the first and the third volumes of Marx's Capital really consisted in the fact that in the first volume Marx had set out to develop the theory of value in relative purity, eliminating for the moment contradictory elements which obscured the operation of fundamental laws, leaving to the third volume the consideration of the actual adjustments of the market. In this procedure, Marx resorted to the familiar method of any scientist who discusses his phenomena first under ideal conditions and then under the realities of existence where perturbing influences must be weighed.

But our professors are much better debaters than logicians, for in their anxiety to score a point, they fail to be consistent with themselves. We will recall with what care they pointed out the dates and occasions upon which the United States intervened in world affairs in the past, and at times, asked for cooperation among the society of nations for the achievement of certain definite purposes.

Having resorted to example and analogy when it suited their purpose, they vehemently protest against Beard's uses of the same questionable, but often-times effective weapons in debate when it suited his own. "We enter a protest," say they, "against resort to the sophistry of employing Washington's Farewell Address as proof of the present necessity to pursue a policy of isolation. The Farewell Address is a matter of historical record, and it is true that in 1796, Washington actually admonished this nation in the following words: 'the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connections as possible.' Mr. Beard rings the changes on the tenacious heritage bequeathed us by the Father of His Country. This appeal to authority, however, is specious. Washington's proposal for an isolation policy almost 150 years ago is not necessarily a valid argument for isolation today."

How nice of them to emphasize this point when their own method of disputation was being turned against them. As a matter of fact, North American isolation from the stream of world affairs ceased with the first permanent settlement on the continent. Commercial and political connections are indispensable appendages for a nation or territory which enters into the maelstrom of modern world economy. Beard was as much justified in bulwarking his case with the formidable authority of Washington, as the professors were quick in resenting that implementing of his case. When professors undertake to implement their policies, they cannot be heard to complain when that boomerang reacts upon themselves.

To make matters worse, these paragons of righteousness actually accuse Beard of "simply trying to pull the wool over his readers' eyes" by suppressing other sections of the same Farewell Address, where, they contend, Washington urges a policy which contravenes the isolationist advice of othe other portions. They actually accuse Beard of forensic tactics to which a third-rate high school debating team would not resort. "To cite one part of the Farewell Address," they protest, "without the other is little less than misrepresentation, assuming, of course, that the person who thus misquotes Washington has been careful enough to read the entire address." To this level of haranguing, blustering and pettifogging have these four professors from four great universities descended in their discussion with an historian of recognized and superlative scholarship, on a matter of greatest concern to the future well-being of this nation!

HAMILTON ON CONDITIONS GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

It would be incompatible with the high purposes of this work, it would be unjust to the contestants in this dispute to close this part of our discussion on so querulous a note. Since the solemn adjuration of one of the Founding Fathers is open to divergent interpretation, perhaps an equally profound observation by another of the Founding Fathers may not be inappropriate to the issues involved. "There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance and quantity, leaving nothing to future discretion, and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties," wrote Hamilton.[120]

Continuing, he argues: "Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the interest or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century, there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts; from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith; and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion."

It may be argued that Hamilton here speaks of treaties and alliances, whereas the professors of the Times Manifesto had in mind a general organization of the nations. The experiences of the past twenty years are conclusive evidence that under the existing order of society any such league of nations is a camouflaged alliance on the part of some of the great powers to curb others of the temporarily not so great powers. But the real point of this quotation from Hamilton is the frank recognition that not abstractions but concrete interests are the basis for international agreements of whatever nature, or however they may be denominated.

E. Function of Phrases as a Substitute for Thought

SEMANTICS BOTH AID AND HINDER LOGICAL THOUGHT

Mankind finds it extremely difficult to free itself from the inertia of its heritage. The most difficult, by far, of all human activities is the development of the discipline of independent thinking. It is so much easier to rely upon dogmas, formulas and phrases. Many of our greatest minds, recognized specialists in their own fields, often resort to the most vapid generalizations of ready-made thinking in spheres outside of their particular activity. The pretext most frequently advanced is that in our highly specialized world it is impossible for one mind to grasp thoroughly more than a minute segment of the whole. That is true.

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[120] The Federalist, No. XV.

It is also true that there is no reason why a great physicist or a great mathematician, should by virtue of that fact, feel it incumbent upon him to pass decisive judgment on politics, economics, international affairs and everything else under the sun. As human beings possessing an active concern in the world about us, we retain an absorbing interest in the activities of our fellow men. But judgment is the highest faculty of human thought. "All judgment," says Kant, "accordingly are functions of unity in our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, so that understanding may be represented as the faculty of judging." [121]

The understanding must operate through symbols, through words. The more concise the meaning of words, the more definite is their significance, and the clearer must be the understanding. But thinking is the most painful activity of man, which most try to evade at any cost. Relapse is therefore had to the employment of ready-made symbols and strings of words which transmit with the least amount of conscious effort some thought, or what passes as the semblance of thought.

Herein lies the secret of the mysterious hold that tradition, dogma and phrases possess over the minds of men. Dewey writes: "As soon as meaning is treated as a meaning, it becomes a member of a system of meanings. . . . A universal proposition, in other words, has meaning as a member of a system, not in isolation. The relation of implication is an expression of this fact, so that the development of an expanded meaning or hypothetic universal in terms of implied proposition, is the determination of what that meaning is." [122]

The uncritical acceptance of implications in a universal proposition is an amiable defect of mankind which contributes much to the amenities of organized existence. It is also the fruitful cause of much misunderstanding and hatred in the sphere of religion, tradition, nationalism and other generalized forms of association and activity. In the field of historical investigation, we discover to our dismay, that historians who, as a class, must rank intellectually as of a higher calibre than the mass of mankind, are still as much the common victims of phrases as the rest.

Barnes puts the matter succinctly: "The tendency to substitute words for things persists even when the religious background is removed. Words are simple and easily handled; the entities for which they stand are often enormously complex and difficult to comprehend." [123] He cites some very striking examples in the case of Christian Science and Coueism. Long ago Descartes analyzed the fruitful sources of error in human thought. "The fourth source of our errors," he wrote, "is, that we attach our thoughts to words which do not express them with accuracy. Finally, since for the use of speech we attach all our conceptions to words by which to express them, and commit to memory our thoughts in connection with these terms, and as we afterward find it more easy to recall the words than the things signified by them, we can scarcely conceive anything with such distinctness as to separate entirely what we conceive from the words that were selected to express it." [124]

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[121] Critique of Pure Reason—Kant, Part 2, Transcendental Logic, Book 1, Sec. 1, p. 55.

[122] Logic; The Theory of Inquiry—Dewey (1938) p. 301.

No modern writer on the use or rather misuse of words could have stated the problem more clearly. The training of the literate part of the human race in the proper use of words is a stupendous task for future generations. All we can hope to do now is to impress upon the educators, statesmen, scientists, historians and leaders of thought generally, the tremendous potentialities both for good and evil—in a relativistic sense—that lie hidden within the womb of those words and phrases generally current, while we pass on the same coin in the same uncritical fashion.

In a recent work on the tyranny of words, Stuart Chase writes: "What the semantic discipline does is to blow ghosts out of the picture and create a new picture as close to reality as one can get. One is no longer dogmatic, emotional, bursting with the rights and wrongs of it, but humble, careful, aware of the considerable number of things he does not know. His new map may be wrong; his judgment may err. But the probability of better judgment is greatly improved, for he is now swayed more by happenings in the outside world than by reverberations in his skull." [125]

Marriner S. Eccles, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board proves that he is swayed not only by the happenings of the outer world, but more so by their reverberations in his own skull. Among all the impressive pillars of society few outrank in dignity the head of our Federal banking system by virtue of that office. Responding to the plea for financial help to Great Britain in her struggle to retain world hegemony, this outstanding leader of contemporary thought advises the extension of another loan, "taking as collateral their gold as well as their security holdings here, in Canada or elsewhere." It is to be regretted that this great financier has not yet shown us how the mortgage can be foreclosed on the property of a sovereign power, should England successfully maintain its sovereignty, and what it would be worth if she does not. It might be suggested that the profound Mr. Eccles had not forgotten that public opinion can be more readily swayed by the idea of a loan than of an outright gift.

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[123] Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World—Barnes, p. 1202.

[124] The Principles of Philosophy—Descartes, Part I, Prop. LXXIV.

[125] The Tyranny of Words—Chase (1938) p. 206.

This same outstanding genius presents a thirteen point solution for all our social, political and economic ills. The first calls for the following: "Creation of an economic climate that will give the greatest possible encouragement to private initiative and private enterprise consistent with orderly and continuous national progress." Just that, and nothing more. This great economic rain- and sunshine-maker discreetly withholds the secret of his trade in the elaboration of the other twelve points of this program, which future generations doubtless will hail as a paragon of clarity and directness. Unfortunately, his contemporaries thought no more of it than to sandwich them in the back pages between some advertisements of glamorous silk stockings and even more exciting underthings in the December 5th, 1940 issue of the New York Times.

INFLUENCES OF PHRASES ON HUMAN CONDUCT

In a remarkable bit of descriptive writing which shows Beard at his best,[126] he describes what passed for thinking among the leaders of society as the distressful year of 1932 came on. Here are some of the typical phrases current among the apologists of the existing order: Restoration of equilibrium through the price mechanism. Bigger prosperity after every panic. Freedom of movement for capital and labor. Individual initiative, the paramount reliance. No government interference. Relief, the duty of local agencies. Technical correction by stock exchange mechanism. The American System. . . . On the other hand, here are typical phrases current among the critics of the existing order: The absurdity of want amid plenty. Challenges to the social order. Defects in capitalism. Crisis in government and economy. Parity of agriculture and industry. Collective action. Economic planning. Insult to intelligence.

It must be obvious that only a small fraction of the people using these high-sounding phrases could have carried on a consistent, intelligent and analytical discussion of their merit for over five minutes. The drawing room etiquette where these phrases pass current, fortunately does not apply to the outer world of no fear nor favors. Every one of those alleged conclusions goes to the heart of a most difficult and intricate problem far beyond the intellectual calibre of phrasemongers to understand, let alone to dissect.

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[126] America In Midpassage—Beard (1939), pp. 111-12.

Max Nordau may not present the remedy for the disease he discusses, but he is caustically analytical in probing the recesses of the average mentality, including that of the average historian.[127] In discussing the psychological premises underlying the interpretation of history, he contends that in a state of civilization, the average man owes the smallest part of his ideas and judgments to the impressions made by his own senses. For the greater part, they come to him as written or spoken symbols through the writing and speeches of others, and remain throughout his life mere sounds and signs which may bear no resemblance to reality, or be quite at variance with it. If the average intelligent man is provided with a good supply of such formulae, and can produce one on any occasion that requires it, he passes in his own estimation and that of his fellows as a cultivated man. But his repetition of formulae is mere psittacism, and his word-knowledge has nothing to do with real knowledge.

Words can be joined together to form a sentence, even if they express the impossible, while its very impossibility escapes the consciousness. "Now, the ordinary man," Nordau concludes, "seldom translates his words into ideas, or only very partially. One repeats a judgment from another, parrot-wise, a judgment to which no thought is attached. He becomes so much accustomed to using abstractions, whose content at best is casual and arbitrary, that his consciousness ceases to mirror the actual world at all. The normal man neither observes nor examines. He repeats mechanically what he has heard said. He is not critical; he is credulous." [128]

This judgment, harsh as it appears, applies to ninety-five per cent of our present teachers of history. As for the remaining few, most of those engaged in so-called research are of the type who concern themselves with the small change of history, the mere events in themselves. For them history is an art, not a science. It will continue to remain so until they free themselves from the tyranny of words and search for the solid content beneath the ideas they transmit disguised as the judgment of their individual understanding.

WORD-INFLUENCES IN RELIGION

That all men are kin under the skin, Colonel Sleeman tells us from his observations among the Hindus in the capacity of a British official.

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[127] The Interpretation of History—Nordau, pp. 264-6.

[128] The Interpretation of History—Nordau, pp. 265-6.

The devout Hindu, he avers, not only believes implicitly every word of every poem that has ever been written in Sanscrit, but the more improbable the story, the greater is the proof of the wonder-working miracles of the Deity. The Hindu religion, he avers, reposes upon an entire prostration of the mind. The good Colonel is discreet on other forms of contemporaneous religious dogma. "There was a time, and that not far distant, when it was the same in England, and in every other European nation, and there are, I am afraid, some parts of Europe where it is so still." [129]

This strangely ubiquitous aberration concerning the mystic significance of words overseeped the monasteries and invaded the ghettoes of medieval days. Among the learned Jews, it manifested itself in the occult Kabbalah, among the laity in an extraordinary form of dialectic known as pilpulism, which in modern times is the pettifogging casuistry of our learned constitutional tribunals.

"The word pilpulism is derived from a root meaning strong pepper," Kastein cautions us significantly. "The method was as follows: A disputant would advance a proposition and prove it from the Talmud. He would then proceed to prove the contrary, also from the Talmud; the object being to demonstrate that although it was contrary to the original proposition, it did not contradict it." [130] This was a species of spiritual gymnastics, the author concludes correctly enough, which is frequently practiced when men's intellects, menaced with suffocation by the pressure of the outside world, find no outlet for creative expression in real life. Most people, however, are supremely content to live out their lives within the narrow confines of their own intellectual ghettoes, and vehemently condemn as enemies of society those who would shake them out of their self-induced torpor. Metonomy ranks among the most insidious enemies of clarity in thought.

Freud gives a humorous illustration of faulty thinking wherein fanciful ideas are unfairly matched against reality, and the possibility is made equivalent to actuality. In the temple of Cracow, Freud tells the story, sat the great Rabbi N. praying with his disciples. Suddenly he emitted a cry, and in reply to the questions of his disciples said: The great Rabbi L. died just now in Lemberg. The congregation thereupon went into mourning for the deceased. Subsequently, it developed that the Rabbi of Lemberg had not died as the Rabbi N. had described telepathically, but on the contrary was alive and in excellent health. A stranger seized the opportunity to banter a pupil of the Cracow rabbi about the episode. "That was a glorious exhibition that your rabbi made of himself when he saw the Rabbi of Lemberg die," he said. "No matter," replied the pupil, "to look from Cracow to Lemberg was wonderful enough anyhow." [131]

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[129] Quoted by Grote in his History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 430-1.

[130] History of the Jews—Kastein (1936) p. 324.

WORD-INFLUENCES IN SOCIAL THINKING

This use of words without relation to reality was amply evidenced in our discussion of international affairs as touched upon by the so-called leaders of thought. The cataclysm of 1929, and the ensuing depression brought in its wake, among others, the protest against the "price system" as the primary cause of our ills. A violent form of economic insanity known as technocracy spread like wild-fire amongst the intelligentsia in those days and worked havoc with what little stability in economic theory there still remained.

Everybody then talked of erg-hours and units of production and national capacity to absorb. To make amends for early neglect of fundamental training in the social sciences, there was neither the time nor the will. Since they were the oracles of wisdom, and oracles must speak, the cognoscenti talked of economics, capitalism and the price system. "Price system" finally won out. It was a crisp, incisive phrase, and implied much, even if it meant little to those who employed it in the diagnosis of current ills. The times called for a simple and comprehensible formula that even a moron could understand, or thought he understood, which amounts to the same thing.

Under that beautiful law of supply and demand, which explains everything, the demand was soon supplied by Howard Scott and Harold Loeb. Everything was made crystal-clear in the following magic words: "Men live by production, distribution and consumption of goods. Goods are produced and distributed by effort. The incentive to effort is profit. Profit depends on price. Price depends on scarcity. Therefore, the life of man under the capitalistic system depends on the scarcity of goods. And the scarcity of goods is being progressively destroyed by the application of science to production, known in its latest phase as technology." [132]

There in a few simple sentences that any babe could lisp was summed up the wisdom of the ages. No need to study economics, history, sociology, philosophy and the rest. As simple as the story of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, the entire layout of modern society was made evident to those who read as they run.

The issue was clear. The "price system" means scarcity. Technocracy means plenty. Let us bow down in reverence before those mighty high priests of the new cult, Scott and Loeb. It is not astonishing that many men did. Even the befuddled and bewildered potentates of industry and finance gathered in annual conclave at the Waldorf-Astoria listened wraptly to the message of the new prophet by their own invitation. After all, if there was something new coming, maybe they could get in on the bandwagon.

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[131] Wit and Its Relations to the Unconscious—Freud, p. 668, Mod. Lib. Ed.

[132] Life in a Technocracy—Loeb, p. 7.

It is scarcely six years since the technocratic mania subsided. Most of us who were then concerned with economic and social questions—and who was not?—still retain vivid memories of the furore that new "philosophy" created. That is nothing new in American life. Such insanity breeds rapidly on our fruitful soil. The disease is stamped out, or rather dies out, only to re-appear later in some other form. Huey Long's "Share The Wealth," Upton Sinclair's EPIC in California (End Poverty In California), Townsend's Two Hundred Dollars Every Month old age pension scheme, California's Thirty Dollars Every Thursday referendum of 1939, all are symptoms of the same basic ailment: Inability to think a problem through, and therefore the dazzling attraction of phrases and panaceas.

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TECHNOCRATIC MOVEMENT

Perhaps it may appear like flaying a dead horse to analyze now the fundamental fallacy of a movement that has already collapsed, as did technocracy. But there is something to be gained by doing so. The underlying processes of thought which brought that craze into existence are still a potent force in determining contemporary political movements. For several years that mania went unchecked, because the leaders of American life in all fields of activity—conservatives, reactionaries, liberals, radicals, Socialist, Communists—apparently could not grasp the handle of its fallacies. It collapsed of its own weight, rather than dissolved before the cold processes of analytical understanding. Nothing is more certain than that the morrow, or the next year, will witness the bursting out of a similar political meteor that will dazzle men's eyes and bewilder their understanding and gather a fruitful crop of adherents only to collapse once more because of the inherent unsoundness which time, not reason, will expose.

This bedevilment of our political life cannot go on ad infinitum. Pressing social problems must be solved if our nation is to realize the marvellous possibilities locked up within its material and human resources. This pragmatical policy of "trying anything once" has its limits in trying and failing once too often. The pages of history are strewn with the records of empires that have been dissolved because of their inability to mould themselves into new patterns of life. What these patterns are when in the making should be the cooperative study of the sociologist, the economist and the historian. All of them are today fumbling at their tasks. Technocracy, the various isms, the N. R. A., the failure of the New Deal to grasp at constructive fundamentals, the indecisiveness of economic reactionaries, these are premonitory warnings of frustration which must end in national disaster unless checked betimes.

In no field of study but society are phrases permitted to pass for thought with such freedom in matters of deepest significance to human welfare. Technocracy appeared impressive because it employed the mysterious and pompous vernacular of pseudo-science.

Their phrase, "the price system" has now become an accepted element of current thought. Even Beard has succumbed to the somnorific influence of its dulcet note. "The price mechanism of the capitalist system" [133] is a self-explanatory string of words which excuses the necessity of further analysis of the processes of capitalist economy. It is not, for him, a mere rhetorical gesture. Its meaning is taken to be as obvious as is the Washington Monument. That phrase occurs throughout his work, and is used without the faintest trace of critical analysis to explain, for example, the basic reasons which lead to the protest of the farmers against their exploitation by industrial interests.[134] Hoover's denial of that contention is also based on the operations of the price mechanism,[135] as is President Roosevelt's efforts to establish debtor-creditor stabilization through the regulation of the price system.[136]

So is the United States Chamber of Commerce resolve to maintain the interests of their class, price mechanism or not,[137] and the equal determination of the agrarian leaders to get the upper hand over this price system [138] at any cost. If history is something more than chronology and the historian's capacity is to be gauged, rightly, not by the mass of facts he accumulates but by his analysis of the significance of these facts, then Beard and his latest book are the most convincing proof of the break-down of classical history.

His attitude toward technocracy is one of Olympian aloofness to disguise more serious defects in his apparatus of approach. Here are the facts, is his method. Do what you can with them. In adopting this position, he thereby confesses his own inability to do anything with them himself. "When Harold Loeb and his engineering associates indicated by the calculations summarized in the Chart of Plenty that the production of wealth, as a physical fact, could be immensely increased in the United States by applied engineering rationality, perhaps doubled, politicians and economists showed signs of cutting loose from the theory that capitalism was automatically efficient and of inquiring into the problem of bringing realities more in line with potentials. Judging by experience it seemed probable that the growing recognition of the fructifying relations between science and culture in general would prove to be correlatively stimulating." [139]

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[133] America in Midpassage—Beard (1939), p. 29.

[134] Ibid. p. 29.

[135] Ibid. p. 38.

[136] Ibid. p. 217.

[137] Ibid. p. 223.

[138] Ibid. p. 250.

Beard accepts without a murmur the assumption that production is a matter of capacity and not of economic laws peculiar to a definite productive system. He tacitly submits to the dictum that capitalist economics is synonymous with price, and price depends on scarcity. He cannot explain the anomaly of the New Deal trying to lift agriculture by decreasing production in order to raise the price on the one hand, while through the N. R. A. it tried to increase production through authority codes in the various industries by stabilizing the price at higher levels or in other instances even lowering it. Nowhere but in the social sciences, particularly in economics and politics, is every epigone listened to with respect. This is not because of a strange contradiction in human nature. If every man's opinion is entitled to equal value, it is because every man feels inwardly his inability to maintain his opinion on the solid ground of science, as based on definite, concrete knowledge of social laws. In presenting here the inherent fallacies of the technocratic ideology we are merely indicating the deeper reasons why history up to now has failed to fulfill its great mission to humanity.

DEFINITE SOCIAL LAW, NOT CAPACITY TO CREATE, GOVERNS CAPITALIST PRODUCTION

Who is the master in modern production, the engineer or the capitalist owner, acting directly or through his agents? We can leave to minds incapable of anything else to quibble as to the meaning of the word master. That type of mentality, working on a simple assumption, can turn out reams, if not volumes, to show the role of the engineer in devising and directing actual production, while the capitalist owner is cooling his toes on the beaches of Miami or Maine, depending on the season.

By master we mean the one—be he an individual, a partnership or a corporate entity—who hires and fires, who gives the word when to start and when to stop, who buys engineering brains on the market as he would any other means of production, and bends that particular purchasable commodity into his particular scheme of things. By master, we mean the one who has control of the books and of the purse, whose fiat has the effect of law within the scope of his enterprise, who determines when to expand production, or to contract it, or to stop producing altogether for reasons accountable to none but his own best judgment.

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[139] America in Midpassage—Beard, pp. 847-8.

There can be only one answer as to who is boss in modern production. The capitalist is the master, the engineer, the servant who starts, regulates and controls the productive process subject to the will of his employer.

When Beard agrees that production, as a physical fact, could be immensely increased in the United States, he speaks like one of the dreamiest of Utopians. There are definite economic laws which regulate production in our modern economy, and until those laws are changed, no other scheme of production is possible despite all the Charts of Plenty from here to Hades. What are the laws that govern production in modern economy, that consequently control the mass and character of the output, the number of people to be employed, the conditions of their employment, the prices of products, the profits to be realized, the number of unemployed, the policies of government, and a host of other problems? Instead of laws, we are given fiat. In place of clear-cut analysis we are given ready-made dogmas.

EXAMPLES OF ECONOMIC DOGMATISM CONCERNING CURRENT PROBLEMS

First among them is the bald technocratic assertion that "men live by the production, distribution and consumption of goods." That is not true either for the present or the past. Vast numbers of men throughout the world today live upon the prodigality of nature. Vast numbers of men in this country who have never done a day's work in their lives, live splendidly upon the labor of others through the mechanism of properly legal devices. Large numbers of other men in this country live an almost self-contained life in communities almost hermetically sealed off from economic contact with the rest of the world. What is lacking in that dogma is the historical element.

Only in those societies where the capitalist mode of production prevails are goods produced not for direct use, but for exchange. Instantly a formidable array of questions present themselves. Upon what basis is this exchange effected? How are values determined? What elements must enter into the formation of the selling price for a solvent and continuing enterprise? How can production and distribution be most advantageously effected in order to lower the individual cost of production per unit? In short, the whole range of political economy opens up before our eyes at the very threshold of the inquiry into one of the most formidable realities of modern-day existence.

Of course, there is one way of settling problems by shutting ones eyes to them and insisting that they are not there; but no serious student of society can indulge himself in that world of phantasy. He leaves that to technocrats and other phrase-mongers. Yet, not a single one of those questions can be evaded by the hard-headed realistic capitalist producer. The practical hat manufacturer, for example, probably doesn't give a fig for all your laws of political economy, but he must follow closely his cost of production, his competitor's selling price, the terms of his banking accommodations, and a host of other matters whose appropriate outcome he ascribes to his individual business acumen, rather than to the operation of overpowering economic forces in whose totality his own is a fractional part.

The gods of Technocracy continue: "Goods are produced and distributed by effort." Once more we have a dogma divorced from its historical relations. In some societies, goods are the free gift of nature which are consumed on the spot or are shared according to communal custom. It is only under definite social and historical conditions that the amount of effort necessary for their production and distribution enters as an important element of its economy.

"The incentive of effort is profit." That is belied by the facts today. An enormous amount of effort in politics, religion, education, philanthropy, and a host of other activities, among them the military, are not dictated by the profit motive. Feudal economy and patriarchal slavery was not actuated by the profit motive. The predominance of the profit motive as a necessary element in economic activity is the mainspring of capitalist economy though profit making is much more ancient; and that mode of production is strictly limited historically and is itself governed by the internal laws of the particular society in which it flourishes. Compare Japan and the United States. Technocrats, political nostrum dealers and historians generally have not the faintest conception of those internal laws which produce the conditions for which they undertake to prescribe or about which they write.

Those who talk so glibly about the profit system have not demonstrated that they know much about the capitalist system. For one thing, they would not place the cart before the horse. The profit is the end result of a process, a cyclical process, one which must constantly repeat itself lest it come to a dead stop because of some fault in reproduction of its economy. Nothing is more common than production going on even in the face of a continuing loss for a considerable period. This is not a violation of the profit motive, but because of it.

Other categories of the capitalist class have a distinct interest in this process. The case of New York City's elevated rapid transit system illustrates this point exactly. The Manhattan Elevated Company, long a financial gold mine, had met with more modern subway competition. The outmoding of the tenement areas from which it drew its passengers caused a shifting of population. Receipts went down. The cost of operation, based on prices of materials and supplies and labor costs, were going up. Its ratio of operation had reached its absolute maximum under capitalist economy, namely 100% and over of it's gross income. That is, for every dollar the company was taking in, it was paying out more than a dollar for actual operating costs, even before deductions for taxes and depreciation. By every rule of capitalist economy it ought to have folded up long ago. Actually it was kept operating on that basis for many years.

How? Because the road was leased to the Interborough Rapid Transit Company for a mere nine hundred and ninety-nine years. The Interborough was operating certain subways, from which it derived a splendid income, but at the same time it was bound through contracts with the city to continue both subway and elevated operation jointly. Ultimately what decided the question was whether or not it was worth while for the Interborough Rapid Transit Company to continue in business on that basis or to go into bankruptcy.

The profit motive is ubiquitous, but for a going enterprise other complicating factors are met with. Many a capitalist enterprise continues despite the fact that the common stock does not earn dividends, the preferred stock is way in arrears, but the bondholders are still kept from compelling foreclosure. Such is the present situation of many of our largest railroad systems. The United States Steel Company for example, is so operated that with only fifty per cent of its plant producing, it can earn a fair profit; with forty per cent operation it will break about even, and it will still go on for a considerable period on a twenty per cent basis or even less, nurtured meanwhile by its accumulated surplus.

Again one can say, profit is the motive. That is self-evident. But the repetition of a vapid truism does not make us any the wiser concerning the laws of capitalist economy, nor help toward the solution of the very conditions which gave rise to technocracy and other panaceas.

DOGMAS CONCERNING THE PRICE AND THE PROFIT SYSTEM

"Profit depends on price. Price depends on scarcity." In these two simple sentences which any babe can lisp are summed up more economic nonsense than it would take a full-sized tome to clear up. That profit depends on price is the substitution of a tautology for an analysis. Even then it does not tell a complete, if redundant tale. Obviously, no profit can be realized until the sale is consummated. But they have yet to explain how part of the product can be sold below the actual cost of production, yet a profit will be realized on the total production. That phenomenon known as dumping is by no means rare in capitalist economy.

Their real problem lies in the dogma that price, hence profit, depends on scarcity. This is the gravamen of the "price mechanism" explanation of the problems created by modern economy. Production is carried on for profit, runs the tale. Over-production gluts the market and reduces the price; supply and demand, you know. Therefore, production must be cut down to keep up the price. The result is the economy of scarcity. Hence crisis, bankruptcy, unemployment, depression, relief and the host of other effects which follow from the operation of the "price system."

These phrases sum up the extent of the knowledge possessed by the leaders of contemporary society about the inner mechanism of their own social system. Industrialists, financiers, statesmen, politicians, economists, apologists, New Dealers, conservatives, reactionaries, Utopians, progressives, liberals, radicals, Communists, all with singular unanimity voice the same shallow phrases of minds incapable of thinking out a problem beyond the third move. They differ only in their ideologies, which are themselves the product of their own superficial subjective rationalizations.

Every fact of modern economic processes, once its laws are understood, belie these ready-made explanations. Price does not depend on scarcity. No producer starts his processes going without some working knowledge of his costs of production. He may not know the rules laid down in the economic text-books, but he does understand the A B C of his bank balance and that ultimately his price must cover the following: the cost of materials and supplies; the costs of labor, including necessary superintendence, engineering, and accounting; the wear and tear, or depreciation and obsolescence of his plant; plus the average rate of profit then current per unit of capital necessarily employed.

Normally the competitive market will teach him in the most effective manner whether or not his individual costs are above, below, or average for his industry. Price is established by the haggling of the market leaving out for the moment the problem of monopolies, but if conditions are such that the price received over a period does not meet his essential costs, eventually he will have to close down. No product produced on a capitalist basis comes into the market without a definite value, like a new-born babe free from sin. Every commodity thus produced has a definite exchange-value attached to it, which it may or may not realize.

At the proper point in our analysis we shall discuss exhaustively, and with exactitude, what are the conditions which make the smooth-flowing cycle of continuous reproduction for capitalist economy impossible, and to what devices various capitalist producers resort when confronted with crisis and depression. For our present purpose, it is but necessary to prove that price does not depend on scarcity, and that this condition of scarcity is a violation, rather than an affirmation of the laws of capitalist economy which makes its profits, and can only make its profits as a going system from the production of values, and consequently the production of surplus values, which are the derivative source of profit of enterprise, interest and rent. We will show that individual instances to the contrary are the affirmation not of the basic processes of capitalist physiology, but rather of its pathology. And we will prove what mankind already instinctively knows, that an "economy" of scarcity is no economy at all, but the evidence of social degeneration and decay.

These apparently abstract but actually very concrete and very grave problems are not within the scope of classical history as evidenced by the works of modern scholarship. Yet it is not too much to say that no one, from the most exalted Wall Street magnate to the most miserable recipient of the nation's relief, has not a very real and very vital interest in the elucidation of these problems of contemporary times. Their due consideration is the substance of history, not the piffle underneath Lady Windermere's fan.

We know that modern society which is a product of capitalist economy, is built upon production, and not the suppression of production. Normally and inherently, the greater the production, the greater the profit. Profit is figured on the total capital employed, not on the individual product. Frequently by increasing production, price is lowered, sales are increased, turn-over is more rapid and profits rise enormously due to the lower cost per individual unit. This is the basis of modern industry which is predicated on mass production at a lower price.

The price-scarcity theory is belied by the facts of the most important social happenings of the twentieth century. Of course, production eventually ceases when profits stop. But that is a far cry from the contention that profit is based on scarcity. The stoppage results from inability to sell at an economic price, not from inability to sell at any price. Necessity may compel dumping at any price, but that is the harbinger of ruin, not of a normal economy. It is one of the inherent contradictions of capitalist economy to annihilate that very competition which was the source of its tremendous energy in the heyday of youth. During its cannibalistic maturity, it was a struggle for the survival of the fittest. In old age it seeks for monopoly, for a closed market, for the security which comes from assured income rather than from constructive effort.

This ideal maximum of monopoly capital has seldom been attained, unless it was in the form of a legal monopoly, through a franchise, patent rights, or otherwise; or a natural monopoly, which is rather rare; or an economic monopoly by agreement which is contrary to state policy. Competition is not ruled out altogether among the giants. No student of history can ignore these vital processes which determine the nature of contemporary life in all its manifestations. The facts prove abundantly that price is regulated as much by mass production and over-production, as by deliberate efforts to create an artificial scarcity.

APOLOGETICS IN CURRENT ECONOMIC THINKING ON GOVERNMENT COMPETITION

Excellent proof of this ubiquitous and pernicious disease, this substitution of words for thought, is offered by the utterances of leaders of society in every walk of life. Let us consider two great New York City newspapers of the date when this is being written. The editors of the Times [140] and the Sun [141] feel impelled to comment upon an address by Benjamin M. Anderson before the American Economic Association. Anderson is the economist for the Chase National Bank in New York, the largest financial institution in the United States, and the largest private commercial bank in the world.

As might be expected, Anderson is bitterly opposed to any program which undermines or limits the free manipulation by private individuals of social economic forces from which his employers derive such enormous profits. The Chase National Bank and similar institutions are fully entitled to the use of the best brains their money can buy.

[140] New York Times, Dec. 29, 1939.

[141] New York Sun, Dec. 29, 1939.

But they are not entitled to palm off the products of those brains as the result of impartial and impersonal scientific analysis.

Anderson is opposed to national planning. "The market place," he says, "is a far more modern and efficient instrumentality of economic coordination than government, and the substitution of government control for control by freely moving market prices represents not progress, but very dangerous retrogression." Everything depends upon what one means by progress.

When Anderson and those for whom he speaks talk about the freely moving market prices, they are resorting to deliberate subterfuge through a play upon words rather than the analysis of actualities. There is no such thing as a "free market." Every device human ingenuity can perfect is devoted to destroying the possibility of such a free market. Rigging, suppressing, eliminating, boosting, faking, all are the product of the gentle technique so well known to Wall Street which Anderson has served so long. These methods, with appropriate variations, are evidenced in any market wherever commodities are sold, be they in an Exchange, the public market place or over the store counter. Capitalism throve on competition, but attempts by every means possible, legal and illegal, to overcome the effects of competition.

The ideal market place exists only in the ivory towers of the professoriate, where buyer and seller meet on an equal footing. Anderson, of all people, should be the last one to speak of free markets and progress in the same breath. Evidence of that "progress" can be found right here on our bread lines and the relief rolls, and in Europe and Asia on its numerous battlefronts.

The Sun's editor concludes that "the government is incapable of planning. It does not know enough." The economic planning of the "free market" has brought about the existing chaos. What is the remedy? Some more free market. Such was the practice of medieval phlebotomists. A little bleeding for an ailment which did not respond to the first treatment was followed by some more bleeding and that treatment was frequently completed by the undertaker.

Italy and Germany were cited by Anderson as examples of economic planning. Such analogies may, perhaps, be sufficient proof for the members of the American Economic Association. At least, Anderson must have thought so, or he would not have ventured to make them. He left out one all-important element to have made that illustration serve as a sufficient warning for those who would venture to apply some measure of rational prevision to the economic processes here in the United States. He forgot to mention what perhaps to him is of little importance, namely, the differences between the dictatorships and our great heritage of democratic political institutions.

Democracy is not a garment which any nation can assume or discard at will. It is a process of development which goes to the very vitals of a nation's existence and must grow out of its loins. Italy and Germany were given the garments of democracy by historic circumstances. It was not the flowering of the spirit of a people through centuries of nourishment, growth and exfoliation. The English, the French and the American people have paid for that heritage with their blood in a consciously undertaken struggle which lasted through many centuries.

Sinclair Lewis and the other observers of the American scene may ask sardonically whether it can happen here, but the analysis of the political obstacles which faced the Fascist Huey Long in spreading his political empire beyond state boundaries, or of Father Coughlin with his 1936 Presidential fiasco will prove, in part, why dictatorship has found this an unfruitful soil; and least, not because the cultivators in large number were lacking.

This entire problem of organizing our national economy will have to be taken out of the hands of the so-called Right or the Left or the middle-of-the-roaders. These very cognomen will be submitted to close scrutiny, and we will not be astonished to discover that beyond shibboleths the overwhelming mass of them have no clear conception even of their programs, let alone the problems themselves.

The Sun's editor claims that the government planners do not know enough; we shall presently see that the supporters of "back to normalcy" know even less of the mechanism of their own economic system. To begin with, one has but to note on the same page the editor's protest against high taxes as siphoning off to unproductive uses money that would otherwise be devoted to capital investment and expansion. Our analysis will show that there are definite economic laws which govern the investment of capital, and least among them is the rate of taxation. But all that in its proper place.

PHRASES SUBSTITUTED FOR ANALYSIS

Anderson's address called forth an analysis by the Times along somewhat different lines from that of the Sun. The New York Times, always an advocate of "free trade," noted that economic planning brings its counterpart of trade barriers in an attempt to establish autarchy, or national self-sufficiency. "In the light of all this, Dr. Anderson seems justified in his conclusion that the high protective tariff is the mother of many of the economic interventions of the New Deal."

Again, we will not trouble the reader now with any extended analysis of the role the tariff has played in our history. We merely advert to the fact that every industrial nation has had to resort to the tariff either to foster or to protect its domestic industry. Even England, having acquiesced to the doom of history which negatived its ambition to be forever the workshop of Europe, has at last resorted to the tariff for economic self-protection. Not all reason and lucidity is confined to the editorial sanctum. What is to them always so obvious, and compels the posture and tone of finality until it becomes constitutional with the editorial fraternity, is not equally clear and apodictic to the unblessed who must live in the outer darkness.

Since, however, editors pride themselves on being supremely practical men, there is one test to which their genius ought to be willing to submit, nay, to gladly embrace. That test is, to apply their theories to practice. Let the editor of the Times descend from his sanctum and assume the tone of ordinary mortals. Let him point out exactly the competitive industrial commodities on which he would reduce the tariff rates. We confidently predict that both capital and labor of the industries affected would hound the editor out of his office and home if his advice had the slightest chance of being acted upon by the proper authorities.

Free trade, unlike charity, begins with the other fellow's industry. Meanwhile, we would like the editor and others who talk so glibly about autarchy, nationalism, totalitarianism and world balance of economy to cogitate upon the nature of capitalist economy which, though world-wide in scope, was built and developed upon a nationalist basis—and necessarily so.

We will, to begin with, ask him to consider the merits of a petition for a protective tariff submitted to the Congress of the United States during its first session under the new Constitution, on April 11, 1789. This appeal sets forth, among other things, "that since the close of the late war, and the completion of the Revolution, they have observed with serious regret the manufacturing and the trade interest of the country rapidly declining, and the attempts of the State Legislatures to remedy the evil failing of their object; that in the present melancholy state of our country, the number of poor increasing for want of employment, foreign debts accumulating, houses and land depreciating in value, and trade and manufactures languishing and expiring, they look up to the Supreme Legislature of the United States as the guardians of the whole empire . . . by imposing on all foreign articles which can be made in America, such duties as will give a just and decided preference to their labors." [142]

We will ask, also, the careful study of Hamilton's historic Report on Manufactures. At the same time, we will expect a detailed analysis in its historical setting of the position taken by that truly representative American statesman, the author of the "American System," Henry Clay, in his remarkable defense of the protective system.[143] Then, after that, we will be in a better position to evaluate the practical worth of the sage advice issuing from our economists, historians and statesmen when they speak of the international division of labor on the basis of an intensely nationalistic capitalist economy with imperialism the only language it can possibly understand on the world front, when properly supported by the national mailed fist.

F. The Religious Interpretation of History

RELIGIO-PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION OF HISTORY BY CONTEMPORARY WRITERS—TILLICH

Between Bancroft's beneficent Providence who helps tide him over difficulties in historical analysis, and the abstract phraseological subterfuges of contemporary leaders which excuses on their part the necessity for further thought, there is a vast field to be cultivated by genuine theology and philosophy. The real workers in this field are rare, and consequently are to be the more highly prized.

To the earnest scholar, labels mean nothing, substance everything. While he may at first be overawed by the intricate concepts of a Spengler and a Kyserling and a Whitehead, it is only because he instinctively accords to all such efforts the tribute of sincerity. He ascribes difficulty of apprehension rather to the limitations of his own understanding, as well as to the imperfections of language in transmitting highly involved ideas. The subject is worthy of the effort, and all doubts must be resolved as due to personal inadequacies rather than to defects in the writer's position.

It is solely for that reason that deliberate obscurantists and charlatans are able to parade in their stolen garments of erudition for any appreciable time. The inevitable denouement comes, not so much from the breakdown of their positions under the implacable scrutiny of persevering scholarship—which is the all too-common fate of vast generalizations—but rather because of the discovery that these philosophies were nothing more than a deliberate word-juggling which temporarily hid from view the intellectual paucity which they served to hide. The honest worker in any field of thought is entitled to the respect and support of similar workers in every other field. It is for that reason that we paid our meed of homage to Berdyaev's "Meaning of History" though firmly disagreeing with his conclusions. For a similar reason we accord tribute to Paul Tillich and his "The Interpretation of History."

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[142] Readings in Economic History of the United States—Bogart, p. 256.
[143] Life and Speeches of Henry Clay—Vol. II, pp. 2-67.

To Tillich also, history is the ultimate fulfillment of the will of God. But God to him is no convenient haven for refuge from analytical difficulties. It is the deliberately reasoned out conclusion of a powerful and sensitively attuned intellect.

To Bancroft, Providence is first of all an intensely partisan personage sporting the colors of our national flag, and coming to our rescue in the nick of time just like the hero in the melodrama. Bancroft's religiosity, however, is a convenient, though highly respectable garment, which he dons only on state occasions when other devices of the historian are found inadequate to the situation. With Tillich, God's will in history is universal in nature, as becomes the ideology of a typically philosophical German.

God plays no favorites. "History," he writes, "in its relationship to transcendent fulfillment and decision receives absolute seriousness. It is not the realm where man acts without relationship to God. There is no such realm. History is the realm where the ultimate is intended. There is nothing in the ultimate that is not in history. In the ultimate, there is no fulfillment that is not intended in history. In the ultimate, there is no decision that is not prepared in history. The ultimate is that which is fulfilled, which is decided. . . . The kingdom of God is the fulfillment intended in history and implied in the ultimate. The kingdom of God is the transcendent fulfillment, the name for the ultimate from the point of view of fulfillment. The Kingdom of God therefore, embraces everything in the course of history as its transcendent meaning. We do not know where real history is. We do not even know it in the events whose subjects are men. We know it still less in the events that are enacted by the other creatures. We actually know of history, only as we stand active within it, and as we are able to transform every foreign history into our own history through our decisions." [144]

This tells us no more than that what is ought to be, and what is not could not be—a conclusion by no means startling or original. From any other writer, we would let this work go by, but from Tillich it represents the ultimate of the religio-philosophical school of German thought, which, as all the world knows, is the acme of profundity—as well as of obscurity.

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[144] The Interpretation of History—Tillich (1936) pp. 279-81.

If history is ever to realize its fullest possibilities, it must once and for all settle accounts with the German philosophical school. This school, by the way, is not confined exclusively to Germany. Its devotees are in every land, though they may not know it, for the secret of the significantly uttered phrase is the common subterfuge of mediocrity wherever its habitat. With Tillich, however, those conclusions are the end result of his analysis, not the convenient recourse of difficulties encountered during the course of the argument.

The first part of his work is one of self-analysis and revelation. It shows him as an earnest seeker for truth who weighs dogmas and evaluates theories, and while a sincere Lutheran, is still a Marxian Socialist, but dissatisfied with both schools of thought as he found them. He was one of the organizers and theoretical exponents of German Religious Socialism which began to develop after the First World War. At heart he never belonged to any sect or party. "My longing has been and is a 'fellowship' which is bound to no party, although it stands nearer to one than the other, and which shall be a vanguard for a more righteous social order in the spirit of prophecy and in accord with the demand of the Kairos." [145]

Here we see the typical evidence of the German philosophical mind, the resort to words and phrases as an escape from realities. The next step is to deny that anything is real outside of thought and concepts. Fortunately that other aspect of German thought denominated as scientific has given the world ample evidence of their ability to understand and pursue the real, once they free themselves from their congenital love of an abstract terminology which is mostly of their own invention.

Tillich speaks of a fellowship in accord with the demand of the Kairos. Kairos is the opposite of Logos. We want to know what those terms mean; and if they represent anything real, how they came into existence and function as they do. Tillich is sarcastic in his reference to that "scholasticism which derives concepts from concepts instead of from objects." [146] He properly concludes that such procedural methods lead to a large number of meaningless concepts which cannot withstand serious investigation.

Kairos deals with historical fate, and the methods man should adopt to meet it most adequately. Logos deals with ultimate destiny which can only be understood when one attains to spiritual affinity with the will of God. "The great question of the relationship of Kairos and

[145] The Interpretation of History—Tillich, p. 67.
[146] Ibid. p. 284.

Logos comes forward, but it is easily settled. The knowledge of nature is open to the non-Christian as well. The knowledge of super-nature is possible only through revelation. Whoever is not reached by it, stands quite outside the truth, a heretic or heathen. But whoever is illuminated by it, finds in this very fact the historical fate which links him to all others of the same destiny. Revelation eliminates individualization in thought and gives every single person an absolute position." [147]

REVEALERS OF REVELATIONS GENERALLY DISAGREE UPON WHAT IS REVEALED

Unfortunately for the happiness of mankind few have attained to the supreme heights of revelation, and those who have are not agreed upon what is revealed. For us, the only effective way of eliminating individualization is by the ordered arrangement of definite knowledge from which the laws of relation and motion are derived. Whether one calls it Kairos and Logos, or Fate and Destiny, we still insist on knowing just exactly how they operate and why. For us, the profound revelations of science are every whit as sublime as those of religion ever were, and besides have the great merit of being transmitted to every other mind capable of sustained and ordered discipline.

All that Tillich has given us so far is the substitution of revelation for knowledge. Now let us see what profounder insight into history that revelation yields him in illuminating the past, present or future of mankind. This does not eliminate the possibility on his part of some very acute observations upon the world as it is. His analysis of the economic-political role of nationalism is profounder than that of many mundane thinkers, while his excoriation of the pharisaical pacifism of the victor nations in the First World War bear the earmarks of genuine statesmanslike observation.[148]

Of the same nature is his analysis of the struggle between Socialism and National Socialism for power in Germany, determined in the final analysis, by the Nazis' more consistent understanding of the nature of power and its decisive role in history.[149] "If all being is indeed a balance of tensions of might, then social being is a balance of tensions of power. For power is might on the level of social existence. . . . Might belongs to everything that advances upon us, that gains authority, that is dominant—perhaps only to retreat the next instant and give way to something more dominant. Our whole world of perception is built up thus, and this encounter in mutual tension of might and impotence is the original being of things." [150]

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[147] The Interpretation of History—Tillich, p. 133.

[148] The Interpretation of History—Tillich, pp. 70-1.

[149] Ibid. pp. 200-1.

Yet his own abstract recognition of the need for effective power could not determine Tillich to struggle in common with the German Social Democracy instead of organizing his little group of German Religious Socialists. Truth, he concludes, "is the final, the actual power," [151] without conceding that from an historic standpoint, the most effective and far-reaching truth capable of stirring men to sustained constructive activity is that which is transmitted through the medium of knowledge rather than of revelation.

The League of Nations, despite its failures, is for him a higher truth on an all-embracing sphere of power superior to individual sovereignty. That strange mixture of economics and faith which is the concoction of all forms of Religious Socialism manifests itself in his solid observation that capital operates through the national state, and that the existing League is merely the representative of dominant national interests.[152] Yet this conclusion, albeit justified, does not in the least assist in clarifying the main purpose of his argument, which is to demonstrate the superior merits of Christian revelation when applied to history over mundane, scientific thought. That same prosaic conclusion regarding the League of Nations has been arrived at by countless thinkers without the benefit of clergy.

Finally Tillich comes down to his conception of "the center of history" around which all revolves, and from which events derive their meaning. "History is established or destroyed with the decision for or against its reality as a meaningful process." [153] This involves a series of consequences for the structure of historical reality. The objective processes of history in time and space are important only insofar as they concern the relation of history and nature. "History can be understood only from the meaning of history. Therefore, not beginning and end, but the point in which history reveals its meaning is decisive. If we call this point 'the center of history,' we can say, that not beginning and end determine the center, as in the case of spatial measurements, but that the center of history determines its beginning and end from the meaning of an historical process. The center of history is the place where the meaning-giving principle of history is seen. History is constituted by the fact that its center is constituted, or—since this is not an arbitrary act—by the fact that a center proves to be a center through creating history." [154] Here we observe the typical method of the metaphysical school of reasoning. First Tillich lays down the proposition that history possess value as history only if it has a meaning; otherwise it is merely events in nature. But no effort is made to prove that proposition, which is advanced as a self-understood axiom.

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[150] Ibid. p. 183.

[151] Ibid. p. 191.

[152] The Interpretation of History—Tillich, pp. 195-6.

[153] Ibid. p. 249.

[154] The Interpretation of History—Tillich, pp. 249-50.

After all, we could inquire what he means by "meaning" in history; how he has established it, whether that meaning is derived from history itself or is being read into it. However, the intellectually uncombatative are inclined to let such peccadillos go by. Instantly Tillich uses the word meaning as a basis for his center around which events revolve, and through which a higher purpose manifests itself. The next step in this epistemological process is for Tillich to identify this center, and to demonstrate by the same logic, that an historic event possesses a meaningful purpose only insofar as it consciously adapts itself to the will or guidance or control of this center, or directs itself toward that center through understanding of its relationship.

We soon discover that this analysis of Tillich's position is correct. The meaning of history is established by Christianity.[155] "There is no concrete interpretation of history without faith. This consideration forces the conclusion upon us that the content of a concrete and believing interpretation of history is the victory of meaning over meaninglessness, or—in Christian terminology—salvation. If history is affirmed—that is the result of our whole analysis—it is affirmed as history of salvation. But whether it is affirmed or not, that is a matter of decision and faith. This again means that the problem of history is combined with the Christological problem. The center of history gives meaning to history only if it overcomes simultaneously the threat of meaninglessness, or if it is the point where salvation manifests itself as the content of history." [156]

The reader accustomed to the devious methods of metaphysics is justified in feeling that the author has let him down. How much more understandable the whole circumlocutory process would have been had Tillich set out from the very beginning with the statement—Christology offers the only rational explanation of men and events. All action not guided by its light is meaningless because without purpose. Only those actions which lead to the realization of the Christian ideal are events which are in accord with human fate and ultimate destiny.

Had Tillich done that, the title of his work would properly have been the Christian spirit in historical events, instead of going the other way around, writing a book on The Interpretation of History, and then concluding that only those events have meaning which enter into the orbit of Christology. The former method would be simple and direct. But then its very directness would have defeated its purpose. He would first have to prove his premise of historical meaning and Christian significance. By pursuing the opposite tack, so favorite a procedure of metaphysicians, the reader is left too bewildered at the end to think rationally, let alone to protest vigorously.

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[155] Ibid. pp. 253-4.

[156] The Interpretation of History—Tillich, p. 256.

Without a murmur he will acquiesce—assuming he has persisted that far—that Christology becomes the only possible answer to the basic question implied in history, concerning aim and purpose. Christ is the center of history, and one's personal life should be completely determined by its relation to God, the principle and meaning of history.[157]

To the very end, Tillich remains true, however, to his religious Socialist philosophy. Even Marx is twisted to suit that purpose. Where Marx speaks of all history preceding the establishment of the classless society as the "prehistory" of mankind, so Tillich believes that his German Religious Socialism has improved upon Christian conservatism by laying the basis for a nobler civilization based upon the true Christology.[158] Because in general we subscribe to Tillich's aims for the future of mankind, we are willing to forgive his atrocious epistemological methods in so far as they help toward achieving the "true center" of history's hidden meaning.

JERROLD'S CHRISTIAN HISTORICAL JESUITISM AKIN TO FASCISM

Contrariwise, Douglas Jerrold in England has written a remarkably explicit exposition of what some professed Christians would do with our social organization if they had the power. "Christians must learn to judge systems of government first by their aims, and only in the second place by their methods." [159] This startling reiteration of a principle made famous by the Jesuits, and now the frankly avowed state policy of the dictatorships seems strangely out of tune from the mouth of a learned divine in the land which fostered our democracy.

Jerrold proves himself the spokesman for a school of thought which professes to be actuated by high Christian motives by denouncing alike the inequalities of capitalism and the iniquities of Communism, and who would reorganize society on a theocratic basis in accord with the philosophy of the Schoolmen in the Middle Ages. "It is not possible for one moment to say that all men have a right to self-government," he avers. "It is possible, however, to say without qualification that all governments have a duty to give their citizens the fullest opportunity for a free exercise of their personal responsibility. Without this opportunity, men cannot attain full stature and therefore, cannot know and serve God to the height of their powers in the natural order." [160]

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[157] The Interpretation of History—Tillich, pp. 258-60.

[158] Ibid. pp. 275-6.

[159] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold (1938) p. 116.

Shorn of its theological subtlety it means in as many words that all men are created unequal, and it is the duty of a government constituted by the most able to allow the not so able to develop their limited powers in that sphere where God and nature placed them. This is the very opposite of the theoretical position of democracy which allows for no hereditary stratification of society, and is ready, in principle as well as in deed, to open all doors to men who can make the grade while guaranteeing certain fundamental rights to all.

No matter with what theological persiflage Jerrold will disguise it, we will show that his ideas lead straight to Fascism and the turning back of society to the days of lords and knights and squires and villeins, with the Church for which he speaks holding both the semblance and essence of power which derives from domination over the minds and actions of men. More particularly, we are concerned with this Christian-Fascist interpretation of history which cloaks the designs of the Churchmen for whom he speaks.

Jerrold is as bitter as any Communist ever was in his denunciation of the evils of capitalism; its poverty, its unnatural inequality, its moral degradation which stultifies the noblest elements of the human soul. The evils around us, he argues, are the penalty for the departure from the Christian social order based on the free family and the autonomous Church. Man has a higher destiny than to be a consumer of equally distributed goods.

Liberty is not the chief, but only the political end of existence. While that today is based on property, "we have allowed the aggregation of property, and so the curtailment of liberty, to proceed unchecked, and thus grave economic and social abuses have grown up. These abuses have created a world-wide political disorder which must be remedied if peace is to be preserved and the possibility of ordered progress to be restored to free men." [161]

He derides the alleged benefits of big business and its vaunted efficiency. "In what sense are all these things efficient as compared with the arrangements which they supersede? Efficiency must be to some end. Are they going to make us happier, or wiser, or wealthier, or all three? And how much shall we lose in the process of becoming so? These are questions fairly easy to answer." [162] On the contrary, as his

[160] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, p. 119.
[161] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, p. 64. [162] Ibid. pp. 143-4.

efforts prove, these questions are much easier to ask than to answer. But the fact that our predominating mode of production is under inquiry constitutes in itself a social gain. Dogmatic analysis can be exposed as fallacious, and while dogmatists are never convinced, perhaps those whom they influence may yet be susceptible to the processes of impersonal scientific inquiry.

THE APOTHEOSIS OF CHRISTIAN MEDIEVALISM

During the Middle Ages, the Christian social order, Jerrold contends, laid the foundations of the highest civilization yet achieved by man precisely because it set itself a higher aim than material prosperity. He sets forth his present social ideals in the following apotheosis of feudalism, which he asserts was based on the fundamental precepts of Christianity. "It set itself deliberately to cast down the mighty from their seats and to exalt the humble. It killed, in due process of time, the institution of slavery; it asserted the dignity of all men and their equality before God. . . . It is not only that the formal bulwarks of liberty and progress—impartial justice, trial by jury, representative institutions, the security of property, the freedom of the Church from the inroads of the secular power, and the authority of the secular state within the limits of the things which are Caesar's—were the discoveries of the early Christian centuries, and not, as the ignorant think today, of the last two hundred years. . . . Villeins became peasants; slaves became craftsmen; and peasants and craftsmen alike achieved economic and political status. The world and its riches were thrown open to the humblest. It was a rough-and-ready world, and the upward path was steep and stony, but it was in the Christian centuries and because of the Christian faith that society was, for the first time in human history, able to draw on its reserves of wisdom, energy and pity." [163]

It is not necessary here to attempt a reply to each separate assertion in this profession of faith in order to expose the hollowness of its pretensions and the falsity of its history. Abundant proof to the contrary has already been adduced in our discussion of the social institutions during feudalism.

When Jerrold speaks of the revolutionary nature of Christianity during the Middle Ages, he allows himself a mere discrepancy of over a thousand years of history. It is so easy to generalize upon the iridescent past. We have already quoted from such revolutionary writers as Marx, Engels, Kautsky and Lenin to prove how sincere was their tribute to the early Christian Church as the refuge of the oppressed during the days of the Roman Empire. We have shown that the Church for hundreds of years subsequently not only countenanced but actively encouraged the prevailing institutions of which slavery, serfdom, oppression and human degradation in general were component parts.

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[163] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, pp. 58-9.

Were Jerrold to cite specific cases, it might perhaps be worth while to pursue this line of investigation further. Our chief interest at present lies in the typical method of ecclesiastical disputation which he offers, the utterance of a merely subjective proposition as incontrovertibly established, and the construction of his entire intellect edifice upon that assumption, which must fall to the ground in its entirety if that can be disproved.

Concerning the glorious elysium of the Middle Ages, it was thus rather for churchmen like Jerrold than for the rest of mankind. When the Church was temporarily weak, the Church was humble, as when Innocent III wrote to the Bishop of France in 1204, "Let nobody therefore imagine that We claim to meddle with or seek to diminish the jurisdiction of the illustrious King of the Franks any more than he desires or ought to hinder Ours." [164] When the Church was strong, the Church was arrogant, as when it made the secular head of the Holy Roman Empire crawl on his knees before the Pope, kiss the foot, and bend the head to receive the crown of authority.

"It was the tragedy of our civilization," Jerrold writes, "that the immense advance of industry due to the industrial revolution took place in England towards the end of the eighteenth century, when the doctrinal counter-balancing force was at its very weakest." [165] It was precisely in those countries where the doctrinal counter-balancing force was weakest that mankind made its greatest step forward in progress. It was only where the deadening hand of bigotry was removed that industry and education flourished and man had an opportunity to assert his dignity with an enormous outburst of that latent creative power which the Church had so long repressed. Abstract rights became concrete realities, while those realities themselves were undergoing further development by their very fulfillment.

Jerrold's outspoken fascism is put bluntly in the following words: "The chief and imperative task of those of us who wish to regain for reason the no-man's-land left barren by the abdication of modern society from its essential duty to preserve a closed, moral system and to submit its citizens to a rigorous intellectual discipline, is to challenge the deceptive fallacy that between right and wrong, between truth

[164] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, p. 7.

[165] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, p. 54.

and error, between justice and injustice, the whole duty of the state is to be impartial."[166]

How are the forces of the state to be employed in training the mass mind? Here is the Hitler-Mussolini formula, which he advocates for the rest of the world through his apparatus of an ecumenic church: "The problem is to utilize the immensely subtle and effective mechanical means at our disposal to inculcate and to diffuse habits of right thinking, of thinking coherently, and of thinking continuously. The obstacle which has to be surmounted is the abdication of the state, of many of the state churches, and the press, from their essential function of guiding and fostering right thinking. . . . Either education must be freed from the state and returned to the churches, or the state must be won to a recognition of its responsibility for a coherent system of religious, political and moral education."[167]

Secular democracy to him is a failure in England, France,[168] and the United States.[169] "Fascism," he writes, "is an anti-political revolt, often reckless and headstrong, often led by overambitious men, but inspired in the first instance by a perfectly natural distrust of the very real deficiencies of European democratic politics."[170] He admits that the Italian system does not tolerate political liberty as Anglo-Saxons understand it. Free speech is not allowed. "That, however, is not because Fascism is tyrannical but because it is non-political."[171]

This devout churchman exhausts all his casuistry in an unfruitful attempt to differentiate between politics and vital social and economic questions which manifest themselves concretely as questions of social polity; the very polity Jerrold would have controlled and determined by the select few whom God in his wisdom has chosen as his vicegerents on earth. It is an ancient system, and as history has so frequently demonstrated, a despotic system.

THE FOLLOWER OF THE NAZARENE ADVOCATES FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH HIS CHRISTIAN PURPOSE

This gentle Churchman is not a pacifist—far from it. "Whatever you want to do, you will never be able to do if you begin by announcing that you will not back your policy to the point of fighting for it."[172] This fire-snortling disciple of Jesus has apparently forgotten that that is exactly what civilized men must learn to do—to substitute persuasion for fighting, reason for force. Mankind must always be prepared to enforce its collective will, but that is a far cry from fighing to back up a domestic program or an imperialist policy peculiar to a definite mode of economy with every weapon known to human ingenuity. Subjective rationalization easily supplies justification for force. Your opponent, of course, is false to Christian principles,[173] and if perchance, victory should perch on his banner, this elusive churchman actually argues that the proof is obvious that his principles, and not your own, as you falsely asserted, are the only true and correct doctrines of the Christian faith.[174] So God is always with the victor.

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[166] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, pp. 106-7.

[167] Ibid. pp. 107-8.

[168] Ibid. p. 162.

[169] Ibid. p. 274.

[170] Ibid. p. 165.

[171] Ibid. p. 245.

[172] Ibid. p. 178.

Europe can only be saved from threatened ruin by pursuing Christian policies. Concerning the nature of those policies, they are remarkably akin to the European policies of Hitler and Mussolini.[175] He sounds the knell of the Atlantic coast powers,[176] and like a shrewd Churchman, urges the union of Western Europe in a crusade against Russia.[177] If Jerrold were less dogmatic about his history he would have understood why one year after his book was published Germany and Russia were for the time being locked in each other's arms in the amity of political allies rather than in the mortal hatred of irreconcilable enemies.

Words for Jerrold exercise the same fetish-like influence as they do over all devotees of whatever faith or lack of faith. They are the common weapons of all subjective rationalists who search out of their inner recesses the angels and hobgoblins with whom they populate the world, and before whom they later fall in humble worship.

Upon occasion Jerrold comes down to cases, when his intellectual nakedness is actually exposed. True, he does not feel abashed, because he is unconscious of his shortcomings. For example, in his panegyric on small business he tells us that over 70% of English factories employ less than one hundred people, and that more than half employ only a handful of men.[178] This is supposed to prove the fallacy of the concentration of capital theory. Any tyro in statistics could show him the fallacy of that position.

Take a typical one-industry town, of which many exist in this country. The industrial plant which is the lifeblood of the community is worth, we will assume $20,000,000, and employs 2,000 people of all sorts, averaging $10,000 actual capital per employee. Within the town are numerous small establishments—retail stores, beauty parlors, barber shops, petty industry and the like, about one hundred in number, employing small groups from one to a dozen or more, totalling 500 workers. Their total capital would scarcely amount to $1,000,000, mostly in goods and fixtures.

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[173] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, p. 219.

[174] Ibid. p. 220.

[175] Ibid. p. 225.

[176] Ibid. pp. 228-34.

[177] Ibid. pp. 236-7.

[178] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, p. 136.

In the statistics of amateurs this is how the results are tabulated: Town X, total capital $21,000,000; number of establishments 101; average capital per establishment $20,000; number of workers 2500; average capital employed by worker $8,000. And by these methods learned writers undertake to analyze the ills of society, and what is worse, prescribe remedies for them!

Again, Jerrold comments upon the relative emptiness of the United States. "To travel through it is to travel through a desert."[179] Kentucky itself is larger than England, he writes. This, incidentally, is atrocious simple geography. Compared to England, Kentucky is virgin soil. This stupendous, astonishing fact as he puts it, exists in a country whose political future is entirely decided for all time.

The real problem for Jerrold to have tackled, and which slipshod-thinkers like him either do not recognize or consistently evade, is the law of population of capitalist economy which makes a practically virgin soil like the United States, actually capable of supporting in comfort five hundred million human beings over-populated today, with a chronic army of unemployed which its peace-time economy cannot digest, but whose humanity forbids the Tamerlane-like removal of the surplus mouths to be fed.

He mentions the one and a half million unemployed in Great Britain in 1938, while in the United States the figures were proportionately higher.[180] Yet the only remedy he can propose is the return to some form of medieval feudalism-guild economy to be ruled over by a strictly-organized Church theocracy! For all his hypocritical pretense to the contrary, the only decent secular state is, to his way of thinking, the Church-State.[181] Jerrold's contempt for democracy shows him to be the spiritual brother in arms as he would be so actually, of the Hitler-Mussolini type of statescraft did the occasion present himself. The humanity and humility of Jesus sound strangely hollow when repeated by Jerrold. The steel helmet would more become him than the churchman's miter.

PATON'S DEVOUTLY RELIGIOUS CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD'S DESTINY

It is a relief to pass from the counterfeit priests of God whose theories would justify the use of poison gas, concentration camps and Stalin's liquidation methods if necessary for their purposes, to the historical theories of one who breathes the spirit of that profound humanity which we have always associated with the name and teachings of Jesus. William Paton's work on present-day civilization and its tendencies expresses the aspirations of a noble soul, though the historical theories upon which they are based will not survive critical examination.

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[179] Ibid. p. 273.

[180] The Future of Freedom—Jerrold, p. 50.

[181] Ibid. pp. 78-80.

With engaging frankness, Paton confesses his own bewilderment before the phenomena he undertakes to analyze, and upon which he desires to pass judgment. He refers to the obvious fact that our world problems differ fundamentally from that of our fathers. We are no longer afraid that the world is not going to be able to support and satisfy our appetites. It is for the opposite reason that our economy is in chaos. We are aware that the command over nature already attained by man is enough to enable him to abolish most of the woes that have afflicted humanity since written history began.

"We know these things," Paton writes, "and we also know that somehow or other we cannot rise to the occasion. Our defect is not primarily intellectual. True, the study of economics is difficult and high finance is a mystery, but we do not really in our secret hearts believe that all the mournful business of quotas and trade restrictions, burning food to keep the price up, and the rest of it, is due to an inability on the part of good men to devise any better way. . . . On the technical side we are ready for the world community, and the work of our best brains has brought it nearer to us." [182] On the technical side also we are capable and ready to blow up in a single air raid the painful accumulations of our civilization for over a thousand years.

It is futile for Paton to speak of "good" men or "bad" one way or another. Every one associated with that air raid is a good man. He has to be. Nor can less be said of the leaders who direct it, or of the ministers who bless it. Every statesman in whose hands is placed the responsibility of the national destiny is presumably the best man that can be found under the circumstances. As for the economic and social derangements of which Paton writes eloquently, some day a great awakening will come to him when he discovers that economics, politics, graphs and prayers are somehow intimately interwoven in the dominant social system and must be studied together before they can be analyzed separately.

Historically-directed activities associated with fervent prayer sometimes make an unbeatable combination, as Cromwell's Roundheads amply demonstrated. The commissioners for Christian Higher Education urged that "the distinctive contribution which Christianity has to make to the problems of economics and politics can only be appreciated properly if these subjects are taught, as they should be, in relation to concrete historical study." [183]

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[182] World Community—Paton (1939), p. 15.

Unfortunately, the Commissioners overlooked the little matter of elaborating a scientific theory of history to which the problems of economics and politics could be related in the true spirit of Christianity. This raises the problem of what is the true spirit of Christianity. Upon this field both commissioners and ministers would feel much more at home, and judging by past performances the debates would continue into the next millennia, if not sooner terminated by urgent recourse to the civil arm for the maintenance of peace among the lambs of God.

PATON RECOGNIZES THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Paton is willing to admit that politics had a great deal to do with the Reformation. He concedes their intimate association with present-day world derangements, but gives up their study as hopeless because he is helpless in not possessing the key to their unravelment.

His explanation of the rise of Protestantism is illuminating for the role he ascribes to nationalism and capitalism in effecting this tremendous social upheaval. "The Reformation," he writes, "meant, among other things, a new attitude towards the authority of the Church. Nations came into being, and the outline of modern national Europe appeared. National Churches replaced for a considerable part of the Christian world, the one undivided Church. With the Renaissance came a tremendous intellectual movement, of which one fruit was the rebirth of natural science, and the application of the experimental spirit of science to all the departments of life. As the scientific method gave rise to invention and to industry, there came into being a different kind of world, a world of greatly increased populations, mainly urban, of huge productivity demanding outlet, and of economic movements and forces which because of their great dimensions and the vast powers unleashed through them, seemed to belong to a separate creation and not to be patient of the ancient controls." [184]

This is a good description of what took place. The real problem is to understand why and how history developed in the manner described. If instead of cudgeling his inner consciousness, Paton would have betaken himself to the study of the internal movement which he describes, he might have found in the laws of motion thus disclosed

[183] World Community—Paton, p. 105.
[184] World Community—Paton, p. 19.

the secret key for the solution of our present problems to men of good will, among whom his work shows him to be, undoubtedly.

Were he to adopt the methods of scientific inquiry for history of which he tells for industry, he would see, perhaps to his astonishment, that the forces which brought forth the world of the Reformation were long present, though suppressed or dormant, during the millennial reign of the undivided Church. Industry, science and manufacture did not spring ready-made out of the Reformation. They had undergone a long period of gestation in the towns and seaports of medieval society, and once the restraining hand of the Church was loosened, the burghers seized the reigns of power where they could and reconstructed society in accord with their mode of life, dictated by their commercial, and later, their industrial and finance capital interests.

Paton is disarming, if not disingenious, when he concedes that "the moral history of the Churches is not a wholly admirable record. To put the case at its mildest, there has been slowness in recognizing the implications of following the Master, in terms of the concrete choices that had to be made at given times." [185] The historian is not concerned with the Church's morality, but with its historic role, and as for that, the Church was no better and no worse than the Roman Caesar or the modern Standard Oil Company in the service of its own institutional self-aggrandizement.

Paton must admit, what should be obvious to everybody else, the apparent irrelevance of organized Christianity to the modern world and its specific problems. Hacker and Kendrick point out that despite the swollen numbers of church communicants in the United States, the empty pews on Sunday are far more significant, and that "by and large it may be said that during the whole period of the early twentieth century, the influence of the country's churches was very rapidly slipping." [186] The earnest churchman should betake himself to the study of the outer world about him, instead of indulging in homiletics to a perplexed people distraught with new and urgent cares with which the Church by its own admission is unable to cope.

Paton reflects its helplessness by his pleas that "yet there must be a multitude of Christian congregations in which there are men of affairs who in their own hearts are troubled about the Christian way in commerce and business, but have never learned to look for help to other Christians within the fellowship of the Church." [187] Only God and the bankruptcy laws can help the Christian business man in his social perplexity or economic extremity; for experience has taught him that not succor, but a secret delight over his misfortune and contempt for his altruism is all that he can expect from fellow communicants who were so ingratiating during the heyday of his prosperity. The hyena ethics of the market are only too often the ethics of the very same Christian gentlemen who greet each other in the congregation with such effusiveness.

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[185] World Community—Paton, p. 42.
[186] The United States Since 1865—Hacker and Kendrick, p. 686.
[187] World Community—Paton, p. 132.

What is Paton's remedy? Simplicity itself; it is all in the Lord's Prayer.[188] Establish the Kingdom of God here on earth. How is it to be brought about? That's easy, too. Just get the men of good will together, starting first with the Christians and then with the good men of Islam, India and China.[189] We have no objection to his trying. But if he seriously suggests that as a definite world policy to establish his world community, then it becomes one's duty to inform him that actual world issues are too pressingly urgent to await his Utopia.

When he admits that the establishment of such a world community is predicated first upon the surrender of some portion of national sovereignty,[190] he speaks like a reasonable man who is himself amenable to reason. Therefore, it must be pointed out that he is merely dabbling in words when he uses that initial formula. The national state remains indestructible so long as the capitalist mode of production prevails as the world's dominant economy. Once and for all, these fine gentlemen of irreproachable morality and elevated social ethics must be made to understand that they will have to step aside and let those who have mastered the nature of the world problems undertake the solution of its ills. The only World Community possible today is that built upon temporary alliances for immediate and evanescent ends.

Nationalism and capitalism are synonymous. Capitalism will resist, and must resist, every effort to divest the national state of effective sovereignty. The inexorable tendency of modern history is toward the strongly centralized state, the combining of various peoples under a single national sovereignty, while the temporary combination of these sovereignties against other such combinations is limited to the effectuation of some immediate national goal. The small nation must be a satellite, if it is not already a satrapy, and this holds in an increasing measure not only for the smaller nations of Europe, but for the smaller nations of the world.

If Paton seeks to lull himself with the Spencerian formula of further integration and consolidation, and thus into his World Community, then he will discover to his keen intellectual regret, no doubt, but to the world's greater sorrow in suffering, that beyond a certain point evolution stops, and stagnation or disintegration begins. Paton may endeavor to combine all the casuistry of all the church-men of the world, and add as reinforcement all the statesmen of the League of Nations, with their sympathetic world professoriate to boot, and they could never agree upon the first paragraph of a formula for the surrender of national sovereignty that would meet with the approval of the great capitalist nations with extensive world interests.

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[188] World Community—Paton, p. 172.

[189] Ibid. pp. 29-32.

[190] Ibid. pp. 156-7.

Paton is somewhat doubtful of success, so he slyly suggests as an introductory offer, just like some persuasive high-pressure salesman, the idea of a national state surrendering the right to sit in judgment in disputes to which it is a party. After the obvious success of the League of Nations, all he can offer is a revival of the World Court. "If the Churches," he writes, "have done much to popularize the idea of the League of Nations ever since its formation, ought they not to be preparing the minds of their members for this further and more necessary, though very difficult advance?" [191]

Shortly after Paton's work was published the churches on our side of the fence found it more advisable to popularize the cause of the democracies versus the autocracies, and to inculcate the idea firmly that justice is on the side of the victorious, and that the blessing of God is with the ultimate conqueror, which must and will be, our side. Or perhaps the sermons go the other way around in the enemy camp, but it all comes back to the same point. God bless our nation and victory to our arms! is the fervent prayer of the Churchman. Paton who despite his ecclesiastical robes is an Englishman under the skin, will add with double fervor: "God save the King, and the Queen, and the Royal Princesses" and the whole damn aristocracy to boot.

TAYLOR'S HISTORICAL CONFESSION OF FAITH

Henry Osborn Taylor after a long and fruitful career, felt the urge to publish the final conclusions of his life-long acceptances. These he embodied in a little work which he called A Historian's Creed. The world begins and ends with the will of God.[192] But the process of unfoldment naturally holds his interest as well as ours, and its analysis forms our common meeting ground.

All existence, for him, is predicated on continuity and survival. The aimfulness in the conduct of organisms enters the continuities of history. An indefinite number of partial causes or enabling conditions unite in the coming to pass of any event. "It is not easy to separate them into independent agencies or appraise their several cogencies, for they move through mutual reactions to a convergent result, which may nevertheless contain disruptive elements temporarily brought together." [193]

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[191] World Community—Paton, p. 157.

[192] A Historian's Creed—Taylor (1939). Preface, pp. 13, 41, 83.

This does not tell us what active role man himself plays in the shaping of those convergent circumstances which produce the events that enter into the making of history. Unless one were to adopt the defeatist attitude that all is kismet, and naught that man can do will modify by a tittle that which is writ in the book of fate, even then we would want to know why destiny determined its continuities in the manner that it did.

For no amount of high-minded phraseology can disguise the fact that in Taylor's Continuities we come face to face with our old friends, Destiny and Fate. "The obvious fact," says he, "that the composite organism has run its course need not weaken the conviction that what is fit to survive will not perish. The love of God may be saved in the Eternal Beloved." [194] It is the old story: Only the deserving survive; the others will not be heard to contradict. In this way, Taylor proves that only the worthwhile of human institutions, social, legal or political has part in the genesis of its successor,[195] because, as some brilliant minds have remarked, life goes on, and there is no denying that. "The unceasing activities of human minds constitute the spiritual continuity of history." [196]

All existence, Taylor observes with remarkable perspicuity, has a peculiar quality of continuing, otherwise it would cease to exist. Sex is a vital continuity, is his profound judgment, and so is man's social instinct, as well as that of ants and bees.[197] In fact, all existence is blessed with an enormous mass of continuities, including such inanities as are published in A. D. 1939 by the Cambridge-Harvard University Press; which fact is our only apology for discussing this work at all.

Since no student would pass by a recent work under such sponsorship, we will be content with the only definite conclusion in the entire brochure of one hundred and thirty-seven pages. "Intuition, emotion, reverence, and sometimes love give wings of faith to the understanding. The sense of God and divine control may take shape as belief in a benevolent providence, which in turn may become intimately personal in its loving care of every man and woman and prove the salvation of the responsive soul. It was the historical office of

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[193] Ibid. p. 28.

[194] Ibid. p. 13.

[195] A Historian's Creed—Taylor, p. 31.

[196] Ibid. p. 34.

[197] Ibid. p. 35.

Christianity to bring to pass the revelation of the divine and human heart." [198]

We entertain a profound respect for sentiments so beautifully and reverently expressed. It is also one of the more sorrowful continuities of history that the most despicable acts of the human hand are sanctified in the name of religion on numerous battlefields in the remotest corners of the earth. Taylor has given us an historian's creed, but it is a misnomer. Its proper title is the Creed of a Sincere and Devout Christian. So named, the brochure possesses many elevating qualities. But decidedly it has nothing to contribute to our particular problem, which is to establish some sort of creed for the scientific historian.

G. The Psyche in Its Social Relations

PSYCHOANALYSIS AS A DEFINITE METHOD OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

Psychoanalysis, sooner or later, simply had to be applied to the interpretation of history. Kenneth Burke had to give vent to that inner urge, and the results are embodied in the two volumes of his Attitudes Toward History. Of course, he could not transfer in its entirety the Freudian Oedipus complex and the various manifestations of the libido. In fact, he makes no effort to do so.

Perhaps it would be more correct to state that what Freud did by delving into the inner recesses of the individual's Unconscious, Burke attempts to do in his penetrating analysis of the symbolic structures which man individually and collectively employs in the relations of social intercourse. The second volume is largely devoted to a dictionary of pivotal terms which influence human conduct in society, and serve as convenient refuge from the necessity of painful study or reflection.

"Obedience to the reigning symbols of authority," Burke writes, "is in itself natural and wholesome. The need to reject them is painful and bewildering. The dispossessed struggle hard and long to remain loyal—but the nature of the case, the bureaucratic order tends simply to 'move in on' such patience and obedience. Eventually sectarian divergence becomes organized (as thinkers manipulate the complex forensic structure to give it a particular emphasis in one direction).

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[198] Ibid. p. 41.

But those in possession of the authoritative symbols tend to drive the opposition into a corner, by owning the priests (publicists, educators) who will rebuke the opposition for its disobedience to the reigning symbols. The opposition abandons some of the symbolic ingredients and makes itself 'ready to take over' other symbolic ingredients." [199]

But there still remains the problem of how the possessors and the dispossessed came about, what is the nature of their relationship and the various differences created by that juxtaposition. Burke has yet to show what holds the social structure intact, how the symbols originated, and the complete host of other problems which form the essence of a philosophy of history.

We are willing to admit the subtlety of Burke's analysis of the symbolic structure of human motivation and conduct. That part of his work is both absorbing and amusing, without being very instructive. To point out human foibles is an interesting pastime, but the science of history will require far more substantial foundations than the exposition of the psychological controls pervading human conduct in a social medium.

By the process of invention which is the very essence of imagination, one may discount through "alienation" of incongruities, as Burke does, the most incongruous theories and so make agree Spengler's formula and Marx's critique of social relationships.[200] For him, scientific knowledge is the bureaucratization of wisdom which has been established since the time of the Renaissance by accumulating and perfecting the methodology of invention.

Phrases are a matter of convention, Burke urges, and one's job is to test their relevance by applying them to the interpretation of events. Our terms should meet three tests of convertibility, assuming that they are already in common use. First, they should apply to the intimate relations of personal contacts. Second, they should apply to public relations as exemplified in the processes of past and contemporary history. And, third, they should apply to the processes of engrossment whereby works of art are organized.[201] With engaging candor, Burke writes: "Frankly, we were not sufficiently aware of our procedure until near the end of the book; that is, we did not verbalize our implicit method into an explicit methodology." [202] The best test of his own method is the uses he himself makes of it in historical interpretation, and that is fully illustrated in his first volume.

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[199] Attitudes Toward History—Burke (1937), Vol. II, pp. 67-8.
[200] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 69.
[201] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 70.
[202] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 182.

BURKE'S SUBJECTIVE FRAMES OF HISTORY

True to his subjective idealization method of viewing men and events, Burke starts out with the concept of frames of history.[203] Now to a physical scientist, the expression "frame of space" has come to have a very definite and specific meaning. To Farraday, the electromagnetic field was the final and irreducible constituent of physical reality.[204] All our experiments and experiences are bound up with the inertial system of which this earth is a part. As for us, the earth is our coordinate system. All our deductions we derive therefrom are limited to the frame of reference which we thus construct, and to this mechanical scaffold all conclusions must be referred to test their validity in our world of reality.[205]

The physicist must prove that his concepts are in accord with experience. "All knowledge of reality starts from experience and ends in it," [206] wrote Einstein. It is a dictum in physics much easier pronounced than proved as is witnessed by the metaphysical school of Jeans, Eddington and Whitehead. Yet the ultimate proof of every theory must be its accordance with the established facts. There is a heaven-wide difference, however, between the scientific and the literary use of the terms frame, field and reference.

To Burke, historical frames depend upon the individual's "frame of acceptance," which in turn depend upon that individual's personal equations and idiosyncrasies. "Since they name both friendly and unfriendly forces," he amplifies, "they fix attitudes that prepare for combat. They draw the lines of battle—and they appear 'passive' only to one whose frame would persuade him to draw the line of battle differently. Aquinas was as realistic as Marx, for instance, in recognizing the existence of social classes. It was the bourgeois interregnum that tried to eliminate them by fiat, in treating the bourgeois class as universal mankind. The difference between Marx and Aquinas is in the attitude (incipient program of action) taken toward the existence of classes. Since Aquinas, following Augustine, looked upon (with attendant phenomena of government, property and slavery) as punishment for the fall of man, his frame was designed to accept the inevitability of classes, and to build a frame of action accordingly. Marx, on the other hand, accepted the need of eliminating classes, hence drew the line of battle differently." [207] In this quotation we have the essence of what Burke means by attitudes toward history. It is a purely subjective process dictated by one's frames of acceptance or philosophical outlook which determines future program and policy.

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[203] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 24-9.

[204] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 56.

[205] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, pp. 162-3.

[206] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 32.

[207] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, p. 24.

While that indeed is the true representation of Burke's historical method, it is a sickly caricature of Marx's method; but more important, it is a libel upon every scientific method of knowledge developed by human thought.

Let us analyze Burke's "frames of acceptance" as applied to Aquinas and Marx. He says that both recognized the existence of social classes. Aquinas accepted that as the will of God, whereas Marx accepted the need of eliminating classes. In this Burke shows that he does not understand the first thing about Marx, Marxism and the historical method by aid of which he formulated his social theories. First of all, Aquinas lived in the thirteenth century, Marx in the nineteenth. Perhaps that means nothing to Burke, as is evidenced by his analogy. But to the Marxist steeped in his relativistic method of reasoning, that means a great deal.

The difference of six hundred years spells the difference of stratification based on relations to land tenure, and the social classes based on the relations of production in an industrial capitalist economy. Under feudalism, the essence of its social structure was the element of obligation and service; under capitalism, the mainspring of its activity is the obtainment of the average rate of profit per aliquot part of capital. No one who has studied Marx's history of the expropriation of the English peasant and the enclosure of the communal lands, will soon forget that spiritual exultation which follows from the ineluctible reasoning applied to those dark pages of England's development. Marx's burning indignation is directed toward the abuses of the process, rather than against the process itself whose historic validity his scientific sense recognized. No one sings more gloriously than he, the historic role of capitalism in developing the productive forces of society. And for the benefit of Dewey, Maurice William and the others who never took the pains to master Marx's system, by productive forces he always included the processes of reproduction, which is part of the cycle of production-distribution-consumption-reproduction.

Contrary to Burke's claim, Marx never taught the need of eliminating classes as such. All his work undertook to prove was that bourgeois economy, which itself was a tremendous step in advance over feudalism, had reached the point where its internal laws of motion were a hindrance to further progress, resulting ultimately in chronic crisis, imperialist wars and social stagnation slipping into retrogression. He did not preach the elimination of classes in the same sense that Stalin liquidates his opposition, but rather that the working class, after constituting itself the dominant class through its possession of a state mechanism adapted to its requirements, will proceed to socialize the various forms of industry which had previously been concentrated and centralized by the capitalist class. Once possessed of the necessary state power and having organized the productive mechanism of society, production will be carried on in accordance with a social plan. Exploitation of man will be replaced by the rational exploitation of nature's resources. The economic basis for the existence of classes will be abolished, and so gradually the necessity of the state as a repressive class mechanism will pass away. The government of men will be replaced by the administration of things. Social classes will disappear because the system of human exploitation will no longer exist.

The state is not abolished; it withers away in the expressive phraseology of Engels (Anti-Duhring, p. 315). This is the Marxian conception of society and the classes of which it is composed. When Burke speaks of the difference between Aquinas and Marx as being derived solely by their subjective attitudes toward social classes, Burke is guilty of an unpardonable offense against the palpable facts open to the review of every inquirer for the truth. Truth here is not an abstraction. It is a fact, a simple, verifiable fact concerning what exactly did Marx teach. It is not a question of agreeing with his conclusions; it is only a question of stating those conclusions as he himself put them. Burke should have been the very last among our bright, modern liberals to indulge the common spleen of vituperating that which they cannot grasp. Aquinas and Marx have nothing in common in their intellectual attitudes toward society and events.

REPLY TO BURKE'S SUBJECTIVE METHOD OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

Throughout his work, Burke rests his fundamental postulate of analyzing attitudes toward history by disclosing the subjective frames upon which they are based. "Frames stressing the ingredient of rejection," he writes, "tend to lack the well-rounded quality of a complete here-and-now philosophy. They make for fanaticism, the singling-out of one factor above others in the charting of human relations. Their simplest caricature is the 'money crank,' who would shape all life's purposes around some project for tinkering with the symbols of exchange without concern for the underlying economic factors and psychological attributes that go with them. Marx, being born into the great century of rejection philosophies, discloses the scars of his environment; nevertheless he did unquestionably lay the foundations for a vast public enterprise out of which a new frame of acceptance can be constructed." [208]

Burke is indulging his phantasy for phrase-making. What does he mean by rejection philosophies? Every new advance at any time must be based upon the rejection of some generally accepted current theory. The nineteenth century was more prolific in their affirmations than rejections, if only because some newly discovered truth opened wide avenues for further discoveries along the same lines. This here-and-now philosophy is a restatement of the pragmatic formula. We have shown in our previous analysis that the here-and-now is incomprehensible unless the laws governing its constitution are clearly understood. Otherwise it results in an enormous mass of empirical observation which soon would drive the student out of his home by their sheer accumulation. The marvel of scientific knowledge, which Burke rejects as sheer bureaucratism, is that it classifies and organizes that vast store of here-and-now facts into some rational, comprehensible form.

If Burke suffers from a paucity of solid content for his ideas, he more than counter-balances that by a superabundance of original nomenclature, and in glittering generalizations which sparkle, if they do not enlighten. History can be treated, he assures us, in homeopathic or allopathic style. The choice is yours according to your frame of acceptance. "The 'allopathic' style of treatment confronts the danger with an antidote of assurance—hence the stronger the antidote, the better. The 'homeopathic' style is based, rather, on the feeling that the danger cannot be handled by head-on attack, but must be accommodated. . . . Western optimism that began its formal career with attacks made by the bourgeoisie upon the style of the church (based homeopathically on the 'prosperity of poverty') was superbly direct in the development of allopathic hygiene. The change had much to do with the rationalization of the revolutionary attitude, as it stimulated people under disaster to begin grumbling early." [209]

This pellucid explanation will settle everything for everyone including, of course, the whole question of European or American Western optimism and Eastern pessimism. The West, as we all know, is a simple, homogeneous mass which thinks and acts as a unit, beginning geographically—but Burke forgot to tell us just where the West begins, and what was meant by the West in the various generations from the sixteenth century to the present time.

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[208] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, p. 35.

[209] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, pp. 56-7.

Another gem of original observation, which by some startling oversight everybody overlooked until Burke's work appeared, is the explanation of the present world crisis by the fact that modern society is approaching its ultimate "Malthusian limits." After the disintegration of feudal society, he explains, "instead of leading to chaos, the new material and moral resources were eventually able to adapt the notions of 'profit' so completely to the secular frame that the zeal of the religious wars abated. There resulted several centuries of fairly rational organization. But now, after nearly half a millennium, these new sources seem to have been exploited to the point where they in turn are nearing their 'Malthusian limits.' The liberal habits of private enterprise 'proliferated' like yeast in the mash, until they could not proliferate much further."[210]

It was much more than the mere notions of profit that took control of the social structure some centuries ago. In our discussion of commerce and the industry of the petty handicraft guilds, we saw developing within the towns the social forces which were preparing to seize the reins of power. With Burke, it is all a matter of attitude. Had their "frame of acceptance" been otherwise—who knows? Perhaps slavery, rebarbarization or even the Detroit belt-line production mechanism might have been ushered in at that time. It all depends on one's attitude or notions concerning things.

We note that phrase of capitalism's "fairly rational organization" for half a millennium. No scientist would accept that phrase in lieu of a concrete analysis. And we feel confident that Burke would be hard pressed in establishing the fact of the fairly rational organization of capitalist economy during its infancy. Of course, he can point to the existing state of our economy with its unemployment, poverty, plowing under, war and the like.

Far from being disorganized, it is the most concrete evidence that never before was capitalism so well organized as today. Production is regulated with key-like precision. Our technological processes were never so highly developed, nor was capital so strongly concentrated in large aggregates and centralized under the control of such a small number of industrial and financial magnates. The real problem for Burke is to prove why at the very time when capitalism had effected its highest degree of rational organization, is precisely the time for its greatest struggle to survive the social chaos its inherent processes have created. Vast aggregations of capital are a social power which have outlived the day of individualistic domination. But the basis for this conclusion—to be demonstrated at the appropriate place in

[210] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, p. 33.

our work—are beyond the ken, let alone the attempt at analysis, on the part of Burke.

A NEW NEO-MALTHUSIAN PRINCIPLE

When it is a matter of phrases and scintillating generalities, the psycho-analytical school is in its own element. Burke is obviously pleased with his epochal discovery of the "neo-Malthusian principle." Time and again he refers to this great thought of astounding originality.[211] He unbends somewhat for those still in the outer darkness. "Is our concept of the 'neo-Malthusian principle' still vague?" he inquires with great solicitude. "This principle names the process whereby a certain set of habits in attaining its full bureaucratic embodiment, proliferates to its physical limits. In a sense it is another word for the 'vicious circle,' since the proliferation gives rise to arrangements that call for still further proliferation, as capitalism generated modes of work that required one to be intensely capitalistic in equipping himself for them." [212] So now the cabalistic word is proliferation, which is a self-sufficient explanation for everything.

Capitalism requires something more than being intensely capitalistic. Most everybody nowadays is plentifully endowed with the spirit, but lacking the wherewithal of capitalistic enterprise. Even where capital is plentiful—is in fact, overflowing—as in the tremendous excess reserves of our banking system now amounting to six and a half billion dollars thereby allowing for a theoretical expansion to ten times that amount in business credits—that fact in itself is apparently not sufficient for the process of proliferation to begin operations on a grander scale except in the munitions industry.

Burke explains all that by that other magic formula "neo-Malthusianism," which establishes limits for capital's efficient utilization. This may be explanation enough for Burke's cognoscenti. Indefatigable research which typifies the scientific spirit, always doubting and questioning like Socrates, will not be content until Burke has satisfied their inquiry concerning the factors which established the limits of capitalist proliferation, and whether these limits of production can be contracted or expanded by conscious control. In short, Burke stops with a tautology concerning an existing fact at the very point where his analysis ought to begin. That this analysis is beyond the capacity of professional word-jugglers, his work is sufficient evidence. He would soon discover himself far beyond his depths with neo-Malthusianism just as the original Malthusian theory broke down before the facts of the expanding industrial revolution.

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[211] As in pages 178, 198, 208, 215 of Vol. I and p. 67 of Vol. II of his work—Burke.

[212] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, p. 178.

Burke has some original ideas on religion and capitalism. "The rise of Protestantism," he writes, "coupled with technological advance and the bourgeois system of ownership, made an exceptional amount of individual enterprise both possible and necessary. The possibilities were necessarily utilized, until in time the whole social order became organized about the efficient utilization of these possibilities. This efficiency, as backed by the material order, equals 'bureaucratization.' And as such bureaucratization matured, the corresponding set of habits proliferated toward its 'Malthusian limits.' " [213]

Now the plainest facts of history contradict this assertion. Geographically, only a small fraction of the world has been brought under the processes of capitalist production, industrial or agricultural. Outside of certain localities in Japan, China, and India, the vast Asiatic continent follows its hereditary economic processes undisturbed by neo-Malthusianism, although tremendously affected by the imperialist processes of the world powers, whose leaven has already elevated Japan to the dignity of that rank and to the employment of their political methods on the world scene.

In Europe, only certain portions of its central area and western fringes have been highly developed along capitalistic lines. France with its fifty per cent industrialization as against England's ninety per cent, is a living refutation of those economic determinists who will not consider the cultural background of a people in the development of their economic and social forms. The enormous continent of Africa is almost virgin soil for capitalist development. South America is just beginning to undergo the travails of that economy.

As for North America, the vast territory north of the United States is still raw material to be developed by American and British capital. South of the United States, Central America still slumbers fitfully, while Mexico has just awakened to the possibilities of utilizing its resources, but not along strictly orthodox lines. Even the United States has not been brought fully under the influence of capitalist economy, as witness the vast extent of the undeveloped regions in the South, and the mountain areas around the Appalachian range and the Rockies. As for Oceania, it is a colony of Great Britain in the truest sense, supplying it with abundant natural goods and getting in return vast quantities of manufactured products.

So much for Burke's fiat of the whole social order being organized about the efficient utilization of capitalism's possibilities. That there are limits to its efficient utilization is perfectly obvious. But it is precisely why capitalism has these limits, while the limits themselves are capable of expansion and contraction, that brings the entire subject within the scope of the historian's labors.

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[213] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, pp. 178-9.

Ten years after the crash of 1929, the index of production in the United States was lower for 1939 despite the large increase in population and the greater efficiency of our productive mechanism. Here are some statistics for those years.[214]

	1929	*1939*
Exports	$5,240,000,000	$3,120,000,000
Steel production (tons)	56,000,000	47,000,000
Auto production (cars)	5,600,000	3,700,000
Freight car loading (cars)	53,000,000	35,000,000
Stock trading (shares)	1,125,000,000	261,000,000
Bank clearings	$728,000,000,000	$308,000,000,000

The outbreak of the Second World War in September, 1939, gave a great impetus to American industry, otherwise the figures would have been consistently lower. But war itself is a normal phenomenon of capitalism in its imperialistic stage.

There is no inherent necessity for that production remaining consistently lower, actually or proportionately. It is perfectly possible for capitalism to go on to further heights, reproducing its contradictions and dilemmas on a still higher plateau without exhausting its powers or stretching beyond its "neo"-Malthusian limits.

Yet the fact remains that capitalist economy has encountered an obstacle in its internal processes whose effects war might temporarily alleviate but which it will never succeed in overcoming. The capital goods industries over the nine year period from 1921-29, spent a total of $107,000,000,000. For the years 1930-38, only $55,000,000,000 went for plant, equipment and buildings; and that chiefly for replacement.[215] This fact is easily seized upon, but it is not so easily explained away either by apologists or critics of the status quo. History knows no status quo in a dynamic world.

MYSTIC PHRASEOLOGY ASSUMES THE ASPECT OF PROFUNDITY

It is truly amazing how a phrase, if one becomes sufficiently enamored with it, can be made to function as the conclusive explanation of the most diverse phenomena. Is it a question of the rise of the corporation? Burke finds no difficulties in applying an appropriate mystic symbol. "Men had been members of a religious corporation, a civic corporation, and a vocational corporation. They now had a chance to become members of a financial corporation, that emerged from the proliferation of many partnerships, until members were included (significantly, they were called 'brothers')—and you finally arrived at the joint stock company. All that was needed was for earnest-minded judges to endow these strange creatures with a legal 'personality' and their future was assured."[216]

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[214] New York Times, Jan 2, 1940.

[215] New York Sun Business Supplement, Jan. 6, 1940.

The financial graveyards are filled with the ruins of corporations whose future was thus assured both by the courts and by Burke for all time. Evidently they required something more than the mystic blessing of the judge's jargon to achieve immortality. It is the function of the historian dealing with modern times to tell exactly why it is that the overwhelming mass of corporations are unprofitable, and those still in existence show mostly losses, while very few of them are really successful. The United States income tax returns consistently demonstrate that the majority of corporations show no net profits. Furthermore, the concentration of economic power has tended to place enormous resources under the control of only a handful of these corporations.

Burke's easy generalizations and ear-eye-mouth-filling phrases and mystic words give no clue to the fundamental processes of our economy which plays such a decisive role in determining the social structure. In a study of the modern corporation, Berle and Means have shown that 200 of our large corporations, other than banking, control over 49% of corporate wealth. "There were over 300,000 non-financial corporations in the country in 1929," they write. "Yet 200 of these, or less than seven-hundredths of one per cent, control nearly half the corporate wealth."[217] Over a period of twenty years, the large corporations increased their wealth two and a half times as fast as smaller corporations.[218] At any rate, the future of the corporations, big and small, were far from being assured with the developments of the past ten years, despite Burke's dictum together with the law's blessing.

The problems of the past decade Burke solves readily with his pen as a magic wand. Currency problems, international exchange, inflation, deflation, all are mysteriously cleared up by the utterance of those esoteric terms. Why go to the infinite trouble of studying facts, records and processes in the search for laws, when all one has to do is to adopt the proper attitude toward history? Money, he reveals, is not backed by a material, but by a function, a social function. This applies even to bullion, and all the more so to the fabulous symbolic superstructure fictitiously erected by bullion, and still vaguely tied to gold by casuistic mumbo-jumbo.

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[216] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, pp. 198-9.

[217] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means (1932), p. 34.

[218] Ibid. p. 35.

Burke does not tell us, for obvious reasons, of those governments like Russia after the revolution, and Germany after Versailles which tried by casuistic methods to stretch the rouble and the mark paper symbols out to infinity. Even they discovered in due time, the correctness of the Einstein formula that space is finite though unbounded. The printing presses emitted symbols in a seemingly endless mass. Soon one needed a billion roubles to obtain one very finite herring of doubtful quality, and after a while a trunkful of marks each noting a million or more could not pay for a glass of Munich's famous beer.

But to the phrase-enamored historian these minor difficulties are of no importance, even if he deigns to recognize their existence. "In particular," writes Burke, "the ease with which symbols can be manipulated offers inflationary possibilities (necessities). Hence, the 'neo-Malthusian principle' would lead us to assume that the prolification of habits would invite the increasing encroachment of financial laxities that casuistically destroyed the basis of money out of which they arose. Hence, covert inflation." [219] Hence one is excused from further study of the role of money in capitalist economy.

Unfortunately for Burke, the entire history of money as a medium of exchange and measure of value—there are fourteen other functions of money which are beyond the scope of our present inquiry—is bestrewn with casuistical attempts at manipulating their value. The record of attempts at coin-debasement by cheating on coin weights, by calling an inferior coin at its old name and imputing the old value to it, would in itself make a splendid history. The fallacy of that method of getting rich was long ago exposed by the common sense of mankind which responds very acutely to casuistry of that order. "If the wealth of a nation," remarked the wise William Petty in the 17th century, "could be decupled by a proclamation, it were strange that such proclamations have not long since been made by our governors." [220] Tinkering with the currency, metal or paper, is far from being a modern notion. The history of our Revolutionary War shows as pretty examples at that kind of "sophistication" as would satisfy the hearts of our bravest inflationists.

THE SCINTILLATING BRILLIANCY OF PHRASE-MONGERS

Our purpose in analyzing Burke's contribution to the problems of history so far beyond its intrinsic merits is to settle accounts, if pos-

[219] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, p. 208.

[220] Quoted by Marx in Capital, Vol. I, p. 113.

sible, with that school of writer whose sole equipment is a nimble wit and a facile pen, who are satisfied to make their little splash and dazzle with their scintillating, if superficial brilliancy, while they obfuscate the understanding, rather than contribute toward its enlightenment. And all for the purpose of winning some temporary applause, or attaining some other personal objective.

After that, further interest in the subject ceases on their part. If they have had their encomium, attained a literary standing, won their professorship perhaps, all becomes well with the world. Meanwhile, another theory is soon exploded, some more shallow phrases are sounded to reveal their emptiness. The earnest student sinks into despondency, while the lackadaisical world shrugs its shoulders to conceal its disappointment over the incapacity of its intellectuals, and contents itself by repeating that practical problems are for practical men. But mere practice, the world now anxiously admits, leads so often from one failure to another. Progress by trial and error exposes its painful short-comings, while assuredness in progress itself has given rise to grave misgivings for the future of our civilization.

Burke gives us an insight into his methods of thinking and writing. "We have tried to reveal the subterfuges to which the poet or thinker must resort, as he organizes the complexity of life's relationships within the limitations imposed by his perspective. He begins, we have said, with the 'problem of evil.' He finds good and evil elements intermingled. But he cannot leave matters at that. Exigencies of living require him to choose his alignments, by the devices of formal or 'secular' prayer. He builds his frames of acceptance or rejection by overt or covert acts of 'transcendence.' He couches his set of meanings by an 'act of will' that opens him to the charge of 'sentimentality' on the part of those who would couch their meanings differently." [221] We, on our part, have not the slightest objection to Burke following that course. What we do most strenuously object to is his handing down of those personal recipes as the infallible road toward the regaining of public health in the sad state in which the world now finds itself.

But it is ridiculous to suppose that every astronomer who started out in youth with cows that jumped over the moon is doomed for the rest of his life to the limitations of his frames of acceptance. There is a very definite process of scientific methodology which compels him constantly to change his frames in accordance with the reality. Does the iconoclast desire to start the debate at the very beginning concerning the nature of reality? Burke does not have to do so having accepted his own frame of what constitutes the reality of the historical

[221] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, pp. 137-8.

world. The scientific historian cannot afford such intellectual luxuries.

We will assume that philosophically he has settled for himself the fact that there is a real objective world of men and women and things and ideas that constitute society. His next step, which Burke does not even attempt to undertake, is to discover the laws of motion within the social structure. It is so much easier to sit back and weave out formulas. Even to that there is no valid objection, providing he relates back his theories for checking up against the facts of the real world, and the none too-merciful criticism of his fellow tillers in the same field.

There is no abstract, no absolute morality. All such ideas are derived out of given historical conditions. When those conditions change, our moral concepts will be modified with them. Between the conditions and our moral sense there is a continuous reaction. Moral concepts do not change mechanically following in the footsteps of the natural conditions of existence. Many of them persist long after the conditions of life have changed, to bedevil the contemporary scene.

Very often too, moral concepts bearing a direct relationship to the actual world from which they derived, are themselves powerful instruments for effecting changes in that world. Witness our Revolutionary War, the Abolition movement, and today the developing social consciousness of the American people that involuntary poverty is no longer an individual, but a national problem.

In a remarkable article, Professor Nevins wrote on the eve of the year 1940: "But it is also true that the great rally of 1933 and the succeeding years released a new spirit, a fuller comprehension of the interdependent character of the various elements in American economy, and the need for a firmer social solidarity. It is too much to expect that the first ten years would furnish us with many well-wrought applications of the new attitude. To have the new spirit itself is gain enough. No intelligent man will ever again believe in an automatic economy or in Herbert Spencer's rugged individualism with accent on the word 'rugged'; and the changed spirit will gradually gear itself to our government." [222] This weighty conclusion is buttressed by a wealth of events since the great collapse of 1929. Historians are still dazed by them, though grimly determined to get at the bottom of that social catastrophe.

As for Burke, it is all so simple. Before he gave us two key words of the mystic symbols, proliferation and neo-Malthusianism. Now he adds a third—ambivalence. Emerson propounded the idea underlying the theory of ambivalence in his transcendental philosophy. "Perhaps," writes Burke, "the genius of Emerson's enterprise finds its

[222] New York Times Magazine, Dec. 31, 1939.

most thorough expression in his essay on 'Compensation.' The technical problem that Emerson confronts can be easily stated: by affirming a doctrine of 'polarity' he is able to confront evil with good cheer. In all evil, there is inevitably some compensatory good. 'For everything you have missed, you have gained something else.' A bad government creates resistance that cures its badness. The swindler swindles himself. And so on, ingeniously, for many pages, with examples from physics, biology and human history." [223]

Burke illustrates from religion, poetry, the drama and literature the general acceptance of transcendental polarity among the great thinkers of the ages. Finally he concludes: "Hegel 'transcended' by taking a dialectic historic process as a way of resolving metaphysical opposites. Our review of the way in which Emerson handled the problem of ambivalence indicates a kindred solution. Marx secularized the Hegelian pattern (though retaining unavowed vestiges of godhead, a covert 'God-function,' in the idea that social antithesis would be reconciled by a 'higher' synthesis). His attacks upon the established symbols of authority seem likewise to have stimulated some sense of guilt, for he identifies himself in a 'pastoral' fashion with a suffering proletariat, who must redeem the world by a blood sacrifice. . . . Materialism pure and simple contrives a kind of 'inverted transcendence' or 'transcendence downwards,' resolving the contradictions between mind and matter by voting that the essence of the duality is matter." [224]

We deny the contradictions between mind and matter. Since Burke insists throughout his work [225] in resurrecting the ghost, if not the teachings of Marx, it is only fair to state that Marxism is a monistic philosophy wherein matter is the primary element, and the mental is the reflex of the material conditions. This does not prevent, however, action and reaction between the human element and the world of reality. How this interaction takes place is precisely the problem of dialectics as conceived by Hegel and Marx.

Earlier in this work, we undertook a rather detailed presentation of the historical dialectic processes as taught by Hegel, Marx, and his followers. Therefore, the reader, regardless of his own conclusions on their merits, will agree that whatever else Burke's "ambivalence" may be, it most assuredly bears no relation to the theories those great thinkers have propounded. They are not even as remotely related as Franklin D. Roosevelt is to Theodore Roosevelt in degree of consanguinity.

[223] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, p. 21.

[224] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, pp. 117, 118.

[225] Ibid. Vol. I, pp. 119, 120, 123, 153, 212, 222; Vol. II, pp. 114, 131, 229, 230.

BURKE'S UNIVERSAL HISTORY IN FIVE ACTS

Burke concludes the theoretical part of his work in a manner which is consistent with his own "frames of acceptance." He schematizes the whole curve of history in accordance with his own subjective ideology, and divides it into five acts,[226] each logically dependent upon its predecessor, and the fourth, or present act, exhibiting the internal lay-out from which his fifth act, or the future, must emerge.

With the opening situation, Hellenism is on the decline and Christian evangelism is emerging. The playwright, fortunately for him, has great latitude in arranging background, scenes, characters and motives. But even he is limited by conceptual possibilities, else all drama would descend to comedy, burlesque and extravaganza. The historian cannot claim greater freedom than the dramatist; in fact he must be content with very much less, and as his subject assumes the aspect of science, with none at all.

By this we do not mean that the scientific historian must rigidly adhere to the expressions of his predecessor. The physical sciences recognize and glory in the fact of definite laws, though the nature of these laws and even more, their significance, keeps changing with every advance of knowledge. Still that does not preclude a very wide difference of opinion as to the specific weight of facts and the conclusions to be adduced. Styles of presentation fortunately vary with the personality and temperament of the author.

While opinions differ widely, the scientist has learned to differentiate between mere opinion and conclusive knowledge based on facts which have met the rigid tests of scientific truth. The specific character of truth varies in accordance with our expanding knowledge of the reality, but the test of truth remains basically the same, although some metaphysical physicists are inclined to deny the objective existence of the very reality which engages their critical labors. However, science has long ago discovered how to compress individual predilections into a common mold, and to discard that which does not meet its rigid standards.

Now Burke prefers to begin the first act of the historical drama in his own way. Every man has a constitutional right to think as he pleases, and in this respect Burke is a strict constructionist. He wants to justify his procedure, and urge others to adopt his own frame of acceptance. The very existence of his book for general circulation demonstrates that. In that case, he must expect opposition, and contrary judgments to the theory he advocates. In short, we come back to the main question: Is a scientifically valid theory of history possible?

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[226] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, p. 205.

To meet that requirement, the theory must offer a universally valid explanation of why history developed in the manner that it did, and that can be accomplished only by disclosing the laws of historic motion. An historian has to begin somewhere, but wherever he begins the same laws must apply, and be universally recognized by scholars accepting the classic method of scientific procedure.

Burke would have to present valid factors which would explain in conclusive fashion Hellenism's decline and the rise of Christian evangelism. No matter from what point of view, or from what aspect he undertakes to discuss his subject the same combination of factors must exist, and the same forces must apply, if his theory is to meet the ultimate test of validity.

Act two of the historic curve as presented by Burke shows the plot under way, as he puts it. The feudal-medieval synthesis is paramount with its plea for the maintenance of the status quo, and submission to authority before the lord, the priest, and within the family circle. It is a dramatically worked out description, but lacks the all-important reasons which explain why matters were arranged in that manner, what were the forces which held feudal society together, as well as those elements developing within the womb of feudal society which were eventually to accomplish its overthrow. He subscribes to the idea that the Middle Ages was a period of stagnation, and served merely to tide over the human story from where it ended abruptly with the collapse of the Roman Empire until the emergence of Modern Europe in the sixteenth century.

Modern scholarship has established the throbbing and progressive nature of the miscalled Dark Ages, a name which the Protestant Reformation stuck onto the period of Romish hegemony, and which has remained to this day, even in the nomenclature of ultra-modern historians. That feudalism set the stage for modern capitalism is indubitably true. It is equally true that there were no forces inherent in feudalism which compelled it, without any further conscious intervention from human agencies, to proceed toward that historic result. That would be equivalent to setting up some mysterious outside agency called society which is separate and apart from the human beings of which society is composed.

The fact is that feudalism does not, and did not necessarily and automatically give way to capitalism. That was a long and frequently a bloody process through which some peoples in Europe, particularly in the Balkans, have not yet passed. Social evolution and historic processes are not self-energizing. Burke has yet to describe the social forces which gave body and color to its internal existence.

Act three of Burke's historic drama deals with the rise of Protestantism which followed the Renaissance. It is the era of enlightenment, rationalism and individualism with the implementation of sectarianism. The quantitative test of wealth and profit is substituted for the claimed dignity conferred by birth, and the social demands hallowed by custom.

This presentation exudes an air of profundity, but in essence, what does it mean? Again we are confronted by a description of results, not an analysis of why and how these results were achieved. Hiding behind his frame of acceptance—he generously concedes to every one the right to construct his own—Burke feels himself immune from the importunities of science which demands something more substantial than phrases and the unification of theories into a single consistent frame.

The Protestant revolution was predicated on the thesis of separating the church and state, Burke argues. Its logical result was the apotheosis of separation and individualism. Its slogans were "Keep the government out of business." "Keep business out of government." "Keep the judiciary independent of the administrative and executive functions." [227] Keep everything out of everything else, including common sense out of history.

Act four in Burke's dramatic concoction represents the "flowering" of the emphasis. Rugged individualism of the competitive economy marks the era of naive capitalism. All social relations are automatically regulated by motives whereby each serves himself best by serving society most, and the law of supply and demand operates like some fiat of Divine Providence. The favorable balance of trade is regarded with profoundest reverence, and any proposal which affects that sacred formula stamps one as an enemy of society.[228]

Even atheism is respectable in comparison to that economic heresy. "Indeed, so thoroughly is capitalism geared to this paradox, that one is actually entitled to feel 'virtuous' for the part he plays in the act of national depletion. If we cannot toss at least ten per cent of our productivity beyond our borders in exchange for inflationary bullion (or even more inflationary paper) 'hard times' befall us, manufacturers 'retrench,' workers are discharged, the internal purchasing power drops accordingly, and it becomes 'impossible' to produce and distribute internally the remaining nine-tenths that could be turned out by our farms and factories." [229] This is a correct description of the economics taught up to a generation ago, and still believed in by the vast number of statesmen, editors, political leaders and other public men to whom God has confided the protection of our destinies.

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[227] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, p. 172.

[228] Ibid. Vol. I, p. 189.

[229] Ibid. Vol. I, pp. 194-5.

While Burke, being of the newer school, recognizes the fallacies of this "balance of trade" theory to which England in its maturity has never subscribed, yet he swallows another error of the classic economics still taught, namely the inflationary influence of bullion upon the currency of the importing country. This "quantity theory" of money has been long exploded theoretically by Marx,[230] and by the actual facts of our economy today.

These facts disclose that the monetary gold stocks of the United States Treasury now total $21,827,000,000, while the total money in circulation amounts to only $7,545,000,000.[231] According to the theory accepted by Burke we ought now to be experiencing inflationary prices due to the cheapening of the value of gold because of our enormous stock and the consequent depreciation of the paper dollar. Evidently the law of value is not determined by mere mass, or supply and demand. It is interesting to note that the Allied propaganda machine when it set itself going to have the United States forgive the $11,000,000,000 due on the credits extended during the First World War employed that self-same argument of the inflation which must ensue following attempts at repayment in gold. The New York Times, as the classical organ of finance capital, gave voice to similar opinions in several leading editorials. Generous England, it would seem, refused to pay its debt, outside of token payments, because of the havoc that would create in American economy.

SYNTHETIC COLLECTIVISM AS THE FUTURE DESTINY OF MANKIND

The final act, the fifth of Burke's drama of history, is the one now being enacted, and in which we are all taking part. This he calls emergent collectivism, which first evidenced itself when the growth of monopoly and the financial corporation began to threaten the symmetry of Adam Smith's rationale.

"We prefer to be somewhat shrewd in our notion of the way in which collectivism must emerge," Burke is careful to observe. "Primarily, we feel that it may enter 'by the back door,' as signalized in that highly ironic term of modern economists, the 'socialization of losses.' The tendency to 'socialize losses' begins with the largest financial interests, as in times of adversity they call upon the government to protect their private holdings by drawing up the collective medium of exchange, the national credit." [232] This handy salvation device, he maintains, becomes democratized and "in this sense, 'by the back door' cyclical depressions bring capitalism progressively closer to socialism." [233]

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[230] Critique of Political Economy—Marx, pp. 220-24; Capital, Vol. III, pp. 536, 588. Anti-Duhring—Engels, p. 270.

[231] New York Times Statistical Summary—Dec. 8, 1940.

To this dangerous and insidious doctrine of automatic progress by inherent necessity the German Communists subscribed when they consistently voted with the Nazis in order to embarrass the bourgeois-democratic regime. They confidently believed themselves the inevitable inheritors of history. Instead, there came Hitler, the concentration camp and the destruction of every device for popular expression. Burke recognizes this danger but believes that the proper correctives can be found if democracy can be maintained by complete "sophistication" once we near the neo-Malthusian limits of its opportunities.[234]

This is indulging in mere word jugglery. The dominant capitalist powers are too keenly aware of their own interest, though in blindly following that they meet the same fate of eclipse which ensued for them in Italy, Germany and Japan. The forces of reaction in the United States will not allow themselves to be shoved out through the back door, even though emergent collectivism has no finicky scruples about making an entrance that way.

Yet the final battle, the decisive struggle, will be fought out in the open. A great deal depends upon us whether the methods adopted by the combatants will be constitutional, or by the traditional resort to force under the cloak of high-sounding formulas, as happened when the slavocracy was pushed to the wall in 1861. A too cocksure attitude toward the back-door process of social evolution is the surest precursor for a bloody combat to secure the main stronghold of political power.

To recognize the character of the collectivist trend in the social forces now at work demands an exact knowledge of the social forces as they have manifested themselves throughout history, and American history in particular at this juncture of our development. Burke does not recognize their existence; and so guesses at the result. He does not want to commit himself, because he senses the near approach of a climactic change impending in the structure of American society, and he does not want to guess wrong. The historical scientist who knows the character of the elements he deals with, and the laws of their operation, is not at all abashed in predicting the consequences under a given set-up. But he knows beforehand what that set-up must be if that emergent collectivism of which Burke speaks is not to be crushed, or is not to be diverted at its inception by dictatorial influences.

[232] Attitudes Toward History—Burke, Vol. I, p. 206.

[233] Ibid. Vol. I, p. 207.

[234] Ibid. Vol. I, p. 215.

The very real danger for the future of this country lies in the fact that the vast masses of our people will not realize the significance of the social transformation upon which we are embarked and hasten to the support of the reactionary forces before the real nature of the struggle is understood.

H. Role of the Muckraker in History

THE MUCKRAKING METHOD OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

There exists a school of historical writers who employ what may be described as the muckraking method, or debunking theory of history. Their method consists principally in digging up unsavory details in the personal or public career of individual leaders and to demonstrate in general that not idealism but sordidness and self-aggrandizement was the motivating impulse of their acts. This general theme has many variations, but its most usual procedure is that which indulges in the display of the moral lapses and peccadillos of the great. The writer assumes, and the reader is asked to adopt, an attitude of outraged virtue tracking iniquity down. It is needless to remark that most often this is merely the protective covering for indulging the one's propensity for profit, and the other's insatiable appetite for the self-same social lapses even if vicariously obtained.

With such trifles, of course, the serious historian has nothing to do. Of far greater importance for us is that variation of the muckraking theme which attacks not the morals of an individual, but the morals of a system. Tarbell's history of the Standard Oil Company written about forty years ago is an excellent illustration of that type where the personalities described are as often as not men of the highest individual probity—kind, generous and philanthropic, yet form part of an immoral system which thrives upon the exploitation of the public. This they are determined to expose.

The early part of the twentieth century experienced a mushroom growth of this character of historical literature. Steffens, Sinclair, Woodward, C. E. Russell and others exposed in their vigorous fashion evils of maladministration or ruthless corporate practices which militated against the public interest. Myers' history of great American fortunes gave ample factual ammunition for those determined to destroy the fetish of great wealth by showing the devious methods by which the various hoards have been accumulated.

After a while the public taste became satiated or indifferent to the works of this type of writer, whose decline in influence was in direct ratio to the progress of the orgy of money-making following the First World War, and the post-war inflationary period. The decade of the 1930's produced a new type of the same muckraking school which exhibited greater finesse in the working up of its material, and being better trained in the handling of intricate economic details, directed its shafts at the economic system as a whole, rather than at individual segments of it. Berle and Means represent the best among them, followed by such writers as Arnold, Fisher, Lundberg, Corey, Raushenbush and others.

INSUFFICIENCY OF MORAL INDIGNATION OVER SOCIAL WRONGS

Muckraking methods of whatever type or degree operate on the similar pattern of erecting some subjective moral level toward which the object of their literary labors is being constantly equated with rather discomfiting results. The inherent shortcoming of this method consists in the assumption that always the agent had a free choice between right and wrong; that the failure is due not to defects in the social system so much as to the imperfections of the human element, which might have been overcome had the worthier of the impulses, rather than the baser, been allowed to predominate. The current fad of economic determinism in the analysis of human motivation as the effective agent contributed to keeping alive the muckraking rather than the impersonal element in the historical equation.

The coldly logical Boudin excoriates a certain group of writers on the development of the American Judicial Power who ascribe underhanded or sordid motives to the delegates of the Constitutional Convention when they met to evolve the fundamental instrument of our government. He recognizes that the Constitution was not framed in the first flush of revolutionary ardor, and that some eleven years had elapsed since the writing of the Declaration of Independence. Furthermore, men are more circumspect about practical details than in the formulation of general principles.

It is a far cry, however, from the admission of these ineluctable facts to the theory that the activating motive of the framers was the protection of property rights as against human rights. "To this theory," adds Boudin, "is sometimes added the addendum or modification that a few intriguing schemers, bent on depriving the people of their rights, and on fastening upon them a government of the 'money power,' or property generally, 'put one over,' first upon the minority of the convention, and then upon the majority of the people. Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson are supposed to have been the chief villains of this nefarious plot. This explanation may be good enough for those who believe in what may be called the muckraker's theory of history. It is entirely inadequate for any serious historian. Great historical events do not happen that way, and important institutions are not imposed upon an unwilling people in this manner. So much can be said a priori, and an examination of the historical evidence proves the muckraker's assertions to be quite untrue." [235]

For himself, Boudin is inclined to accept Farrand's conclusion that the delegates to that convention were neither rogues nor demigods, but represented a fair cross-section of the men of affairs of that time who rose to greater heights than was usual for such an assemblage because the historic situation was one to key them for their great opportunity. The masses in the latter part of the eighteenth century had not yet reached that social status where they could, or perhaps even desired, to speak for themselves. This was the development of the ensuing decades in our history. At the same time Boudin rejects the contradictory position of Beard who vacillates alternately between the theory of the gradual development of the Judicial Power and the muckraker's explanation of its origin.[236]

This proneness to substitute personalized motivation for the more difficult process of historical observation in ensemble and critical analysis of social forces can be readily understood, if not pardoned, in writers of inferior calibre. The problem becomes more serious when we observe the virus of the muckraker's disease affecting the judgment of even the most deliberate and well-balanced among our historical writers. They question not the individual, but the social morality of a particular period. They go behind the apparent and the accepted historical fact to search for the hidden and the mysterious in order to expose for public contempt the true motives which inspired the actors. Their motives are usually depicted as mean and sordid, and quite the opposite of that which is officially taught in our schools.

These methods are applied to the discussion of every phase of our history with the obvious purpose of creating disbelief in what at best is a pious historical fraud. They are the champions of truth, the unvarnished truth, and nothing but the truth, even if they have to manufacture new historical frauds in order to destroy the ancient ones.

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[235] Government by Judiciary—Boudin, Vol. I, p. 85.

[236] Government by Judiciary—Boudin, Vol. I, p. 583.

SUBSTITUTING NEW HISTORICAL DOGMAS FOR OLD ONES

An excellent illustration of this streamlined, highly stylized method of exchanging new historical frauds for old—if such they be—is the currently accepted explanation of the true origin of the War of 1812. By some strange aberration, Boudin departs from the subject of which he is master for a gratuitous assault upon a hallowed tradition concerning a phase of our history about which he knows very little. For one must be actuated either by honest ignorance or unworthy animus to indulge his spleen, and the rest of his work fully absolves Boudin from the latter charge.

"The War of 1812 has been a much misunderstood event in American history," he writes. "Misunderstood, principally, because of the fundamental error referred to, which gave a peculiar slant to the whole of our historiography, at least, until very recently. Without going into a detailed discussion of that subject, which is outside the purview of this work, we shall only note briefly that the traditional view, fostered by the New England School of History, was that the War of 1812 was fought for free trade and sailors' rights—more particularly against the right claimed by England of the so-called 'impressment of seamen. . . .' We may now add, that the War of 1812 was forced by Southern and Western Republicans, whose interest in sailors' rights must have been problematical, on an extremely unwilling New England Federalism, whose interest in the subject must have been real and immediate." [237]

He goes on to analyze the vote for war in the House of Representatives which was carried by 79 to 49 with the States North and East of Pennsylvania furnishing only 17 of the affirmative votes. "This vote," concludes Boudin, "clearly justifies the remark of a recent writer on the subject: 'Thus the war for free trade and sailors' rights was really rammed down the throats of sailors and traders by planters from the Southern States and backwoodsmen beyond the Alleghanies.' " [238] The writer upon whom Boudin relies, and the only authority he cites in support of this reversal of the accepted version as to the cause of the War of 1812 is J. N. Pratt's work on this phase of our history.

"The fact is," Boudin adds, "that the War of 1812 was a war of expansion in the most literal sense of the phrase. It was primarily a war for the acquisition of territory. The United States went into the War of 1812 because Southern and Western Republicans hoped thereby to take away Canada from Great Britain and Florida from

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[237] Government by Judiciary—Boudin, Vol. I, pp. 269-70.

[238] Government by Judiciary—Boudin, Vol. I, p. 270.

Spain. The unsatisfactory course of the war prevented those hopes from being realized, and because the war did not actually lead to any expansion, the New England School of American History was enabled to hide the truth of the origin and purpose of the war. And not being able to see or to avow the real purpose, they confounded the occasion of the war, which was a quarrel relating to commerce, with its purpose." [239]

There is no equivocation about this conclusion. Beard subscribes to it, citing further as proof Pratt's analysis of the pro-war vote as already stated above.[240] Nevins in his Gateway to History also supports this new theory, and speaks in laudatory terms of Pratt's thesis as convincing upon the issue.

Now the issue is clearly drawn. Did the classical school of American historians correctly portray the circumstances leading up to that struggle? Did they suppress the truth in order to color their theory? Does the modern interpretation, with Pratt's work as their chief reliance, represent the true state of affairs which led to that conflict? Our purpose in undertaking this analysis has for its single objective to establish whether the classical writers colored their history white, or the modernists are muckraking theirs a muddy brown, and without sufficient cause.

METHODS OF THE MODERN HISTORICAL MUCKRAKER

First we will consider the paradox mentioned by Pratt, which he says, apparently gave little concern to the older historians: "If the real grievances which caused the war were interference by Great Britain with American commerce and the rights of American sailors, why was the war to redress those grievances opposed by the maritime section of the nation, and urged by the inland section, which they scarcely affected?" [241]

Let us, at the very outset put to rest this marvelous geographical analysis of the war vote which Boudin, Nevins and Beard unite in hailing as the crowning achievement of recent historical research. Ninety years ago Hildreth had given exactly the same geographical analysis of the vote,[242] using the same well-known figures quoted by the "modernists" as the result of recent intense intellectual labors. Fifty years ago, McMaster in his usual painstaking fashion gave the vote on the war resolution state by state, and commented upon the sectional division which that decision disclosed. Writing a year earlier than McMaster, Henry Adams had gone into an exhaustive analysis of the divisions then existing within the national councils.[243]

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[239] Government by Judiciary-Bonding, Vol. I, p. 271.

[240] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, pp. 393, 413.

[241] Expansionists of 1812—Pratt (1925) p. 9.

[242] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, p. 305.

If Hildreth and Adams are representative of the New England School of historians—and none better could be found or even desired in any school from the standpoint of thoroughgoing scholarship—both are extremely bitter against Massachusetts and the entire Essex Junto for their wretched sabotage of the national effort in a great emergency.

That the war was unpopular was known in advance. That the nation was compelled to resort to arms in defense of its inherent sovereign rights was one of those inconvenient but historically existent facts. At the proper place, this entire situation will be considered in detail. All that we desire to establish now is that Pratt's "original" muckraking analysis of the geographical support for the war so beloved by our historical moderns had been commented upon at length long before he had his brochure printed, which has every earmark of being a thesis for admission to the Ph. D. purgatory while awaiting the call to the scholastic heaven.

And now for that great anomaly which the very clever Pratt states, but does not answer. Why, if impressments was among the immediate causes of war did the New England states refuse to pick up the gauntlet while the landlocked farmers of the West rushed to the defense of our oppressed seamen? If historians would only use a little of that perspective they talk about, the anomaly would be found not only non-existent, but the attitudes adopted by the respective sections of the country would be justified to the hilt.

The Treasury reports on American shipping showed that by 1810 it had a registered tonnage of 1,424,000, of which 984,000 was engaged in foreign trade while 127,000 new tonnage had been constructed during that same year.[244] These astounding figures cry their own story to high heaven. Muckrakers with a keen nose for every privy could not be expected to appreciate the significance of those facts. War would mean the blockade of our coasts by the British Navy—as eventually did happen with the significant exception of some parts of the New England coast—and the destruction of the entire immensely rich carrying trade. Even with all the Orders in Council of the British Cabinet and Napoleon's decrees, American commerce was thriving, some even under the register and flag of such nondescript neutrals as Pappenberg, Kniphausen and Varel,[245] whose very mention is reminiscent of Gilbert and Sullivan operas.

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[243] History of the United States—Adams, Vol. VI, pp. 222-9, 445.

[244] Ibid., Vol. V, p. 290.

[245] Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 273.

Not all shipping could be stopped by the respective policies of the great European antagonists, nor were all seamen impressed, nor were all shippers equal losers in the issue. The overwhelming number of ships got by in one way or another, and while misfortune made the loser howl for redress, twenty others were gloating over their successful venture.

Is there any wonder that the commercial and shipping interests as a whole were violently opposed to any change in national policy, even if American ships occasionally were stopped and searched, and many of its seamen were being dragged off to British men-of-war or confined in English prisons?

Even the number of impressed seamen rightly entitled to the protection of the American flag was in doubt. Lord Castlereagh claimed that only eight hundred seamen could establish their right to such citizenship, at the most sixteen hundred.[246] That fraud was frequently practiced by seamen claiming American naturalization goes without question. The wildest guess was ten thousand sailors were so impressed, while Hildreth is content to rest his case on twenty-five hundred.[247] But whichever figure one cares to accept, the fact remains than an infinitesimal fraction of the total number of American seamen were thus involved by the British assault upon American sovereignty.

Matters appeared in a far different aspect to the proud statesmen of Virginia and the South who lived in true seigniorial style, and who adopted for the national welfare their same meticulous code of honor. War for them would mean the closing of European markets for their staples, cotton and tobacco, which meant ease and affluence to them. If they chose to fight for national honor at the sacrifice of their immediate interests, they did so with eyes wide open, and to the glory of their manhood and their devotion to the young Republic.

The war actually did strike the South hardest, but the Southern aristocrats, as in the days of the glorious Revolution put honor above profit, and chose to fight for the defense of the national dignity. From the West a new type of statesman was emerging on the scene in the person of Henry Clay. A new spirit of national unity was being preached by that eloquent tongue and moving personality destined to play a dominant role in the councils of the nation for the next forty years.

The government was virtually "kicked into the war," as Josiah Quincy put it.[248] It was ill-prepared; it was slow in getting started; it met with numerous disasters during its early campaigns. But as the war progressed the nation was being welded. Political power began to shift toward the West. As the national effort, so slow in getting started, began to gain momentum in 1814, three powerful counter-campaigns had been launched. The enemy was in retreat at New Orleans, had abandoned the Washington campaign, and American troops were victorious on the Northern-Canadian front.

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[246] History of the United States—Adams, Vol. VII, p. 273.

[247] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, pp. 349-50.

[248] Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 474.

The abstract philosopher Hegel commented upon the contrasting courage of the American militia during the War of Independence, and the indifferent results of the later contest when independence was not at stake.[249] From this he drew a typical Hegelian generalization, but the fact of the matter was that the United States entered the struggle an amorphous aggregate of contending sectional interests, and emerged fully launched upon that industrialism which was to weld it into a cohesive nation, and to become the basis of its future greatness.

NONDESCRIPT IMPERIALISM ASCRIBED TO EARLY AMERICAN EXPANSION

We have still to settle the question affirmatively raised by competent writers whether territorial aggrandizement was the real aim of the pro-war faction, a proposition which is proclaimed as an achievement of recent scholarship, and one which classical historians either distorted or suppressed.

That the United States had designs upon Florida long before the War of 1812 is one of the established facts of history. It would be insulting the intelligence of the reader to cite authorities for an obvious fact for which any volume of history is a ready reference. "England and the United States," wrote Henry Adams, one of those New England historical apologists, according to Boudin, "like two vultures, hovered over the expiring empire, snatching at the morsels they most coveted, while the unfortunate Spaniards, to whom the rich prey belonged, flung themselves, without leadership or resources, on the ranks of Napoleon's armies. England pursued her game over the whole of Spanish America, if not by government authority, more effectively by private intrigue; while the United States for the moment confined their activity to a single object, not wholly without excuse. As long as Baton Rouge and Mobile remained Spanish, New Orleans was insecure."[250]

This referred to West Florida, of which the Gulf portions of the States of Alabama and Mississippi are now a part. Only by the strangest twists of language could American covetousness for that territory be ascribed to imperialistic adventure. There is such a thing as natural boundaries for a modern nation, moralists to the contrary notwithstanding. Their possession was part of the future "Manifest Destiny" of the United States. History rejects considerations of absolute morality divorced from time, place and circumstance. This is neither a justification nor a condemnation of American policy. History requires not justification, but an explanation.

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[249] Philosophy of History—Hegel, p. 86.

[250] History of the United States—Adams, Vol. VII, p. 305.

When it comes to the analysis of the American attitude toward Canada, the problem assumes a more intricate character. After all, the United States did declare war against Great Britain. We did invade Canada. Many utterances of our public men, particularly those of Henry Clay,[251] could be quoted in support of the contention that we desired to seize that territory. There is no reason to doubt that had the fortunes of war been overwhelmingly in our favor, Canada would have been annexed and incorporated as part of the United States. But it is one thing to state the consequences of a military policy; it is a far different matter to assert that that policy was dictated for purposes of territorial aggrandizement. Here the record of the case is incontrovertibly against Boudin, Beard, Nevins and the others.

Even their sole reliance, Pratt's thesis, turns out to be not only a slender, but a broken reed. Pratt admits—for who can contend otherwise?—that New England and New York, their nearest neighbors, had no territorial designs on Canada,[252] although geographically the control of the St. Lawrence River and of the Newfoundland fishing banks had long been both a political and economic necessity for that section of our country.

Who were those fire-snorting, smoke-eating imperialists who desired Canada's annexation? The Kentuckians. They were the villains of the piece, the scape-goats of Pratt's thesis and of the amateur excursionists into muckraking history. Believe it or not, the land-hungry Kentuckians inspired by Henry Clay were hot-foot for escaping from their crowded counties, sometimes numbering as high as ten persons per square mile, into the virgin lands of England's northern domain where freemen could breathe the uncontaminated air.

The facts belie this historical distortion. Did not the United States acquire the enormous extent of Louisiana but the day before, figuratively speaking? Was not good land to be had for the asking, practically, at fifty cents an acre to be paid for in depreciated paper currency? Was it not a fact that for over a hundred years the tendency of migration had shown itself to be along parallel lines, rather than longitudinal, or criss-cross? Was it not a fact that immediately north of "overpopulated" Kentucky where human mass was supposed to be pressing on the means of subsistence there were the open, empty and fertile lands of Indiana and Illinois and Michigan?

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[251] Ibid. Vol. V, p. 189.

[252] Expansionists of 1812—Pratt, p. 165.

No, all this is but an idle phantasmagoria. "It was the men of the agricultural frontier," writes Beard in connection with agricultural imperialism, "who cherished these ambitions and at last brought about the declaration of hostilities against England in 1812. There is no doubt on that point, Professor Pratt has plotted on a map the constituencies of the congressmen who voted for the war resolution and has shown that their districts stretched from New Hampshire to Georgia in a great crescent bending westward." [253] This plotting, by the way, was already done ninety years before Pratt; a fact which obviously escaped Beard's attention.

Unfortunately for Professor Beard, Professor Pratt had very grave doubts on that very point. Furthermore, he expressed them. After stating that his inquiry is limited to the particular consideration of the expansionist sentiment as a causative element which entered into the formation of the war sentiment, Pratt cautions his reader in the following significant sentences: "Two explanations are due, with respect to the scope and proportions of this study. First, it makes no effort to give a full account of the causes of the War of 1812, but deals with one set of causes only. The exclusion from all but the briefest mention of the maritime grievances against Great Britain is with no wish to belittle them." [254] So apparently there were other factors to be considered besides agricultural imperialism.

For the present, it suffices to state the following categorically. Nowhere does Beard, Nevins, Boudin or others of their thought, present evidence other than Pratt's work. Examination of Pratt's work will disclose that nowhere does he even attempt to urge that expansion was the dominant, let alone the sole cause of that war. Nowhere does Pratt undertake to disprove the conclusions of the "older historians" concerning the decisive factors which led the United States to undertake what all recognized must be a disastrous struggle from the standpoint of the national economy as it was then constituted. And what is of greater immediate importance to our present discussion of historical methods, there is not a single worthwhile authority whom Pratt quotes in support of his theories who was not known to Henry Adams, particularly; nor do Pratt's authorities affect in the slightest degree the validity of that great writer's painstaking analysis of the situation surrounding the War of 1812 contained in nine volumes of over thirty-seven hundred pages, each the product of a scholarship which has seldom been equaled, and of a style which has never been surpassed.

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[253] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, p. 413.

[254] Expansionists of 1812—Pratt, p. 14.

Before Boudin, Beard, Pratt and the others can be heard to discuss the causes of that conflict, they must first destroy that monumental achievement of New England historical scholarship. It passes all comprehension why modern writers who possess all the appurtenances of perspective and solid fact so dear to the classical historian's heart, should with such singular venom proceed to construct a purely synthetical case to their country's disgrace.

For the present, we will content ourselves with the statement made by President Madison in a confidential message to Congress outlining his country's grievances which impelled recourse to the arbitrament of arms: (1) England's infringements upon our maritime jurisdiction, and disturbance of the peace of our coasts; (2) her impressment of American seamen; (3) her paper blockades, unsupported by any adequate force; (4) her violation of our neutral rights by her orders in council, and her inflexible determination to maintain those orders; (5) and lastly, her instigation of Indian hostilities on our undefended Northwestern borders.[255]

Hildreth goes to considerable effort in his presentation of the various factional attitudes toward the war; he was a contemporary, intensely partisan and strongly anti-Republican. Yet he concludes that the War of 1812 was in reality a second war of independence. "Looked at from this stand," he concludes judiciously, "as it will be by numbers—since few are capable of viewing anything in more lights than one—though the making impressment the turning-point of the war was, in fact, an accident and afterthought, yet, since that did become the point, this war, with all its blunders and disasters, will still present itself to many minds as a necessary and noble struggle against insolence and oppression; not the less noble because rashly undertaken on behalf of the poor, the helpless and the stranger, and perhaps, like other great efforts on the side of humanity, not the less effectual, though at the moment it seemed to fail wholly of its object." [256] To this view the present writer wholly subscribes.

If some are inclined to point to the Canada expedition, the reply is that its very failure was the best proof that it had not been premeditatedly prepared for. However, we have never lacked our share of imperialists at any time of our history. Offense still remains the best defense in certain types of military strategy, and all the mouthings of public men, their confidential papers and the other resorts of Pratt in support of his thesis merely prove that the loss of Canada had always been a bludgeon which the United States has at times felt it necessary to hold menacingly over England's head. The Canadian campaign of the Revolutionary War, and the delicate situation created during the Civil War is well known to everybody.

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[255] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, p. 303.

[256] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, p. 352.

But our present aim is limited to a single objective; namely to subject to critical investigation the muckraking spirit in historical analysis even when it is resorted to by scholars of outstanding calibre like Boudin, Beard and Nevins. They will not be heard to make statements of the rash nature to which they have lent the dignity of their names without being called upon to submit more proof than is contained in a petty little doctorate thesis where "originality" at any cost is the prime consideration; which, characteristically enough, does not even possess the merit of a firm assertion, but leaves open a dozen avenues of retreat if the going gets too tough. Eleven years after his first historical achievement, Pratt tempted fortune again, this time with a volume on the expansionists toward the end of the century. His best explanation of imperialism is an adaptation of Darwinian principles to national survival, and here again he hides behind the shield of his authorities on that subject, Fiske, Strong, Blaine, Burgess and Mahan.[257] Fortune did not smile again upon this Procrustian method of fitting the facts to the theory.

THE EXPOSÉ METHOD OF WRITING HISTORY

Fortunately, not all muckraking holds itself out as history. Some of it is necessary, just as a sewage system is necessary. Every now and then the Augean stables of government corruption have to be cleansed, if only for self-survival. Bryce's famous declaration that "there is no denying that the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States," [258] is, sixty years after its utterance, still true to some extent despite occasional uprisings of the electorate. Yet whether it be a virtuous Steffens or a Seabury, the particular occasion vanishes while the general condition remains.

Government, to many is still a business, and those types of business men can, with considerable justification, put in a strong defense to prove that their tactics vary in methods, but not in essence, from the standard of morality we have learned to expect from business in general. State and Federal agencies are afflicted with their general corruption, and as long as money-making will be the chief aim in life for most people, they will not cavil too much over the practices employed in its acquisition. It is useless to argue with those people who insist that it will always be so. The historian simply knows that it has not always been so, nor is there any inherent reason in the human make-up or in the organization of society why other than motives of financial self-aggrandizement cannot become the predominating impulses of human conduct in our social reactions.

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[257] Expansionists of 1898—Pratt (1936), pp. 10-25.

[258] The American Commonwealth—Bryce (1895 ed.), Vol. I, p. 637.

INDIVIDUAL ETHICS OF WEALTH ACCUMULATION—MYERS

Writers like Myers and Lundberg who treat of great American fortunes are muckrakers by their very nature, despite their highly laudable motives. Their work is doubtless a social gain in so far as it tends to counter-act the propaganda of sycophants that all wealth is the reward of outstanding individual effort, ability and virtue, based on the abstract Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest. Poverty, by implication, is the result of incapacity, lack of thrift, industry and the other copy-book virtues which are sure to bring wealth to those who exercise them.

Up to ten years ago this was, without question, the predominant ideology among vast masses of our people. Their mathematics of wealth as the result of ability was exceedingly simple. A fair mechanic got sixty cents an hour, let us say; a better mechanic, seventy-five cents; a good mechanic a dollar; an excellent mechanic, a dollar and a quarter. In time, his ability may be recognized, and he might aspire to become a foreman.

Anyone who has worked in a shop, will know the caste system which exists among workers, and how carefully the subtle propaganda of economic apologists nurtures that spirit. Putting two and two together, it must be obvious that a man earning four thousand dollars a year is twice as good as one who earns only two thousand. And by that subtility in which propagandists are especially proficient, this notion is carried along to apply to the man who has a fifty thousand dollar a year income, or one of five million dollars a year. Ability gets its due reward, is the slogan of smugness as well as of deceit.

To overcome this ideology is the purpose of books like that of Myers and Lundberg, if they possess any purpose at all. Myers' latest publishers deny that his work properly belongs among the category of muckrakers. His book is uniformly depressing. No one yet has successfully questioned the thoroughness of its research. It has its place in the library of an historian, but one must possess a certain morbid affinity for that monotonous repetition of details concerning the wiles, the inhumanities, the crimes against the elemental decencies of human nature, to which accumulators of wealth resorted in getting their hoard; and then the reverse pictures which shows their heirs squandering away their lives in prodigious efforts to hasten the dissipation of those extraordinary hoards.

No effort is made to establish laws, principles or even connections between the beginning and the end of the process outside of some vague idea of "progress" which is curbed by human sordidness. This is no reflection upon Myers' humanity and larger social vision. His book is replete with sardonic instances of blatant wealth in juxtaposition with grinding poverty from which it emanated.[259] His description of the double exploitation to which the Pullman workers were subjected, first in the mills, and then in the company-owned homes in which they lived and the company-owned stores from which they had to buy,[260] fills one with loathing and disgust for the degradation of human nature.

Nor is Myers so ungenerous as to withhold praise when it is due, where upon occasion he hits upon a case where inherited wealth is employed for useful social purposes. Speaking of Mrs. Russell Sage, Myers writes: "She was credited, and justly, with having made amends for the total lack of social attitude or obligation on the part of her husband. It was, therefore, all the more noteworthy that one of her most useful benefactions was named after him. This endowed establishment was the Russell Sage Foundation, to which she gave $5,436,104. For one of the features of this Foundation, its library on social subjects, students availing themselves of its facilities have cause to feel grateful to Mrs. Sage's memory in providing a much-needed place of specialized information." [261]

This very virtue of Myers' work is developed out of its inherent defect. The problems of individual morality monopolize the stage. The historian, however, is confronted with a far different problem. He must take the morality of fortune-makers as he finds them. He must even concede to them all the average degree of social responsibility customary to their day and age. His concern predominantly must be not with how individual fortunes were made, but with the social laws which made them possible, and the social forces which nurtured and protected them long after their primary historic role was completed.

From this standpoint, Myers gives us only interesting snatches here and there of social customs, laws, and forces. For that we, in turn, are deeply grateful. But if one stops there, the whole purpose of Myers' work, historically considered, is lost. It is not for us, from the vantage point of contemporary morality, to confine ourselves merely to viewing with alarm the methods of a former age, nor to turn the nose over some particularly malodorous mess. Therein lies the distinction between genuine history and the muckraking counterfeit. The first leads to understanding and perchance to action of social significance, while the latter creates only personal revulsion, and the desire to get away from the evidence of individual degradation. Once in a while it may even stir to action, but that generally is limited to a given situation, and the missionary zeal is soon dissipated. Nothing is more ephemeral than a reform movement generated by protest against some particular abuse.

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[259] History of the Great American Fortunes—Myers (1936 ed.) p. 387.

[260] Ibid. p. 199.

[261] History of the Great American Fortunes—Myers, p. 503.

SOCIAL ETHICS OF WEALTH ACCUMULATION—LUNDBERG

Lundberg brings the burning question—for some people—of the ethics surrounding great American fortunes up to date,[262] to satisfy the social pruriency of the essentially envious. Such studies have their place, but, if properly undertaken, should bear that attitude of scientific impersonality which surrounds a problem of pathology, rather than resort to personal animadversion, in this case against the manipulators of organized wealth. Muckraking into the private lives of the wealthy is best conducted, judging by the examples at hand, in the tone of studied restraint which surrounds a clever stock-jobbing prospectus. Its excruciatingly painful studied reserve excites the appetite and numbs the understanding.

Suppose there was substituted for Lundberg's list of sixty families found wanting in the main, another list of sixty or a hundred and sixty more virtuous families—the kind which observe the ten commandments, go to church regularly, do not smoke or swear, contribute a genuine tithe to charity, and on the whole conduct themselves in a manner which would meet even with Lundberg's approval. Yet the same fundamental social problems arising from the distribution of the wealth annually created would still remain, the recurrent break-downs of the economic system would still occur, universal poverty, degradation and the curse of war would still be with us. The evil of historical muckraking consists in the fact that it personalizes rather than socializes the fundamental problems of collective existence. That there is great, if evanescent glory to be won by the social muckraker, the great immediate success of Lundberg's book afforded sufficient evidence.

At the very outset, Lundberg narrows his problem to within the mental range of his prospective audience. "What this book purports to do," he states, "is to furnish replies, naming names and quoting book, chapter, and verse, to two blunt questions: Who owns and controls these large fortunes today, and how are these fortunes used?"[263]

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[262] America's Sixty Families—Lundberg (1937).

The scientific historian restrains with great effort, the initial impulse to throw a book with such a beginning out of the window. To him, the preponderant problems are, in view of the period in our history covered by that work: What are the social laws of production which condemn the producers of wealth to poverty? What are the forces within the social structure which sustain such an economic order? And if the historian is blessed with the fire of the missionary's zeal, a third question will present itself out of the preceding two, namely: What can the collective will and intelligence do to reconstruct society on a more rational, a more humane basis?

It is possible, in a few brief sentences, to give the essence of Lundberg's work which excited, among others, the ecstatic applause of Secretary Ickes.[264] Wealthy families tend to form a caste through closely-knit alliances where equality of financial resources serves as the decisive criterion, just as rank and blood played a similar role in feudal times (p. 21). The big fortunes of America are mobilized in protective phalanxes for mutual protection and support; but it is that guarded cooperation of the wolf-pack where individual strength is the assurance for survival (p. 34).

The concentration of wealth has resulted in the situation where in 1933, of 43,000,000 persons gainfully employed, only 3,600,000 could pay income taxes on incomes as low as $1000 for single persons (p. 48). Clever lawyers have devised means of entailing large family fortunes, in defiance of long-established public policy, resulting in the establishment of an hereditary wealthy class (p. 49). Every great fortune that rolled out of the nineteenth century was rooted in fraud (p. 53).

Abundant facts are adduced to prove the thesis that private use of government powers have been the indispensable handmaiden of wealth during the twentieth century (pp. 50-188). The press and other organs for the dissemination of information are designed to compress the public mind into the mold predetermined by the actual ruling class of the country (pp. 244-319). The hullabaloo concerning the philanthropy of the rich as justification for their existence is disproved by the fact that the very richest among them, with incomes over a million dollars a year, contribute less than two per cent of their incomes as gifts to churches, colleges, endowments, or relief, even in the prosperous years, such as 1928 (p. 321). The basic purpose of foundations is to escape taxes and to support existing social institutions (p. 346). Gifts for education are invariably for universities of the rich and poor students, if accepted, are soon molded as champions of the ruling class

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[263] America's Sixty Families—Lundberg, p. XI.

[264] Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior in President Roosevelt's cabinet.

(p. 404). The personal holding corporation is a device for escaping taxes (p. 469). Lundberg suggests a field for future muckrakers in the expose of eminent law firms who devise the tricks employed by finance capital (p. 471).

A typical example of the method pursued throughout the work is the following quotation from Judge Samuel Seabury's denunciation of the tactics employed by the Consolidated Gas Company of New York, the New York Edison Corporation, its owners, managers and agents: "Their record has been one of extortion. Their privileges were conceived in fraud and political corruption and throughout their existence they have been a constant source of temptation to corrupt officials. Both of these corporations exist in violation of the law and both enjoy absolute monopolies in the necessaries of life. Both have violated the law of the State, both have made false reports to avoid the payment of their just taxes, and both have entered into a close and friendly alliance with public officers whose duty required that they should protect the public from extortion" (p. 495).

After reading this righteous outburst, what is the impression left on the mind of the average reader of muckraking literature? Is it one of loathing and disgust? Does it arouse in their breast the zeal for a crusade in behalf of civic virtue? On the contrary, a large proportion of them would say: "Lucky dogs! Wish I was in on that! How do they do it?"

The world has always had its share of social pruriency. It requires a far different grade of mentality and of character to develop the stamina required in sustained struggle for human betterment in face of almost universal indifference of the masses and the formidable opposition of the ruling classes and their satellites strategically placed at every critical point within the social structure.

TARBELL SET THE STYLE IN MUCKRAKING HISTORY

Ida M. Tarbell's History of the Standard Oil Company set a style of muckraking which, despite all its laudable pretensions, is not only futile in results, but actually a hindrance to clear social thinking. One may memorize every single well-authenticated anecdote and scrap of evidence without ever understanding the role played by the trust in the development of our country and in the exploitation of its resources. That in so doing the trust's real purpose from the standpoint of their prime movers was merely the amassment of wealth and the enjoyment of that tremendous personal power which accompanies great financial resources, is merely incidental from the standpoint of scientific history.

Personal motives are frequently the direct opposite of their historic consequences. Rockefeller and his group, we will concede, made their money by exploiting both the material wealth of the country and the people who lived in it. Standard Oil was responsible neither for the natural nor the human resources of the nation. But they were responsible for devising methods for concentrating social wealth and perfecting means for their more economical employment.

Obviously their methods were superior to those which they superseded. If one points to the low grade of their ethical conceptions, the reply is that it does not lie in our mouths to condemn those whom the great masses of people in all classes secretly envied, and who would not have scrupled, in the main, about the employment of similar tactics, if not worse, to achieve the same ends. In order to leave no doubt in any one's mind what those methods were, they consisted of every crime from arson to murder and mayhem, not to speak of such minor peccadillos as bribery, perjury and double-dealing. Those were the business ethics of the latter part of the nineteenth century; and let it be whispered, sotto voce, the business ethics of the twentieth century are not a whit better, only the more restrained because of a more developed social consciousness among a larger number of our people.

History has nothing to do with abstract moral considerations. Such matters come within its purview only in so far as they manifest themselves concretely in the actions of men, whether those be of the itinerant preacher or the leader of a nation. Rockefeller unquestionably represented, historically, a progressive element within the social structure. Miss Tarbell recognizes that. "To those who know anything of the way in which Mr. Rockefeller does business," she writes, "it will go without saying that their marketing department was conducted from the start with the greatest efficiency and economy. Its aim was to make every local station as nearly perfect in its service as it could be. The buyer must receive his oil promptly, in good condition, and of the grade desired. If a customer complained, the case received prompt attention and the cause was found and corrected." [265]

Its efficiency methods in the production of tin can containers, for example, was a model for the rest of the industrial world to shoot at. The factories were spacious, clean and well-lighted. Internal organization was of the highest engineering science could devise. There was no waste. The very dirt on the floor was carefully swept "not to be dumped into the river, but for sifting for tin filings and solder dust. At every step something was saved." [266]

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[265] History of the Standard Oil Company—Tarbell, Vol. II, p. 33.

Of the great numbers who read about the Standard Oil Company's misdeeds—which we certainly do not care to minimize—few have had the vision to recognize what their methods of organization have meant for the development of American industrial technology. "Something besides illegal advantages," writes Miss Tarbell, "has gone into the making of the Standard Oil Trust. Had it possessed only the qualities which the general public has always attributed to it, its overthrow would have come before this. But this huge bulk, blackened by commercial sin, has always been strong in all great business qualities—in energy, in intelligence, in dauntlessness. It has always been rich in youth as well as greed, in brains as well as unscrupulousness. If it has played its great game with contemptuous indifference to fair play, and to nice legal points of view, it has played it with consummate ability, daring and address." [267] At another point, she praises the compactness and harmony of the Standard organization, the ability of its members, the solidity of the qualities governing its operations.[268]

But these are all little gold nuggets of genuine historical analysis hidden among the dross of muck. Miss Tarbell must have her fling at sin, foul play and lawlessness. History does not recognize these abstractions when divorced from their relations. Those business ethics were customary for their times. But to the end she remains unreconciled, and persists in the campaign for virtue. "Very often," she writes with deep indignation, "people who admit the facts, who are willing to see that Mr. Rockefeller has employed force and fraud to secure his ends, justify him by declaring, 'It's business.' That is, 'it's business,' has come to be a legitimate excuse for hard dealing, sly tricks, special privileges. It is a common enough thing to hear men arguing that the ordinary laws of morality do not apply to business. Now, if the Standard Oil Company were the only concern in the country guilty of the practices which have given it monopolistic power, this story never would have been written. . . . The methods it employs with such acumen, persistency, and secrecy are employed by all sorts of business men, from corner grocers to bankers." [269]

Tarbell concludes by shedding bitter tears that such methods instead of arousing contempt are more or less openly admired! "Of course, such a state of feeling undermines the whole moral nature of a community." [270] Somehow the community as a whole has thriven despite those ominous cracks in its moral armor.

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[266] History of the Standard Oil Company—Tarbell, Vol. II, p. 239.
[267] Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 231-2.
[268] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 254.
[269] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 287.
[270] Ibid. Vol. II, p. 289.

EVEN THE MARXIST COREY TURNS MUCKRAKER

If Corey's book on the House of Morgan did not excite the same furore as Tarbell's work, that is only because it appeared some thirty years after its prototype, and public taste for such kind of writing had suffered the revulsion which follows after satiety. That expose of the masters of money, as the subtitle puts it, follows the classical lines for that type of muckraking. There is the usual delving into the humble antecedents, the tactics of wealth accumulation, followed by the arrogant abuse of the social power with which wealth endows its possessor.

Such writing is perhaps excusable in others, but not in Corey. His training in history and political economy is far more thorough than is manifested, or is indeed required of the run-of-the-mill muckraker. In fact, Corey's work would not even deserve notice were it not that four years later he established fully his rank among the first grade of present-day thinkers when he published his study of the contemporary American scene in his Decline of American Capitalism.

To the occult student of Marxian economics, Corey's study of the House of Morgan is a veritable storehouse for corroborative data illustrating the processes of concentration of industry, followed by the centralization of control through the devices of finance capital, in whose development Morgan and his associates played so decisive a role. Corey illustrates graphically how, as far back as 1912, the House of Morgan controlled, through the mechanism of interlocking directorates and community of interest among its allies, with J. P. Morgan as the recognized commander-in-chief, over $22,500,000,000 in aggregate resources.[271]

Yet we have this plaintive wail, so strange from the lips of a Marxist: "But the Morganization was animated by no social purpose or policy, moving within the limits of profit, control and power, imposing tribute in the performance of a socially necessary task. Corporate combination and centralization solved the problem of competition and profit, but not the social problem of their oppressive power and antagonisms aroused. Financial centralization and control, moreover, strengthened the power of concentrated capitalism, making it easier to crush the resistance of small business men, farmers and labor." [272]

Corey had manifested, long before he penned those lines, too firm a grasp of the nature of historical processes to have seriously expected from Morgan any purpose other than personal enrichment, and that elation of the ego which ensues from the consciousness of tremendous power practically uncontrolled, and accountable to none but himself; and this despite the outer trappings of democratic government.

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[271] The House of Morgan—Corey (1930) p. 356.

[272] The House of Morgan—Corey, p. 177.

Social laws make puppets of nominal rulers, and Morgan, by dominating vast aggregates of that concentrated form of social power, money, was enabled for a time to manipulate those social forces, and therefore, their mode of manifestation. But money itself is a fetish, a product of society, existing by and through the social will, and while dominating the scene, its possessors in a democratic society are always fearful it will lose its mystic spell. This we have witnessed to a remarkable extent since 1933, when the great big-wigs of finance went crawling before the political authorities in Washington begging for government loans and relief. The devil to-day is not so sick and therefore, not so repentant, but the people at large have not yet gotten over their gratification at that edifying spectacle.

Corey's book on its own merits was a failure for precisely the opposite reasons that made Tarbell's a sensation. She knew little about the mechanism of the inner laws of capitalist economy; consequently her indignation over its manifest abuses was genuine, and her laments impressed readers by their sincerity. Corey knew too much about these self-same laws, recognized their social validity, and inwardly justified the historic role of his actors. As a result his indignation lacks the ring of honest belief, and occasionally relapses into the impartiality of a surgeon describing a case, rather than of a moralist thundering damnation upon iniquity and sin—those prime ingredients of the muckraker's art.

"The organization of security companies," Corey explains in the best professorial manner, "constituted evasions of legal restrictions upon national banks, imposed, however, by the needs of developing industry and finance. Large-scale industry required large, more unified banking facilities, and erased the old distinctions between commercial and investment operations. . . . Morgan's system, operating by means of a complex (if incomplete) institutionalized mechanism for the control of financial resources and corporate industry, was the expression of a new economic order, of concentrated capitalism, and its need of a measure of unity and regulation." [273]

This attitude of scientific impartiality is not part of such a writer's forte. The first-rate muckraker needs a simple tale to tell for simple minds where all is either black or white, and injured virtue, though temporarily crushed to earth, will rise in its might at Armageddon for the final battle against sin. Corey's tongue is too often between his cheek for the rapid fire speech required of a convincing muckracker. It is obvious his proper place is in the realm of critical analysis where

[273] The House of Morgan—Corey, p. 359.

logic must be combined with facts, and these related back to the social forces from whence they arise, and to the composition of the social structure wherein they operate.

BERLE AND MEANS—IMPERSONAL MUCKRAKERS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY

Berle and Means in their historical analysis of the function of the modern corporation reach to superb heights in the vastness of their conceptions and the impersonality of their conclusions. Yet their work is a pragmatical rather than a scientific perception of the nature of the social forces with which they deal.

Underneath their tone of studious restraint there runs a continuous note of moral indignation over the abuses which have developed in the great cleavage between management and ownership of great corporate enterprise. Since they make no attempt to explain the composition and origin of the social system, they content themselves merely with the description of the evolution of the corporate structure and functions. Their work in essence is an exposé of existing conditions, though their revelations concern legal rather than personal entities.

Consequently their conclusions, as we will see, are insignificant and disappointing in view of the tremendous mass of painstaking scholarship they obviously brought to their task. The reader feels let down. In comparison to their conclusions, the mountain has labored in vain. It is no accident, therefore, that Berle who was one of President Roosevelt's closest advisers, if not the principal theoretician in the launching of the N.R.A. witnessed the ignominious collapse of that economic edifice even long before the Supreme Court, out of Christian charity, unanimously voted to inter the remains from the sight of men.

Blind pragmatical experiment with social forces most frequently results in a violent reactionary kick-back. Fortunately, the masses by 1936 had not forgotten the horrible experiences of the past seven years and voted to give the Roosevelt Administration another lease of life. It is no accident that the past three years of that Administration has been devoted almost exclusively to ameliorative measures of a social character. This does honor to its humanity, but these reforms are no less than what has been in effect in England for quite a while; the product, in the main, of conservative regimes. Economic stagnation still persists and while the social arteries have not hardened, ugly festering sores continue to disturb the body politic.

If Berle and Means had any constructive purpose in undertaking their study, it must have been not only to expose but to correct these maladjustments in our economy. If they have failed, it is not that they have had no hearing, but because the historical method of their analysis is subjective rather than scientific. Their conclusions possess the muckrakers' penchant for reform, rather than the scientific purpose to explain, to propound the nature of its ailments, and to indicate the correctives which can only be understood by the exact knowledge of the inner laws of motion of our modern economy and the social structure which it has developed and in turn modifies and constricts that economy.

CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS BY BERLE AND MEANS

Berle and Means' greatest merit consists in demonstrating, through a wealth of statistical material which does credit to the persistency of their research, the facts relating to the concentration of industry, the development of finance-capital and the revolutionary significance of the wedge which had been driven between legal ownership of corporations and their management. "It is of the essence of revolutions of the more silent sort," they write, "that they are unrecognized until they are far advanced. This was the case with the so-called 'industrial revolution,' and is the case with the corporate revolution through which we are at present passing."[274] The modern corporation represents the dissolution of atomized productive enterprise which was the characteristic of capitalist economy for over three hundred years. Its tremendous centripetal force has concentrated vast masses of capital much too large for individual control through personal resources.[275]

Ford and Mellon are outstanding exceptions to what is the unvarying rule. Ownership has changed from an active to a passive agent; direction of productive enterprise has been surrendered to the mere participation in profits produced by management. Problems of management have arisen which seriously weaken the common law claim of the owner to the just usufruct of his capital.[276]

Now this is a situation which was pretty well recognized before the advent of Berle and Means' work. They have given form and substance to support the general notion. But we have a just claim upon those who would essay the role of leaders of thought to tell us exactly why this situation had to develop; not merely to reason back from the event, but to disclose the laws which control that development. They describe the changes which have taken place since the rugged individualism of Adam Smith,[277] but not the social forces by which those changes were produced.

For them, the revolutionary economic transformations effected by the corporation have been but recently discovered. Marx seventy years ago predicted exactly how this change must take place in language which sounds as up-to-date as a page from Berle and Means. The difference between them and Marx consists in this: They study the facts and reason backward; Marx also studied the facts, but searched for laws which govern the development of social phenomena, and in discovering those laws was able to reason not only backward but forward.

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[274] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means (1932) p. VII.

[275] Ibid. pp. 8-9.

[276] Ibid. pp. 285-6.

[277] Ibid. pp. 345-51.

Marx finished the first draft of volume three of Capital between 1863 and 1867.[278] In his discussion of the inherent tendencies of capitalist economy, Marx writes about the future with that confidence which is based upon the disclosure of fundamental laws of social motion: "By means of the formation of stock companies an enormous expansion of the scale of production and enterprises takes place, which were impossible for individual capitals. At the same time, such enterprises as were formerly carried on by governments are socialized. Capital, which rests on a socialized mode of production and presupposes a social concentration of means of production and labor-powers is here directly endowed with the form of social capital (a capital of directly associated individuals) as distinguished from private capital, and its enterprises assume the form of social enterprises as distinguished from individual enterprises. It is the abolition of capital as private property within the boundaries of capitalist production itself. It means the transformation of the actually functioning capitalist into a mere manager, an administrator of other people's capital, and of the owners of capital into mere owners, mere money capitalists." [279]

Marx continues to argue that as capitalism develops, the owner is transformed into the mere holder of claims upon dividends which may be derived from numerous corporations engaged in such diverse enterprises as domestic railroads and rubber plantations in the Far East. Engels contributes a long note on the future development of kartels and trusts.

Marx concludes with this paragraph to which we desired initially to draw the reader's attention in view of Berle and Means' "revolutionary" discovery in 1932. "This is the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within capitalist production itself, a self-destructive contradiction which represents on its face a mere phase of transition to a new form of production. It manifests its contradictory nature by its effects. It establishes a monopoly in certain spheres and thereby challenges the interference of the state. It reproduces a new aristocracy of finance, a new sort of parasites in the shape of promoters, speculators and merely nominal directors; a whole system of swindling and cheating by means of corporation juggling, stock jobbing, and stock speculation. It is private production without the control of private property." [280]

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[278] Preface by Engels to Vol. III of Capital, p. 11.

[279] Capital—Marx, Vol. III, pp. 516-17.

Let us contrast the above striking analysis of the inherent tendencies of concentration of industry and centralization of control whose laws Marx first worked out in the first volume of his great work, [281] with their results as they presented themselves seventy years later to Berle and Means: "Finally, as the token becomes more and more separated from the physical properties through the interposition of managements and their endowment with legal power which can be traced through to the physical assets, the 'jus disponendi' over the physical properties ceases to be in the owner of the token. His real right of disposition is a right of disposition over the token itself, over any returns which may be distributed to him, and over the proceeds of its sale. He has, in fact, exchanged control for liquidity. It is thus plain that the concept of a share of stock must now be vigorously changed. No longer can it be regarded, from the point of view of the investor as primarily a pro rata share in an asset fund, or as a continuing, pro rata participation in earnings. It is true that legally both the underlying assets (to a small extent) and the participation in earning (to a far greater extent) are supposed to measure the legal right of a shareholder and exercise their influence over its actual value. But the factual concept must be not what these legal participations and rights are, but what expectations the shareholder has of their being fulfilled in the form of distributions and what appraisal an open market will make of these expectations." [282] So-called legal titles to functioning capital dwindle down to the market prices of securities, as determined by the earnings and dividend policies of management. The functioning capitalist entrepreneur of laissez faire days has been transformed to a mere claimant for rent, interest and profit of enterprise.

Berle and Means give very valuable data on how those dividends are affected by the policies of finance capitalists who exercise effective control over the corporation by means of devious technical devices. First, the more widely stocks are distributed, the easier it is for a small coterie to control the corporation, and therefore, dictate its policies, administration, management, and disbursements for supplies, materials, and so forth.[283] Here we see the hollowness of the claim put forth by apologists who point to diffusion of stock ownership. The Western

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[280] Capital—Marx, Vol. III, p. 519.

[281] Ibid. Vol. I, pp. 684-89.

[282] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means, pp. 286-7.

[283] Ibid. pp. 58-9; 87-9.

Union messenger boy may be under pressure to purchase a share in the corporation that employs him. In essence the employees put up a portion of the capital by which they are exploited, but that is the only practical consequence of stock diffusion among workers.

It is not surprising for the board of directors of a large corporation to own but an insignificant fraction of the shares of the enterprise whose destinies they direct. Thus, the Board of the United States Steel Corporation in 1928 held only one and a half per cent of the company's common and preferred shares then outstanding.[284] This control is obtained by various devices, such as the proxy system of voting stock which is usually manipulated by the management. Not all stock has the privilege of voting; sometimes there is a voting trust whereby power is placed in the hands of a few individuals.[285]

Whatever the mechanism, Berle and Means are agreed that democratic control in proportion to one's financial interest in the corporation is a thing of the past. "The recognition that industry has come to be dominated by these economic autocrats must bring with it a realization of the hollowness of the familiar statement that economic enterprise in America is a matter of individual initiative. To the dozen or so men in control there is room for such initiative. For the tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and owners in a single enterprise, individual initiative no longer exists." [286]

Another favorite device for effective control is the holding company, where by a series of corporate layers pyramided one on top of the other it became possible, for example, for the Van Sweringen brothers and associates by an investment of less than twenty million dollars to control eight class I railroads having combined assets of over two billion dollars.[287] Through the medium of mergers, it is possible for an initial top-holding corporation to dominate a tremendous bulk of subsidiaries locked together through the mechanism of financial manipulation rather than by reason of economic necessity, or even by the rules of economic adequacy.

It is beyond our scope to mention more than briefly the processes whereby the ancient common law pre-emptive right of a shareholder in the equity of his corporation is evaded by modern practices of financial control operation through their management of the enterprise. Shares are diluted by creating various classes of stock such as class A, class B, each sharing in the net earnings.[288] Shares outstanding are further diluted by mergers,[289] issuing of preferred stock.[290] Reorganizations often weaken the underlying bond issue, despite their theoretical higher rank in the financial hierarchy.[291] Purchase warrants on new issues affect disadvantageously those among the existing shareholders who have neither funds nor desire further participation. Frequently the power to amend the charter of the corporation is pushed to extreme limits,[292] thus affecting by a series of gradations, often very subtle, the rights of existing stockholders.

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[284] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means, p. 87.

[285] Ibid. pp. 75-83.

[286] Ibid. pp. 124-5.

[287] Ibid. p. 73; also pp. 117, 203, 204-6.

[288] Ibid. pp. 159-60.

[289] Ibid. p. 172.

[290] Ibid. pp. 176-79.

By these methods which are beyond the comprehension of the average owner, and surely beyond his hopes of successful intervention even if they are understood, the modern corporation has gradually reduced ownership to a mere claim on future income, while control is left where it rightfully belongs, by laws of God and in the very constitution of things, in the hands of the manipulators of finance capital.

No one really has a legitimate complaint to make. Every one goes into the thing with eyes wide open. The average owner of money to invest has not a sufficient hoard for individual economic operation under modern methods of industrial production. All he is concerned with is a certain income from his capital, above that what the savings bank or government bonds will afford. Therefore he buys shares in some corporation which he has reason to believe will yield him a fair income.

His very entrance into the financial market predisposes him in favor of the powers who so mysteriously control its destinies; but more important, pay him his dividend, which assumes the proportion, as capitalist economy advances, of a mere average rate of profit per aliquot part of capital. Stock dilution, or higher stock prices will soon take care of a company's share which averages eight dollars a year dividend as against its neighbor's four dollars. The former will soon sell for twice the price of the second. Another need of the average investor is liquidity. For this reason stock markets [293] are created. The individual entrepreneur in modern large-scale economy exists only in the pages of college text-books on economics.

TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY AND MODERN FACT

Traditional economics as taught by Adam Smith, and by most college professors today, was predicated upon the individual who actively participated in the management of his enterprise.[294] The modern corporation has reduced him to a number, with another set of numbers to indicate the extent of his holding. Wealth in classical economy stood for the worth of tangible property from whose employment the

[291] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means, pp. 279-80.
[292] Ibid. pp. 212-13. [293] Ibid. p. 289. [294] Ibid. pp. 346-7.

entrepreneur expected a profit. The modern corporation has transformed him into a passive holder of a claim to a share in the profits of an enterprise, and whose holding value fluctuates with the varying fortunes of the business over which he exercises no control.

One by one the old shibboleths of private enterprise and individual initiative go by the board. Even the profit motive, as such, has undergone weird transformations. Frequently management operates to make profits out of their companies by purchase of materials and supplies from dummy corporations at inflated prices. Dividends are sometimes passed over, at their discretion, to conserve the assets or to extend the enterprise.[295] These ostensible motives often disguise stock manipulation by an inner ring.[296]

One of the secrets for the relatively small holdings by the directors of large corporations is that the really big money is made in side-lines around which the corporation's fortunes revolve.[297] The profit motive still remains the mainspring of capitalist economy. But the manner in which profits are siphoned off the main enterprise by the insiders causes the economists who never got beyond Adam Smith to quake with horror.

Competition, another ancient classic, is at best a temporary struggle between the big fellows who have long since crushed out the small ones. "In each of these situations to which these fundamental conceptions refer," Berle and Means sum up, "the modern corporation has wrought such a change as to make the concepts inapplicable. New concepts must be forged and a new picture of economic relationships created." [298] This empty generalization is the ultimate test of the clarity of their understanding of the inner workings of the economic mechanism whose wheels and pulleys only they have been able to describe.

I. Ancient Utopianism in Modern Historical Dress

BERLE AND MEANS RECOGNIZE NEW SOCIAL TRENDS, BUT NOT THEIR CAUSES

Modern corporate practice, Berle and Means contend, by widening the cleavage between ownership and management, has depersonalized the most vital factor in our national economy. This has gradually led to a division of interest between the passive owners and those in control of the enterprise. From a social standpoint the effects of this development are even more vital. "Observable throughout the world," they write, "and in varying degrees of intensity, is this insistence that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the same tests of public benefit which have been applied in their turn to power otherwise located." [299]

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[295] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means, p. 260.
[296] Ibid. p. 329. [297] Ibid. pp. 229-31. [298] Ibid. p. 351.

The genuine Socialist and Communist movements represent the extreme left of this popular attitude. But even in strictly capitalist countries by which they mean those countries where the radical movement has made little headway, or where it exercises little influence over government policies, a powerful sentiment exists that industry must accept responsibility for some measure of protection for workers, investors and consumers. The authors do not undertake to prognosticate how this responsibility can or will be met. "To answer this question would be to foresee the history of the next century. We can only consider and appraise certain of the more important lines of possible development." [300] Thus, at the most critical point of the discussion their historical method breaks down.

The tragedy of society's present dilemma is intensified by the fact that analysts become extremely cautious when it comes to the all-important question of the future. What, they ask, would you expect a blue-print of the future? And each smiles in self-satisfaction at this conclusive retort. We hasten to add that none but engineers could draw such blue-prints—social engineers—and the first thing any engineer demands is exact knowledge about his materials and of the problem at hand. He must know how events developed, and why, and he must understand exactly the nature of the social laws with which he deals, the social forces which create those laws, and the social structure wherein those aggregates operate.

Berle and Means did not begin their analysis in this scientific fashion. By that we do not mean that everyone who undertakes to write a book on the modern corporation must begin with Adam and Eve in order to build up his case. It is both necessary and convenient to start their work as they did. But back of their heads there should have been initially the knowledge of the laws of social motion if the deductions —or purpose—of their book was to possess scientific merit. They have merely described a process without having understood it in essence. Hence, they must resort to the methods of the veriest Utopian and weave out of their skulls theories as to how society should or could be best organized.

The impossibility of blue-prints of the future is an apparently incontrovertible truth, but one which we successfully contradict every day of our lives. Civilization—in fact all organized existence—would be impossible without valid prediction. It is only a question of degree.

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[299] Ibid. p. 353.

[300] Ibid. p. 354.

If it were possible to order exactly everybody's role in the scheme of things social science would attain the ultimate of its organization, provided all was arranged in accordance with the laws of nature. This, of course, is pure fantasy. Between the two absurdities of the impossibility of conceiving the final future organization and of attaining complete social organization, there is plenty of room for legitimate social science to operate.

THE SCIENTIFIC MUCKRAKER RESORTS TO UTOPIANISM

There are, in the opinion of Berle and Means three possibilities of future development. The first is for the fullest application of the theory of trusteeship to the management of corporations, whereby operation will be conducted for the sole benefit of the security holders despite the fact that owners have ceased to actively participate in the affairs of the property in which they have an interest.

The second theory is in direct opposition to the above doctrine, usually supported by corporation lawyers. Under that view, frank recognition should be taken of the real fact that ownership in the classic sense has lost its meaning, and that shareholders by their purchase of such securities, really desire only participation in profits pro rata, dependent wholly upon the skill and enterprise of management, whose power should no longer be limited by outmoded ideas of implied obligation with respect to the uses of the property of others.

The third theory is the middle of the road policy between the extremes. Recognition must be taken of the realities as they are. Passive ownership by acquiescing to the active forces represented by management has released society from the strict enforcement of the ancient doctrines of property rights. The controlling groups, however, cannot operate the properties without any restraint and solely for their own benefit. "Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount interests of the community. The present claims of both contending parties now in the field have been weakened by the developments described in this book. It remains only for the claims of the community to be put forward with clarity and force." [301] Berle and Means have succeeded in doing neither.

First of all, their presentation of the problem is purely subjective and artificial. There is no real existence of three alternatives except in their own theoretical structure. No theoretical structure, even as a working hypothesis, is worth considering unless its outlines conform to the reality. The Roosevelt first edition of the New Deal presented that picture of the problem as conceived by Berle and Means with their N. R. A. solution. At the appropriate time both ownership and control united against the Administration, with the strange, though not unjustifiable support of the masses themselves. This conceptual monstrosity collapsed of its own inherent weaknesses long before the Supreme Court gave it the coup de grace.

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[301] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means, p. 356.

Berle and Means actually fear that the future may see the economic organism, now typified by the corporations, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly superseding it as the dominant form of social organization.[302] By this analysis they exhibit their entirely fallacious conception of the modern state whether within the territorial confines of the United States, England and France, or that of Germany, Italy and Japan. Even with the latter group, the state authority is far from being either the complete master or the pliant tool of corporate wealth.

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD VERSUS THE UTOPIAN FOR SOCIAL PLANNING

Berle and Means, were they to speak the language of the scientific historian, would use the words may and must with greater delicacy of understanding. Some events may happen under a certain set of circumstances. Other events must happen because a definite set of circumstances are already in existence and since we know what social laws brought them about and a good deal concerning the nature of the human element which is the active agency through which social laws operate, predictions concerning the future are not pure fantasy. In our discussion of the Fourth Period of American history, which deals with the present and immediate future as it must develop under a given set of circumstances whose nature and history will be well established by then, we will see how social evolution develops not as worked out with the subtle schematics of the subjective ideologies of Utopians, but in accordance with historical blue-prints whose general outlines will be firmly delineated and whose finer details will be filled in with the expansion of our knowledge concerning the workings of our social mechanism.

Meanwhile it is important only to point out that mankind has never yet been prevailed upon to accept a ready-made formula no matter how enticing its promises nor how pressing the immediate necessities. The Russian masses apparently accepted the Bolshevist program—but only apparently—since they neither understood that program nor enacted a conscious historic role as a people in its un-

[302] Ibid. p. 357.

foldment. But little by little, sometimes by spurts and leaps, often hastened by the concentration camp or the liquidation squad, they found themselves with a Socialist economy but back in the grasp of a single despot's power.

So did the American people, and the American Congress in the early days of 1933 accept the New Deal, whatever that meant, only gradually to return to the Old Deal with amendments which at least they understood. Sudden leaps in history there certainly are, as our Revolutionary War and Civil War's aftermath conclusively demonstrate; nor are those leaps necessarily taken only through the compelling stringencies of war. More often, those wars are merely the concluding phases of a process, as well as the medium for the ushering in of a new era. A great deal depends on man himself as a conscious factor in history.

We state here provisionally that the First and Second World Wars were the forerunners of such an impending reorganization of our economy, and of world economy in general, but that the ultimate resolution of the world's pressing problems will be effected by far different methods than the finely-balanced rationalizations of the typical "middle-of-the-roader." Such have their place in society, but not at the time when society is in the travail of birth of a new social order after the normal gestation.

Berle and Means are pragmatists, but something more than mere factual observation is necessary at such a time. A little social physiology will help a lot; nor should the surgeon's skill and determination be lacking if the emergency should demand.

That our authors did not grasp the nature of the capitalist society which they set out to analyze, and for whose ailments they issued pompous prescriptions, was evidenced by their statement in the first chapter of their work that the modern corporate system "bids fair to be as all-embracing as was the feudal system in its time." [303] This is weak as an analogy and false as a fact, but what is worse it beclouds the issue as presented by the grave situation they set about to diagnose.

In the first place feudalism was a definite form of social organization, with its distinctive economy based on land relationship, with a state organization responsive to the needs of the landed aristocracy and with the predominating ideology being determined by the Church which was indissolubly connected with the state mechanism, of which it frequently was the master. The modern corporation is not the social structure itself, but the end result of a process which, by Berle and Means' own admission, began over three hundred years ago, and developed into its present form within the lifetime of most of us.

[303] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means, p. 9.

The corporation may influence the agents of the state, but it is not the state apparatus. The corporation in its present form is meeting with resistance from the masses below whom it oppresses, and who are neither powerless nor inarticulate; from above the state holds its destiny within its hands; and that destiny will be resolved ultimately by social policy rather than by the wiles of corporate unilateral determination. The corporate system cannot be all-embracing as was the feudal system, because the former is but the creature of a social system, whereas feudalism was the social system itself.

Having begun at the very outset with an erroneous conception of the social mechanism, they were logical enough to follow their error through to the very conclusion wherein they proclaim the possibility of the economic organism superseding the state. Even the Italian Corporative State and the German National Socialist State makes the economy subservient to state policy rather than the other way around. This error of conception must bring about an error in emphasis. "The law of corporations," say Berle and Means in concluding their work, "accordingly, might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state, while business practice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship." [304] This is the acme of historical futility. These writers demonstrate they have neither the slightest conception of the nature, nor the origin and function of the state.

Mere legal enactments do not change fundamental social relations; they only reflect them. Whether those social changes are to be effected peacefully, intelligently, by deliberate resolve of a people who know what they are about depends a great deal upon how that question is presented. The corporative system could not dominate the American state without a revolution. It requires therefore, something more potent than clever legal devisement to accomplish that purpose. The implication of such a system will be thoroughly grasped by a people ready to resist to the last extremity the deprivation of their democratic rights. This is a negative prognostication. True, not all problems must be answered affirmatively. There is such a thing as drifting. Society may drift hither and yon resulting in stagnation, or drift into chaos. History shows ample evidence of both. But the United States will not drift into an economic despotism in absolute control of the state.

Another categorical statement here made and to be later justified by the record is that the American people are not given to aimless drifting, for long. They will be stirred to action eventually. It is incumbent upon us to try and make that action as effective and as rational as lies within the power of an intelligent and essentially humane people.

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[304] The Modern Corporation and Private Property—Berle and Means, p. 357.

UTOPIANISM APPLIED TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Assistant Secretary of State Berle is still the subjectivist in a recent polemic with Senator Nye on the question of the United States following a policy of national isolation.[305] Berle twits his opponent on the impossibility of hermetically sealing this country from economic access to certain basic materials like coffee and rubber.

One may grant a certain minimum of trade as necessary for a modern nation, even for one with our vast resources and varied climate. The basic issue, however, is one of active participation in or keeping out of, the quarrels of Europe which must in time encompass the entire world. We have already stated our judgment that the United States made its declaration of war on the side of the Allies with the repeal of the Neutrality Act on Nov. 2, 1939.

Now comes Berle with his plea for America's participation in the world settlement which will follow, presumably after the Allies' victory. After drawing attention to the "friendly neighbor" peace policy of the Western Hemisphere, Berle states: "The cooperative peace involves no surrender of sovereignty, but merely a willingness to be governed by international law. It involves undertaking no commitments, save to give our own cooperation, when it is useful and to accept cooperation when it is needed. . . . Our role, accordingly, must be that of the good neighbor—beginning at home and in the group of American nations of which we are a part, maintaining and upholding its bases, which are law, order, respect for others, self-restraint, justice, fair dealing, building toward cooperation."

This persiflage may be good statescraft, but it is either meaningless, or it means too much. Precision is lacking where precision is most essential for the protection of our national welfare. If Berle thinks for a moment that Europe and Japan will supinely accept the good neighbor policy when only one carries the big stick as is the case in this hemisphere, then he is due for the same kind of rude awakening which met him twenty years ago when he was part of Wilson's menage at Versailles.

Cooperation means either an alliance of victors, no matter what else it is called, or whom it includes, or a genuine world federation with the surrender by the nations of their sovereignty to that vital extent where a world armed force will be enabled to enforce its will against any single nation or combination of recalcitrants. This we discussed before and concluded that the economic foundation of modern nations make such real surrender of sovereignty impossible.

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[305] New York Times Magazine, Jan. 14, 1940.

Berle will have to get down to fundamentals and recognize that capitalism and nationalism are as inseparably intertwined as are capitalism and the modern corporation of which it is the creator. One is the necessary accompaniment of the other, and neither can be removed, or vitally amended without destroying the other. Any other contention is the phantasmagoria of subjective rationalization and results both in the creation of windmills and the wind to make them go—but only 'round-and-'round.

ARNOLD'S MYSTERIOUS SOCIAL SYMBOLS

To Thurman W. Arnold, former professor of law in Yale University and now an important figure in the law-enforcing agency of the United States government, all problems of history and government arise from the mysterious workings of the Social Unconscious. His entire theory of society is contained in the following thought: "As with individuals, so it is with institutions which cement groups of individuals together in such a way that they achieve a sort of separate personality. Institutions—whether courts, commercial banks, or government bureaus—develop institutional habits, entirely separable from the personal habits of those who spend their working hours in their service. They build themselves little dramas, and play varied roles. They are confronted with conflicts which they resolve by constructing complicated theories, or by splitting themselves up into different institutions through which the same men play inconsistent roles. And it is this process which makes up the story of government. By the symbols of government we mean both the ceremonies and the theories of social institutions." [306]

With Burke the mystic password to history was in the word "attitude"; with Arnold it is "symbol." In a certain sense all organized forms of life are dependent upon symbols for their proper understanding, for there is nothing inherent in nature which makes of the letters f-i-r-e the reality for which it stands, nor t-a-x-e-s the complex of emotions which those letters when placed in that relation call forth among those who live in the higher brackets. If that were all Arnold could tell us about symbols his labors were in vain.

We recall an anecdote in the Butyrka Prison in Moscow during 1921. The jailer had been connected with that institution for many years. One of the prisoners confined to his care was, ironically enough, the former Superintendent of Prisons during the Czarist regime.

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[306] The Symbols of Government—Arnold (1935) p. IV.

Upon inquiring of the jailer how he felt in putting under lock and key his former chief, the answer was simple and direct: He was the jailer; he received certain papers in proper form; it was not for him to inquire who wrote or signed the papers. The day after the revolution he came to the prison gate as he had done for thirty years of his regular routine. This routine was his life's work, and he would carry it through in the same fashion if the present head of the government were consigned to his care. All he demanded was duly authenticated papers. Those symbols of duty were the all-important considerations for him. Yet twist and turn the symbols as one might, precious little would be gleaned from them concerning the revolutionary transformation effected during the October 1917 days.

This anecdote applies to the Arnold-thinking mode of historical analysis. The real key to history is not the symbols but the institutions which they represent. One may tease and twist these symbols with the greatest acumen and still be unable to resolve the really great problem of how the realities for which they stand came into existence, and what it is that sustains them.

To Arnold, the problems of government consist merely in the attitudes which one bears toward them. These attitudes are determined by faith and symbols, and if only they could be modified, or destroyed and replaced by other and more suitable symbols, everything would be well with the world.[307] All this sounds plausible and profound only because it is obscure. Government, to that line of thought, is a constant, continuous stream in life. Surface disturbances may create storms, just as wind rouses the sea to anger, but deeply underneath the vital social processes go on basically undisturbed. If only we could properly control the surface manifestations, the symbols of life, all disturbing elements could be controlled and government processes be directed along more rational lanes.[308]

It is suave theories like these which constitute some of the more formidable obstacles to social progress. Instead of devoting their undoubted abilities to the investigation of laws, they are content to fritter away their energy in quarrels about symbols. This is an ancient human failing. Infinitely more blood has been shed concerning the symbols of Christianity than its content, or in promoting the spirit of that mode of life which Jesus so beautifully exemplified by his own.

Symbols of government are to society what the duly authenticated document was to that Russian jailer. Neither symbols nor documents disclose the nature of the underlying social forces of which they are only particular modes of manifestation. We will grant that all government consists in the authority which it exercises over the governed based upon precepts to which the rulers themselves are frequently amenable. But this abstract conception does not tell us why a particular government is an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy. It is only under given social conditions that these particular forms of government are possible.

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[307] The Symbols of Government—Arnold, p. V.

[308] Symbols of Government—Arnold, pp. 1-2.

Arnold tells us much of their symbols; he tells us nothing of the circumstances which determine their nature. Subjective attitudes are not enough. A recognizes in B a ruler because B in A's eyes assumes the form of majesty by what Hegel calls the reflex category. But it requires much more than that for the sovereign to maintain his authority. Attitudes toward historical facts are enforced, just as is one's attitude toward the law of gravitation. Each form of law possesses its own effective and sufficient monitory processes.

ARNOLD'S SYMBOLIC CONCEPTION OF LAW

But Arnold does not recognize law as the all-controlling element in social relations. To him there exists only the law of the lawyer which can be bent and twisted and shaped to suit the fancy, or what amounts to the same thing, its symbols. "Law," he writes, "is primarily a great reservoir of emotionally important symbols. It develops, as language develops, in spite of, and not because of, the grammarians. Though the notion of a 'rule of law' may be the moral background of revolt, it ordinarily operates to induce acceptance of things as they are. . . . From a practical point of view, it is the greatest instrument of social stability because it recognizes every one of the yearnings of the underprivileged, and gives them a forum in which those yearnings can achieve official approval without involving any particular action which might joggle the existing pyramid of power." [309]

There are some yearnings of the underprivileged—that most disgusting philistine expression—which history abundantly proves can never be achieved without joggling the social pyramid, and even upon occasion, upsetting it. But like all these subjective rationalists who are incapable of studying their subject objectively and scientifically, Arnold accepts pragmatically the social pyramid as it exists without going into a discussion of the why and wherefore of it, which is the first elementary step in science. That form of intellectualization soon teaches one what to do with his symbols and his attitudes if he is to penetrate the mysteries of reality.

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[309] Symbols of Government—Arnold, pp. 34-5.

Arnold bemoans the fact that "the knowledge of the anatomy of governmental institutions has fallen behind almost every other field of thought," [310] and he makes a plea for a competent governing class gifted with the necessary techniques for social cures. The trouble with Arnold's analogy between medical and governmental practice is that it will not hold up. Your anatomist deals with the same human structure whether it be that of a slave or master, serf or lord, worker or capitalist. His prescriptions for the respective classes may vary, but not so their physiological functions. Any school book on civics will give Arnold all the anatomy of our government that he would care to memorize. In fact, Hacker has supplied us with an excellent skeletal outline of the Federal Government of which Arnold is a distinguished ornament.[311] But were Arnold to undertake to analyze scientifically, as he urges, the evolutionary development of its members, he would discover that all his attitudes and symbols would have to be thrown into the discard.

That is the characteristic trait of the pragmatist; he takes things as he finds them, and then rationalizes about them as living institutions whose operational functions yield readily to analysis, but will not so readily yield the secret of their evolution. The economist must call upon the sociologist, and the historian upon both. Above all, the philosopher must prepare him with a valid theory of knowledge if he is to escape the mirage of subjectivity and the resultant inadequate programs in which all contemporary statesmanship eventually bogs down.

Arnold starts out with the proposition that when institutions function adequately the theories which support them appear adequate. When they fail to exercise the social control expected of them, then everything connected with these institutions is brought into question, as witness the aftermath of the debacle in 1933.[312] The social scientist follows a different method. What would we say of the architect who mastered the principles of his craft by trial and error with his first dozen buildings? Prosperity as well as depression is the normal for our present economic order, and before Arnold can expect to prescribe the cures, he must know the disease; and his work is ample evidence that his intellectual armamentarium possesses knowledge of neither. Arnold arbitrarily assumes that government is based upon certain spiritual and temporal powers, concerning whose nature and character he does not trouble to inform either himself or the reader. Having made his assumptions in good old-fashioned medieval scholastic manner, he begins to rationalize about them. Our spiritual government today, he avers, centers in the judicial system, which is the repository of all the older symbols and theories both legal and economic. Therefore, it is to the courts that solid conservatives look as their final bulwark against change. This superficial pragmatism is destroyed by the simple fact that since President Roosevelt in due course of replacements for the Supreme Court as vacancies occurred, or were forced by his unremitting pressure, the conservative element in Congress has become the bulwark of the big business interests.

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[310] Ibid., p. 21.

[311] American Problems of Today—Hacker (1938), diagram between pp. 276 and 277.

[312] Ibid., p. 106.

Between the spiritual and temporal governments, Arnold argues a sub-rosa practical government develops which today we call politics.[313] And so with these purely verbal concepts which mean anything to everybody and little for himself, Arnold undertakes to explain away the problems of modern government.

From a humanitarian standpoint, says Arnold, the best government is that which we find in an insane asylum where the attending physician is precluded from classifying theories as sound or unsound.[314] With this brilliant generalization as a starting point, Arnold argues why not look on society as a vast insane asylum? This will preclude the necessity of questioning the rationality of economic and social theories. The only question will be, Does it work?

Lest the reader may think this is some form of spoofing, let Arnold speak for himself: "The advantages of such a theory for purposes of thinking about government are that we escape the troublesome assumption that the human race is rational. We need not condemn policies which contradict each other solely on the ground that the action of government must be logically consistent. We need not constantly worry about permanent cures, and discard day-to-day policies because of their effects on the morale of the irrational people we are governing in the future. We need not delay such necessary undertakings as public relief because we are worried about their effect on the character of the recipients." [315] And later, "The concept of government as an insane asylum liberates us from the notion that wise men think up principles and schemes for their duller fellows to learn and follow, and that thus social change is accomplished. It frees us from the notion that 'thinking men' decide between the relative merits of communism and capitalism, and choose the better form." [316]

God help the inmates of an insane asylum run by a staff of Arnolds who are ready to try anything once. "It is true," he concludes, "that there is little in the present conduct of the governments of the world which can by any stretch of imagination be called adult."[317] It is equally true that there is little between the covers of the Symbols of Government which can commend itself to the rational intellect of an adult. Perhaps its very inanity were the credentials required to qualify him first as a Yale professor and then as an overseer of that weird periodic concoction from Washington vicariously labeled the New Deal.

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[313] The Symbols of Government—Arnold, p. 126.

[314] Ibid., pp. 232-3.

[315] Ibid., p. 233.

[316] Ibid., p. 236.

FISHER'S BLUE-PRINTS FOR THE FUTURE SOCIETY

There are not lacking pragmatical theorists who find scientific training irksome and so are content with looking about them for ideas to be developed in their bag of tricks. Professor Fisher is one of them. He is not satisfied to be merely another of that great legion who wring their hands and utter piteous lamentations upon the cruel consequences of an economic system which harbors both hunger and surplus crops side by side. "The paradox of poverty in a world of potential plenty," he writes, "which has been used in support of the most divergent practical policies, is in part to be explained by our failure to appreciate the necessity for continuous changes of the kind described—namely the transfer of production from primary or agricultural, and secondary, or manufacturing to tertiary or service and luxury occupations. Potential plenty is the natural consequence of scientific advance; but we cannot enjoy the benefits of plenty unless we organize the productive capacity which has been released, so that it can be applied to the production of new things hitherto little known or even entirely unknown. If we refuse to do this, we are likely to find ourselves in the curious situation where not only are we deprived of the possibility of enjoying these new things, but some of us are also deprived of the possibility of enjoying except by way of charity, the goods and services which are already abundantly supplied."[318]

The good professor has all the blue-prints ready. Why go to the trouble of studying the laws of production regulating capitalist economy? One does not, if a college professor, even have to recognize the existence of any laws; a refuge, however, to which the capitalist producer soon finds it futile to resort, as his bank balance, if the sheriff does not the sooner, apprise him of the stern realities of the situation. The marvelous thing about being a professor is that the salary check comes in despite his mistakes. As for the business man, the sheriff unceremoniously enforces upon him the penalties for such errors in real life.

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[317] Ibid., p. 270.

[318] The Clash of Progress and Security—Fisher (1935), p. 33.

All society has to do, according to Fisher, is to agree upon his plan since, really, displaced labor must be put to work again,[319] don't you know. The good man might have saved himself a great deal of effort had he had the good fortune or foresight, like Professor Dewey, to read William's contrary theory of social evolution which proves that over-production, or under-consumption cannot exist.

For, argues William, "it is not the economic evolution which gives rise to the Social Evolution but it is the Social evolution which dictates the economic evolution. Social evolution in its aim to solve the problem of existence has evolved the social mode of production. The social system adapted to the social mode of production is in the process of evolution, shaping itself to the social interests of the majority. Socialism will be realized through a movement of consumers and not a movement of producers." [320]

Fisher argues production has broken down, while William has discovered a new principle, namely that social evolution has seen to it that consumption cannot break down. Both of them ought to get together on that, unless they have since been converted to Arnold's philosophy of insanity where logic and reason are unnecessary encumbrances in a society of fools whose government is operated by idiots.

MORAL PREACHMENT FOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION—RAUSHENBUSH

Stephen and Joan Raushenbush obviously do not subscribe to the theory of congenital social insanity. If society stumbles and blunders, they are human enough to admit, it is because society does not see the way out of its difficulties. Hence they have cooperated upon another of those blue-print theories where good wishes and a noble resolve are considered sufficient substitutes for the imperious demands of scientific thinking as applied to the actual processes of history.

With commendable courage in the face of certain rejection, they worked out a scheme for the future organization of society which would abolish crises, poverty and war from among the self-inflicted curses of mankind.[321] Unfortunately the world paid little heed to their final warning. Of course, as they predicted, the Second World War broke out. It is also safe to predict that cases of measles will be reported the next month. A few million others predicted the inevitability of the present conflict before their book appeared. Their successful prediction does not surround their cure for social ills with the same aura of infallibility.

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[319] Ibid., p. 133.

[320] Social Interpretation of History—William, p. 70.

[321] The Final Choice—Raushenbush (1937), pp. 282-6.

In substance they advocate that an international Control Board should be set up, the nations to be demobilized by half of their existing forces, while the Control Board was to have an armed force twice as great as that of any other nation. Colonies were to be placed under international control, enormous loans extended to the have-not nations at two per cent interest while raw materials were to be accessible to all.

It is fruitless to go down the list. No one questions their good intentions. Arnold would not even question the sanity of those proposals. He, for one, would join with the Raushenbushes to see how this thing would work out—if it could ever get started.

Such methods of social planning reflect the glaring defects of their historical methods. The scientist knows no such thing as a priori good or bad. He studies the social structures of the various epochs. He analyzes their laws of motion, and the social forces through which they operate. Then he is in the position of the social architect who can say to society: These are our materials; this is how they function. You can build with them a social palace, or you can build a social prison. The choice is up to you. But no matter what you decide upon, there are definite laws which condition the nature and character of the social structure. We can leave to the well-meaning Raushenbushes to build their castles out of air.

J. The Role of Propaganda in History

PROPAGANDA AS A FORM OF HISTORY

Propaganda in the form of history is much older than history itself. By propaganda in the modern sense is meant the conscious effort to create ideas for the purpose of winning adherents to a cause. Only those ideas are transmitted which are most likely to achieve the desired purpose. Elements which contradict or weaken the cause, which is the goal striven for, are deliberately suppressed where they cannot be colored. The end glorifies the means is a self-sufficient justification for the propagandist.

Obviously between him and the scientist there is an impassable barrier. Science itself has often been prostituted for the purposes of propaganda. It is puerile to argue which is the more important, abstract truth or the concrete goal aimed for. Science can never be an end in itself despite all the pretensions of the purists, who are generally among the first to submit in the face of a genuine crisis. Truth for truth's sake can number but few adherents in its behalf, and perhaps none among the ancient singers of a peoples' prowess.

Sagas, epics, and vedas are a form of history through which were transmitted the ideas most acceptable or agreeable to their times. Wells gives a very graphic account of the role played by the bards as a source of information about vanished times.[322] Traditions were flexible and amended or reconstructed to meet the exigencies of the time. Written history underwent this process of modification. Parson Weems who set down the prodigious feats of Washington has long since surrendered his rank as the pre-eminent historian of the Father of His Country, without in the least affecting the stature of that truly great man in the estimation of the present generation.

School books deliberately foster propaganda in history which in the judgment of the powers that be is the kind of information for the young people best calculated to foster desirable traditions; and let it be whispered in sotto voice, desirable prejudices. One of the delights of the muckraker's craft is the iconoclastic fervor which ancient tradition arouses in their breast simply because it is ancient. Naturally the cherry tree of Parson Weems suffers greater injury at their hands than it did at that of little George. They annihilate it completely both root and branch without hope of ever sprouting again even for the desirable improvement of not so innocent minds. Modern times have witnessed an excessive exacerbation of both the disease and its pretended cure, which usually takes the form of counter-propaganda.

"History has been propaganda from the very beginning," H. G. Wells declared categorically (N. Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1940). While that distinguished reporter did not care to question the validity of that conclusion as it applied to the past, he took particular pains to deny that such is the case in the present. A particularly maladroit address on the part of William Allen White, chairman of the euphemious National Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, was the cause of this too earnest disclaimer.

White, the mid-Western expert in molding public opinion upon an unfortunate occasion, boasted on how his organization began to work up public sentiment, or rather hysteria, to the point where the United States was ready to give up fifty of its "over-age" destroyers to re-inforce the British Navy. Evidently well-pleased with himself, White narrated how he got the small-fry middle class in 700 branch organizations to bloat their vanity by pumping Congress with letters and telegrams as his organization demanded, and thus working up a so-called public sentiment which acquiesced in a patently unneutral act. (N. Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1940.)

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[322] The Outline of History—Wells, pp. 242-251.

The wiser and much more circumspect editor of the Times who still remembered the expose of British propaganda which paved the way for America's entrance into the First World War, calls White sharply to task for this childish blurb of "smart tricks," and while proclaiming stoutly that they were ineffective in producing the desired result, admonishes him severely to hold his tongue, be the truth what it may. (N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1940.) There is a time and place for everything, and plainly the truth about current propaganda should not be made known until long after the American people, too, have paid their price in blood and tears and sweat.

COMMUNIST AND FASCIST PROPAGANDA AS HISTORY

Without question the most effective employment of propaganda as history during the past twenty years is represented by the Communist, Fascist and Nazi movements. The fundamental methods of approach to power of all three were the same, regardless of what differences there may exist in the ultimate goal toward which they ostensibly aim. Adolf Hitler has given to the world a most elaborate presentation of the propagandistic method in history. It is deserving of investigation not only because he has achieved enormous world power, but because of its intrinsic merits as an historical document concerning present-day affairs.

It is our opinion the "Mein Kampf" played an insignificant role in paving Hitler's path toward power. "For let it be said to all knights of the pen," Hitler wrote, "and to all the political dandies, especially today: the greatest changes in this world have never yet been brought about by a goose-quill! No, the pen has always been reserved to motivate these changes theoretically. But the power which set the greatest historical avalanches of political and religious nature sliding was, from the beginning of time, the magic force of the spoken word alone." [323]

A slight amendment is necessary to Hitler's assuredness. It may be debatable whether the greatest changes in the world have not been brought about by the pen, but it assuredly has cemented the most lasting ones. Long after Hitler will have taken his rank among the world's historic figures, the spirit of the Magna Charta and the American Declaration of Independence will have placed his bust and his book among the important, if more sombre relics, of a bygone age during which he consigned the similar records of human greatness to the brutal assault of the wrecker's hammer, or to the vengeful, consuming flame.

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[323] Mein Kampf—Hitler (1939), Reynal & Hitchcock ed., p. 136.

Mein Kampf does not explain Hitler's greatness, but it does show in some measure why a great people have temporarily surrendered their dignity and their will beneath the iron rule of one of the most remarkable, as well as the most despicable men of our times. Hitler's secret lies not so much in the cleverness of his propaganda, but in the consummate skill with which he wove oratory and propaganda into the history of his time, and at the critical moment proved himself to possess the requisite daring of the gambler for power, be the consequences what they may.

Of such stuff was Napoleon. Like him, Hitler is a throwback of history. As Napoleon eventually discovered that not all historic epochs lend themselves as pliant tools to an Alexander's will or a Caesar's ambition, so will Hitler discover, as will Mussolini with him, that the epoch which bred the single master of the world idea, despite its present flamboyant flicker, is gone never to return. Hitler depends upon oratory, but even that has its limits in time, and its boundaries in geography. The pen—or what amounts to the same thing, the ideology of his opponents—will again prove its mastery over the sword. Superior armament will win the final battle. Steel rusts, but sound ideas are imperishable, despite, or rather because of their frequent modifications to conform with the times.

HITLER'S PROPAGANDA METHODS

We are not concerned with the scientific validity of Hitler's racial theories. In full justice, neither was he. As a consummate propagandist he recognized the potency of an appeal which lifted the German people from the degradation to which the Versailles Treaty had consigned them for generations to come. Hitler pays the highest tribute, the more remarkable considering its source, to the Jewish people's instinct for self-preservation.[324] It is a characteristic, however, which is abundantly shared by other families of the human race, and not the least among the Germans.

This great people instinctively turned to their democrats who spoke the language of Wilson during the critical days following the Armistice of November, 1918. Allied vindictiveness, they inwardly felt, could scarcely wreak its vengeance upon a defeated Germany now represented by spokesmen of a republic. After these men had obtained terms which, oppressive as they were, still left Germany essentially intact and united, it was easy for Hitler and others to work for the renunciation of the Versailles dictature.

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[324] Mein Kampf—Hitler, p. 412.

During the 1920's Germany got its breathing spells through the Dawes and Young Plans which served to loosen the noose and fill out the victims' emaciated body with additional loans advanced by the victors in order to be able the better to pluck the vanquished without killing him. When Germany had recovered somewhat its economic strength and the erstwhile victors were losing theirs, the day for vengeance was nearing as well as the day for national rehabilitation. That was the "miracle" of Hitler's simple political formula which everybody understood and which no one could refute. So much for the instinct of self-preservation of the German people.

As for Hitler's demagogic instinct, the election of November 7th, 1932, had shown the Nazi wave was receding from the crest it had attained at the preceding election in July of the same year, when its popular vote declined by the alarming extent of more than two million supporters.[325] Then began the maneuvers whereby the big industrialists made him Chancellor, followed by the catastrophic Reichstag fire.

From 1933 to 1939 Hitler led a very willing German people to the expansion of its national power, first under the disarming claim—as far as danger of united Allied intervention was concerned—of racial unification, and then for strategic frontiers to bind up Germany's "bleeding wounds," as at Munich in the fateful September 1938 agreement.

Hitler, despite all his claims to the contrary, is compelled to carry on the old imperialist policy dictated by German capitalist economy which is: Export or Die. If left to his own devices, perhaps Hitler would be content to establish some form of National Socialism. But he has learned that National Socialism is as impossible in one country as Russia has found National Bolshevism impossible for itself. We live in an inter-dependent world where the weakness of the one is the condition for augmenting the strength of the other. The English, French and American economic systems would soon crush a National Socialist economy in Germany as it hampered the development of a revolutionary Socialist economy in Russia after earlier military intervention had failed.

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[325] Mein Kampf—Hitler, p. 570.

Power is the only law recognized in the world today. A complex of circumstances into which we cannot now enter rendered unified action by England and France against Germany impossible during the formative days of the Hitler regime, until the fateful die was cast which settled once and for all the true direction of the Nazi policy. The dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia resolved all doubts, while the invasion of Poland raised the curtain for the Second World War.

Hitler stated his program fully: German hegemony in Europe; a power not founded on distant colonies subject to severance by a sea-power—Great Britain—but based on control of contiguous territory in Europe itself. With unerring instinct, Hitler repeated the thoughts of every German capable of thinking: "The French goal is: the dissolution of Germany into a hodge-podge of little states." [326] When it comes to the struggle for racial self-preservation—highly developed as Hitler concedes it to be with the Jewish people—the German people, who so justly aspire to pre-eminence in all other fields, do not have to yield the palm to any other in this most vital respect.

HITLER'S EXPOSITION OF THE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE

Hitler stands before the world as the chief exponent of the leadership principle in contemporary times. His argument runs that the first step which visibly distinguished man from the animal was that toward invention.[327] All inventions are the result of the creative ability of some person. The creative ability must be placed over the organization of the community, putting the heads above the masses and subjecting the masses to the heads. These heads are selected by the hard struggle for life. The principle of the value of leadership must be guided by its contribution to the welfare of the majority. "World history is made by minorities wherever this numerical minority incorporates the majority of will and determination." [328] The Fuehrer is responsible for the entire leadership of the movement, and, if in power, of the nation.

The real difficulty with this leadership principle consists not in his selection, but in his accountability for policies, and his answerability for mistakes. The lack of controls and correctives is the fatal defect of dictatorships. Every ruler in time feels himself endowed first with omniscience, then with prescience, and finally with infallibility. The latter quality must be asserted even in the face of the gravest mistakes. In fact, no mistakes dare be admitted; only by their consequences will his fate, his personal fate, be decided.

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[326] Mein Kampf—Hitler, p. 975.

[327] Ibid., pp. 662-6.

[328] Mein Kampf—Hitler, p. 603.

By good fortune the dictator may survive disaster, though many of his subjects perish, and countless others be subjected to unnecessary privation as the direct consequence of his deficient judgment. The defect of democracies consists in hesitancy about determination of policies; the defect of dictatorship consists in inability to correct the disastrous ones. A democracy resorts to the muddling through process of politics. Its broad power base insulates it against disaster after defeat. The dictatorship can know only victory or ruin.

Inevitably history catches up with the individual, and Hitler, sooner or later, must learn the great lesson of the human record, that social forces are amenable in the last resort only to social control. This fundamental law applies to the great leader in industry, to the great leader in religion, and to the great leader in politics.

While Hitler was riding the crest, forces within German society deposited him into the seat of power. This has happened often before. Napoleon did not make the French Revolution, though he was for a long time from the superficial view, its principal beneficiary. Once firmly seated, Hitler had to consolidate his position. Hitler led the way, but subterranean forces pushed him on ahead. There came a point of decision. A democracy is not ashamed to halt, even to retreat; a dictator cannot. At least, Hitler could not.

On September, 1939, he was confronted with the situation he faced in November, 1932. Another Reichstag fire was necessary, this time lit by the incendiary bombs of airplanes. The tide was beginning to turn. Poland resisted, with assurance of British and French support, if not immediately, surely in the ultimate settlement. Hitler will be defeated not because his cause is wrong—moral considerations do not enter into a scientific history—but because his resources will prove to be insufficient in a long-drawn-out combat into which American strength will be pitted before long.

Democracies have their limitations, but they also have their strong points, too. Among them is that universal quality of animal courage of which no race possesses a monopoly, plus the material resources in which Germany is lacking. Dictatorships must stake their fight for power by appeal to the emotions; democracies in the final analysis must appeal to reason. Nothing deflates the emotions so quickly as frustration or defeat. Here again the differences are only of degree, not in principle.

Hitler gives us an insight into his political methods by the comparison he draws between the leaders of the respective sides during the First World War, Lloyd George and Bethmann-Hollweg. The German intelligentsia, he tells us, scrutinized, as with a magnifying glass the speeches of the English leader, and came unanimously to the conclusion that they lacked coherence, were deficient in logic, hackneyed in expression, and even wrong in history as in grammatical construction. Bethmann-Hollweg's possessed all the virtues that his great antagonist lacked.

One day, Hitler tells us, he obtained a copy of the little Welshman's speeches. "I had to laugh loudly at the fact that a normal German knight of the pen had no understanding for these psychological masterpieces of influencing the soul of the masses." [329] There is one thing Hitler and the average German who has no understanding of democratic traditions slowly built up over the centuries cannot grasp, and that is if Lloyd George had possessed the eloquence of a dozen Hitlers but had misused the power entrusted to him even during the fever of war, the British Commons would have turned him out of office.

This is not to belittle the power of a magnetic personality or the living, burning images created by a fiery tongue. But by no stretch of the imagination can we conceive Lloyd George getting up in the House of Commons during peace times, as Hitler did in the Reichstag in 1933, and asking for, let alone getting, a grant of absolute uncontrolled power for four years! The very walls which house the Mother of Parliaments would have shrieked out their protest.

Every demagogue appreciates the subtle power of the spoken word, but words have definite limits in genuine democracies. This is no panegyric upon the democratic system. History has shown that any one from idiots to infants, can rule but few can govern. Gibbon tells us that Sapor ruled the empire of the East even before he was born, while still in his mother's womb.[330] Germany is now paying the penalty of arrested political development which followed the disastrous Thirty Years' War three hundred years ago. She possesses no democratic traditions and had republican institutions thrust upon her as the consequence of the First World War, which she wore like an ill-fitting garment until Hitler's advent to power.

THE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE IS REGRESSIVE TODAY

Democracy, as we have since learned, is not a form of government which can be imposed, but must be developed. The history of the United States shows how gradual is the process of its growth. We can all the more appreciate Germany's predicament when republican processes were adopted in one fell swoop at Weimar. Among the most modern mechanisms was proportional representation which they developed to absurd limits.[331] A host of small parties were encouraged and flourished with a vengeance.

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[329] Mein Kampf—Hitler, p. 712.

[330] The Decline of the Roman Empire—Gibbon, Vol. I (Mod. Lib. ed.), pp. 580-1.

To make the bedevilment worse, the Social Democratic Party was torn by internal strife, which reacted upon the confusion existing among the trade unions which that party dominated. The masses were disheartened by the conflicting policies of mediocre personalities thus suddenly thrust upon the political stage. This, combined with other demoralizing factors paved the path for a movement where the leaders did all the thinking, or rather one for all the rest. Hitler openly avowed that the famed German educational institutions were over-stuffing youthful brains, and that ninety-five per cent of what they taught was useless anyway.[332] Under the leadership principle thinking itself became the special function of the few, if not the exclusive privilege of the One; the people are born to obey.

This principle claims to be new; in reality it is older than history itself. Force, actual or potential, determines the actions of the mass who are regimented to approve that which is demanded. Only under such a regime will ninety-nine per cent of the eligible voters render a ninety-nine per cent verdict as directed. Dismissing all the trappings of democratic processes which are an idiotic concession to world opinion, we see in such a state merely the twentieth century recrudescence of ancient despotisms. Our chief concern with this theory of history and mode of social organization is to show why it must lead inevitably to stagnation and eventual regression. The monolithic state paves the road to social petrification.

This is not to minimize the potentialities inherent in the leadership principle. In times of crisis where opinions are many and programs are conflicting or hesitant, the easiest way out is to have a strong man take over. Indecision is often more fatal than inaction. Democracies are not immune from that chronic defect inherent in the social organization. Only democracies have learned through the centuries how to curb the strong man who invariably grows ambitious with the exercise of power.

Oliver Cromwell, the Republican, became Oliver Cromwell, the Protector, and would fain become Oliver the King. Such indeed he was in fact, and more. To his son, Richard, he bequeathed the vestments of his power. But rarely does a great son follow a great father. "His humanity," wrote Macaulay about the son, "his ingenuousness and modesty, the mediocrity of his abilities and the docility with which he submitted to the guidance of persons wiser than himself, admirably qualified him to be the head of a limited monarchy." [333] A moron of the royal lineage can make a splendid king. But not so an upstart. In a few brief months the son had lost the prize for which a great father had labored many years to make secure, and many more years to make hereditary to his blood.

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[331] Mein Kampf—Hitler, pp. 566-7; note by editors.

[332] Ibid. p. 626.

Italy, Germany, and Russia have no such democratic traditions as the English people have built up during the centuries. But neither have their despotic rulers learned how to circumvent the biological principles which defeated the designs of the Great Cromwell. Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin may select their successors, but they cannot, by sheer will, transmit or confer upon another their genius. The English people, despite the temporary reaction which followed the accession of James II after Richard Cromwell had passed from the scene, had developed the art of biding their time but acting resolutely when the auspicious moment arrived. The upshot of all Cromwell's painful labors was the Great Revolution of 1688 which dethroned James and gave to the world the immortal Bill of Rights.

LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

This is not an attempt to forecast the future of the European despotisms. The present World War will lend seven league boots to the processes of history. All that we desire to do is to emphasize the principle that a nation must stagnate once the difference of social potential within its social structure is suppressed. Internal movement is the essence of social development, and possibilities for variation is the essence of progress. Later we will discuss the theory of progress in history. But even by the standards of progress set by the dictatorships themselves, which is based upon the organization of effective force, the democracies will be enabled to demonstrate their superiority through the mobilization of both superior material and moral resources.

One is the reflex of the other. The only real force which holds the dictatorships together is the threat to their national existence. Let that danger be removed from the minds of their people and one of the props for the existence of the dictators disappears. The dominant capitalist regimes within the great democracies will never succeed in convincing those peoples even if a score of oratorical Hitlers combined their art of persuasion.

For deep within the consciousness of even the dullest is the recognition that the governments of France and England as now constituted, will do unto Germany and her allies, what Germany would do unto her antagonists should she emerge victorious. Therefore, the struggle will go on to a decisive issue, and the devil—that holds for either side—will become repentent when the devil will be very, very sick. But as between the two antagonists, only the victory of the democracies holds out the prospect for an immediate social advance. Otherwise the pall of reaction will settle over the human race whose consequences are unforeseeable only because the processes of history will have been thrown in reverse after a continuous movement forward, despite occasional reactions, after over four hundred years.

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[333] History of England—Macaulay, Vol I, p. 154.

That the present Allied rulers cannot be the instruments of social progress is plainly evident by their course during the initial stages of the present war. Everybody now recognizes the futility of their propaganda with the object of undermining the morale of the German people. For, despite all the Allied protestations to the contrary, the German people know that the only power that stands between them and the vassalage to which they would be subjected by a victorious and capitalist-dominated France and England, is that of the will of their Fuehrer and the resources which he is able to command. No more conclusive evidence of the ineptness of the Allied rulers and the marked insufficiency of the Allied program can be asked than the propaganda which they endeavored to palm off as history through the mouth of their current ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian.

CURRENT BRITISH PROPAGANDA AS HISTORY

This worthy product of British diplomacy had mastered the technique of his trade. He condemns with engaging disingenuousness the wiles of the propagandist who engages "to influence your countrymen, or other nations, to a particular course of action, by lies or half-truths or tendentious innuendoes." [334] But he, being a plain, blunt-spoken Briton does not possess, even were he minded to employ, the nimble dialectics of the facile tongue. As to the origin of the war, he does not propose to spend much time on that. Everybody has read the negotiations of the fateful weeks preceding the invasion of Poland. Those negotiations began as a perfect blank, which Hitler wantonly covered with blood.

It seems clear that Germany is resolved upon conquest and domination over poor, innocent, peace-loving nations. One has but to read "Mein Kampf" for proofs. Lothian admits the victors blundered at Versailles and after. "I often wish," he says with the typical guilelessness of a British diplomat, "that three French and three British historians would publish a joint statement of the true facts during the post-war era. I think it would astonish a lot of people. But there is not the slightest doubt that having won the greatest victory for freedom and democracy in 1918, of which history has record, the Allied powers threw away their chance, both by faults of omission and commission."

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[334] This speech appeared in full in the New York Times, Jan. 5, 1940.

Having duly made this open confession of incapacity for the British ruling class which he represents, he feels morally justified to seek and obtain both full absolution and a blank check for his class to repeat these blunders at a peace conference following the second holocaust which bids fair, before it is stamped out, to surpass the horrible tragedies of the first.

No attempt is made by Lord Lothian to analyze these blunders of omission and commission, but students of history have performed that painful duty for him. In the light of those results Lord Lothian and his class stand condemned as the most colossal congenital incompetents who ever bungled an historic opportunity not so much out of sheer viciousness as out of sheer ignorance. This recent speech demonstrates conclusively that they have learned nothing since, and that they are incapable of aught else but the repetition of the Versailles blunders should the Allied peoples still remain content to repose in their hands the fate of the world.

Upon the occasion of Lord Lothian's untimely death while serving his class as British Ambassador to Washington, the obituaries and editorial comment in the American press emphasized most strikingly to what extent propaganda enters into the formation of public opinion in a modern democracy. The New York Times (Dec. 13, 1940) calls him a martyr to his country who died in harness while serving its interests. "Whenever Washington was nervous, or whenever prospects abroad looked black, Lord Lothian was imperturbable; yet no man saw more clearly or felt more keenly the deadliness of the struggle in which his country was engaged."

The New York Post whose social outlook reflected the enlightened viewpoint of its publisher, George L. Backer, gave us a little more details upon this imperturbable British aristocratic phlegm. In 1935, he visited Berlin and became an enthusiastic admirer of Hitler whose regime he hailed as a "buffer between England and Marxist Russia." He was one of Lady Astor's distinguished members of the Cliveden set who helped shape Chamberlain's course to the disaster which befell the English people. It is needless to say that they were distinguished chiefly by their intellectual impermeability. This does not prevent the able journalist, Arthur Krock, from heaping encomiums upon Lord Lothian as an Ambassador of rare and highly appreciated qualifications. Bless his heart, weeps Krock, he could even memorize an "Americanism" to delight the simple souls of the newspaper fraternity.

Lord Lothian in his plea for American support for the British Empire at the outbreak of hostilities casts a nostalgic glance back to the Victorian era of England's greatness when her navy ruled the seas and the Monroe Doctrine was sustained against the world only by her acquiescence. "What were the foundations of this wonderful century? There were four. First, all the main currencies were based on gold, and therefore, interchangeable on a stable basis. Second, the British Empire and a good deal of the rest of the world was free trade or low tariff, so that capital and goods could flow freely everywhere. Third, the New World, especially the United States, was still an open field for immigration, so that the population pressures of the Old World, then at their worst because of the high birth rate, could find relief. Fourth, and most important of all, there was a rudimentary police power in the world, the control of the sea by Great Britain and the United States, which made world war—though not local war—impossible, until some other nation was strong enough to challenge their power on the seas."

Characteristically it is the last proposition which commends itself most to the comprehension of the British diplomat. The transparent gesture to the power of the 19th century American navy we will let pass. No one can seriously contend that Germany today threatens England's sea power. That is precisely the field of warfare where the Allies have been conceded and continue to maintain, unquestioned supremacy. If England fights it is not to retain her abstract naval supremacy, but her empire which Germany now threatens in many directions.

Imperialism is the prime condition for the existence of a virile modern capitalist economy. Naval and military supremacy are only the means for effecting that end. England could emerge from this war in undisputed possession of her control of the seas and still have lost the richest parts of her imperial domains in Asia and Africa. This would mark the eclipse of Great Britain. She knows it, and Lord Lothian admits it. But none of them is willing to concede the real causes of the war, though the various blue, white and yellow books may give the official government side as to its origin.

The real reason, perhaps, is beyond their understanding. This is evidenced by Lothian's own analysis where the first three conditions of England's former undisputed supremacy were economic in their nature and therefore, did not commend themselves to diplomatic understanding. The fourth condition, namely, power politics he grasps at with avidity, because there he is at home.

When it comes to the problems of the peace, Lord Lothian exhibits the same lamentable ignorance about social forces which his predecessors at Versailles made manifest in their conclusions. The only history he understands is that recorded in the almanacs. Were the class he represented permitted to dabble once again with the world's entrails about the peace table, they could do no better than repeat that famous surgical operation and give occasion for some future Lord Lothian to admit once more with such engaging and disarming frankness that the job was bungled again and must be done over by the very elements who did the other bungling jobs so magnificently.

ANALYSIS OF LORD LOTHIAN'S DIPLOMATIC VERSION OF RECENT WORLD HISTORY

Our present prospective surgeon told us how he would go about his task. He makes the appropriate diplomatic genuflexion before the principle of a federal world system. There is no harm in that. Diplomats agree to most anything in principle. They do their best infantile stuff when it comes to working out the details.

Some of us have not yet gotten over the shock of that November day in 1921 when Secretary of State Hughes proposed naval limitations upon the great powers assembled in Washington, and all with breath-taking unanimity accepted his proposals in principle.[335] We have had ample opportunity to learn since what diplomats mean when they accept anything in principle. Lord Lothian did us the great good service of telling in advance just what he means by the federal world system. It is simply another League of Nations with some amendments, and none of them vital. The essence of a real world system is the willingness of a nation to surrender its policy-enforcing agency on the international field, which is its effective armed forces, to a central authority.

That is the crux of the situation. No amount of palaver can cover up or soften down that prime consideration. The day when Great Britain, for one, is ready to surrender its effective armed forces to a central world organization, that day will mark the greatest event in human annals since the advent of writing. Britain, of course, will not stand alone. The offer will have to be made by all the other important powers without any strings attached. And that proposal will never be made by Lord Lothian and his class.

[335] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. II, p. 689.

They cannot speak about it with sincerity because they know, even if they don't understand why, the national system for which they stand is the basis of their capitalist economy. That economy has long since outgrown its national boundaries and must have the world around which to roam. The same holds true for the national economies of its great competitor nations. In this great imperialistic struggle force alone is the decisive element. Politics and diplomacy merely prepare the ground for the most favorable outcome of that ultimate decision.

Lord Lothian understood that much, and he said so in the following significant passage of his address: "So long as we have a navy which could hold these positions no European power, except a few casual raiders and submarines, could get into the Atlantic at all and so leave to you the sole responsibility for defending the Monroe system. Those were the four foundations of the Victorian Age. Personally I believe that in some new form they will have to be restored, if the rest of the century is to be without another world war. They were challenged by Imperial Germany at the beginning of this century. They are being challenged by Hitler again today." Then follow some platitudes about the world changes which make the restoration of the nineteenth century impossible.

But he does not say a single word about Great Britain surrendering the essence of its present power in order to make the new twentieth century system possible. For him there is only one choice for the world. Some nation must have the power. It may act in cooperation with other nations, but national power politics must decide the issue. There will be no voluntary surrender of ancient shibboleths by Lord Lothian and the historical forces for which he spoke.

He concluded: "The nineteenth-century system, of course, was by no means perfect. But can any fair-minded person doubt that, on the whole, it promoted freedom, prosperity and peace better than any system which preceded it in modern times? And can any fair-minded person doubt that if Herr Hitler and his friends were to win the war and seize its sea power and sea bases from Britain that the world would get any equivalent prosperity or freedom? It might get peace, but it would be a peace with the light of liberty gone out. That is the real answer to the charge that this is a mere war between imperialisms." And so at the end of his address Lord Lothian comes back to the same principles of politics which motivated the arbiters of the world at Versailles in 1919.

He admitted they blundered only because he could not deny the facts. So the same social and economic classes which now dominate the destinies of Britain sent him to the United States to help drum up favorable sentiment for the Allied cause so that the inheritors of Versailles could repeat the blunders which led inexorably to the present tragedy.

They audaciously take for granted their continuance in power despite the horrible trials which still await their peoples and the world before Germany will again be compelled to yield. Neville Chamberlain is even more mediocre than Lloyd George who overtopped his associates at that momentous conference. His successor, Churchill is the apotheosis of British tenacity, in which virtue he represents the best traditions of his people, but his world outlook is typical of modern British imperialism, and in that he represents the worst traditions of his class.

As to what awaits a helpless world left to their ministrations can now be seen, not only by the limited understanding of historic processes exhibited by Lord Lothian, but by the fact that the New York Times editorially hailed that address as an outstanding pronouncement of a new world policy. But that great newspaper has never been particularly brilliant in its grasp of international affairs despite its commendable efforts to supply a continuous stream of international piffle gleaned from grills and bars in every important world center.

BOURGEOIS GERMAN OUTLOOK ON WORLD HISTORY

Ernst Wilhelm Meyer, former Counselor to the German Embassy in the United States before the advent of Hitler, also had his say on what the future world constitution should be like. His program calls for (a) self-determination, (b) establishment of international law with an effective instrumentality for enforcing decisions, (c) consolidation of some major colonies in an international pool, and (d) establishment of the United States of Europe.[336]

Did these proposals not originate from such an eminent source, they would be dismissed as the product of some prize-winning high school contest on a program for perpetuating world peace. Nowhere in his article does he discuss the prime conditions which would have to be met before such a world reorganization could be possible. President Roosevelt has often experienced the torments of the hornets' nests he stirred up with his minor reforms to our social and economic order. These are but petty annoyances compared to what can be expected at a world conference where the practical details for the surrender of national sovereignty and the remaking of the economic system will have to be undertaken.

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[336] New York Times, Dec. 31, 1939.

We hope Mr. Meyer a very long life, but if his mortal span were twice that length, it would not be sufficient in which to thresh out the first clause of the first article dealing with the surrender of national sovereignty if the Lord Lothians congregate around that peace table. Good intentions are not a sufficient substitute for the knowledge of social forces and their influence in shaping history. The destiny of mankind must be taken out of the hands of these incomparable bunglers who parade as the master minds of contemporary society.

K. American Marxists Look at Our History

THE MARXIAN SCHOOL OF AMERICAN WRITERS

There exists among us a small, inarticulate—and when they are heard, generally incoherent and contradictory—group of commentators on the contemporary American scene who constitute collectively the Marxian school. Of them, Beard writes in his most recent work: "After the downfall of Trotsky in Russia, the school of Marxian commentators was splintered in America and the adepts devoted more energy, if possible to the denunciation of one another than to the application of their scheme of thought to the American scene. No Kautsky, Lenin or Bukharin arose in the United States to a place of intellectual mastery, and directed the swirl of petty controversy to any objectives of significance in either theory or practice." [337]

This judgment, is amply justified by the facts. The reading of current disputes among these theoreticians proves that petty priests have usurped the role of great prophets and that theological disputation has displaced the living doctrine. Marx is apotheosized while Marxism is neglected, and the true faith is submerged beneath a mess of devious phraseological constructions that would put to shame the ingenious disputations amongst the astutest intellects of the medieval church.

BOUDIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MARXIAN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

On a different plane among them, or rather above them, stands the work of Boudin. His recent work on the constitutional history of the United States is a tribute to his learning, his scholarship, and, above all, to his love for legal disputation. He revels in it and thrives upon

[337] America In Midpassage—Beard, p. 881.

it, with the result that frequently the Marxian scholar is overshadowed by the lawyer anxious to win his case. Of course, the work is primarily a discussion of the development of the principles of constitutional interpretation as evidenced by cases actually decided by the Supreme Court. He is limited by the processes of judicial procedure and the rituals of constitutional practice. Nor does he attempt to interject Marxism surreptitiously into his discussion. In this work Boudin frankly is the lawyer first and foremost, while his philosophical ideas are kept strictly in the background.

Only rarely does he allow himself the privilege of stating his political convictions, and then only through the mouths of others in the course of a legal dissertation. So does the opinion of Professor Kales serve as his medium for subscribing to the Marxian principle of the class struggle,[338] and the opinion of Justice Van Orsdel in the Adkins case involving the minimum wage act served as the vehicle for expressing his belief in the class nature of the state.[339] Throughout his work he is justly scornful of those miscellaneous liberals and radicals who would change the form of our governmental structure without understanding its processes, and who seek to modify American opinion without going to the infinite trouble of finding out the exact nature of the ideological forms to which their culture is attuned.[340]

During the course of this series on American History we will have occasion to go rather fully into the unfolding of our constitutional processes, at which time Boudin's work will be considered, together with that of other great commentators on American legal history. At this point, however, we cannot let pass the occasion for expressing the opinion that what is undoubtedly the law's great gain, has been a commensurate loss for the broader social sciences.

Boudin originally was cast for the American prototype of the German Marxist, Kautsky. His unsuccessful struggle with Hillquit for the leadership of the Socialist Party during its early days compelled him to fall back upon the practice of law. In 1907, he published the "Theoretical System of Karl Marx," which, while a small work, and controversial in nature, gave every indication of a keen and penetrating intellect. Subsequent developments compelled Boudin to confine himself to the practice of labor law where he easily established himself as an outstanding leader. His "Government by Judiciary" shows internal evidence of having been begun during President Taft's incumbency[341] while its date of publication is 1932; in itself a grim commentary on the exacting nature of his law practice, and evidence of sidetracking of a rare intellect in a field where a dozen other inferior minds could have done just as well.

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[338] Government by Judiciary—Boudin, Vol. II, pp. 522-3; also by interjection on his own account on pp. 84, 222, 229, 391, 395 and 432 in Vol. I; and pp. 95, 518, 524, 529 and 551 in Vol. II.

[339] Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 550-1.

[340] Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 447, 449, 451.

COREY'S ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Next to Boudin, Corey in his "The Decline of American Capitalism" proves his rank among the most brilliant of the Marxian interpreters of the American scene. It is easy for another Marxist to pick flaws in that work, but that would be based merely on questions of interpretation of particular passages from the radicals' Bible—Marx's Capital—a bible, by the way, which suffers like all others in being the most widely referred to and the least read among contemporary scholars.

Corey's scholarship is beyond dispute, and his analysis of present-day American capitalist economy challenges refutation by the more conservative workers in that field who find it convenient to ignore this masterful contribution to the discussion of current economic problems from the Marxian viewpoint. With that specialized field we are not now concerned.

Of more immediate importance is the question raised by Beard why it is that after fifty years of active organizational existence in the United States of both the Socialist and Communist parties, neither of them has produced, outside of the limited works of Boudin and Corey, a generalized presentation of the Marxian theories in the field of American history. None of them could benefit by the recipes such as are pleasantly developed by Professor Fling in the choice of a subject.[342] The entire range of American history is virgin soil for the Marxian scholar and the husbandmen have not yet appeared. The non-Marxian critics of Marxism are equally distinguished by not having taken the trouble to study in detail the original source, and that weird concoction of economic determinism which has so long been solemnly paraded as Marxism before us, must make that giant in the Valhalla of genius writhe in impotent rage; on earth he could well enough have taken care of these epigoni.

The only explanation for this dearth of working class scholarship which appears to be both factually and historically correct is that the radical movement had never developed the faculty of supporting its intellectuals so that they could devote themselves exclusively to their task. As for the professoriate, there were no chairs to be obtained by proficiency in that branch of social science, except for the dilettanti, who could never be expected to pay the price of at least ten years single-minded devotion necessary by a mature intellect to the intricacies of Marxism if they were ever to grasp the full significance of Marx's teachings. Since these two types of intellectuals, the radical thinkers and professional teachers, were debarred by the necessities of their situation from the full pursuit of their inclinations, Marxism was bound to fall into the hands of dogmatists, radical apologists, faddists, crack-pots and downright charlatans.

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[341] Government by Judiciary—Boudin, Vol. II, p. 95.

[342] The Writing of History—Fling, pp. 36-7.

BIMBA'S COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IN THE GUISE OF AMERICAN HISTORY

Foremost among the latter category is the official history of the United States sponsored by the Communist Party and written by Anthony Bimba. It was originally published in 1927 when the "party line" was revolutionary—whatever that means. It achieved its fifth printing in 1937. This issue contained the same matter as the original, outside of a few minor changes and the addition of some pages for the intervening years.

The work rejects with a grandiloquent gesture the claim to being "impartial." It openly takes the side of the working class against the bourgeoisie. There certainly is no objection to that. But facts are facts in any language, and before one can dare to undertake their interpretation, one at least should know what they are. Being a radical does not absolve one from the obligations of scholarship. Radicals could ask for no better prototype than the man Marx whom they so ostentatiously worship, and who spent the better part of thirty years in the British Museum collecting the facts for his monumental contribution to the analysis of capitalist economy.

Ordinarily simple errors in writing are pardonable, even unavoidable, when considering the enormous range of history, especially with the limitations surrounding scholarship in working class movements. But when four errors of fact dealing with a vital problem of our government occur in a single paragraph, while each one of these alleged facts forms the basis of a continuous argument, then one is entitled to ask for pause. Honest radicals must seriously evaluate the consequences of slurring of facts for temporary victories, conscious that in the end no cause can succeed where the exigencies of the moment are allowed to prevail over the deep-running currents of life which ultimately determine the final form of history.

ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST HISTORICAL METHODS

In the paragraph referred to, the following statement of facts concerning the Constitutonal Convention are made: first, that the sessions were held behind closed doors in order to put something over on the masses; second, that this was done at the behest of the commercial and industrial classes and for the protection of their private interests as against the national welfare; third, that the Supreme Court consisting of nine lawyers usurped the right to declare laws unconstitutional; and fourth, that Chief Justice Marshall was mainly responsible for this.[343]

By far the most serious defect lies in the appraisal of the American Revolution and the nature of the government it was instrumental in bringing forth. Marx himself was more generous in his judgment of that great event. To him the American war of independence sounded the tocsin for the European middle class, and thereby gave a tremendous forward impetus to world history.[344] Later, it will be amply proven that the great American working class of the eighteenth century for whom Bimba sheds his synthetic twentieth century tears was practically non-existent at the time when the Constitutional Convention met; that more than ninety per cent of the population was agricultural; that mechanical industry had not yet developed, and that therefore, the industrial proletariat as we now know it, had not yet come into being.

Bimba, the Communist Party's official historian is guilty of two unpardonable errors in elementary Marxism—first, he looks at an eighteenth century event through twentieth century glasses; and second, he creates out of his imagination the relations of a capitalist-worker class struggle when the material basis of production could not have brought those classes into struggle for state power, since both constituted an infinitesimal segment of the social classes within the given social structure. Therefore, his conclusion that the reason for the closed sessions of the Constitutional Convention could not have been the fear of facing working class opposition to the results of their endeavors.

The scientific instinct, the kind of instinct which impelled Marx to his painstaking labors, should have led Bimba to the consideration of the social background surrounding the Constitutional Convention instead of resorting to a subjective rationalization. He would have discovered that secret sessions for representative bodies was traditional and customary in those days; that the impelling motives were the relative freedom of frank interchanges of opinion and the consequent hastening of their conclusions to a fruitful result.

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[343] History of the American Working Class—Bimba (1937), p. 58.

[344] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, p. 14.

It is true, that if one is looking for pretexts to support an erroneous opinion he could fall back upon the respectable authority of Beard to support his secret session thesis. But since when have official Communists of the Latter-Day Saints breed bent the knee before respectable authority unless it be in the person of Stalin?

Beard states, after referring to the uprising led by Shays: "Under these circumstances, the supporters of the Constitution had to be somewhat circumspect in the expression of their views; but happily for science, the proceedings at Philadelphia during the drafting of the Constitution were secret and they were able to discuss with utmost frankness the actual politico-economic results which they desired to reach." [345]

This left-handed stab at secret sessions is effectively answered by Schouler: "But Madison, forecasting the historical consequences of this momentous assemblage, undertook to report, though not verbatim, its entire proceedings; and being accurate and methodical, a notably impartial writer, and used to epitomizing, he was tacitly recognized as the official chronicler of the occasion; his fellow speakers commonly revising his brief of their speeches. His ample notes, withheld from publication while it was proper, bear abundant marks of fairness as well as authority." [346]

We who are accustomed to bulky Congressional Records, to elaborate press reports, to daily columns by trained commentators, and in some cases to the microphone being shoved in front of the speaker's lips, may look askance at the methods pursued in Madison's time. But let us not commit the anachronism of conjuring up a breathless public anxiously awaiting news from Philadelphia while scheming tricksters deliberately deny them access to essential information. One must consider the state of the then existing society; the insufficiency of communication, the hazards of travel, the embryonic nature of the press. People actually made their wills, then, when crossing from New Jersey to Manhattan, and McMaster gives a delightful description of the adventurous character of a trip across the East River from Manhattan to Brooklyn.[347]

Even as late as 1813 fierce debates were held on the floor of the House of Representatives against giving access to reporters during its deliberations. Such a sterling democrat as Speaker Clay was opposed to this new-fangled freedom of the press, while "Calhoun reprobated in strong terms, the admission of reporters to the floor, where they might overhear and spread abroad the conversation of members." [348] A Marxist would not have to be reminded that democracy as we know it today did not spring forth like some gallant knight fully armed and accoutred the first day of its borning.

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[345] An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the U. S.—Beard, p. 190.

[346] History of the United States—Schouler, Vol. I, p. 40.

[347] History of the People of the United States—McMaster, Vol. I, p. 47.

It must be obvious, therefore, that Bimba is trying to make a case, not to establish a fact; that he has a cause to advance, not a truth to propound; that his type of history must be propagandistic and not scientific; and that deep within the inner recesses of the radical consciousness there lurks the fear that they could not uphold their doctrines before the calm scrutiny of enlightened judgment.

In view of this, we can dismiss with contempt such a cheap and palpable error in simple historical fact as that the Supreme Court at first consisted of nine members when in fact it started with six, it not having attained the present number of judges permanently until the act of 1869; [349] Chief Justice Marshall did not assume office, as asserted, when the constitution went into effect in 1789, but was the third occupant of that position, assuming his rank in 1801.[350]

Ordinarily these slight errors are overlooked, but they cannot be excused in a fifth printing over a lapse of ten years. Let these self-proclaimed scientific students of society take a leaf from Engels who had Marx's daughter check up on every single quotation in Capital to make sure it was correct.[351] One could go through the entire book by Bimba and point out similar travesties on fact and interpretation as countenanced by the official Communist hierarchy, but the reader may well be spared them now.

Sidney Hook and Louis M. Hacker are both historians of the Marxian persuasion, perhaps of conviction. Both are obviously shackled by their connections with our institutions of higher learning. Hook's work "Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx" shows every evidence of being made to order to qualify for a Ph. D. As far as his understanding of Marxism is concerned, he would have been better advised to have given up studying that subject in Berlin, Munich and Moscow, as his publisher states, and have employed that time and energy sitting on his haunches right here in New York with his nose buried in Das Kapital.

In the eighteenth century there might have been some reason for such gallivanting around the European seats of wisdom, but that is somewhat antiquated in this day of easy and universal intellectual exchange. But then, the demands of university trustees cannot be lightly treated by the hopeful aspirant for a professorship.

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[348] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. VI, p. 414.

[349] The Supreme Court of the United States—Hughes (1936), p. 42.

[350] Government by Judiciary—Boudin, Vol. I, pp. 196-7.

[351] Capital—Marx, Vol. I, p. 27; Preface by Engels.

Hacker's work is on American history directly, with all the curbs of a text-book writer and a university chair holder. His ideas will be considered from time to time purely on the basis of his contributions in that field at their proper place in our inquiry.

CHAPTER VI

The Problem of Progress In History

PROSPECT OF SOCIETY AT THE DAWN OF THE 20TH CENTURY

From the middle of the eighteenth century until comparatively recent times, the dominant concept in political thought was the theory of the progressive advancement of the human race to ever higher levels of material, moral and cultural achievement.

Politically this period was marked by the emergence of the common man from the background of history to a point where, by the development of the democratic processes in the government of the world's most virile powers, he held within his hands the determination of its destiny. Economically, men had already wrested from stubborn nature the mystery of her fecundity, and by a host of ingenious devices had turned those productive forces toward the creation of commodities best suited to his purposes and the enhancement of his powers, organically and mechanically. Ideologically this period was characterized by a tremendous outgrowth of human fellowship, genuine philanthropy and the rapid multiplication of the human race due both to the easing of the struggle for mere physical existence, and the conquest of the enemies to human life.

Truly could one look upon the world at the dawn of the twentieth century and say it was good, for never before was the vista more pleasant nor the prospects of the long-erring human race more promising.

Then something happened. Few are agreed as to exactly what happened, and fewer yet as to why it happened, but the fact that something calamitous to the world outlook did happen is recognized by every thinking member of organized society.

Politically, the onward sweep of that democracy which, dreamers thought, was destined to close the cleavage between the ruler and ruled by making kings of all men, had come to an abrupt end. The great democracies themselves had lost faith in the potent power of their shibboleths. In the terror induced by recognition of the insidious progress of the paralysis which was spreading over their economic system, older democracies began to turn to Messiahs who would lead them back to the green pastures, while the newer democracies quickly abandoned the vestments of popular power and sought refuge under the protecting arm of some great and omniscient leader.

Even in the United States, a thoroughly frightened Congress in 1933 voted almost unlimited power to the President, not because they had faith in his panaceas so much as they desired to shift to other shoulders the responsibility for failure; the glory of success could easily be shared.

Economically a blight appeared to have settled upon the industrial centers of the world. Factories were stilled, locomotives were lifeless, ships haunted harbors after entering, while millions of men formerly swallowed every morning by the insatiable appetites of factories only to be spewed forth again at the end of the day, now trod ceaselessly before the factory gate, and eventually trod as ceaselessly toward the government relief lines. Ideologically despair seized the hearts of men, stultified their too-new humanity, and embarked them once more on that primordial quest for existence, to obtain or to protect which was the duty of men, with lethal weapons placed in their hands and now replenished by those who labored in the rear.

This is the status of the world today. After the war—what? No one vouchsafes a reply, and in the hearts of thinking men the world over is the gripping fear that once more the struggle and the sacrifice will be in vain, and the new peace as merely an interlude between recurrent conflict. At no time more than the present, when the fate of our civilization hovers poised either for ascent to higher reaches or to collapse as did so many civilizations before our own, does mankind stand in need of clear vision and the knowledge of how to attain that higher social level which we all feel is in our hands and yet escapes our grasp.

All mankind today finds itself being gradually overpowered by forces which are slowly but surely crushing out the gains so painfully achieved during the past two centuries. It is futile to blame our neighbor for the disasters which affect us all, and to which all civilized peoples have contributed in proportion to that very industrial development to which they owe their greatness. No people have a monopoly either of virtues or vices. Even Hitler, who is customarily the whipping boy for the world outside his orbit, owes his power over the German people to his avowed purpose of restoring them to their vanished greatness and proper place among the nations of the world.

It is the tragedy of history up to now that all its conscious movements have been those of minorities acting in the name of their fellows. So it was during our own Revolutionary struggles. One has but to read Beard's illuminating statistics [1] on that score, should proof be desired of what is a quite obvious historical proposition. History has no reason to attach mystic significance to the words majority or minority. It is concerned only with the lessons frequently taught that control by the minority from being a means becomes the end in itself, and that invariably the masses pay the heaviest price for the misdeeds of their rulers and their own blind or helpless acquiescence.

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[1] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, pp. 256-7.

Progress does not depend on a mechanical majority, but since our modern concept of progress involves the transfer of actual benefits to the majority, if not their active participation in the determination of their destinies, we must consider the concept of progress in its historical setting, and the different meaning that term possessed during different periods in the history of civilization.

RELATIVE VALIDITY OF CONCEPTS OF PROGRESS

What is progress? "Progress," says Dewey, "means increase of present meaning, which involves multiplication of sensed distinctions as well as harmony, unification. This statement may, perhaps, be made generally, in application to the experience of humanity. If history shows progress it can hardly be found elsewhere than in this complication and extension of the significance found within experience. It is clear that such progress brings no surcease, no immunity from perplexity and trouble." [2]

Man's striving for immunity from perplexity and trouble is always defeated at the very moment when he thinks he has the means for their banishment securely in his grasp. Shakespeare's tragic characters invariably portray this duality in man's nature, that whereas he willingly barters his soul for the elements he thinks most conducive to his present happiness, he has lost the capacity for their enjoyment once they are in his possession. No future state of society, even in Utopia can free man from the inherent imperfections of his race. All that even Marx sought to establish was not to end human conflict, but to change the nature of that conflict from its animal status for the sheer possession of the material means of life, to the fuller realization through struggle and contradiction of the intellectual and cultural potentialities of the human species.

If freedom from worry over the management of political affairs was one of the conditions of human progress then the peoples of the totalitarian states ought to have been numbered among the happiest of the human family. Dewey gave expression to a profound psychological truth when he states that the true measure of progress is the increase of life's present meaning in all its varied significance, moral, material and intellectual. To this the scientific historian would add that the degree of social progress can be gauged by the extent to which the capacity for the appreciation of life's meaning is enjoyed intensively and protensively, by even larger masses of the population.

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[2] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey, p. 283.

The People is a new concept in human drama. It is only recently that the great incoherent, inchoate mass has become the object of the historian's interest. In the past, the people functioned only as the background of the historical stage upon which the great man strutted and enacted his role, with occasional incursion of the masses like trained animals of the circus, or under melancholy circumstances, like the untamed beasts of the forest according to Carlyle who intrude their presence unceremoniously, as in that fateful act which determined the destiny of France in 1789.

With profound insight into the nature of historic processes Hegel described the Oriental world as the submergence of man into the despotism of the One, the Greek world as the emergence of only the few who were free, while with the German world, man realizes the self-determination of freedom.[3] It is needless to cavil about the imperfections which attach to such vast generalizations, but the inherent significance of the epochs of history thus generally characterized is truly depicted in those bold strokes of genius.

Progress to the Oriental mind consisted in greater fidelity in the reproduction of the type; to the Greek mind in the perfection of the type; and to the Western mind in the creation of nobler universal types. There is nothing absolute in the concept of progress. It is an historical concept, deriving its validity from definite conditions limited in time and space, and reflecting man's psychological reactions to the ever-changing world in which he supplies at once the motive for the drama and the principal actors. Only the unfoldment of the drama changes; the conflict remains essentially the same.

How is the course of this drama to be portrayed? How can one foretell the inevitable end? Can the historian, like some great Greek tragedian load his actors with the burden of their doom which the course of the play unravels with inexorable logic to the pre-destined end? Spengler essayed this task with formidable consequences until the inquisitive world, after it had sufficiently regained its equilibrium, began to analyze the inner mechanism of his drama, and discovered the pre-devised mechanism which made the world course its orbit through spring-time, summer, autumn, and doom.[4]

Or shall we depend upon the prophetic vision of the seer who perchance will warn in time the onrushing world as it plunges unseeing and unheeding toward disaster? So prophesied the immortal Socrates: "And now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you; for I am about to die, and that is the hour in which men are gifted with prophetic power." [5] But then men of Greece did not listen, or did not care, for the Bible spoke truly about no man being a prophet among his own.

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[3] Philosophy of History—Hegel, pp. 105-8.

[4] The Decline of the West—Spengler in Table I of "Contemporary" Spiritual Epochs.

"The prophets," wrote Kastein, "constitute at once a historical and a timeless phenomenon. If our attempt at defining the concept of prophecy be accepted, then prophecy must be possible in every age among every people." [6] There are such prophets in every age, but the modern prophet divines the future best in proportion to the mastery he has attained over the laws governing his phenomena. Mankind has always exhibited an insatiable desire for penetrating into the mystery of the future. To a large extent that has been gratified in the grosser aspect of his material existence. In the world of ideas, and in that complex of unsubstantial but very real ideological structures wherein man erects his spiritual world within the general fabric of society, we still rely in the most fundamental aspects of our nature upon the metaphysician's subtleties or the alchemist's practical tricks. The science of society is the last of the cultural fields to be tilled and it is yet so barren in its yield.

MATERIAL AND CULTURAL MEASURING RODS FOR PROGRESS

Progress generally includes the idea of improvement. Since intellectual improvement is frequently accompanied by material advancement, people have developed a rough and ready schedule by which to measure the relative progress of nations. By that formula the United States is the most progressive nation on earth according to any scheme of such computation—the number of automobiles, of electric refrigerators, of school-houses, the size and number of prisons, the telephones in operation, candy and cosmetics consumed, books published, circulation of comic strips—in fact almost by any indices one chooses to gauge material national well-being.

Yet somehow we ourselves remain unconvinced. "Progress," writes Nordau, "is an increase in the capacity to set attention in action artificially, and to sustain it by the exclusion of distracting objects. In other words, progress, in the last resort, is the development of the force and endurance of the human will, expressed in the intellectual spheres of attention and inhibition." [7] This is a rather severe test wherein all the stress is placed on the intellectual side of the equation.

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[5] Dialogues of Plato—Apology, p. 33.

[6] History of the Jews—Kastein, p. 49.

The defect of both the mechanical footrule and the intellectual footrule is that they spring from the subjective creations of the respective proponents. A nation like the United States might have the largest per capita of almost every conceivable object of wealth, and yet stagger under the disheartening burdens of unemployment and general uncertainty as to the future among the employed, the aged, the youngster just out of school, as well as the impressive-looking banker or important director whose dignity has never quite succeeded in recovering the assuredness of the pre-depression days.

Or a nation like Germany with a culture whose real merits had long been an object of universal emulation, and a people whose attention, both natural and artificial, might meet with even Nordau's specifications as to progress, may yet be crushed, as they are today, beneath the weight of a despotism with few parallels in modern history.

The distinction between the American go-getter's definition of progress and Nordau's consists only in their respective emphasis; one on the total number of material things which is mechanically averaged up for the entire people, thus giving a distorted picture of the reality; whereas the other selects the individual who is to be the prototype for the mass. Both blot out the concept of society itself as a definite historical structure. The "social man" concept is just as much an absurdity in history as the "economic man" concept has proven to be in political economy, and for the very same reason: There are individuals but no average man. The devices of biology do not apply to sociology.

Theories of progress are social products which reflect the particular ideologies of definite groups within the social structure of an historical period. Let us consider our own times. It is not so long ago, when the prosperity of Wall Street was considered an infallible index to the general condition of the country. Whoever has lived through the speculative mania of the 1920's, while somehow maintaining his mental equilibrium, could not but be struck by that grand flowering of fifty years of incessant propaganda by every device known to man which extolled first the accumulator of great wealth and then the manipulator of the evidences of national wealth.

The financier represented the acme of progress. Since not all could be financiers, many did the next best thing by taking advantage of the opportunity so generously accorded them of participating in those subtle processes whereby their little piles could become bigger and obviously better piles through the necromancy of the financier's art.

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[7] The Interpretation of History—Nordau, p. 340.

Eventually the net result of all this legerdemain was the general distribution of vast piles of engrossed paper which, betimes, many would gladly have given in exchange for a good square meal. In the days preceding the final denouement any one who undertook to question the sanity of the proceedings was obviously an enemy of society to whom very few paid any attention, and fewer took seriously.

Even the Socialist and Communist movements participated in this universal mania by financing various enterprises like summer camps, hotels, publications and meeting places through the issue of claims upon the future. Labor unions, like the railroad brotherhoods, led by men who believed that destiny played them a mean trick by shunting their genius into obscure places, made amends by rushing their organizations into banking enterprises with the final consequence that workers' savings vanished in the same direction with perpetual prosperity.

Such was the culmination of that grand era which was dubbed "The Gilded Age" at its beginning by Mark Twain and his collaborator Charles Dudley Warner. "Beautiful credit," they jibed, citing a speculator in lands and mines, who boasted, " 'I wasn't worth a cent two years ago, and now I owe two million dollars.' " [8] Charles A. and Mary R. Beard immortalized that period, as well as their own reputations for descriptive writing, in as beautiful a piece of historical reporting that ever was turned out by the historian's art.[9]

Continuing in the same spirit in their later work they write: "That the masses in cities and rural regions might dwell in the effulgence of the golden glow, leaders in business enterprise offered stocks and bonds to 'investors' and country banks. Investment houses often affiliated with great banking institutions, established branches all over the country, tied together by leased wires for instant communication. They organized selling forces, headed by high-powered drivers who 'pepped up' salesmen by their florid orations on the 'merits' of the 'securities' offered to the public, and by promising bonuses and promotions for success in disposing of stocks and bonds. Young men fresh from academic groves, Bachelor of Arts in one thing or another, were recruited by the tens of thousands and drilled into rank and file salesmen for the highways and the byways. On trains, in airplanes, and by automobile they sped hither and yon looking for customers." [10]

This luxurious exfoliation of our economic life was paralleled in its state organization. At no time in our history was public morality in such a deplorable state. Misfeasance and non-feasance were minor faults. Malfeasance of the worst sort was common in Cabinet officers,

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[8] Quoted by Schlesinger in his Political & Social Growth of the U. S., 1852-1933, p. 159.

[9] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. II, Chapter XXV.

[10] America in Midpassage—Beard, p. 11.

Governors, Mayors, and hosts of other government agents. Teapot Dome on a national scale was repeated in every State and in every locality big enough to hide the malefactor from the envious eyes and consequently the righteous indignation of his less lucky neighbor.

The curse of prohibition enforcement spread like a pall over the land and served to palliate with scarcely even an attempt at concealment the open alliance between the law-enforcing arm with bootleggers, gun-men and racketeers of the worst sort. The great crash at the end of the decade and the ensuing depression served a useful purpose historically by compelling the country to get rid first of its excrescences, and then to begin to take stock of its economy.

That stock-taking is not yet completed, nor has the country decided upon its course. The issue hangs delicately in the balance, with habit clinging to the old moorings, and the instinct for self-preservation compelling the cautious to resort to untried methods in the effort to solve the problem of individual existence in a social milieu. Dewey emphasizes this cautious approach of social invention and experimental engineering,[11] but at this late date has nothing more to offer than stale advice upon the need for increasing detailed scientific knowledge of social problems.

Such an attitude would have been quite progressive a hundred years ago or even fifty years ago, but is quite pontifical today. Our real difficulty today is not the lack of detailed knowledge but what to do with the accumulated mass now bearing down the shelves of government bureaus and innumerable public and private libraries. Dewey himself went to infinite pains to prove why nothing could be done about making history a science. Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover were masters in the art of evading problems by passing the buck to commissions whose first duty invariably was to amass enormous stacks of the very detailed knowledge for which Dewey asks. President Roosevelt keeps on trying one thing and another like a gambler in the hope that some day he will strike the lucky combination. His efforts at amelioration are most admirable, and reflect credit to his genuine sense of fellow-feeling. But most of his major efforts at reform have been defeated, not because of opposition so much as the defects which time exposed in the many improvisations to which he so frequently resorted and as rapidly discarded because events proved them ineffective.

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[11] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey, p. 148.

MODERN HISTORY REVOLVES ABOUT THE COMMON MAN

Modern capitalist society differs from medieval, Graeco-Roman and ancient civilization precisely because unlike its preceding forms of social organization its central theme revolves about the average man, rather than the powerful man, or the free man, or the intellectual man.

Capitalism was predicated upon the greatest good for the greatest number as its rallying cry. All that capitalism really wanted was freedom from that form of external restraint which was represented by aristocratic society. Bourgeois or burgher society was democratic only in so far as the elements of power were placed in the hands of its class, though in the struggle for power it had to lean frequently upon the masses for support. In his illuminating study of English history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Marx showed that the growth of popular power was merely an aftermath of this unceasing conflict between the remnants of a feudal aristocracy and the expanding requirements of the rising capitalist class. The placing of the average man on the center of history's stage was the result of one of those inchoate historical conflicts, rather than the consequence of deliberate social effort.

American constitutional history illustrates the operation of this process most admirably. Despite all its grandiose expressions of human equality it was founded at the very outset upon the denial of its revolutionary protestations. That the Negro was a human being had been grudgingly conceded only after the first enthusiastic missionaries had converted some of them to Christianity. The ethics of how a Christian with a white skin could hold in slavery a fellow Christian with a black skin and even kill him at pleasure had been settled with typical ecclesiastical casuistry; the Negro was human but possessed no soul. A soul is in bondage to the body, and the body itself could be killed at the will of the master without presumption of prepense malice sufficient to hold one for murder, since no man would deliberately destroy what is useful to his own estate.[12]

A hundred and fifty years after that decision the descendants of the Southern planters were called upon by a similar resort to inverted logic to compromise upon the issue that while the Negro was not a man in the eyes of the fundamental law when it was a question of suffrage, he was three-fifths of a man in the eyes of the census taker when it came to representation in the popular branch of the new national legislature.

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[12] History of the United States—Hildreth, Vol. I, pp. 521-2.

Slowly the right of suffrage was extended to the masses of the white population by the revision of property and residence restrictions. In the case of one of the original states of the Union, Rhode Island, it was only after a rebellion on the part of the industrial workers who, possessing no freehold, had no right to vote, that the indispensable condition of democracy became the equal heritage of all white men.[13]

Economically the advent of modern industry spelled the doom of petty industry and self-sufficient agriculture. Production depended upon a market for their products, and the boom conditions of a new country with a virile people were the prime requirements for the tremendous development of industry. The average man was the all-important consumer of mass production, while the development of his tastes for a variety of things was the principal concern of a vast army of propagandists marshaled under the general heading of advertising and expanding civilization.

Still the average man was but a link in the endless chain of capitalist economy which must ceaselessly recreate the eternal cycle of production-consumption-reproduction at a profit, or collapse. Ideologically capitalism was committed by its own internal laws to expanding production due to the accumulation of capital and to the falling tendency of the rate of profit and in so doing to expand the social needs of the average man.

As long as the cycle kept repeating itself on an ascending scale, the defects of its economy were concealed from public scrutiny. Once the mechanism stalled and collapsed, these defects obtruded themselves upon the stage of history. Every move, every scheme of amelioration from both the so-called progressive and conservative sides had to deal with the irrepressible fact that our entire economic order, while motivated primarily by the production of commodities for profit, was burdened with a method of production that was keyed for mass consumption.

EVOLUTION OF MODERN SOCIAL FORMS

But consumers need money to buy. They cannot get that money—outside of savings which are soon consumed, or public relief—unless they work. Employers, however, cannot set their plants going unless there are solvent customers in sight. This is the vicious circle in which modern industry now revolves. As to how this circle developed, and why the schemes devised by both progressives and conservatives for the solution of its problems have failed, and must fail, will be the subject of more detailed analysis when dealing with the Fourth Period of

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[13] History of the People of the United States—McMaster, Vol. VII, pp. 165-78.

American history. Ours is a mass production age—mass voting, mass consumption, mass thinking, mass spectacles, mass drabness, and mass dullness.

All that we are concerned with at the present point of our study is the indisputable fact that modern society and its economic base revolves about the average man, though he is still bewildered about the entire process, and does not even know how it all came about. Neither do the masters of our economic processes and their spokesmen who manipulate public opinion. But while the causes may be obscure, the fact still remains that capitalism, desiring nothing more than profits in the form of rent, interest and profit of enterprise for its beneficiaries, has brought about a situation where, by the very processes of its internal workings, its fate is dependent upon the ability of the average man to buy the mass of consumable goods his industry creates.

Once and for all, let us settle accounts with that school of apologists who feel secure only when they obscure an issue. By a capitalist we do not mean every owner of property whether it be a tooth-brush or a railroad. Nor do we include in that classification every one who receives interest, or rent, or a dividend. A farmer may own his land, or a worker his home. The mere fact of possession does not establish his economic status. What does matter is whether or not the income derived from property is sufficient to establish one as a man of independent wealth in the society of a given period. But of even greater importance are the relations of production in society.

People who dabble in economics, without troubling themselves much about, let alone to analyze, the economic categories often adopt an arbitrary figure, say three thousand dollars a year, as the dividing line between the worker and the middle class, and ten thousand dollars a year to demarcate the middle class from the capitalist class. This does not prevent Dr. Gallup who conducts a thinly-veiled propaganda organization under the guise of an Institute of Public Opinion from putting those who earn between $20-50 a week in the middle income category in his biased pre-election surveys during 1940.

Social science in the division of the classes has nothing to do with the amount of income, but with the relations toward property from which the income is derived. An owner of a factory is no less a capitalist simply because his business is in the red for one or more years. The worker is not a capitalist even when his annual income is greater than that of his boss, so long as his chief source of income is derived from the wages earned by his labor. He does not become an exploiter simply because he is out of work while his wife is holding down a job. He may be a parasite, but not an economic exploiter if he habitually lives by the wages of his wife or children, assuming him to be able, but unwilling to work if the opportunity presents.

The trained public servant who draws a salary of ten thousand dollars or more is still the servant of the people and not a capitalist as the epigoni would classify him. The rooming house keeper who slaves over a houseful of boarders and collects rent, including the price of meals and room service is not a capitalist living off the revenue of her minions. The worker who owns his modest home and receives rent from the family upstairs to help pay its upkeep and the taxes is not a capitalist.

The farmer who sells part of his product for the market, while his family subsists on the remainder, using the cash for necessaries, is not a capitalist. The widow collecting dividends on her holdings of a modest policy is not a capitalist. The owner of a pleasure automobile or a radio is not a capitalist. There are dozens upon dozens of various other classifications one can discover or conjure up between that dividing line which separates the capitalist and non-capitalist.

We have noted that Berle and Means have shown how modern corporations are manipulated by management with a minimum of security-ownership, while the more general the distribution of the stocks and bonds, often held by their own employees, the easier it becomes to obtain a working control of an enterprise. Writers of law books insist that it is easier to recognize a tort than to define one, and the same may be said about a capitalist.

However, our discussion is concerned chiefly with the capitalist system rather than with capitalists, and there exists no comparable difficulty in either recognizing or defining that mode of economy. Our argument up to now is concerned only with that aspect of its operation wherein it was compelled by its own internal laws of motion to rely upon mass production for mass consumers, and how it was compelled, inadvertently, to make the average man and the satisfaction of his wants the fulcrum around which revolved its economic processes.

We repeat here the profound observation of Hegel: "In history an additional result is commonly produced by human actions beyond that which they aim at and obtain—that which they immediately recognize and desire. They gratify their own interest; but something further is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though not present to their consciousness, and not included in their design." [14] Man is limited in his aim, but the consequences of his acts often transcend his purpose.

No observation is more common than that we live in a material age. This is often spoken in contemptuous tones, implying that former societies were more noble or idealistic. The indulgers in such invidious comparisons point to the chivalry of the Middle Ages, to its art, its drama and to the great poets of those times, and in deprecating manner they compare their accomplishments in those fields with that of modern times. Look at ancient Greece, they exclaim. What modern culture can compare to the glory of their achievements?

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[14] Philosophy of History—Hegel, p. 27.

It is clear these romanticists have a theory of progress which does not jibe with the bustling optimism of our Babbitts and the towering statistics of President Hoover's innumerable commissions to cover up his omissions. Dewey, Robinson, Cheyney, Burke and the others are ready with their agreement on the impossibility of a valid historical measuring rod that will be universally acceptable for all eternity. Nor is it our purpose to supply one. None will be found because none exist. Every epoch in history creates its own distinctive measuring rods of progress, and the skull-heaps of the Mongol conquerors probably were as much an indication of progress in their eyes as the limits of a man's banking credit is in ours. The concept of progress is purely subjective, and the nature of that concept, if valid, must vary with the particular historical requirements of the time.

BASIS OF AN HISTORICAL CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

What do we mean by historically valid concepts of progress? First, our ideas must be based on the realities of a given situation. Second, our aims must be developed out of that situation. Third, our actions must be in consonance with the laws of motion of the given historical period. Fourth, the objectives aimed at must be particularized to the quality of the human and material forces at hand. Let us consider these propositions in detail.

At the very outset we meet with the objection that no two ideas will agree exactly on what constitutes progress, though all will maintain with equal assuredness that they are based on the historical realities. The pragmatist will point to the mechanism of our economic system and its institutions. Instantly a divergence of opinion among this school is evident. The upholder of rugged individualism will blame all its defects on government interference with natural economic processes. The radical economic determinist will retort that there is nothing inherent in nature which puts one man in the driver's seat and the other man in harness. The Darwinian evolutionist polishes up his arguments on natural selection and the survival of the fittest. The idealist breaks in with examples of morons, idiots and babes still unborn who actually do, or are destined to, maintain their places among the elect, supported by the majesty of the law and the paternal care of trusteeship based on their idealized relations to property. Their claims are evidenced by formidable documents and the weird hieroglyphics of ponderous legal tomes. The moralist can point to the gross injustices which all accept as inevitable, or necessary, to the social order. The preachers will denounce iniquity and sin in general terms, while some will do so in particular examples; but most will advise acquiescence to God's will on earth, as actually determined by the will of the dominant class in the seats of power.

The pragmatist, the rugged individualist, the radical, the evolutionist, the idealist, the moralist and the preacher all draw their texts from the realities of the situation with such bewildering results. Wherein lies their difficulty? It is in the method of approach. Each of them starts out with an irreducible minimum of abstract ideology, whatever their motives. Each of them deliberately or unconsciously, picks out of the reality those segments of it which maintains his position or can be used as a battering ram to destroy that of an opponent. There is one method of approach to reality which we have left out, and that is the scientific.

Objection will be raised that the scientific mind in social affairs does not exist. Every man who approaches these questions, it is urged, does so with a bundle of prejudices and preconceived notions, the first of which he sucked in with his mother's milk, and the other he imbibed at her knee. The so-called impartial mind that science asks for does not exist, they say, because it would have to be a perfect blank at the very outset of the task. We concede that such blank minds are useless for the purposes of science. But we also contend that they are not necessary for its purposes.

Science does not depersonalize the scientist. All that it asks him to do, and what it imperiously demands of him if he is to penetrate its secrets, is that he study the objective world as it really exists and acquaint himself with its ways and its laws as they really are outside of his personality. He has a simple and effective test for his conclusions: Does this reality exist only for himself or also for his neighbor? Does that reality survive the particular observer or participant, or does it pass away with his passing? Persistence in the type, rather than in the individual object is the key to the secret of objective phenomena.

THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO SOCIAL PHENOMENA

Science does not begin with purpose but with existence. The metallurgist is both an automaton and a man of the world. As the former, he accommodates his actions to the laws of his material. As the latter, he has certain objectives in view. If he is a man of warm social sympathies he would like to see the steel he assists in producing be turned into tractors rather than tanks. Should he attempt to concretize his ideologies he would discover, if still pursuing the path of science, that society itself responds in its internal organization and concomitant distribution of forces, to certain definite laws which impel toward the production of instruments of peace or of war. So would the pragmatist, the idealist, the moralist and the preacher discover that specific social forces dominate the relations of bodies within the social structure and determine the nature of the predominant social laws.

No matter how divergent the road from which the scientific thinker starts, the scientific process of investigation must converge them to the same conclusion. There is no way out. Man has a choice, but if he chooses the path of science, he must accommodate his mental processes to the subjugating sway of her imperious methods. For reality is like a jealous God, and its laws will brook none other.

From this standpoint—the only valid position for one who would understand reality as it is, and not fashion it in his own image—there can be neither a radical nor a conservative, idealist nor materialist, phenomenalist nor nominalist. There is but a single objective reality for the student of history, namely society itself, though widely varied minds and personalities will endeavor to pierce its mysteries.

There is but a single conclusive test for scientific history, as for any other science, and that is the ability to foretell future events when based upon the knowledge of definite social laws. Theories of progress, therefore, are based not merely on that which is subjectively desirable, but that which is objectively possible under the conditions as they exist.

VARYING BASES OF DIFFERENT CIVILIZATIONS AND CONCOMITANT CONCEPTIONS OF PROGRESS

That this is a material age no one would take the trouble to deny; yet no age, even the most sublime, has been able to subsist on religion, or art, or philosophy alone. The conditions of progress and the ideological superstructures of Greek society differed from feudalism as both differ from those of modern times.

The key to Greek civilization was the state which was in the hands of citizens of pure blood organized in gens and tribes. Strict demarcation was established between citizens, subjects, foreigners and slaves. Pericles summed up the Athenian ideal which he strove so mightily to realize visually in those public monuments intended to impress all with her glory: "For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection." [15]

Indubitably the Greek state did not exist by politics alone, but the overwhelming influence of the state upon its economy and the shaping of its ideological superstructure was decisive in forming those ideals which characterized its social structure and by virtue of which it attained to a degree of perfection for the ruling few not equaled by any civilization before or after it. Even the mordant Marx pays warm tribute to Greek art and epos.[16]

Nor did feudal society subsist on chivalry, pageantry and theological disputation. The state structure as the central, unifying organ of power was weak, or non-existent. While theoretically deriving power from the next highest in aristocratic rank, actually each depended upon his own muster to establish and maintain his dignity. The ecclesiastical organization perfected a similar hierarchical form of organization, though by the very nature of the rule compelling celibacy if not continence, that made necessary the constant infusion of new blood. This recurrent stream of new material was worked up gradually through rigorous training and strict discipline, if not in piety, surely in loyalty to the organization. This was and still is the secret of the power of the Catholic Church. It frowns upon variation and nurtures the skeletal structure which has maintained it for all these centuries.

The economy of feudal times was sufficient for its existence within the rigid limitations which stability called for. Trade existed furtively, within the interstices of society. Reproduction with the regularity of nature was the alpha and omega of feudal existence. Their conception of progress was circumscribed by this narrow life cycle, and strain of blood counted for more than any other material advantage of life.

[15] Quoted by Bury in his History of Greece, p. 388.

[16] Critique of Political Economy—Marx, pp. 310-12.

Yet within itself feudal society underwent constant refinement and perfection. Noble cathedrals showed a new direction for man's loftiest aspirations. Motifs of painting and tapestry centered about the Christ-life and the Madonna, but endowed them with the extraordinary conceptions of genius circumscribed by the narrow confines of the Churchman's world. Poetry, literature and music flourished. The amenities of life among the aristocracy were highly perfected. If their material resources were crude from our standpoint, so would our manners appear cruder still from the point of view of aristocratic culture which characterized life during the Middle Ages.

Modern civilization was ushered in with a puritanical spirit. Thrift, simplicity and economy was the source of burgher strength, just as extravagance, ostentation and profligacy were causes of the downfall of the aristocracy. The puritanical virtues were elevated to the rank of equality with the ten commandments. Since man himself and not rank was the basis of its social conceptions, democracy became synonymous with the bourgeois method of organization. Man's nature, however, was not changed much in the process. Ancient habits simply accommodated themselves to a different basis for attaining social eminence. Where before it was the title of blood, now it was the rank of wealth. Man's dominating motif in bourgeois society became the possession of money. That was the open sesame to approbation, recognition and even glory.

A free field and no favors expressed the sum and substance of his political philosophy. But back of his head that virtuous maxim was intended to apply only as far as his neighbor was concerned. For himself, rugged individualist though he professed himself to be, an impediment cast in the way of a competitor or a government contract or subsidy gotten by stealth, was an advantage which he eagerly sought.

Adam Smith summed up the ideology of the rising capitalist class as a class most perfectly: "To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for no other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the different orders of his subjects." [17] The great principle of laissez faire and the doctrine that each in pursuing his own ends therefore furthers indirectly the interests of society, Smith expresses as follows: "As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both to employ his capital in support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of society as great as he can. He generally indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is pro-

[17] The Wealth of Nations—Smith, p. 618.

moting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security, and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good." [18]

Sophisticates who are inclined to smile at Smith's assumptions should be dissuaded to save their sneers for more appropriate occasions. The fact remains that Smith was, and still is fundamentally right. The steel maker, the oil producer, the hat manufacturer, and the myriad other capitalist producers create their useful products primarily for their own profit. As an incident to that purpose goods are created and distributed. The entire complex mechanism of our economy is organized on that fundamental basis.

Smith erred only by postulating as an ineluctible consequence a condition which was historically limited to a specific period of history. Since profit is the real motivating factor, it is only a question of time and circumstance when the ordinary procedure for its obtainment, as Smith visualized it, would be abbreviated or circumvented. It can, and is being shortened by shifting the emphasis from the productive activity of industrial capital to the paramountcy of parasitic usury and finance-capital. Production as a means to an end has been cut to the simplest possible category where parasitism collects tribute from the various active agents of the economic process at every step along the way. Smith's theory worked out in the era of free competition for petty industry. That era is now closed for most of the basic modern industries. This is not said with any nostalgic regrets. It is a fact of present-day existence with which the government, the worker, the producer of raw materials and the consumer of the finished product has to deal.

THE "BIGGER AND BETTER" GRADUALISM THEORY OF PROGRESS

Among our statesmen and nondescript politicians there is but one simple mathematical theory of social progress they can readily visualize. That is summed up in the phrase "Bigger and Better." All their efforts at solution of pressing political problems are directed toward the discovery of the lucky combination which will put idle capital and labor to work as they euphemistically put it.

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[18] The Wealth of Nations—Smith, p. 423.

By producing more we will consume more. Obviously the more we consume, the more will have to be produced. Beyond these simple word pictures their minds cannot function. Brought up in the political world where the popular mind can seldom think out a proposition beyond a single factor and a second move, political leaders key up their faculties to formulate a simple, catchy slogan which will strike the popular imagination. In their ideology the only essential difference between the New Dealer and the Standpatter is upon the emphasis whether the productive mechanism could be stepped up by a wholesome dose of rugged individualism at the top, or by pump-priming from the bottom to start the old process going again. Neither of them have any doubts concerning the efficacy and permanency of the economic system as it is now organized.

Those who have any opinions keep them to themselves, or at most venture to suggest some amendatory reforms. From the professoriate no constructive criticism is heard because they are even more bread-and-butter conscious than trade union workers who at least can go from one job to another. From the institutionally unattached intelligentsia, the radicals have long since stopped to think out of the channeled grooves established fifty years ago, while the so-called liberals and conservatives have stopped thinking altogether.

The current of contemporary intellectual life courses like a sluggish, brackish stream indicative of the stagnation which has gripped our society for the past thirty years. Evidence of this social stasis was gathering as far back as 1913. But then America was yet fresh, buoyant and virile from the elan of a century of astounding development. The blight of the First World War finally reached our shores and infected our people with unnatural, feverish activity. The shameful profiteering of the war days developed into the post-war inflation. After a temporary halt in 1921, the United States embarked upon that insane orgy of gambling with present wealth and speculating upon the temerity of succeeding generations. Finally there came the day of reckoning, and each successive year has added its accumulated mass of human suffering and privation to swell the grand total.

The present World War is the aftermath of our social disorganization and degeneration. Society was ready thirty years ago for the next step in social progress through the conscious organization of its material and moral resources. But culturally we were not prepared for it. Instead we chose the path of least resistance and drifted into disaster succeeded by greater disaster. Our moral and intellectual unpreparedness was witnessed at Versailles and in the attempt to throttle the Russian Revolution by armed intervention. This led to the deterioration of that epochal event fraught with such great possibilities, into a sordid dictatorship, and to establish the basic pattern, though not the basis, for other dictatorships in Hungary, Italy, Turkey, Poland, Germany, China and Japan.

Now we are engaged in another World War which descended upon an already stricken world, impelled most unwillingly to this catastrophe by social forces beyond their control, to the fateful decision of arms. Germany, organized on a capitalist basis, could not stand still without smothering, and the Allies could not yield a portion of their abundance without imperiling their hold upon the rest. Of course, we must have our personal devils. Recognition of the realities is not enough. Our ideas concerning the nature of historic events must be based upon the laws which govern their development, as the essential prerequisite for the formulation of a program with the object of avoiding such future disasters.

UTOPIAN CONCEPTS OF PROGRESS

This brings us to the second point in the discussion of historically valid concepts of progress, namely, that our aims or objectives must be developed out of the realities of the situation. Progress does not consist in dreaming of the desirable, but of working concretely for the possible and the practical. It can be stated that as between the Utopian and the dictator, by far the greater enemy of society is the former. A dictator is essentially a practical man; that is, he must weigh carefully the consequences of his acts so that at least his own country's economy will not be disrupted and his power undermined. The Utopian adds stature to his height by taking thought. His sincerity is obvious. He is altruistic, often self-sacrificing, and passionately devoted to his ideals. Those who come within his orbit succumb beneath his spell and surrender their individual motivation.

Programs are enounced, a movement is started, many hearts are captivated. After a while obstacles arise. These difficulties cannot be surmounted; its pretensions are exploded, and the movement collapses or just dissipates itself into nothingness. Such was the fate of numerous utopian movements in the early decades of the nineteenth century of American history.

Later on great popular upsurgings sought expression through the Greenback movement, the Grange, Populism, Bryanism, Wilson's New Freedom and Roosevelt's New Deal. Their immediate practical achievements were inconsequential and usually of a reparative nature. Few of these utopian movements hewed a new path for social progress, though the seed was planted in the hearts of responsive men and women. Immediate progress was left to the makers of history, the manipulators of our economic system, as it developed into mass production and its big industry phase.

The capitalist entrepreneurs, the ingenious organizers of uncoordinated enterprises into gigantic concentrations of capital, the centralizers of productive powers through the mechanism created by finance capital, these were the unconscious agents of social progress. Like all men of limited vision they laid plans for eternity, when the processes through which they operated were of historical validity. They were the instruments rather than the creators of the social forces through which they operated and by which they were controlled.

With the arrogance of inflated power and vanity, they denied that their magic talisman had lost its potency. When the denouement developed into a disastrous rout, they at first refused to recognize the facts for what they were, and then doggedly persisted in advocating a course which would bring business back to the old stand for sheer paucity of ideas, though with some slight amendments. If the question did not involve so much the welfare of vast masses of our people, no better demonstration of the utter incapacity of the old formulas to meet the present situation could be desired than to say to the supporters of the old methods: "Here, take back control as in the old days. We will give you five years, ten years to set our house in order. If at the end of that time you have not succeeded in eliminating the present evils, then let us take over the social system and remake it without hindrance on your side."

As a sporting proposition those who advocate a new economic alignment would be betting on a sure thing. However, problems in real life are too vital to be settled in such fashion, although that method apparently is the only certain way of convincing many people as to the outcome of an event. So did Hitler in 1933 ask from the Reichstag a modest grant of absolute power for four years. Most people possess neither the capacity nor the desire to reason things out step by step, while the involved operation of many factors which influence the course of events are too intricate to be followed except by specially trained minds. The matter indeed would be hopeless, were it not for the fact that people hold on instinctively to what they have got and can understand. This accounts for the overwhelming victory of the New Deal in the 1936 elections despite its patent mistakes, and will be the decisive factor in the Republican defeat of 1940. (This was written in January, 1940.)

MUTABILITY OF SOCIAL FORMS

History teaches no lesson more thoroughly than the mutability of social forms. It also instructs us that no fundamental change has ever been effected by the conscious determination of those who stood to lose by it. Another corollary is that the dominant class becomes so strongly intrenched that it represses any movement for change, and must be uprooted by a volcanic eruption from the submerged social strata.

This has been the process of effecting social transformations in the past. There is no inherent reason why it must continue to be so in the future where like in the United States, the means for effecting changes are still formally a part of the democratic process. Whether they are so actually will be considered in our presentation of the Theory of the Continuing American Revolution.

Progress consists in the opportunity for the fullest development of the economic, political and ideological possibilities inherent in the social structure of an epoch. Under Graeco-Roman civilization social progress was expressed in the flowering of culture and the organization of closely-knit political forms. Under feudalism it resulted in the fullest expression of the aristocratic-ecclesiastical form of social organization and culture. Under capitalism progress expressed itself in the rich exfoliation of its innermost essence; namely, in the development of the productive powers of society urged on by the profit motive to explore and conquer the outermost corners of the earth; in the subjugation of nature to minister to the wants of man; in the harnessing of its resources to utilitarian purposes; in the devising of political forms most suitable to the hegemony of wealth regardless of its temporary possessor; and finally in the universal spread of its culture based on the inalienable rights of man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, which was the essential condition to free individual initiative from the former restraints based upon the aristocratic principle.

"No social order," said Marx, "ever disappears before all the productive forces, for which there is room in it, have been developed; and new and higher relations of production never appear before the national conditions for their existence have matured in the womb of the old society." [19] The problem as to whether or not capitalism has fully matured the productive processes of which it is capable on the basis of its own laws of production, is a question of historical fact and not of rhetoric.

This fact cannot be decided by the use of a convenient measuring rod. It announces its existence by the impassable barrier that capitalism itself has erected beyond which it can no longer function. We will not, for the present advert to the plight of the involuntary unemployed and socially unassimilable. Capitalism has no qualms of conscience on that score. An economic system which breeds modern wars wherein are consumed the flower of our manhood and is ready to destroy its centers of civilization would not scruple about allowing those whom it cannot use to rot away on the sidelines.

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[19] Critique of Political Economy—Marx, p. 12.

Nor is capitalism much concerned as to the beneficial uses to which its products are put. Munitions of war or milk are merely so many commodities which must yield the average rate of profit for each aliquot part of capital employed. The impassable barrier for capitalist economy is the profitable production of commodities, lacking which it stops. Resources back up into the huge reservoirs of our banking system as idle capital. The rate of profit falls. The rate of interest which, in the final analysis, is regulated by the prevailing rate of profit, falls along with it.

Enormous groups of pensioners, rentiers, and coupon clippers who are the modern backwash of their socially useful predecessors, the entrepreneurs, the organizers and the financiers of a bygone day, are pinched in their living standards by the decline in their annual income, though the nominal principal remains intact. New social conditions demand additional expenditures for relief of human suffering.

These beneficiaries of a social system wherein they sow not but reap the products of the labor of others, cry out most vehemently against the rise in taxes. They insist upon economy, whereas the economic order of which they are the beneficiaries has itself broken down, and they have more than demonstrated their utter incapacity to get it going again. Their wind-bag apologists shout tauntingly "Defeatism" at those who still hold intact the dykes which keep back social unrest from swamping the broken-down economic system. All this is not a question of theory, but of fact. The United States with the rest of the Western World is faced by this economic impasse.

DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING PRINCIPLES FROM MERE FACTS

Principles are hard to establish and yet harder to demonstrate. That involves the process of ratiocination, and thinking still remains the most difficult, and therefore, the most frequently shunned task of the human race. Experience is still the most effective, if not the best, teacher. But some experiences are too dearly paid for. Pragmatic efforts at amelioration, though understandable, are invariably failures, because they must necessarily tackle the obvious evils, which are the surface ones.

Between Roosevelt and those who attack him so viciously, there is no fundamental difference in objectives. Both would set the economic system to rights again. Both would like to continue business at the old stand under the same rules, brought up to date. Both believe in the possibility of capitalism going on and on to newer and higher reaches in endless succession. The only difference between them is that Roosevelt insists on holding the child of reform while he empties the bath of Despond; the others are frankly indifferent to the fate of this infant called Social Responsibility. The reactionaries would let nature take its course, while Roosevelt insists that in this day and age, intelligent concern for the ill-housed, ill-clad and ill-nourished is also a law of nature, or at least of prudent politics, for those who would preserve democratic America.

This debate could go on endlessly, as similar debates went on during other critical periods in history. But the main issue is not resolved. Nor are we advocating that it is within the province of a great humanitarian leader like Roosevelt to press the issue to a final conclusion. He will have performed a great historic duty most commendably if he will but succeed in holding the fort while a clear-sighted public opinion is being developed behind him.

We would be false to the basic proposition of our work were we here to advocate a pet thesis or a favorite nostrum. Even Marx supported the proposition that no social order passes away until its progressive forces have been fully developed and it begins to stagnate and vegetate away in sheer aimlessness. Our conclusions are not based upon the observation of the past ten, twenty or thirty years. We will endeavor to establish by every method known to the scientific and inquiring mind that capitalist economy has already fulfilled its progressive role in history, and that the American people are confronted with a choice of either evolution or devolution, for in the long run, history proves that stagnation in a living world is synonymous with degeneration and ultimate extinction.

Conceptions of progress are not woven out of inner recesses of the Unconscious or for that matter, the Conscious. It does not depend upon the ingenious devices for corporate control, as Berle would have it, or upon the various schemes for dictatorial control of the state. Progress does not depend upon brewing a suitable concoction of agricultural, monetary and industrial reforms as La Follette would if he had the chance. Progress does not even depend upon nurturing the virtues of that nebulous individual initiative which means everything to most men, for the most hide-bound reactionary and the very ultimate of iconoclastic radical could well unite upon maintaining and fostering that indispensable factor in social advancement.

All of them, as we have pointed out, are essentially pragmatists, and not scientists. Science does not demand, nor does it expect, its devotees to approach it without preconceived notions concerning the order of things. All it asks, and has a right to demand of those who would penetrate its secrets is that we study the objective facts, and the laws which brought them into existence.

Only in that way can we depersonalize our conceptions of progress, and, if we have satisfied ourselves that the internal laws of motion of capitalist economy have reached their ultimate of development, only then, and not until then, are we justified in looking around for ways and means to resolve this impasse. This is what we mean by the second point in our analysis of what constitutes an historically valid concept of progress.

MAN'S WILL AS A FACTOR IN PROGRESS

If men were machines and not as obdurate as mules our third point, namely, that actions must be in consonance with the laws of historic motion, would proceed logically out of the preceding two. But even mules must have some motive, rational enough for themselves, for actions which may appear to us as purely cantankerous. It would be interesting to know what the mule thinks of his master. While the question may be moot as to whether the mule is guided by reason for his actions, the issue can be immediately resolved as against his master in the majority of cases.

The exercise of the faculty of reason results in the formulation of a judgment through the medium of the understanding. This implies the operation of the laws of logic, and for most of the human species the ability to think correctly and consistently beyond the second movement of a single factor is still an exercise beyond their powers. Philosophy, which involves the ability to discern relations and to deduce laws is the highest, as it is the most difficult, achievement of reason.

This caused Kant to protest against the pedagogical methods of his time when philosophy or the general principles of reason were taught as a forerunner of the sciences of his time. "The logic of the particular use of the understanding," Kant wrote concerning this specialized branch of knowledge, "contains the laws of correct thinking upon a particular class of objects. The former may be called elemental logic—the latter, the organon of this or that particular science. The latter (philosophy) is for the most part employed in the schools as a propaedeutic to the sciences, although, indeed, according to the course of human reason, it is the last thing we arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and needs only the finishing touches towards its correction and completion; for our knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by which a science of these objects can be established." [20]

It is this recognized difficulty of understanding the laws of social motion and their practical application to the current problems of society that is the basis of the leadership principle in political life. That argument is fervently advanced by Hitler in his "Mein Kampf" where one certain will, even if wrongly directed, is preferable to a multitude of contradictory wills. For application of conclusions requires decision, and the democratic process is too tedious and uncertain to cope adequately with the problems created by the tempo of modern existence.

DICTATORSHIP VERSUS THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL PROGRESS

Recognizing, as we do, the intellectual infirmities as they now exist among the masses of mankind, it would appear that we have conceded the case in favor of the dictatorship as against the democracy principle; or at least we have submitted a strong case for the resurgence of a stream-lined oligarchy composed of experts in governmental science. We concede to neither conclusion.

Social problems stand on a far different footing than individual problems or the general problems of science. An individual scientist may propound an epoch-making principle or devise some revolutionary technique. Do we therefore, give him a free hand to revise instantly all our text-books and to remake our technology? Is not the very contrary the fact? Does not individual genius come to society humbly, hat in hand, and ask for a hearing? How often has genius asked in vain, and died unheralded in some obscure garret. How often have decades passed and even centuries, before some great principle has been grudgingly accepted, or a technique adopted. And yet society is justified for all its disdain, and is to be commended for its caution. In fact, society does not give a snap for either your justification or commendation. For the impulse to survive is infinitely more powerful than the wiles of reason.

Consider for a moment what would happen to life if it were to yield pliantly to every impulse for variation. Every principle of existence teaches how much more powerful are the forces of heredity over those of modification, and how cautiously nature will modify in order to further the impulse for survival. The same fundamental principles apply to social existence. Everyone knows how difficult it is to change the old habits, and how, even in their change, the old habits too often reappear more firmly intrenched than before.[21]

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[20] Critique of Pure Reason—Kant; Part Second, Transcendental Logic, p. 45.

Society's instinctive reaction to change is a positive no. Out of all the myriad efforts to embark on new paths very few are successful in achieving the desired result. History proves abundantly that societies more frequently are prepared to perish than to venture upon a mode of life to which they are not accustomed.

THE ROLE OF GENIUS IN AFFECTING SOCIAL PROGRESS

Individual genius stands on the same footing whether it be in science or in politics. In science, society exercises definite and positive controls. While they may work injustice as regards the individual great man, there is a far different standard of justice that society must adopt for its own protection and self-preservation. It cannot afford to entrust its fortunes to the vagaries of every intellect oppressed with a brilliant idea seeking objective confirmation.

Society has perfected through the millennia controls over even the most absolute of despots. Even the most imperious of wills has broken before the sullen inertia of the mass; and in those cases where the despot has prevailed, the invariable record of history is that both he and that particular society have left naught but a memory, and even that has been too frequently extinguished from the story of man.

Society is governed by laws which differ from the nature of the laws which govern its individual components. Those societies have survived which learned the lesson of dividing responsibility and power in order to put a brake on individual attempts at domination. The few who did succeed in establishing complete mastery during their lifetime did so only while preponderant force could prevail upon those whom they subjected to their sway. Upon their death too often their power vanished; some, like Napoleon, survived briefly the collapse of their power; but always society took back what belonged to it when circumstances were propitious; or society decayed and succumbed when it did not assert its paramountcy over a long period.

Those societies, like in China and India, that acquiesced to the surrender of its power to temporal and spiritual leadership today pay the penalty in being the most vegetative and unprogressive among civilized peoples. Now that the price is proving too great—which is but another way of putting the proposition that new historic conditions dictate a different method of approach to current problems—we notice in both those great countries a tremendous upsurge of national consciousness which will in time place them among the first rank of modern peoples.

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[21] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey, pp. 107-9.

The individual great man is justified in his complaint that democracies are a brake to political genius; but still, only a brake. There is something in the elan of the dictator who holds a caucus with himself and decides on the moment that captivates the imagination and excites the secret admiration of even the most convinced of democrats. But that charm works only while that decision is the correct one. Sooner or later, the dictator's mistakes are bound to creep up on him as society begins to pay the price for those errors.

Some day he will make one fatal mistake or add the last straw among his previous accumulation. Then there is no drawing back. It is either victory or disaster. And in the long run it must be disaster. It is not because a number of fools are collectively wiser than a single fool, but that numbers divide responsibility and cushion the shock, whereas the brittle dictator either stands upright or breaks; if he bends, he is lost, for the charm of infallibility is broken.

Even a dictator is mortal in the flesh, though his fame may be immortalized. No way has yet been found to transmit intact dictatorial power to a mediocrity in a modern first-rate power. What is called absolutism is really a dictatorship exercised through the intervention of many wills, which means no dictatorship at all. In modern times, these many wills are those of representatives in whom are reposited both the semblance and the essence of power.

Still that does not solve the problem whether democratic decisions will further or retard social progress. Spreading responsibility, while a safeguard against dictatorial action, is too often the pretext for no action at all. The human mind is essentially pragmatical without bothering much about the details of James' or Dewey's philosophy. A virile society, like that of England or the United States devises practical methods for advantaging the lessons of experience.

In England, the Cabinet is really the executive committee of the dominant party in the House of Commons. In the United States, the balance of power shifts alternately between the executive and the legislative branches of government dependent upon the character of the President and the political composition of Congress. The veiled dictatorship of the judiciary through the Supreme Court has now been ended, at least for a generation. While dictatorships have shown themselves to be the more spectacular, the democracies in the long run will demonstrate their greater lasting powers. Yet neither dictatorships nor democracies are freed from the necessity of directing their policies within the limitations of the societies over which they prevail.

AMBITIOUS LEADERS SELDOM POSSESS A DEVELOPED SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Political leaders, statesmen and social thinkers of all degrees concern themselves about society, but chiefly as individuals within society, with all the limitations of an individualistic approach. They have not yet learned that the science of society deals with a definite entity which is something different than the sum of its individual components, and that social laws of motion are different in their nature from individual motivations. Social science does not recognize the existence of individuals outside the influence of his social relationships. "Science," writes Dewey, "does not concern itself with the individualities of things. It is concerned with their relations. A law or statement of uniformity like that of the so-called causal sequence tells us nothing about a thing inherently; it tells us only about an invariant relation sustained in behavior of that thing with that of other things." [22]

John Smith as such tells us nothing about the man. John Smith, the steelworker, or the banker, or the father soon places that individual in understandable social relationships. Our knowledge about John Smith increases in direct proportion as we understand the various ties which bind him to his fellows. As a social being we know a great deal more about him if we understand the political, the economic and the ideological world of which he is a part.

Real statesmanship necessarily involves the ability to analyze present movements and so to foretell coming events. If we accept the definition of progress herein outlined as the fullest development of all the inherent possibilities of a definite social system, then such statesmanship must recognize the laws of motion which dominate the relations of the component elements within the social structure of his time. Having analyzed their methods of operation he would recognize their potencies and their limitations.

Let us assume the statesman is convinced that these have not exhausted their possibilities of development. He would undertake to defend his position and suggest constructive measures for their further growth and fulfillment. Practice and experience will demonstrate the correctness or fallacy of his position. If he is right, society will go still further ahead in the course along which it is already embarked. For capitalist society this is the extension of productive enterprise at profitable employment and the maintenance, at least, of social standards already achieved. If he is wrong, which under democratic processes will be quickly and perhaps painfully drawn to his attention by his opponents, either he or others more suitably equipped will be called upon to undertake a different course.

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[22] Philosophy and Civilization—Dewey (1931), pp. 293-4.

THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN STATESMANSHIP

As to what that course will be depends upon the extent of their knowledge of the controlling factors with which they deal. Too often the opposition possess no constructive program of their own. With the melancholy consequences of ignorance and indecision in times of crisis, history possesses an ample acquaintance. Defeat, stagnation, decay, these are the inevitable results of the inability of a society to accommodate itself to new historic situations.

But let us assume that we have a new type of statesmanship at the helm. There is no harm in this assumption, and it is not beyond the range of possibility, as the history of the United States during former crises has fully demonstrated. This statesmanship we will suppose to be fully aware of both the possibilities and the limitations of the situation, as was Lincoln who desired to abolish slavery eventually, but who actually rallied the North around the issue of preserving the Union. We will further endow this statesmanship with the essential power of persuasion, which in a democracy takes the form of prevailing upon the greater number.

This statesmanship need not be exclusive; on the contrary, the more expansive its ideas, the broader is the basis of its power. This statesmanship is thoroughly grounded in history and the social sciences. Its practical policies are dictated by the knowledge of the laws which govern social relationships and why they no longer function with their accustomed vigor. We will discount the tricks of the demagogue's art, for we will assume that both sides are equally adept in their employment.

If the new statesmanship prevails it is only because it has discovered the Achilles' heel of the standpatter's appeal to tradition. For survival to the present generation is a matter of greater importance than adherence to formulas which harbor the possibility of extinction. Few are afraid to die for a principle to which they are firmly attached, but they will hesitate about immolating themselves for the sake of a dogma that no longer inspires because it can no longer fulfill its mission.

Mankind has successfully met great crises in the past, and can surmount the present one if its nature is clearly understood. Genuine statesmanship is sound when its ideas are based on the realities of a given situation. It is far-sighted enough to formulate definite aims developed out of these realities. It is essentially practical enough to direct its actions along the lines of social motion once they are clearly established.

Statesmanship must now meet the fourth and conclusive test of progress. Its objectives must be clear-cut and attainable through the human and material forces at hand employed with the greatest degree of efficiency and the least derangement which any social transformation renders imperative. This ideal, of course, is more easily stated than achieved. The difficulty up to now for genuine statesmanship has been the inability to recognize the laws of historical motion, due chiefly to the denial that such laws exist. Some historians concede the possibility of their existence but immediately qualify that by the assertion that the mechanism of the human intellect debars it from the analysis of factors in which the observer necessarily plays a role.

Yet all the elements for the scientific analysis of the laws of social motion are at hand if only we would look for them. The organization of the social structure lies open before any who care to study its internal mechanism. No sound principles of statesmanship are conceivable unless the nature of the social structure is clearly grasped. Society up to now has just grown up, and no doubt is much the better off, with all its shortcomings, than the monstrosity which would have resulted if ignorant statesmen would have created it in the image of their own absurd idealizations.

THE INHERENT TENDENCY TOWARD PROGRESS IN A VIRILE SOCIETY

Whatever progress the human race has achieved has been due not so much to its conscious efforts, but almost in spite of them. Man's aims are limited to definite goals which the long-term verdict of history has invariably over-ridden. This is not due to any mysterious power which stands outside of society and takes delight in upsetting its plans. The fact is that society has never been a conscious factor in the shaping of its destiny. Nor could society up to now play the role of the maker of its own history, instead of being its victim. The historic processes have always been manipulated by anti-social or ignorant elements who temporarily possessed the instruments of power.

Only with the past few generations in the long line of the human race has the concept of society begun to assume coherent shape. It has not yet attained definite form. This habit of thought is too new to the human race. Even in the so-called democracies the ancient traditions are hard to overcome. New habits for the social exercise of social power have scarcely taken hold despite the outer forms of democratic processes.

"It would be difficult," writes Geoffrey Crowther, editor of the London Economist, "to find a political concept that is capable of as many divergent definitions as democracy. America, Britain, and France are all passionately attached to the democratic ideal—and they all mean different things by it." [23] He goes on to contend that to an American democracy is synonymous with personal equality; to an Englishman with liberty; to a Frenchman, with the undisturbed enjoyment of property.

The gross inequalities of wealth in the United States are patent to all; in England considerable vestiges of a class order of society are still visible; in France, the state is a stern disciplinarian; yet all are democracies, and each reflects the temperament of a people and the actualities of their existence. Progress can be experinced better than it can be defined. But its consequences are unmistakable in a virile civilization whatever its specific form. Mere growth is not virility, for then China and India would be the most progressive of nations.

The science of history cannot generalize as to all peoples nor conditions of social existence. But it can point out that definite political conditions which allow for social development are due to the structure of the indigenous society. That in the last analysis is the resultant of the operation of definite factors which shape the organization of the state as it is determined by the dominant economy and the ideology of an historical epoch.

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND PANACEAS FOR PROGRESS ARE THE PRODUCT OF SUBJECTIVE RATIONALIZATION

No people have ever suffered from the want of plans, programs and panaceas for their difficulties. Our history proves the American intellect to be as prolific in their derivation as any, and perhaps more so than most. Still our history does not show a single example where a fundamental political change has been effected by prevision rather than by compulsion. The facts of life are the most compelling of

[23] The New York Times Magazine, Jan. 21, 1940.

factors. Fortunately, barring the Civil War, all changes have been peaceably effected.

Most changes have been evolved by adaptation and modification of long-established policies or institutions. If some are inclined to point to our Constitution as a great achievement of historic prevision —a proposition no one would, or should care to dispute at a Fourth of July celebration—the fact still remains that the Constitution came after independence had been achieved, and after the Articles of Confederation had demonstrated their impotency; while the Constitution itself was the consequence of practical compromises by practical men who were laying the foundations for a future government as far as their vision could foresee, and that only in general outline with provision for its amendment by future generations.

Before long, twelve amendments were adopted by those who had agreed upon the original structure. With all their prevision, the elements for the violent sundering of the union were contained in the slavery compromises. Nor could it have been otherwise. No intellectual garment can be devised to cover completely the framework of a growing and developing social order. All that we can hope for is that when the time arrives for a fundamental change, that change will be effected by the processes of reason and in accord with the peaceful provisions contained in the fundamental framework, through the due exercise of the legislative power, by forward-looking judicial interpretation, and as a last resort, by amendment.

While the possibility of effecting changes in the political organization of society is important, of much greater importance is the nature of the changes desired and the time when they should be effected. The most hardened standpatter today is dimly aware that our social structure cannot stand much longer as it is now organized. Even the unimaginative Chamberlain talked darkly about a new European organization which must supplant the present nationalism now run riotous and unheeding into a second World War. More he did not say, either because he did not have more to say, or because he could not afford to say much more in the midst of a great crisis where united action and not divisive discussion must occupy the center of national attention.

Here in the United States there is developing a broad and deep general consciousness that the country cannot go plodding along indefinitely as things are today with industry, agriculture, labor and government in their existing state. We are living in the electric time of an interregnum between the social order as it is now constituted, and the social order which must supplant it. It goes without question that the instinct of the masses, here as the world over, is for letting things go on in their accustomed manner after effecting the necessary patch-work. Such patches will no longer hold. The conditions themselves do not permit of this easy relapse to the familiar ways.

Every vital statistic proves that society is approaching a stalemate. Even increased longevity has brought with it the additional problem of the worker past his physical prime and of the aged who face their declining years with little or no resources save the generosity of society. Abounding natural resources remain undeveloped, productive forces in industry and agriculture lie fallow, unemployment staggers along with its millions, marriages are postponed, the birth-rate declines, and the only way out appears to be universal suicide through the destruction wrought by war. Even then some nations are restrained by that last rational impulse which recoils from the impending disaster which must engulf their civilizations.

Seldom indeed was the outlook for humanity so forbidding, its future so uncertain. Upon the editorial page of the morning newspaper of the day when this is being written there appears ample confirmation of this thesis. Each of the eight editorials shows another aspect of society gripped in the maelstrom of a precipitous decline. This newspaper ranks, justly, as among the ablest edited in the country. It is conservative in policies, constructive in approach, and cautious in outlook.

Here are the gleanings of a single day gathered together for comment upon the contemporary scene as viewed from the editorial tower of the New York Times.[24] The first editorial deals with the expiration of the thirty-year-old commercial treaty between the United States and Japan, denounced by the former after six months' due notice, to express this government's disapproval of Japanese policy in China. For three years since Japan procured the "incident" which led to its assault upon China, the United States has been its chief supplier of basic war materials, such as oil, scrap iron, machinery and cotton for Japan's industrial sinews and munitions of war.

The second editorial reflects a somewhat peevish reminder by interested parties that while appeals for Finnish war relief are all very proper, we must not overlook that even comparatively opulent Great Britain and France are hard-pressed for civilian relief of those directly affected by the war, and will contributions please be sent to the chairman of those relief funds. The third editorial comments upon the upholding by the New York State Appellate Division of the conviction of a former great political leader who sold protection against prosecution to powerful gangsters who for years prayed with impunity upon the citizens of our largest city.

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[24] Issue of January 27, 1940.

The fourth editorial is an appeal for the saving of the Metropolitan Opera House as a valuable adjunct of American cultural life. It admits that for generations opera was supported by the socially elect for their show-off occasions. Now that it is a useless adjunct for the heirs of the Four Hundred, will the masses kindly oblige by coming forward with contributions to preserve grand opera in private control —and intrigue—free from the demeaning contamination of social control.

The fifth editorial is an appeal for the quickened Allied assistance to Finland and her glorious ski troops in its first war against Russia. The sixth editorial tells of the horrible disaster wrought by the Spanish Civil War, and describes the plight of 500,000 men and women political prisoners in Franco's jails and concentration camps. The seventh editorial deals with the dissolution of the Canadian Parliament and the coming general election on the issue of a more vigorous Canadian participation in war. The eighth editorial describes the tangled pension status of certain civil service employees and brings to the mind of the reader, indirectly, the entire involved old age pension question which society, in self-defense if not from humanitarian motives, will soon be called upon to solve in a manner befitting the wealth and resources of the United States.

Of course, it is the duty of editors to discuss problems arising out of social dislocations. The normal in society cannot be news. But the important point is not the variety, but the nature of the problems which now afflict our distraught society. Nowhere throughout over three columns of small type is there evidenced the recognition of the social forces which produce the circumstances described. Nowhere is there an appreciation of the significance of the material, the moral and the intellectual degeneration which those events disclose. Nowhere is there a constructive proposal advanced; only palliation of the immediate problem is proposed. Throughout there is a dogged resolve to stick it out and see it through along the same lines, let hell gape and thunder roar, but with as little incidental cost as possible, please, to the class the New York Times represents. For while that supercilious organ always speaks in behalf of the best interests of the nation, it always means by that the "best" people, and not the greatest number of people.

SOCIETY HAS SOLVED GREATER PROBLEMS THAN NOW CONFRONTS IT

This is not to paint a picture of impending doom. The world has encountered greater problems, and worse disasters, and survived them.

The human race will still go on. But the real question is how will it go on? Will our civilization, such as it is, survive? Some egregious optimists are even emboldened to ask, cannot our civilization realize those great inherent possibilities we all know it to possess for the further improvement of mankind?

These questions are too general. The human race is a social abstraction. We deal with definite entities as society is organized today; with nations like the United States, with those of Western Europe, or the Soviet Union, or China, Japan or the great African continent so grotesquely cut up and divided among the nations of Europe. We must know what it is that constitutes that extraordinary entity we call a nation.

Particularly we are concerned with this great nation we call the United States. To it, we owe that deepest love which inspires the last full measure of devotion; its institutions create in our hearts the profoundest reverence; the glory and tragedy of its history awakens in us the most generous sentiments of patriotic ardor; it stimulates the keenest sympathy for its people and arouses an exalted admiration for its imperishable past. We cherish as our dearest treasure the inspiration of its traditions, and we are highly resolved to carry on, and to pass on to the coming generation the sacred torch of freedom which was entrusted to our care. O, grant that our hand will not falter. Grant us the vision for our course, the understanding to pursue it, and the steadfastness for the struggle in the same measure as was given our fathers.

Faith, prayer, idealism, all have their potent role to play in history. So has science and the quiet assuredness with which it may support the rest, and in turn be stimulated to perseverance by them. We have often spoken of historical laws. The unfoldment of the history of our country in the light shed by the Historical Field Theory will disclose the nature of those laws and their mode of operation as they have been made manifest in the record of our past.

At the very outset of this work we cautioned the reader against the danger of accepting general conclusions for specific laws. Therefore, we have refrained very deliberately from stating these laws as conclusions, and then developing them out of the historical record itself. This is a perfectly legitimate procedure in general science, but history has not been established as a science, and such a statement would stand charged with having prejudged the case.

In a new field of inquiry it is best not to state the conclusions, but how they were developed and then draw from the historical phenomena itself their rationale and their justification. To the contention that only those historical facts will be presented that fit into the theory, the answer is that all material facts must be adequately encompassed by a theory which lays claim to being scientific. There will be no quibble as to what is a material fact. Any fact which can be shown to influence the course of history is a material fact and must be satisfactorily explained by a scientifically valid theory of history.

Enough has been submitted to indicate that by progress we mean not an absolute principle toward which society is presumed to tend, but rather the opportunity for furthest development of all the factors inherent within a social system definite in its organization and of a temporal nature as historical time is reckoned.

We have emphasized the elements which enter into the qualitative and quantitative composition of the social structure at a given time. We have stressed the fact that this social aggregate is composed of three divisions, the state, the economy, and the ideological superstructure. We will be able to establish, particularly as it applies to the United States, and generally as it applies to every other civilization of which we have record, past or present, that the development of a civilization is dependent upon the relation that any two of these factors, the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure, bears to the third. If this law can be successfully established, we will have an invaluable measuring rod by which to gauge the progress attained by a civilized society at a definite phase of its historical development. But all factors are relative to their time, and their value is not absolute but in relation to their own historical form and function.

DEFINITION OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

Social progress is the opportunity afforded by society for the development of the creative forces inherent in the social structure during the virile periods of a civilization.

CHAPTER VII

Causality or Indeterminacy In History

A. Search for Law in Phenomena

IMPORTANCE OF THE FUTURE IN A SCIENCE OF HISTORY

It might appear to some as a gratuitous incursion into the troubled waters of contemporary scientific thought for the historian to weigh the respective merits of causality or indeterminacy amongst his problems. Yet they cannot, and should not be avoided. If history is to achieve its highest, its most significant utilitarian purpose, it must face resolutely the problem of predicting future events.

That such predictions are actually being made even by the most mediocre of intellects is a commonplace, and therefore little noticed, experience imposed by the very nature of our social existence. There is a point where reason, intuition and instinct are merged, and are indistinguishable from each other. The least thoughtless recognizes that the morrow will come whether or not he will be there to greet it; that food, clothing and shelter will be required, that ordinary business pursuits will be resumed in their accustomed manner, and that a multitude of familiar relations will still be met with on the morrow and the day after that in the usual fashion.

Now it may happen that a particular individual will not again experience a to-morrow, or the job will be lost, or the subway will break down, or a number of other unpredictable events, as far as he is affected, will take place. The student of society who is not concerned with the individual as such, outside of his social relations, is necessarily engaged in making predictions of a very definite character. He assumes that the human race as it is now constituted will continue on substantially in their present mode of existence for the next day or month or year. Industry, agriculture, commerce, politics, even war, disease and death are definite elements in his calculations.

"In physics, as in every other science," says Planck, "common sense alone is not supreme; there must also be a place for Reason. Further, the mere absence of logical contradiction does not necessarily imply that everything is reasonable. Now reason tells us that if we turn our back upon a so-called object and cease to attend to it, the object still continues to exist. Reason tells us further that both the individual and mankind as a whole, together with the entire world which we apprehend through our senses, is no more than a tiny fragment of the vastness of Nature, whose laws are in no way affected by any brain. On the contrary, they existed long before there was any life on earth, and will continue to exist long after the last physicist has perished." [1]

In these eloquent words the distinguished promulgator of the Quantum Theory has put in his case for the reality of the external world beyond the word images of the individual. At the same time it is the medium for our affirmance of the reality of society and the events which take place independent of the observer and regardless of his particular existence. The elective executive, the dictator, the captain of industry, all are indeed very concrete personalities, but none of them would function as they do were they lonely outcasts on some little island.

Continuity from moment to moment is the essence of prediction. It is a far different matter when we consider, as history necessarily must, the question of what it is that continues, and whether it will continue in the same manner, or will undergo changes during the passage of time and its mere relations in space. In short, the entire vital processes of physical existence comes within the scope of the historian's necessary philosophical background. He must equip himself for his task with a satisfactory theory of existence in order to understand how continuity is effected and to solve the problem of how changes are evolved.

That changes do take place is the elemental fact of history. Why they take place in a certain manner, at a certain time, and under definite conditions are questions that would, if properly answered, constitute a substantial triumph for the human intellect, besides contributing much to the future welfare of mankind.

Obviously in this day such problems require for their consideration the co-operation of all the sciences. From the standpoint of society there is no such thing as the hierarchy of the sciences. All must contribute toward making our civilization what it is, and if physics of late has been occupying the spotlight, as Selig Hecht, professor of biophysics complains somewhat petulantly,[2] it is only because that field has attracted some of our keenest intellects, whereas the social sciences touch too intimately the deepest interests of the controlling powers in society to be permitted that indiscriminate freedom which every theoretical physicist looks upon as his natural birthright.

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[1] The Universe In the Light of Modern Physics—Planck (1931), p. 8.

[2] Harper's Monthly Magazine, Jan., 1935, p. 238.

THE ROLE OF CAUSALITY OR CHANCE IN ESTABLISHING HISTORY AS A SCIENCE

Whether or not historic events are causality connected or are the result of chance, accident or mathematical probability are much more than abstract speculations. Their answer goes to the very root of the historian's method of procedure. Of what would it avail us, if after all our labor, the reader were to agree that while strict causality has been proved in all past history, the future must be shrouded in darkness, or is controlled by chance? One may be convinced that historical events are controlled by laws, but conclude that these laws are not causal, but indeterminate in nature.

Should he accept the proposition that historical laws are causal in nature, his method of procedure is narrowly circumscribed by the classic methods of science. "There is only one method of apprehending the real nature of causality," wrote Planck. "This method is to begin with the world of data which we possess, i.e., our experiences, to generalize, to eliminate as far as possible all anthropomorphic elements and thus cautiously to elaborate an objective concept of causality. The many attempts which have been made in this direction show us that the best approach to the concept of causality consists in attaching it to the capacity of foretelling future events which we have acquired and tested in daily experience. And indeed there is no better means of demonstrating the causal connection between two events than to show that the occurrence of the one event can regularly permit us to forecast the occurrence of the other." [3]

We will disregard for the moment Planck's conclusion that in no single instance is it possible accurately to predict a physical event. Our principal concern is the method of procedure which Planck outlines for the scientist who would proceed to explain by causality the operation of particular laws in producing definite results. For the question still remains whether in history we are dealing with a single event or a large number of events which are traced to a particular source.

The supporters of indeterminacy contend that we really do not deal with a single event but a very large number of events, and that what we observe is actually the resultant of these many happenings.

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[3] The Philosophy of Physics—Planck (1936), p. 44.

The regularity we observe, and which the indeterminist concedes, is not due to the invariant operation of causal factors, but rather to the result which will take place when a myriad of influences cancel each other out and leave us with the average of their mathematical combination, or statistical probability.

Both determinist and indeterminist will agree upon the result, but not as to how that result was produced. The first will stress the resort to the classical methods of scientific inquiry in search of an efficient cause; the other will press the accumulation of facts, rather than how they were produced, for to him history is the result of the calculus of probability.

THE STATISTICAL METHOD OF FORECASTING FUTURE EVENTS

In history these divergent methods of scientific procedure result in the relatively small school which still persist in building up its case by the plodding methods of classical science, as against the much larger group who have recourse to charts, diagrams, curves and cycles derived from the observed phenomena by the process of mathematical formulation. The classical school will predict, if at all, by firm reliance upon causality. The so-called modern school will consult their graphs and predict the future by the process of an extra-polation based on the established results of known factors. If the factors upon which these predictions are based do not continue as mapped out, the conclusions enounced on such contingencies must fall to the ground.

Thus in 1912 some optimistic Socialist leaders had it all worked out on the basis of their movement's progress during the preceding Presidential elections that Eugene V. Debs would be the nation's Chief Executive by 1928. Unfortunately for them as a consequence of the First World War and the Russian Revolution the Socialist Party was hopelessly split by 1920 and is to-day practically non-existent.

According to the industrial charts of the statisticians in 1928 we ought now to be enjoying a paradise on earth from the standpoint of the material production of wealth widely distributed, instead of wallowing in the chaos of unemployment, and teetering on the brink of another plunge into the Second World War. There is a little comfort perhaps, for the social scientist in the thought that both the economists and the political theoreticians who depended on the process of pragmatical inquiry and mathematical extra-polation were both proved to be wrong.

First of all, he would be practically alone in the enjoyment of his crumb of philosophical satisfaction, since the well-populated fortress of classical science of old now finds few champions, though, oddly enough both Planck and Einstein, among the chief architects of modern thought, still stand, albeit somewhat irresolutely, with the old rank. But the only intellectual satisfaction that the supporter of causality derives from the progress of history during the past fifteen years is the complete bankruptcy of the pragmatic school and the need, now so evident, for recourse to the methods of classical science.

By the pragmatic school we mean that particular intellectual product which was the creature of our dominant thought during the heyday of prosperity from 1900 to 1930. The practical man did not have to understand the why and wherefore of things. All he needed to know was that somehow things clicked and there were his bank book, his production chart and eventually his income tax to prove that all was for the best in the best possible of worlds. The only upward curve he seriously objected to was in the amount of his tax payments, and that was substantially reduced during the Coolidge era of prosperity. The great American philosophy was that which brought results, and the only results known to the practical mind were those that could be grasped, particularly by the fingers.

The American business man never indulged in speculations—that is, of the philosophical order. He left that to the professors of the well-endowed universities. They uniformly taught, under the benign influence of Dewey, that a theory corresponds to facts only when it leads to other similar facts through the medium of experience. And since no experience is more pleasant nor more earnestly sought for than prosperity, the institutional processes whereby such marvelous results were uniformly obtained by the upper strata, with filterings to the classes below, were of all things the most desirable, and the most perfect on earth; subject of course, to future checking, but with no doubt as to the result.

Pragmatism theoretically differentiates itself from crude empiricism which is interested only with facts and their workability. Pragmatism is concerned with future operational functions and their consequent result. "An empiricism," writes Dewey, "which is content with repeating facts already past has no place for possibility and for liberty. It cannot find room for general conceptions or ideas, at least no more than to consider them as summaries or records. But when we take the point of view of pragmatism we see that general ideas have a very different role to play than that of reporting and registering past experiences. They are the bases for organizing future observations and experiences." [4]

These observations and conclusions are all perfectly well as long as things function well, but they collapse when the world of experience which supports them collapses. Pragmatism is not concerned with the origin and development of its experimental phenomena. It surely is not concerned with their laws of motions, but only with their results. The great crisis and ensuing depression annihilated one set of social pragmatists nurtured under the Coolidge-Hoover regimes. Another set of pragmatists came on to the scene as the architects of the New Deal with their curves of production, with their hills and steps and valleys and the mysterious cycles of business. The grand social structure based around the N.R.A. collapsed with its fall, and they have been floundering around helplessly ever since from one improvisation to another, and are admittedly getting nowhere.

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[4] Philosophy and Civilization—Dewey (1931), pp. 24-5.

SCIENCE IS CONCERNED WITH LAWS GOVERNING PHENOMENA

Science is concerned with the laws which govern phenomena and is not content to ruminate unceasingly about the phenomena itself. A law is the statement of a definite relation between physical phenomena in agreement with provable fact. The most perfect expression of a law is the rational explanation of a present state and the absolute prediction of a future state under conditions stated by that law.

Writes Planck: "What now do we mean by a physical law? A physical law is any proposition enunciating a fixed and absolutely valid connection between measurable physical quantities—a connection which permits us to calculate one of these quantities if the others have been discovered by measurement. The highest and most keenly desired aim of any physicist is to obtain the most perfect knowledge possible of the laws of Physics, whether he looks at them from a utilitarian point of view and values them because they enable him to save himself the trouble of costly measurements, or takes a deeper view and looks to them for satisfaction of a profound yearning after knowledge and for a firm basis of natural science." [5]

Mathematics is the means of attaining the highest expression of exactness, and the price we must pay for abandoning, or surrendering the use of mathematical formulations is the concomitant loss of precision in the formulation of laws.[6]

The question immediately arises: Are historical laws subject to mathematical formulation? The answer must be no. Not all laws need necessarily be stated in that form. The language of mathematics only

[5] The Universe In the Light of Modern Physics—Planck, p. 58.

[6] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, p. 29.

aids in precision, but the inability in our present state of knowledge, or conceivable state of future knowledge, to use the language of perfection does not militate against the existence of definite laws developed out of definite, physical relations.

It can be stated, for example, as an absolute law of capitalist economy that large scale industry is predicated upon the following relations in our economic system: the existence of a class which owns the means of production, and of another class, which uses those means of production. Obviously the steel workers as a class would not labor in the steel mills if all of them were enjoying incomes from independent sources of ten thousand dollars a year. We know human nature, and we draw the logical deductions from the employer-employee relationship.

Yet it is quite possible that in a careful search among the vast number of steel workers thus engaged, there may be found a few who do enjoy such an independent income and perhaps more. Such a fact would not defeat the law of the relations of production nor would it be contrary to human nature as we know it. We have already discussed the question of worker-ownership of securities in the corporation by which he is employed. From the standpoint of scientific social inquiry the capital-labor relations as stated is a fundamental law of capitalist economy, no matter how it is encrusted, often deliberately so, by extraneous factors.

Again we can state with certainty that no enterprise conducted on a capitalist basis will go on indefinitely year after year losing millions of dollars a year, and with the certainty that there will be no change in this situation. Yet we know that some enterprises will go on for a considerable time despite heavy losses, not in contradiction of the profit motive, but because of it.

In other words, history must have its constants, just as physics has its constants. But though the constants of physics are universal, since its phenomena are ruled by relatively simple and few laws, the so-called constants of history must be of an historical, and therefore of a limited validity. Physics is justly proud of its universal constants, such as the gravitational constation of Einstein, the velocity of light, the mass or charge of an electron or proton in accordance with Planck's great discovery.

History does not deal with constants out of their relations in a definite social structure. Human nature is too variegated and fluctuating to serve the purpose of an historical generalization, even if it could be defined with the rigidity required by science. But history does deal with constants in a relative field of the nature discussed in the processes of capitalist economy.

Conceding for the moment that capitalism is the dominant mode of production to-day, yet it is not the exclusive mode of production. Small scale petty industry continues wherein the entrepreneur is not governed by the rigid profit and loss accounts of a large-scale enterprise. Millions of our farmers are really subsistence farmers, who sell part of their crop for cash to purchase those things which they cannot produce. Government itself is engaged in industry on a basis which would soon wreck a private enterprise, only because it obtains periodic replenishment through its general revenues. The laws of production of feudal economy were far different from those of the Roman latifundian estates. Still the bushel of wheat from the land of the American farmer, that produced by the feudal serf or the Roman slave was still the same bushel of wheat regardless of the different social systems under which they were produced. History, too, has its certainties, but they are of a nature which differs fundamentally from the certainties of physics.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN HISTORY AND PHYSICS

History deals with the definite problems of a limited period, whereas theoretical physics concerns itself with the nature of universal reality. That does not mean that the solutions for physical problems now currently accepted will survive the investigations of even the present generation of scientists. Planck considers the question of absolute concepts for physical science: "In view of the experiences through which scientific progress has passed, we must admit that in no case can we rest assured that what is absolute in science to-day will remain absolute for all time. Not only that, but we must admit as certain the truth that the absolute can never finally be grasped by the researcher. The absolute represents an ideal goal which is always ahead of us and which we can never reach." [7]

The historian is even more fortunately situated than the physicist. He does not have to search for the absolute in history or human destiny. He leaves that to the preacher or to the moralist who are more expert in those matters. All that the historian is concerned with is to demonstrate how forms of social organizations and religions and moral concepts are derived from given historical conditions, are determined by them, and in turn react upon the peoples of their time. History does not have to consider human nature as an absolute, unchanging, unvarying factor, so long as we know that human characteristics are relatively stable and predictable over a given period.

[7] Where Is Science Going?—Planck (1932), pp. 199-200.

Our knowledge of historical development is immeasurably enhanced by the fact that we recognize as spiritual blood-brothers the peoples of other past civilizations whose records we can now decipher. It adds to the solidity of our understanding to know that human beings at a certain stage of their development will react to definite conditions in a definite way. This does not preclude modifications within the human element itself, individually or collectively. The great advantage of historical laws is that our investigation is limited to the analysis of what the conditions are that make civilized human beings act in the way they do, and why they react in that manner. For laws are developed out of definite relations, and both the laws and the relations through which they manifest themselves are modified or are destroyed when the particular historical field in which they manifest themselves has been radically modified or changed.

People will still live in houses under a capitalist regime as well as in a Socialist society. But it will make all the difference in the world as to the type and location of those houses whether they are produced upon the basis of the effective laws prevailing in a capitalist economy, or are created by society for the adequate housing of its people, with emphasis on the word adequate. This opens vistas of achievement in housing which are impossible of attainment under the laws of capitalist economy, despite the obvious fact that we now possess all the elements necessary for proper housing in engineering skill and in the abundant supply of material and labor.

This proposition many will concede without further cavil. But they will not be so quick to agree that definite laws in modern society as now constituted compel the existence side by side of the anomaly of shameful slums and unemployed building workers, while banks bulge with accumulated capital lying fallow for lack of profitable use. Here people draw the line. The conclusions which may properly be deduced from this situation possesses elements of danger to the dominant social class. Therefore the problem of housing, for one, is surrounded by an intricate maze of conflicting opinion, data, reports, charts, statistics, commissions, philanthropy, the ambition, egotism and vanity of politicians, and of the ministrations of vicarious thrill hunters and voluntary charity workers.

LIMITED VALIDITY OF HISTORICAL LAW

Historical law instantly arranges order out of this chaos and states simply that on the basis of the present organization of society adequate housing for the masses is impossible. Even the term adequate has a limited historical meaning. An entire mass of problems arise out of this situation inherent in the present social order of historically limited validity. Since the average weekly wage of those employed in the so-called unskilled and semi-skilled occupations is around $25 to $30 a week—when they are working—available living quarters must be gauged by that fact. Experience has shown that the average family can safely spend for rent per month one week's income. For such a family the choice is confined to the slum district, or to some form of philanthropy in housing.

That can be obviated by having another member of the family working, if such a one is available, and is fortunate enough to secure the highly coveted job. Unmarried sons and daughters eventually develop an existence of their own. Wives must contribute to the family income if the living status is to be raised. If, perchance, there are many young children, the family is sunk to the lowest level of existence. Therefore families must be limited in this age of knowledge about contraceptives.

It is pitiful to contemplate that recently there was hailed as a triumph of our civilization the recognition of birth control to the level of legal respectability under the euphemistic title of planned parentage. This is no brief for large families. It is merely a demand that social problems be recognized for what they are, as the result of definite conditions controlled by social laws. The law of population during colonial times or a hundred years ago was far different than what it is to-day. Let us draw the mask from religious bigotry and the moral hypocrisy of so-called reformers on the problem of population, and point to the definite historical forces which compel limitation on the part of existing families and retard the assumption of marriage obligations on the part of young people unless both parties are willing to work and are lucky enough to find someone to employ them.

Pollyannas and apologists will both raise the entirely false issue of a married woman's right to a career. No one denies that, although there is much to be said for successful homemaking as a career to tax the ability of the ablest among our aspiring womanhood. The simple question here postulated is that young women, and older women too, are compelled to camouflage breadwinning with the euphemistic halo of a career while under the stress of strict necessity, when, if left to their own devices, the family unit and the family manner of living would be far different than that which they must accept because they have no other choice.

Historical laws developed out of definite social relations prevailing at a given time will prove, for example, why our national net income hovered between sixty and seventy billion dollars annually before the war and was unable to realize but a fraction of the wealth-creating capacity which the nature of our resources and the character of our people now render possible. Nondescript reformers and all types of botchers whose only qualification is the ability to write or read a speech have filled us all with astonishment at the facility with which they reel off cures without understanding the first principles of normal social physiology, let alone the elements of social pathology.

Those terms are foreign to the science of history because it knows no such thing as the normal society, and therefore cannot recognize the abnormal in society. We arbitrarily select a certain year as the base for our calculations. But no one can show why that basis is selected, and in what degree that is normal of society. Up to recent times the year 1925 was most customarily used for the purpose of equating production in steel, car-loadings, automobiles and what not. Lately the average for 1935-1939 has been so employed. All these statistical references are arbitrary. They disclose nothing of the underlying social forces at work.

Those who employ that ready economic reference generally feel absolved from the necessity of explaining the laws of social movement. Results are what counts. Of course, results are important. Primitive man, too, was a shrewd judge of results. If modern man surpasses him—and anthropology shows how little indeed we differ from early man in the basic human qualities—it is only because we have applied science to the problem of unearthing why those results were achieved, with the object of improving upon nature by the employment of her own forces to suit man's higher purposes.

COMPLEXITY NO BAR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF HISTORICAL SCIENCE

Take laws out of science, and we are confronted with the sheerest empiricism. History so far has not developed out of that stage. Every utterance of our leading public men, editors, statesmen, politicians and economists prove that conclusively. Opinions on social problems are seriously expressed and accepted which, if they dealt with some other phases of human concern, would be laughed to scorn as the ignorant vaporings of charlatans. An aspirant for the Republican nomination for President, and a powerful leader of his party, Congressman Joseph W. Martin Jr. issued a twelve point program for the solution of the country's ills which for sheer inanity would claim the booby prize in any school contest.[8] And he by no means plumbed the depths of contemporary statesmanship. Let one hasten to add that our editors, educators and commentators are not much superior in wisdom, else Martin would not have dared publish his balderdash.

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[8] Published in the New York Times, Jan. 30, 1940.

In no branch of knowledge is the standard of education of such a low calibre as that which exists among the social sciences. There obscurantism is deliberately cultivated. The laws of motion of the solar system are of infinitely greater importance, apparently, than the laws of motion in human society. Where laws are eagerly searched for in the first instance, they are as resolutely denied in the second. The complexity of social phenomena is the excuse advanced for the difficulty in establishing historical laws. Yet it will be shown that the laws of social motion in essence are no more complex than those of the solar system or of the atom. The real reason for the relatively high development of the physical sciences over the social sciences is that the former are safe to pursue and sometimes yield profitable results, while the latter deal with matters of most vital, immediate concern to the existing powers who sit uneasily over the social volcano. The impartial, scientific study of social phenomena is inconceivable in a class-dominated society.

It is the duty of the historian to prove that the surest way of realizing that which people most fear is to close our eyes to the realities before it is too late, or before the country abandons itself to the lethargy of innocuousness and decay. It is the historian's function to point out the road to the progressive resolution of our difficulties and toward the attainment on the part of all our people of a level of civilization dreamed of only by the sages and prophets of the past, but which is now within our grasp.

ECONOMIC STATESMANSHIP IMPAIRED BY ABSENCE OF HISTORICAL LAWS

That the utterances of our statesmen are seriously meant and as seriously reviewed is evidenced both by their careful preparation and the scrutiny to which their proposals are currently subjected. Should we turn, from the aspirant for political office to the economist in public service, we find that his level of social perception is not of a much higher order.

This is illustrated by the testimony of a recognized economist before a Congressional Committee on the vital problem of foreign trade pacts as they affect domestic labor. In the course of his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee on the results achieved by the reciprocal trade agreements, Isador Lubin, Commissioner of Labor Statistics, urged the continuance of this policy on the ground that these pacts negotiated by Secretary of State Hull has resulted in

300,000 additional jobs created for American workmen by the increased exports of our products.[9]

When questioned as to the consequences of the imports received from the treaty countries upon the domestic industries thus affected, he at first denied that any workers were thereby thrown out of employment. Upon being confronted with evidence to the contrary he retorted—having obviously prepared himself for the rebuttal if cornered—that American labor benefited in the final settlement, because the worker received an average of 75 cents an hour on the products for export, whereas he received only 55 cents an hour in the industries affected by the alleged competition from imports. The conclusion followed that the higher paid industries are prospering because of the treaties, while the lower paid industries have no place in our economy.

EXAMPLE OF HULL'S RECIPROCAL TRADE PACTS

Among the lower paid industries are lumber, boots, and shoes, crude petroleum, glass, cement, clocks and watches. In the first place, there is no inherent reason why these industries should pay their workers one third less than rubber and tires, wire, textile, machinery, cash registers and so forth. Modern industry is based essentially upon the working tool being attached to the frame of a machine, and the worker's movements being regulated by the motion of the machine rather than by the operation of individual skill or judgment. All labor in modern industry outside of a few specially trained experts is what is described as common unskilled labor. The fact is that so-called common labor represents a high degree of intelligence and technical skill acquired by training and the mechanical aptitude characteristic of this age, where the small boy can take apart and assembles first his toy electric engine, and later the engine of the family automobile.

If labor in some industries is more highly paid than in other industries, it is not for Lubin to pass the death sentence on the lower paid labor, but to find out exactly why this situation exists. He would soon discover that labor organization or the lack of it supplied a suitable answer. Or it may be that the industry is located in districts of sweated labor, or is due to industrial inefficiency, or to geographical location, such as in the South where the slavery tradition toward labor still exists, or the Northwest, where vigilantes and one hundred per cent Americans employ force and intimidation to keep labor organizers out.

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[9] New York Times, Jan. 28, 1940.

But the main issue is still untouched. The disparity of wages cited has nothing to do with the case. It is the total amount of products in dollars that counts in international trade balances. High or low wages may determine, though not necessarily, how many products will be exchanged, but not the total amounts which must be balanced on the basis of reciprocal trade pacts. In their theoretical operation a million dollars of imports from country A must be balanced by a million dollar exports to country A. Triangular settlements are left out because that does not affect the issue. The United States must import from the agreeing country in one way or another the amount that it exports, or settle for the balance by extending a loan.

Triangular settlements bring in a number of complicated exchange problems which it is the very purpose of those agreements to avoid. When capitalism was in its prime gold settlement was the basic law of international exchange. To-day each nation hoards its gold stock, and the United States to-day holds over twenty-one billion dollars' worth of that metal.

Now the country that buys from us can settle in only three ways. Dollar payments are ruled out by the nature of the trade pact. Exports to balance purchases here must be of a character that will not compete with domestic industry. The third is loans from us to finance the purchases.

Past experience has shown that such loans really are in the nature of a gift. There is no other way for effecting balances.

So long as England was the workshop of the world it could consistently support the policy of free trade, and habitually import more than it exported with the difference representing income to its leisure and ruling classes on their export of capital and "law and order." To-day those imports are still in the main raw materials and luxury products, where the money obtained for the raw material is again transformed into the means of payment for the leisure class.

The United States cannot adjust its economy to the status of England as a tribute-receiving nation. Imports from our purchasers must be industrial and agricultural products. Outside of a few selected basic materials such as rubber, tin, manganese and coffee, imports must compete with our own products, with their only advantage being a lower selling price.

Hence coal comes in from Wales, cement from Belgium, butter from Denmark and machinery from England. South American countries like Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay can send us only agricultural products of which we already have an abundance.

The whole issue is finally boiled down to this fundamental law of modern economy. Sale and purchase are polar relations of a single transaction. The seller must have payment for his particular equivalent, which is the particular product he produces. The purchaser must pay either in the universal equivalent, which is gold, or in a product which he offers in exchange. Modern capitalism has practically destroyed its traditional method of settlement. This destruction was caused by the industrial development which it itself fostered by capital export to the erstwhile colonial and semi-colonial countries.

These South American countries can now pay only in competing products, as far as the United States is concerned. Those countries which settle in complementary products like Cuba, Central America, the Philippine Islands, Chile, Bolivia and Peru, are, economically or politically, dependencies of the United States. Secretary Hull may speak blandly about the civilizing aspects of trade. But trade throughout history has also had its unpleasant aspects, not the least of which have been war, exploitation, enslavement and rapine.

The only economic international policy the New Deal has been able to devise is that of the reciprocal trade pacts. They have been a failure, and they could not have been otherwise. They have failed to achieve any of their major objectives. Knowledge of the laws of social motion would have prevented this useless chasing after an elusive, because unobtainable goal. It would also have caused our Latin-American diplomacy to be grounded on a more realistic basis.

From a practical standpoint, Lubin had to show how the twenty-two nations having reciprocal trade pacts with the United States can settle their balances without gold or by sending us their competitive products. He claimed 300,000 additional workers were directly employed and thousands of others indirectly employed because of these pacts. But he does not tell us that the only reason why this condition can exist, is because those countries were benefiting from the war orders of England and France and thereby obtained the exchange for settlement of the balances against them in the United States.

We have had economists juggle with facts before. President Hoover had a slew of them in the Department of Commerce, but all the necromancy of their figures could not overcome the inexorable operation of social forces of which they themselves were an integral part. Pragmatism has taught us the vicious practice of taking the facts as they appear and rationalizing about them. When the entire fictitious structure collapsed about their ears, they simply shrugged their shoulders and a new crew of economists started another set of statistics and charts going, which evolved from within their mysterious depths the rationale of their future course.

We are in a position now to appreciate the thoroughly practical significance of the discussion concerning the limitations of the mathematical principles and the statistical approach to social phenomena. The entire wisdom of that school, and they are numerous in the land, is confined to searching the inner significance of these factual consequences of social existence from a standpoint which differs in no essential respect from that of the ancient Roman priest performing an haruspex.

The scientific historian knows that statistics merely disclose the results and not the nature of the forces which produced them. He knows, too, that the process of prediction by extra-polation, the convenient resort of pragmatists, be they optimists or pessimists, is based on the projection into the future of functions assumed to be self-acting and continuing. But the validity of these assumptions is the very thing that scientific history destroys. Of course, the facts of life as they unfolded consistently disproved the conclusions of those economists. But unless we can establish definitely why they were untrue, other pragmatists will take the place of these discredited theorists who in turn are destined to lead society into a similar blind alley.

OBSERVATION OF RELATIONS IN PHENOMENA

Man's instinctive yearning is for law in his conception of the universe. It may be, as Planck concedes, that some future generation will overthrow most of our present basic conceptions of man and the world of which he is a part. If that is ever done, it will still be due to man's insatiable urge to establish law and regularity as the order of existence.

The true scientist, says Einstein, is possessed by the sense of universal causation: "What a deep conviction of the rationality of the universe and what a yearning to understand, were it but a feeble reflection of the mind revealed in this world, Kepler and Newton must have had to enable them to spend years of solitary labor in disentangling the principles of the celestial sphere." [10] The modern historian must be similarly moved by the consciousness of law which regulates the relations of organized society.

Anarchy is as repugnant to social existence as it is in the ordered progress of the heavenly bodies. The absence of formal law among groups of men does not invalidate the proposition that their relations are regulated by some form of law which all recognize to exist. Such leaders of Anarchism as Kropotkin and Goldman conceded that communal existence must be predicated upon the recognition of mutual rights, which they, however, sought to be enforced by self-discipline rather than by what was to them the external power of the state.

[10] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 266.

Anthropology proves conclusively that the most primitive men observed some form of law in their mutual relations, even if that was the law of the club and all that it signified. Sociology reinforces that proposition by the analysis of man's tedious development of his forms of organization and the institutions which characterized the various phases of his progress. History alone has been backward in the recognition of law in society, chiefly because up to within recent times historians concerned themselves almost exclusively with formal law makers and the posturing of rulers rather than the real world on whose stage these figures were merely enacting a role.

Perhaps the laws which science so proudly proclaims to the world are only its conception of the reality rather than a valid representation of the reality itself. Kant calls this representation of reality as the formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the conception of the understanding is restricted by the schematism of our reason which is debarred from grasping the nature of reality itself.[11] To this Engels replies that as far as man is concerned when he knows fully the properties of a thing, he knows that thing, and while truth is possible of infinite expansion, it is truth only in relation to man's requirements, be they practical or theoretical. He denies absolute truths, but only truths in relation to man and the world of which he is a part.[12]

Thus Engels applied to history the relativity principle which forty years later Einstein established in physics. In our investigation of historical phenomena we are not concerned with absolutes either in politics, economics, or morality for the simple and efficient reason that there are no such absolutes. "There is nothing divine about morality, it is purely a human affair," [13] writes Einstein. Nevertheless, morality plays a tremendous role in history. It is the duty of the historian to discover the reason for the mutability of moral concepts and explain scientifically such phenomena in the past as the social attitude toward slavery, and the modern changing attitude toward undeserved and grinding poverty on the part of the actual producers of the nation's wealth through their labor of brain and brawn.

We will not quarrel with Bergson who says: "In a general way, reality is ordered exactly to the degree in which it satisfied our thought. Order is therefore a certain agreement between subject and object. It is the mind finding itself again in things." [14] Science has pretty well established an ironclad formula for establishing the difference between thought and the objective reality which thought seeks to mirror for itself by means of concepts. Writers like Mach, Avenarius, Wund,

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[11] Critique of Pure Reason—Kant, Book II, p. 102.

[12] Anti-Duhring—Engels, pp. 104-6.

[13] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 267.

[14] Creative Evolution—Bergson, p. 223.

Whitehead, Sir Oliver Lodge and Eddington question if all existence is not some grotesque phantasmagoria of the mind.

Lenin submitted the theories of these solipsists to the devastating analysis of his keenly critical faculties.[15] Planck supplies the more recent refutation in the following words: "Even if this school maintains that the priority of the sense data is the sole foundation of physics, it is yet compelled, in order to escape irrational solipsism, to assume that there are such things as individual deceptions of the senses and hallucinations; and these can be eliminated only on the assumption that physical observations can be reproduced at will. This, however, implies what is not evident a priori, namely, that the functional relations between sense data contain certain elements not depending upon the observer's personality nor upon the time and place of observation. It is precisely these elements which we describe as the real part of the physical event and of which we attempt to discover the laws." [16]

No matter how radically historians may differ about everything else, upon this they must agree: There is a real world outside of themselves crowded with people and events in temporal relation toward each other. Without this concession there could be no place for their art, as they call it. Solipsism plays no part in the historian's world structure, though fideism undoubtedly does in the character of their explanations.

ROLE OF ACCIDENT AND CHANCE IN MODERN SCIENCE

Accident is the negation of law, while chance, when numbers are large, possesses an element of certainty, though not necessity.[17] Accident and chance play an important role in the methodology of classical historians. Who knows, soliloquizes Durant, but that the discovery of America was due to the excessive libidinous yearnings of the Europeans? "To render their diet more exciting, and perhaps to assist Aphrodite, the Hindus have grown and consumed an unusual abundance of curry, ginger, cloves, cinnamon and other spices. Europeans valued these spices so highly that they stumbled upon a hemisphere in search for them; who knows but that America was discovered for the sake of love?" [18]

History scientifically considered would disclose that not accident but law was the cause of this discovery. The pampering of the libido is not a characteristic peculiar to any people or group. We will leave

[15] Materialism and Empirio—Criticism—Lenin, pp. 65-72.

[16] The Philosophy of Physics—Planck (1936), p. 21. Compare also pages 44, 71, 116.

[17] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 72.

[18] Our Oriental Heritage—Durant (1935), p. 477.

out of the discussion the physical laws and consequences of Columbus' voyage. Why was it that these great adventures of exploration were undertaken by merchant men for commercial purposes? To the merchant, it is immaterial whether his profits are derived from spices or corn. Definite social relations impelled the merchant to venture for profit wherever it could be found, and where the yield was commensurate with the risk.

Five hundred years before Columbus Icelandic adventurers had made contact with Labrador and Newfoundland, yet nothing developed from their discoveries because they lacked the historical relations which impelled the pursuit of the later discoveries by the European governments and merchant companies. "Chance," wrote Plechanoff, "is a relative matter. It appears only at the crossing of necessary processes. The appearance of the Europeans in America was a matter of accident for the inhabitants of Mexico and Peru, in the sense that it was not the result of the social development of those countries. But the passion for sea-voyages which took hold on the Europeans towards the end of the Middle Ages was not a mere accident, nor was it a mere accident that the Europeans easily overpowered the aborigines. Nor, again, were the results of the conquest of Mexico and Peru by the Europeans a mere matter of accident. These results were in the last analysis caused by the resultant of two forces: the economic conditions of the conquering nations on the one hand, and of the conquered nations on the other. And these forces as well as their resultant, can be fully investigated according to the laws of scientific research." [19] It is the object of this work to establish the specific nature of the laws of historical motion by the process of a scientific approach to the developments of American history.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHARACTER OF THE LAWS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND OF PHYSICAL ORGANIZATION

Perhaps the reiteration of law in history has become tedious to the reader. Our only valid reason for this is that law is all-important for science; and granting law, then the definite unfoldment of its processes as established by causality, rather than their counterfeit statistical expression by the substition of probability and uncertainty.

Time is a necessary element in all phenomena, including history. There is no such thing as repetition in history. Eddington has given the conclusive and crushing rejoinder to that well-worn phrase of political and historical hacks by his analysis of the Second Law of

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[19] Quoted from the Theoretical System of Karl Marx—Boudin, p. 276

Thermo-dynamics. Conditions can never be exactly reproduced. "Entropy," writes Eddington, "continually increases. We can, by isolating parts of the world and postulating rather idealized conditions in our problems, arrest the increase, but we cannot turn it into a decrease. That would involve something worse than a violation of an ordinary law of nature, namely, an improbable coincidence. The law that entropy always increases—the second law of thermodynamics—holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of nature." [20]

History deals with organization, it is true, but the laws of social organization are of a far different character in the field and scope of their manifestation than are the laws of physical organization as envisaged by Eddington. An historical moment once passed can never be reconstituted. That is why at an earlier part of this work we stressed the fallacy of historical analogies and the intellectual impotence of those who resort to them.

If history is to be something more than story telling it must develop the awareness of reality as does every legitimate science. Clever analogies may impress the superficial, but in the end they must leave the reader with problems unanswered, and ideas confused, while bringing history into disrepute as an uncertain guide for the future of mankind. Durant indulges his penchant for illustration in the following: "Since poverty is created by wealth, and never knows itself poor until riches stare it in the face, so it required the fabulous fortune of Solomon to mark the beginning of the class war in Israel. Solomon, like Peter and Lenin, tried to move too quickly from an agricultural to an industrial state. Not only did the toil and taxes involved in his enterprises impose great burdens upon his people, but when those undertakings were complete, after twenty years of industry, a proletariat had been created in Jerusalem, which lacking sufficient employment, became a source of political faction and corruption in Palestine, precisely as it was to become in Rome." [21] All that is lacking to make this jumble of anachronisms complete is the declaration of a sit-down strike while a henchman of John L. Lewis' prototype shuts off the power, and the King summons out his machine-gunners.

DURANT'S PENCHANT FOR ANALOGIES

There is absolutely no historical analogy between the proletariat of Jerusalem, of Rome, or of Moscow, in their particular period of history. Durant's comparison between the corruption of the proletariat in Palestine and in Rome is false in every possible manner, economically, socially and politically. The Roman proletarian at a certain stage of his history did not have to work. The fact of his citizenship absolved him from that obligation and rendered his support the liability of the state. The Roman proletarian was a free man, the theoretical equal of any in the realm, and the natural superior of Rome's vast hordes of foreigners, subjects, and slaves. Politically he exercised the right of selection that made his vote so much coveted by those who sought power in the councils of the Republic.

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[20] The Nature of the Physical Universe—Eddington, p. 74.

[21] Our Oriental Heritage—Durant (1935), pp. 314-315.

At another point, Durant describes the philosophers of ancient China as Socialists and Anarchists in such general terms that every brigand who ever cut a throat, or every autocrat who ever aggrandized state power could easily fall into one classification or the other.[22] Even the Chinese precursor of Darwin is not lacking; "not as clear as Darwin, but it will serve." [23]

This monotonous repetition of history is an ancient story which recurs only in the concoctions of its adepts. Plutarch expresses this formula in its most pleasant form. "It is no great wonder," he writes, "if in the long process of time, while fortune takes her course hither and thither, numerous coincidences should spontaneously occur. If the number and variety of subjects to be wrought upon be infinite, it is all the more easy for fortune, with such an abundance of material, to effect this similarity of results. Or if, on the other hand, events are limited to the combinations of some finite number, then of necessity the same must often recur, and in the same sequence." [24]

Here almost two thousand years before Heisenberg the easy-going Plutarch who modestly never laid claim to philosophic acumen, gave expression to the substance of the modern theory of history in terms of statistical probability as currently propounded by our keenest intellects.

Under the influence of the same thought, Professor Dunning wrote as the concluding words of his study of political theories: "Anarchistic individualism was preached by Sophists and Cynics; constitutionalism by Aristotle and the other conservative upholders of the Nomoi; nationalism is but the theory of the city-state writ larger; societarianism has never been more completely formulated than by Plato. In twenty-three centuries the movement of thought has but swung the full circle. Such is the general lesson of the history of political theories. It is not different from the lesson of history in respect to all the other varieties of theory by which men have sought to solve the basic problems of their earthly existence." [25] It is precisely this unscientific and thoroughly defeatist attitude toward history which we desire to combat and to disprove. The cornerstone of a scientific theory of history must rest securely upon the fact that each moment is unique in history and can never be retraced, though social development itself is regulated by law.

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[22] Our Oriental Heritage—Durant, pp. 677, 692, 693.

[23] Ibid., p. 691.

[24] Plutarch's Lives; Sertorius, p. 678. (Coronet Press ed.)

THE UNIQUENESS OF MOMENT IN HISTORY

This proposition is upheld by every law known to modern science. But uniqueness does not destroy the possibility of establishing laws. Historical laws, like all other laws, are developed out of definite relations between bodies in translatory relation within a given field. The laws of physics are not suspended or destroyed by a modification of that relationship. They are merely expressed in some other form.

The laws of history are the temporal expression of definite social relations at a given period of human development. While many of the underlying social forces are the same, their mode of operation is determined by the organization of the particular social structure, and the relation of its component parts.

Professor Selig Hecht whom we have already quoted on several occasions, posits the problem of those who contend that, if it requires the powers of the most brilliant experimental and mathematical physicist to describe the behavior of the simplest material substance —hydrogen—how is it possible to describe the behavior of more complicated units, let alone social phenomena? He falls back, unknowingly (at least he does not admit it) to the Hegelian proposition that quantitative differences bring about qualitative changes, and that complicated structures behave like a new unit.

The meteorologist, he asserts, is not concerned with the influence of the individual tree upon the weather. He deals with forests and mountain ranges.[26] The political economist is not concerned with the individual worker but with the problems arising from the total social effort and the relations of production and distribution of values in a given country. So is it with historical science. We deal with masses, but do not neglect the individual. However, we know that the individual must have an adequate social background if he is to essay successfully the role of a witch-doctor in some backward community, or of an electrical wizard in the plant of the General Electric

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[25] Political Theories From Rousseau to Spencer—Dunning (1928), pp. 422-3.

[26] Uncertainty Principle and Behavior—Selig Hecht in Harper's Monthly Magazine, Jan., 1935, pp. 244-245.

Company. Even genius has its limitations, so reflected Napoleon in the solitude of St. Helena.

B. The Problem of Free Will and Determinism

FREE WILL VERSUS DETERMINISM IN HISTORY

Free will versus determinism has always been a fruitful source of dissension among moralists, theologians, physicists and historians. Even the most mechanical of classical nineteenth century scientists hesitated before the problem of automatism in human behavior.[27] To-day the debate waxes more warmly than ever on this age-old problem of metaphysicians and philosophers, though it is carried on latterly by physicists armed with the latest weapons supplied by contemporary thought. The issue is far from being decided.

For a period after Heisenberg's enunciation of the Principle of Indeterminacy the supporters of causality were in a very sad minority. The outlook has changed considerably during the past five years. Apparently to many of the intelligentsia fundamental principles of science can be adopted or discarded with the ease of milady's fashions. Historians and political economists under its stimulus abandoned in the wholesale the classical methods of scientific procedure for the empirical observation of the practical realities as they viewed them. Through the process of functional observation and mathematical deduction theories were evolved concerning their nature, and postulates advanced for predicting the future. In every vital respect this procedure has proved to be wrong. The facts of existence do not disclose the nature of the laws which brought them into existence, while extra-polation must assume an independent existence for the factors and their ratios by which they chart out the future.

This pragmatical procedure may be pardoned in the street-corner business man and the red-faced political orator, but it is a disastrous one for the country at large. Historians as well as others are conscious of the practical implications involved in the problem of free will. The law must assume that the convicted criminal had a last free choice between good and evil. Yet experience has compelled abandonment of the rigor implied in the moral code. The mentally ill are not held responsible for their acts. Minors are placed in a different category though they are old enough to distinguish between right and wrong. On the whole, society has come to recognize a relationship between social environment and offenses against constituted society.

[27] Principles of Psychology—Spencer, Vol. II, Part VII, Ch. XV.

Reclamation and the safety of society rather than punishment is the guiding principle of modern criminology. Free will has been shorn of many of its attributes in the consideration and the punishment of crime, nor is retribution on the part of society either certain or desirable.

James Murphy who wrote an interesting introduction to Planck's book entitled "Where Is Science Going?" also gives us in the same work an absorbing epilogue on the problem of Free Will in the Socratic manner in a discussion with Planck, Einstein and himself as the interlocutors. Here is a brief excerpt:

> *Murphy:* I have been collaborating with our friend, Planck, on a book which deals principally with the problem of causation and the freedom of the human will.
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> *Einstein:* Honestly, I cannot understand what people mean when they talk about the freedom of the human will. I have a feeling, for instance, that I will do something or other; but what relation this has with freedom I cannot understand at all. I feel that I will light my pipe and I do it; but how can I connect this up with the idea of freedom? What is behind the act of willing to light the pipe? Another act of willing? Schopenhauer once said: Man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills.
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> *Murphy:* But it is now the fashion in physical science to attribute something like free will even to the routine processes of inorganic nature.
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> *Einstein:* That nonsense is not merely nonsense. It is objectionable nonsense.[28]

Freud carried on the battle for causality even in the behavior of those whom the world calls insane. "The category of the accidental, requiring no motivation, which the normal person lets pass as part of his own psychic functions and faulty actions, is thus rejected by the paranoiac in his application to the psychic manifestations of others. All that he observes in others is full of meaning; all is explainable. But how does he come to look at it in this manner? Probably here, as in so many other cases, he projects into the mental life of others what exists in his own unconscious activity." [29]

There is an element in the denial of free will which goes against our grain. It offends our sense of human dignity. In each day of our lives we are conscious of choosing, planning, devising. History does not unreel itself from a pre-determined mold. The human element with all its dreams and aspirations is a factor which confronts us in every walk of life. No one is born a Demosthenes, a Michaelangelo, a Shakespeare or a Wagner. The natural aptitudes, we will concede,

[28] Where Is Science Going—Planck (1932), p. 201.

[29] Writings of Freud—Psychopathology of Everyday Life, pp. 162-3.

are already there. We will grant also that the social background must be existent for the expression of their distinctive type of genius. Yet there appears an inner voice which keeps continually prompting that man himself, individually and collectively, is a factor in the making of his own history. Neither mechanical evolution nor automatism created the ancient Greek civilization or that of Britain to-day.

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR AS CONCEIVED BY PLANCK, EINSTEIN AND SPINOZA

Planck assumes a middle ground between the extremes of free will and determinism in human affairs. On strictly logical grounds he concedes causal relation to outer reality. But in the sphere of human achievement we cannot divest ourselves of the sense of responsibility for our actions.[30] "The law of causation," he concludes, "is the guiding rule of science; but the Categorical Imperative—that is to say, the dictate of duty—is the guiding rule of life. Here intelligence has to give way to character, and scientific knowledge to religious belief. And when I say religious belief here I mean the word in its fundamental sense." [31]

Planck classes this phase of his study with a noble apostrophe to real religion insofar as it cultivates all the powers of the human soul to act together in perfect balance and harmony. Like so many others before him, and amid the company of his great compeers in contemporary thought, Planck sees no irreconcilable opposition between religion and science.[32] Writers who possess the instinct of the true historian have long since freed their minds of the theistic, agnostic or atheistic prejudices of their youth. Religion with the concrete manifestation of its effects upon human thought and behavior is one of the basic realities of existence and must be treated as such in any study of man worthy of that characterization.

Our particular problem now is to determine how and to what extent man himself enters in the shaping of his own destiny, and whether he accomplishes that in spite of, or because of social laws which dominate his time. Spinoza's work ranks to this day after three centuries as the most perfectly chiseled logical structure for the demonstration a priori of causality as the only effective agency in a monistic conception of the world. His proposition is that: "From the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers of things in infinite ways (that is to say, all things which can be conceived by the infinite intellect) must necessarily follow." [33] This was hailed by his learned friend Tschirnhaus as the most vital point in the work.[34]

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[30] Where Is Science Going?—Planck, pp. 114, 128, 164.

[31] Ibid., p. 167.

[32] Ibid., pp. 168-9.

Spinoza effectively answered Planck three hundred years before that great contemporary thinker stressed the role of imagination and the Categorical Imperative in art, science and morality. The mind, argued that great logician, is subject to the affections of the body and the world which acts upon it. There is no affect of the mind, no idea, concept or imagination which can be divorced from the world of reality or the body which gives it form.[35]

It is interesting to note that Einstein lends the weight of his great reputation to the position taken by Spinoza in the discussion with Murphy above. In a significant message to the Spinoza Institute of America upon the occasion of that philosopher's tercentenary Einstein wrote: "To Spinoza the spiritual and the material are merely different manifestations of one universal, deterministic reality. This concept has become the intellectual heritage of all men who strive after spiritual values. But even our age is still very far from grasping the full implications of this concept in its application to life, as Spinoza has grasped it. The recognition of the causal interrelationship of human behavior should lift our actions to a higher plane of conduct, which should not be subject to the irrational reactions of blind emotion. Our behavior should be motivated by the ever-present realization that human beings in their thoughts, feelings and actions are not free agents, but are subject to the inexorable laws of cause and effect as are the stars in their courses." [36]

No one reading this inspiring message by Einstein cannot but be profoundly moved by this generous enthusiasm which prove once more the ample proportions of his own greatness.

When those lines were penned the fate of causality had already been decided by the cognoscenti with thumbs down. From ten to one against him as Einstein then whimsically admitted, the odds are more than even for his side today, and the swing (not in popular music but among scientists) is growing almost daily in his favor. Of such stuff is the composition of the modern vacillating intellectual world.

SCHOPENHAUER AND WATON ON DESTINY AND FATALISM

Schopenhauer expresses himself with accustomed vigorous rancor on this much-mooted question of free will that somehow will never stay settled. It seems every generation must consider these fundamental problems for itself even at the time when it appears to be most submissive to authority and precept. The ancients too had a name for it. They called it Fate. The medieval metaphysician called it Predestination. Waton calls it Destiny.

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[33] Ethics—Spinoza, Part I, Prop. XVI, p. 113.

[34] Ibid., Letters, p. 477.

[35] Ibid., Part III, Def. III, p. 207, and Part V, Prop. XXXIV, p. 391.

[36] Addresses and Messages published by the Spinoza Institute of America in 1933, pp. 28-9.

Schopenhauer is not appalled at tackling a difficult problem from the worst angle. He rather revels in it. "Instead of trying to explain away the fundamental truth of Fatalism," he writes in his mordant fashion, "by superficial twaddle and foolish evasion, a man should attempt to get a clear knowledge and comprehension of it; for it is demonstrably true, and it helps us in a very important way to an understanding of the mysterious riddle of our life. Predestination and Fatalism do not differ in the main. They differ only in this, that with Predestination the given character and external determination of human action proceed from a rational Being, and with Fatalism from an irrational one. But in either case the result is the same: that happens which must happen." [37]

Schopenhauer thought he had advanced the settlement of the issue by that dictum. In fact, it is meaningless. He only tells us the first part of the proposition, that what has happened had to happen. But he does not show why it had to happen and that it could not possibly have been otherwise. To revert to a previous argument, the same amount of bricks and mortar can be turned either into a prison or a palace. Schopenhauer only tells us that it is a prison.

It does not require a genius to see that. What he ought to have told us, and the problem which he consistently evaded is, Why was a prison built instead of a palace? There is nothing inherent in the materials which make it one or the other, or leave them undisturbed as man found them in their original situs. Certainly neither fate, nor predestination, nature or existence itself determined the final arrangement of those materials. Nor, for that matter, will they be final.

Our noble Parisians in that ever memorable July day of 1789 decided that paving blocks of granite were preferable to the Bastille—and a few other things that it stood for. In short, man's will, his needs, his objectives, form an important element in the ultimate decision. Yet decision or no decision, a prison like the Bastille is not built without materials, nor is it lacking in historical function created by definite relations where it becomes a necessary element in the existing social structure. To emphasize the role of man's will in this determination, does not at all solve the problem whether that will be free or un-free. It only proves that man is not wholly the blind instrument of an all-pervading Fate.

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[37] Essays by Schopenhauer on Human Nature—Free Will and Fatalism, p. 69.

Waton attempts to supply the answer in a Spinozistic manner. Nature, man and society comes into existence with a predetermined form and function, themselves the result of an evolution wherein they modified their nature in causal relation to external forces and internal stresses. The human will has a predetermined nature in accordance with which it functions. "Because of this, the will is free," Waton argues. "Free in what sense? It is free to act according to its nature. This, in fact, is true of all realities. Take steel. Steel is free to act as steel, and nothing in existence can make steel act otherwise than steel should act." [38]

This method of proof is typical of medieval disputation. Steel is created by man; it is not the product of nature. Man operates upon the raw materials of nature with the forces nature itself supplies to shape and mold that steel. But only under definite social conditions does mankind require the extensive use of metal in that form. And only under definite social conditions will that steel take the form of ploughshares or swords, of tractors or tanks. It is precisely what those historical conditions are, and how they came into being which is the problem to be decided.

Schopenhauer and Waton in essence are content to let the matter rest by telling us that things are as they are because they could not be anything else under the given conditions. But these conditions are either predetermined for all time or are historical in nature. If they are predetermined, then man has nothing to say about them, and the human will is merely a blank wax, or at any rate the instrument which records the impress of this deterministic force of which he himself is a minute figment. If the unfolding events are historical in nature, then we are back again to our old problem concerning whether or not man is a factor in shaping his own history, and to what extent, and how. This is the real problem of Free Will or Destiny and neither the mordant Schopenhauer nor the astute Waton has contributed to the solution of the problem in this form.

CONTRADICTORY VIEWS OF GREEN AND BUCKLE ON MAN'S WILL IN HISTORY

Green in his very readable history of the English people gives the true historical touch to this ubiquitous problem of free will. He traces the tremendous repercussions of the English Revolution of 1688 upon the history of the world generally and of France in particular.[39] Prior to that epochal event England was practically unknown even to its nearest neighbors.

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[38] Philosophy of Spinoza—Waton (1932), p. 266.

[39] History of the English People—Green, Vol. IV, pp. 108-9.

With the advent of William III in its government and of the Duke of Marlborough on the battlefields of Europe foreigners began to become aware of the tight little isle's existence. They discovered suddenly its rich literature and the traditions of personal liberty of which the Bill of Rights was an example. Voltaire, fortuitously, was compelled to sojourn there for a while from his native France. For a hundred years after a lively intellectual intercourse developed between these geographically close neighbors but hitherto sealed against each other by mutual indifference and the antagonisms natural between strange peoples, strange language and strange customs.

Now it could be readily rationalized that if there had been no English Revolution, its extraordinary consequences would not have been remarked in Europe, and its learned men would not have troubled to acquaint themselves with that strange people who could do such unheard-of things. Voltaire might not have gone to England, and so failed to imbibe those ideas which he and his successors so industriously propagated in their native land to create the spiritual foundation for the French Revolution. The chain of events are thereby forged, and it can be contended that if a single link were missing then history would have been far different than it turned out to be. Every element of chance, accident and free will are contained in this apparently ironclad sequence of events.

Yet the real facts will show that in the evolution of modern Europe there was not accident but causality in which man himself was a causal agent. In the first place, it is no belittling of the genius of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Turgot, Rousseau and the rest to state that the historical conditions in France itself were a powerful lever for that social progress of which these men were both the effect, and the cause of other effects. "Such an influence," writes Green, "could hardly have been aroused by English letters had they not given expression to what was the general temper of Europe at the time." [40]

Buckle, with that characteristic thoroughness which combined with his genius makes his work immortal, gives two full pages of only the names of French writers and their works who were influenced by this influx of the English spirit.[41] "Such was the eagerness," concludes Buckle, "with which the French imbibed the literature of a people whom but a few years before they had heartily despised. The truth is, that in this new state of things they had no alternative. For where but in England was a literature to be found that could satisfy those bold and inquisitive thinkers who arose in France after the death of Louis XIV?"[42] That this literature could not grow out of a barren soil is proved by the rich matrix of events which manured the land and prepared it for its abundant fruit.

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[40] History of the English People—Green, Vol. IV, p. 109.

[41] History of Civilization In England—Buckle, Vol. I, pp. 522-3.

Nor was this preparatory process autogenous in its development. Campbell in his history of Puritan influence in Holland, England and America gives some illuminating facts upon the influence of the Low Lands and their institutions in shaping the minds of the great leaders of the English people.[43] Holland during the first three quarters of the seventeenth century undoubtedly was the most progressive and affluent nation of Europe. Their industry and commercial enterprise made its people the leaders of the world just as the strength of their burghers made them the most democratic, as democracy was then understood.

Should we endeavor to trace out only a small portion of the dovetailing processes of history during that period we would have to repeat the history of the world up to that time. This applies to any period of history. The chain of causality is unbroken no matter from which link or terminal we begin. Even the history of the Hermit Kingdom would contain necessarily the story of the nations whose importunity opened up Japan to the commerce of the world, though to-day they may well pause with an admixture of astonishment and fear at the genii their persistence had called forth.

ROLE OF CAUSALITY IN CLASSICAL SCIENCE

What do we mean by causation? In what respect, if at all, has modern science modified that conception? Can strict causality be proved in history? We shall now consider each of these questions in that order.

Jeans properly proclaims the principle of causality as the greatest triumph of classical science.[44] This principle is restated by Planck in this simple sentence: "When we say that there is a causal connection between two consecutive events, we mean that there is some kind of law connecting them, the earlier event being called the cause, and the later the effect."[45]

Laplace expressed this rigid determinism of eighteenth century science by the statement that we must regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state, and the cause of the state to follow. From this it follows that if we understand the nature of the existing state and its laws of motion we can predict with certainty the result in the succeeding state. Thus it is conceivable that, granting an intelligence which could grasp all the realities of nature and the forces animating them, nothing would be uncertain for him; he could reconstruct the past as well as predict with apodictic certainty the state of the future.[46] It was this assuredness which gave courage to the great investigators of the past and was the basis of that faith in the stability of the intellectual edifice they were painfully erecting brick by brick upon an indestructible foundation.

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[42] Ibid., p. 524.

[43] The Puritans In Holland, England and America—Campbell, Vol. II, pp. 374-8.

[44] The Mysterious Universe—Jeans, p. 18.

[45] The Philosophy of Physics—Plank, p. 42.

For two centuries indefatigable workers labored in every field to rear the glorious edifice which Spencer capped in his synthetic system. Causality was not merely the keystone; it was the brick and the mortar and the foundation itself was predicated, logically and eternally, on the Newtonian principles of physics.

Only history lagged significantly behind. However successfully causality could be applied to nature, inorganic and organic, its laws were inapplicable to the analysis of the super-organic. Not that the task was not essayed by the intellectual giants of their time. Condorcet, Comte, Hegel and Spencer had attempted to involve the whole of existence in a single comprehensive formula which was consistent with itself. Spencer's rigid formulation of evolution was carried through not only in sociology but in the principles of ethics and morality. The classicists could look out upon the world and say with God that it was good. They had succeeded in creating a world in their own image.

PHILOSOPHICAL LIMITATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICISTS

Then something happened. It did not happen all of a sudden, for great indeterminists like Eddington and Jeans give a very graphic causal explanation of the revolution in scientific thought[47] which began to gather late in the nineteenth century, assumed torrential proportions in the early years of the twentieth, and before the third of its decades had arrived, had succeeded in overwhelming what was labeled "Classical Science" at the obituaries pronounced over the remains of the mechanistic-causal conception of the universe.

This so solid earth began to assume an airy shape in our conceptions of reality as propounded by physicists, while philosophers proceeded to subjectivize reality into something ghostlike until all was reduced to a question of mental concepts, and pure mathematical symbols became the real essence of all existence.[48] To Sir Oliver Lodge even mathematics was an unnecessary burden. Mind itself became the only reliable substance of the world-stuff upon which man could rely with fullest confidence in creating the semblance of the outer world.[49] Even Eddington hesitated to make that irrevocable decision in the acceptance of such nonsense.[50] There are gradations even in the declension to ultimate absurdity.

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[46] See New Pathways In Science—Eddington (1935), pp. 74-5.

[47] Chapter I of The Nature of the Physical World by Eddington; Chapter II of the Mysterious Universe by Jeans.

Jeans hesitated over the precipice, and to this day remains there teetering in a state of unstable equilibrium. "If the universe is a universe of thought," he writes, "then its creation must have been an act of thought. Indeed the finiteness of time and space almost compel us, of themselves, to picture the creation as an act of thought." [51] He proceeds to demonstrate how amateurish most physicists are in philosophy by showing how little the new concepts of physics which he explains so painstakingly have penetrated into the nature of his own thinking. After analyzing with great precision the relativity concepts of time and space and that space is finite but unbounded, he proceeds to rationalize the negation of the very relativity he defends by postulating a creator who is working outside of time and space which are part of his creation.[52]

Plausibility takes the place of classical proof,[53] and symbolism assumes the form of reality by the operation of pure mathematics.[54] The Kantian dilemma about the thing-in-itself has at last been solved. God is a Mathematician, Eddington assures us, and God is always on the job, Millikan tells a so-called scientific world now showing evidences of inebriation induced by their own intoxicating extravaganzas and fearful lest they be over-powered by its effects.

On the other side of sanity, Planck also teeters over the ledge but is still held by some fraying strings to the side of classical science. Only nine years have passed since he wrote the "Universe in the Light of Modern Physics" at the time when Heisenberg was in his heyday and the epigoni, incapable of thinking matters out for themselves but anxious to go through the motions of thinking, were unanimous in their enthusiasm over the demise of causality.

Not that they had any particular grudge against it. The intelligentsia are too shallow-pated either to think deeply or to feel deeply. Their only evidence to the outer world of intellectual life within is the espousal of something different, something new. They have an inveterate dread about the classical, because, right or wrong, it must be mastered. That effort is too much for their limited powers. It is so much easier and sounds so much braver, to denounce the established order and to embrace the latest pronunciamentos of creative thinkers. By that very fact they create the illusion of having mastered them after having found the old wanting. Therefore they flocked pell-mell to indeterminism with such enthusiastic unanimity. Heisenberg was the god of the moment and the epigoni hastened to prostrate themselves at his feet.

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[48] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 291.

[49] Beyond Physics—Lodge (1930), p. 112.

[50] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, pp. 344-5.

[51] The Mysterious Universe—Jeans, p. 181.

[52] Ibid., p. 182.

[53] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 337.

[54] Ibid., p. 249.

PLANCK'S STARTLING REVERSALS ON CAUSALITY AND INDETERMINACY

Since Heisenberg based his principles on the quantum theory propounded by Planck himself, the old master was somewhat nonplused. Bewildered would be the more correct description. Believe it or not, but within the space of four pages he adopted three different theories on causality. On page 82 he writes: "Hence from a logical point of view, we must admit every justification for the hypothesis that the only kind of law in nature is statistical." Two pages further on that clear-cut expression is replaced by the following right-about-face: "Physics, no less than meteorology, geography and social science, is frequently compelled to make use of statistical laws. At the same time, however, no one will doubt that the alleged accidental variations of the climatological curves, of population statistics and mortality tables, are in each instant subject to strict causality." And to render the confusion engendered by this somersault complete, Planck reverses the reversal beginning with page 85 to prove that the human will is both determinate and indeterminate, and in either event one could not establish one or the other. "The fact is," he decides, after himself admitting that these considerations appear unintelligible, "no person, however clever, can derive the decisive motives of his own conscious actions from the causal law alone; he requires another law—the ethical law, for which the highest intelligence and the most subtle self-analysis are no adequate substitute."

This unintelligible meandering causes Professor Dingle to burst out how "Planck can in the same breath, without laying perjury upon his soul, affirm and deny the validity of the principle of causality!"[55]

Throughout all this muddle and turmoil Einstein remained among the few outstanding thinkers of our time who stood his ground man-fully, though not unperturbed by the apostasy of so many in the house of science. While admitting that nature appears to be the realization of the simplest mathematical ideas, he stands firmly by the proposition that experience alone may suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced from pure thought. "Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction." [56] Physical theory must fit the observed fact.[57] There must be an absolute agreement between theory and the observed fact.[58] Science seeks a unitary theory.[59] Dualism is disturbing to the orderly mind,[60] while man very reluctantly acknowledges that only to show the inadequacy of his present state of knowledge.[61]

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[55] Through Science to Philosophy—Dingle (1937), p. 20.

The most important of the propositions that Einstein was required to establish was that energy had mass. Prove that, and the relativity theory is established. It was finally proven,[62] and the Relativity Theory takes its place among the tremendous generalizations of our civilization.

Einstein is still searching for a formula that will combine both field and matter, the Relativity Theory and the Quantum Theory in one single, vaster generalization. "Science forces us to create new ideas, new theories," wrote Einstein and Infeld. "Their aim is to break down the wall of contradictions which frequently blocks the way of scientific progress. All the essential ideas in science were born in a dramatic conflict between reality and our attempts at understanding. Here again is a problem for the solution of which new principles are needed." [63] It is not within the province of the historian to pass judgment on these ultimate problems which justly intrigue the profoundest intellects in the world of physics. All thinkers realize that no matter how divergent their specialties, all converge on the ultimate problems of the nature of existence, and the laws which govern its mode of manifestation.

C. MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT AS IT AFFECTS THE HISTORIAN

WHY THE HISTORIAN MUST CONCERN HIMSELF WITH THE ULTIMATE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

This subject is not merely of academic interest in our special investigation. Law, causality and indeterminacy are fundamental to our problem. We cannot rest only with the establishment of historical laws. If History is to become a science, its laws of motion must be determined. But it cannot stop there. We cannot shirk the real duty of the historian which is to predict the future in its field on the same basis, and in the same manner, which any study that has reached the dignity of a science is called upon to project its ideas into the future in its specialized field.

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[56] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 36.
[57] Ibid., p. 69. [58] Ibid., p. 137. [59] Ibid., p. 55.
[60] Ibid., p. 63. [61] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 122.
[62] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, pp. 208-9, 258, 260.
[63] Ibid., p. 280.

Up to now the very idea of scientific prediction in history has never been considered; that is, seriously. In fact, it is the commonest and most widely accepted practice of the historian to shun his own time precisely because he is too near it to appreciate its phenomena with due regard to their relative significance. The nearest an historian dare approach with any degree of assuredness is the period before he was born.

As justification for this procedure, the argument is advanced that all the material facts of events in our lifetime cannot be established, nor the results of actions, programs and policies be known until the important principals are dead and their biographies have been published; or, if living, are engaged in autobiographical writing as their chief occupation on the past which now is only of academic interest. But these are only excuses for evading the real issue.

After all, not all the facts of a past or present event are known, or ever will be known. As to what constitutes a material fact will always remain a subjective consideration. At best, the classical historian is dealing with a past era, as Dewey argued, and obviously no longer a living reality, and he desires to reconstruct it with as much artistry and imagination that his facilities bring to the task. This is no argument to demonstrate that we cannot know the past. Many of its effects are carried over into the succeeding period, and if we can determine, not by whim or predilection but by scientific impersonal methods, what are the really important effects thus transmitted as the heritage of the following period together with their causes, we will have advanced far in establishing history as a science.

It is important for us, therefore, to determine in the conclusive manner of science whether these effects have been causally transmitted, or are the resultant of mathematical probability or chance. It is not enough to say that the probabilities of modern America becoming a kingdom, or a colony of a European power, or of industry reverting to its handicraft origin are a hundred to one, or a million to one. We must show that politically, economically and ideologically the United States had to develop as it did, by all the indices which any historian would accept as valid, and establish sufficient factors to account for its progress which any scientist, understanding its laws of historic motion, would conclude to be all-impelling. The classical historian, not being in possession of such knowledge, leaves the field of inquiry at its most dangerous point, namely, the analysis of his time. All his formidable excuses for abandoning that field may be in mitigation, but not justification, for that does not hide the fact that he left the scene of action at its most critical period.

THE HISTORIAN MUST PROVE HIMSELF EQUAL TO THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS OF HIS TIME

Others rush pell-mell to fill the place the classical historian has so ignominiously quitted; a medley of would-be statesmen, politicians with various degrees of public decency and morality, reformers of the gentle but ignorant type, silver-tongued orators and leather-lunged demagogues, radicals of various shades of belief, soothsayers and mystics of various orders of mental and emotional stability and crack-pots of all types with their favorite nostrums urged all the way from the councils of the President's cabinet to the back room of some dingy saloon hall.

Nor do the evil consequences of the historian's abscondence end there. All-wise professors and pragmatists of various degrees enter upon the stage. Business leaders feel amply qualified to express weighty opinions on matters of deepest social significance simply because they are prosperous sausage manufacturers, clever manipulators of public utilities, big butter-and-egg men, not forgetting the jugglers of high finance assisted by their statisticians and financial experts of all sorts and stations who make up their retenue. So the merry-go-round goes whirling with the vocal and music accompaniment of the same character. One needs only to scan the morning newspaper, to read the Congressional debates, to follow the deliberations of alleged learned societies, and to study the pronunciamentos of an assorted collection of so-called conservatives, radicals, progressives, liberals, pinks, revolutionaries, churchmen and undoubted humanitarians, in order to appreciate the havoc in affairs which is the logical result of the confessed inability to treat social affairs scientifically.

History cannot perform the role destined for it unless it can clear the field of the motley accumulation of ignoramuses, empiricists, pragmatists and functionalists who occupy the stage in that all-important period of the present. But historians know that the old tricks of the trade geared to rendering post-mortems will not work in the field of living social physiology and pathology. This analogy between the social structure and the individual organism is necessarily defective, but it will serve its purpose if it shall indicate the difference in the manner of approach between the history of the past and that which must be applied to the analysis of the history of the present.

It is for these reasons that the problems of causality and probability must play a vital role in our analysis. For we must establish beyond cavil the proposition whether under all the given conditions, human, material and ideological, history could possibly have been different from what it is. This proposition is easily advanced, but it is the most difficult of proof. This is why every history dealing with the past twenty-five to forty year span is very circumspect in the treatment of its material. There is an evasion of positivistic assertion and its tone becomes more hesitant as it approaches the immediate present.

Circumspection becomes circumlocution until finally it degenerates into the mere chronicling of events with comments which certainly do not go beyond the perspective of the average enlightened editorial writer. Of such nature is the more recent work of Beard, Hacker and Schlesinger in the field of general history.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE MASS IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

There is one aspect of our subject where the problems of the historian and the theoretical physicist are closely akin, that of the ultimate unit and the group. It is for the physicist to determine for himself in what way, if at all, our method of solving this problem will assist him in his own. For ourselves, we repeat our deep gratitude to theoretical physics for having carried practically single-handed the torch of philosophical enlightenment during the past thirty years.

This is no gratuitous offer of aid. We are now so heavily indebted to physicists that the scientific historian, at the utmost, could only push on a little further along the path which their labors have illumined for the larger world of scientific inquiry. It is our hope—and unless that hope is realized our labors will have been in vain—to establish conclusively by the actual development of American history, that the analysis of the individual unit stands in a different category than that of the mass of individual units within the social organization. One will never succeed in unraveling the laws of history by the analysis of the laws of individual motion or existence.

It is true that society is composed ultimately of a vast aggregate of individual units. But we will show that social laws are far different than individual laws, and that while it is possible for the individual's nature to remain substantially the same, as it has during several thousands of years of civilization, yet that has not militated against the development of the most diverse social arrangements whose nature could never be deduced by the most painstaking study of its individual constituents.

Modern thought in every branch of knowledge, in mathematics, physics, economics, politics, international relations, is permeated with the pragmatical spirit which manifests itself either in arbitrary assumption or in empirical acceptance, and the attempt to derive from functional relations the laws of its inner movement.

There really is nothing new in this method. Mankind have been pragmatists from the time when the capacity for sustained reason first came to be developed. For many thousands of years man has made arbitrary assumptions and rationalized his observations, fears, hopes and aspirations. Sheer necessity and simple human inquisitiveness accounted for all of the worthwhile achievements up to the beginning of modern times.

Then began that glorious epoch of social development whose mainspring in the intellectual field was provided by the scientific method. It has often been remarked that civilization really began with the Industrial Revolution as far as the mass of mankind is concerned. Naturally it all depends upon what one adopts as his criterion for measurement. Actually intellectualization had merely changed its form of direction. Inherent human capacity has not undergone much modification during the past few thousand years, only in its mode of expression.

The crux of the scientific method exists in the consciousness of causality in the world of reality. Mankind was no longer satisfied with accepting reality and rationalizing about its destiny. Its leaders wanted to know the why and how to explain the what, and were content to leave to philosophers the problem of the wherefore. Newton's physical principles were to rule the universe for all eternity, and so was Darwin's evolutionism and Spencer's cosmogony. To-day the aggressive certitude of classical science has been replaced by doubt, uncertainty and chance. For the categorical imperative there has been substituted the weak-kneed may or perhaps. Probability has taken the place of causality.

UNCERTAINTY OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT IS REFLECTED IN THE FIELD OF HISTORY AND STATESMANSHIP

Nowhere are the effects of this revolution in thought more noticeable than in history, particularly in contemporary history as it is now being made on the national and world scenes. Never having had the advantage of the other sciences in being firmly predicated on laws and principles, historians readily succumbed to the current thought that anything might happen, and as far as they were concerned it generally did.

Wilson's League of Nations idea illustrated exactly what pragmatism amounted to in action. The thought behind the plan was as unexceptionable as the Ten Commandments, and, like them, equally unattainable despite the best efforts of its protagonists. Like the religionists, failure can be palliated by animadversions relating to human frailties and weaknesses. But statesmen, unlike the vicegerents of God, must take humanity as they find it, and work through it.

To do so would require on their part a knowledge of the social structure far beyond what any of them possessed, at least by the then dominant figures in the councils of the world. The collapse of the League can be ascribed to human weakness by those who had the opportunity for organizing human strength, but did not know how to go about it. We all know the consequences of their failure. But the entire human tragedy will have been in vain if we shall not have discovered the reasons for that failure.

So do we notice to-day the complacent propaganda about some nebulous United States of Europe which the Allies hint at organizing as the aftermath of the present war. The full fury of the war has not yet, at this writing, burst upon the unfortunate peoples of the principal combatants. But even if that fearful holocaust should never break forth unrestrained with its concomitant anguish and vindictiveness, yet none of the leaders abroad, nor in America, have evidenced any appreciation of the fundamental re-organization the European social structure will have to undergo in order to realize the desired goal. If left to the present crop of leadership we will have a second edition of Versailles, no matter by whom dictated nor by which side in the present struggle. The classical spirit of causality has departed from the councils of the world. Not all that is probable or desirable is possible, and classical science always laid down rigid antecedent requirements to limit that which can be done with the materials and forces at hand.

IMPROVISATION TAKES THE PLACE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

In economics the same uncertainty as to fundamentals is everywhere exhibited by the leaders of thought and action. The result is the sheerest improvisation on the part of those who must find some solution to the pressing problems of the day, while those not burdened with the immediate responsibility of power can do no more than yearn either for a return to the good old days, or for some desirable Utopia which they proceed to blue-print with varying degrees of definiteness, and whose outlines are dependent upon personal predilection or phantasy.

No one can lay the responsibility for this chaos at the doorstep of political economy. Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marx and Engels had already laid true and deep the foundations of that science. But with the increasing control of capitalist influences over the seats of learning that noble science was cut off in the full bloom of its development through the substitution of objective study of laws by the subjective analysis of motives. Let anyone in our modern academies speak of the law of value and he will be frowned at as a vulgarian of the classical era. The modern stream-lined economist glides through the airy mists of utility abstractions, though every cost accountant who ever set pen to paper in any going enterprise throughout this land proves by the very requirements of capitalist economy itself how miserably shallow are the apologetics of the Jevons and the Marshall schools.

The same pitiful functionalism permeates the economic schemes of our so-called statesmen. They have but two questions to determine when formulating their schemes: First, Is it desirable? Second, how shall we go about it? Having abandoned the tedious quest for law, all they have to do is to determine how a thing works and project their plan into the future on a graded scale.

With only minor exceptions, every basic economic program typical of the New Deal philosophy has fallen through. On the basis of their own proven incapacity the New Deal statesmen deserve to be repudiated, were it not for the fact that their opponents are even more ignorant than they concerning the fundamentals of our economy. But even worse, their opponents are utterly lacking in a broad, genuine prosociality. The defeat of the Roosevelt wing of the Democratic Party to-day would constitute a definite set-back for the masses of the American people.

EVEN THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL HAS ABANDONED MARXISM FOR PRAGMATISM

An interesting illustration of the world-wide effects following from the substitution of pragmatic opportunism for science in history is exhibited by the tactics of the Communist International during the past eight years. Originally the Third International was organized in 1919 by the Russian Bolsheviks under the clear-sighted leadership of

Lenin. In his own career he exemplified the spirit of Marxism as a living philosophy which refused to be shackled by the rigid, dogmatic formalism of Karl Kautsky, the spiritual head of the Second International. That typical German dogmatist assumed by common consent the mantle of Engels, who in turn had inherited it upon the death of Marx.

The original objective of the Communist International into which the Third had evolved was the stimulation of international revolution principally on the European continent. Lenin died in 1924 and the ensuing years witnessed the stabilization of capitalist economy everywhere. The advent of Mussolini in 1922 had fully demonstrated the fact that there was no automatism in social development. The internal division of Italian Socialism was reflected in lack of cohesion among the labor unions.

Even as late as 1928 world Marxism had not succeeded in plumbing the social significance of Fascism. They still denounced it as "a terrorist dictatorship of big capital." [64] Either they could not, or would not concede that fascism represented, as far as the masses were concerned, the militant effort to curb economic individualism run rampant, and instill into the economic order a deeper appreciation of its social responsibility through the over-powering might of the state. To-day we know that it is not the Italian economy which rules the state, but the state which determines every move of the so-called capitalist entrepreneur.

THE GERMAN COMMUNIST STRATEGY MISCARRIED TO RESULT IN HITLER'S ACCESSION TO POWER

In Germany the economic order had been hard pressed by the exactions of Versailles and the necessities of the victor nations to maintain control of the world markets. World economic disintegration had set in during 1929, with tremendous repercussions in German industry. Unemployment there mounted to over six million.

The country was poor; doles were meager; bankruptcy among small business men and farmers was accelerated; youth was denied its opportunity to work and build for the future. In this fertile ground Hitler appeared with his outworn shibboleths of a hybrid political philosophy. His appeal was simple—the regeneration of the great German people now crushed down by the victor's heel. His program was equally simple—to organize the national resources for the national welfare.

[64] Fascism and Social Revolution—Dutt (1935), p. 109.

The masses were temporarily disillusioned with the meagre results achieved by the Social Democrats and the republican Centrists. This is a customary phenomenon in well-organized democratic countries. The same American people who overwhelmingly voted Hoover and the Republican Party into office in 1928, could just as enthusiastically vote them out of power in 1932 without endangering the foundations of the indigenous social structure.

In Germany the spirit of democracy was too newly acquired to have taken firm hold in the hearts and upon the imagination of the people. Besides, the Communist delegation in the Reichstag was committed to the policy of sabotaging the republican government. By taking advantage of parliamentary formalism they consistently voted for any side, including the Nazis, that would embarrass the regime and hasten its downfall. They looked upon themselves as the inevitable inheritors of power.

Apparently the voting statistics favored them from 1930 to 1932. One has but to read the official Communist apologia to see how the Communists played their hand with all too-consummate cleverness.[65] They finally over-played their hand. Monopoly capital, when confronted with certain doom under a Communist regime, as against the unknown possibilities of a National Socialist regime, preferred, quite naturally, the latter.

FALLACY OF THE COMMUNIST UNITED FRONT MOVEMENT

Hitler could not resolve the economic impasse without socialization of industry. Socialization is inconceivable without democratic control. Nationalization requires only a strongly entrenched centralized political power, and that is exactly what Hitler desired. At the same time his ideology impelled him to avow an intransigeant policy toward Communism, then his most formidable enemy. The Communist International quickly rallied to organize its defenses. All its surplussage of fine-spun, divisive doctrines were quickly discarded. An appeal was issued for a United Front by all forces of democracy against dictatorship. No one need halt to cross-examine his neighbor as of yore concerning his orthodoxy. There was but a single shibboleth, democracy, and but a single enemy, fascism.

On this ground many attractive alliances could be, and were engineered. In the United States Earl Browder, leader of the Communist Party, even addressed an appeal to the Catholic Church for a common struggle against the common enemy. In France the powerful Socialist

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[65] Fascism and Social Revolution—Dutt, Ch. VI.

Party formed a United Front with the Communist Party, and by the additional support of the Radical Socialists, who are neither radical nor socialists but middle class republicans, founded a United Front Government with Leon Blum as Premier. This policy was really an armed neutrality among basically dissident groups wherein each eyed his partner, seeking surreptitiously to advantage his collaboration, and stood cautiously ready to desert with all his forces upon the first untoward move.

Of course, the Communists with egregious self-confidence thought that they could in time dominate the whole by dint of superior discipline, if nothing more. When the critical moment came, the petty bourgeois republicans left the coalition when capitalism felt oppressed by the liberal social reforms initiated by the Blum government. In the face of impending world war the French republicans were seen as intense nationalists, the French Socialists reverted back to their anti-capitalism, while the French Communists—at least their leaders—proved their first allegiance to be toward the Moscow regime.

Stalin's dickering with Hitler while stalling for time resulted in the trade agreement with Germany in August, 1939 which all the world correctly interpreted as paving the way to an open alliance. Then followed the Polish invasion by Germany, the division of the spoils between the suspicious partners, and then finally the Russian expansion in the Baltic and toward the Balkans in order to strengthen her defenses.

All the hysterical outburst upon Russia's assault against Finland was merely a convenient outlet of long pent-up vindictiveness against the Soviet regime so long repressed because its enemies had had no clear-cut issue upon which to rally an overwhelming public opinion. Of all the contemptible diplomatic ineptness during the past few years, nothing could have been of a lower order than that of France and England who betrayed in turn Austria, Ethiopia and Republican Spain, while they secretly hoped for Germany to unleash its fury and waste her strength and substance in a Russian campaign. They cannot now be heard to complain when Hitler and Stalin beat them at their own game.

Much as we detest the Stalin dictatorial suppression of human rights and the methods of liquidating opposition, there was always the excuse of internal politics and the grand goal toward which the Soviet power was driving. The first bomb dropped among the helpless civilian population of Helsinki exploded many illusions fondly entertained among the supporters of the Soviet Union throughout the world. That bomb shattered also the gaudy propaganda type of power politics indulged in by radicals of every country who had abandoned the slow but certain progress of solid enlightenment for the spectacular appeal to the masses on any issue for the sole purpose of obtaining power. They had won that power in Spain, and in France, but in doing so the leaders had lost spiritual contact with the masses. The leaders were left to their own improvisations, and such leadership can result in only one of two developments—a personal despotism or disintegration. Spain evolved the first, and France witnessed the disintegration of the forces of radicalism with their flimsy United Front. Pragmatism of the radical vintage had speculated on certain synthetic combinations. When their cohesive powers waned—as every student of social science foresaw it must—all their spectacular constructions crashed before the first solid impact of the social forces inherent in the very capitalist system whose laws of motion they had neglected to study for the alluring achievements of "practical politics."

Every student of the radical movement who has closely followed its nuances dating from the first Revisionists led by Eduard Bernstein, can recognize how it stemmed off from the abandonment of Marxism which was based on the study of social laws, for the functionalism of the pragmatic school.

CONSEQUENCES TO THE WORLD RADICAL MOVEMENT OF THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO CURRENT WORLD PROBLEMS

We have now rapidly re-capitulated the high-lights of the historical scene during the past twenty years. Whether it be the League of Nations debacle, the orgy of economic expansion and its aftermath of destruction in values, or in the practical politics of such a highly specialized field as that of the radical movement, we find everywhere one common factor to which is attributable their shortcomings, namely the substitution of improvisation, or what amounts to the same thing, the subjective rationalization of those temporarily in power, for the analysis of the laws of social motion.

This was to be expected of non-Marxists. It became an historical tragedy of major significance when Marxists, too, surrendered to the all too-common impulse of opportunism which grasps for the shell and loses the substance. The plodding process of education, of slow but certain gain, was surrendered for the quick conquest of power by a clever political maneuver. Subsequent events proved the shallowness of this scintillating cleverness, with the result that to-day the Communist movement stands universally discredited and condemned; the Socialist movement is disorganized where it has not totally disappeared; while despotism of the most despicable sort flourishes beneath the slogans immortalized by the French martyrs of the Commune of 1871, and the Russian Revolutionists of 1917.

The world will emerge from the Second World War totally unprepared to face the even more formidable problems of the peace. Radicals, liberals and conservatives have neither a program nor the intellectual capacity to formulate and defend one. All will again be left to chance, to time, to destiny, and perhaps during the interim of sanity still remaining a voice pleading for law and causality in history may yet be heard.

REVOLUTIONS GENERALLY PROMISE MORE THAN THEY ACHIEVE

It is in the nature of revolutions, whether in society or in scientific thought, to arouse grandiose expectations which future events must negative. This is because man feels unrestrained in the exercise of his imagination, while nature puts definite brakes on his understanding. So, for example, were the flamboyant declarations of the rights of man in the absolute terms of the eighteenth century. Even to this day, in America, particularly in the South, vast numbers of our fellow citizens, both black and white, are little more than peons or serfs under the guise of share-croppers.

In the world of scientific thought the discoveries of physicists and the generalizations they deduced therefrom created the urge to question all old-established doctrines and subject them to careful scrutiny in the light of those achievements. This was indeed an unexceptionable by-product of intellectual advancement, provided it was undertaken by first-rate intellects. Unfortunately this was not the case. Instead the epigoni who constitute the intelligentsia pounced upon the revolution in physical science as a convenient sounding-board for announcing out of hand a revolution in all thought.

Anything old was suspect simply because it was generally accepted. Since relativity was the opposite of absolute, all constants functioning as independent variables were condemned as false, and people even were led to believe that the well-known law of gravitation as we experience it was henceforth to be suspended and declared null and void. Figuratively speaking, Einstein had to go about assuring people that it was still bad judgment to walk off the roof of a tall building.[66] Bricklayers being matter-of-fact people, still persisted in using the plumb line. From the denial of constants it was but another step to the denial of causality and finally the denial of law, or what amounts to the same thing, the assertion that the human intellect by its very constitution was debarred from grasping the essence of reality.

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[66] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 70.

D. Effect of Recent Scientific Developments on Historical Theory

THE HISTORICAL FIELD THEORY IS PREDICATED UPON LAW AND CAUSALITY

It is important for our investigation to analyze how this revolution in thought was brought about, not only because the Historical Field Theory is predicated upon law and causality, but because the very concept of an historically limited field for the operation of those forces is derived, in a measure, from the physical field theory as propounded by Einstein, which was itself the culmination of a radical departure in classical science.

The classical world concept as conceived by Newton and propounded in his law of gravitation was predicated upon two independent absolutes, time and space, the one composed of instants, the other of points. The ponderability of matter was assumed, and bodies exerted an influence upon each other simultaneously by a gravitational force operating through an ether between them. Newton himself was aware of the arbitrary character of his basic assumptions concerning the absolute nature of time and space, the nature of mass, the nature of ether, and simultaneous action at a distance. Bertrand Russell points out that during his own life-time some of these assumptions were subjected to attack by Leibnitz and Clarke.[67] Newton was firm, however, in the belief that experimental tests ultimately would bear out the logic of his hypotheses.

Writing of Newton's principles Einstein says: "We can indeed see from Newton's formulation of it that the concept of absolute space, which comprised that of absolute rest, made him feel uncomfortable; he realized that there seemed to be nothing in experience corresponding to this last concept. He was also not quite comfortable about the introduction of forces operating at a distance. But the tremendous practical success of his doctrines may well have prevented him and the physicists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from recognizing the fictitious character of the foundation of his system." [68] Even before the nineteenth century had passed the means for the destruction of classical conceptions had already been gathered by indefatigable thinkers who had prepared the ground for the Relativity Theory.

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[67] Analysis of Matter—Russell (1927), Ch. II.

[68] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 35.

RELATION BETWEEN THE HISTORICAL FIELD THEORY AND THE PHYSICAL FIELD THEORY

Chief among them was Faraday and Maxwell who strove to explain the phenomena of electricity and magnetism. Such marvels as the telephone, telegraph and electric lights were beginning to play an ever larger role in the expanding life of modern industry. Empiricism had yielded to scientific investigation in biology, chemistry and the vast new field of applied technology.

It was to be expected that the growing electrical industry would require more than a pragmatical knowledge of the forces upon whose practical utilization depended the progress of their expanding industry. The material conditions of existence gave rise to the problem and the solution was gradually unfolded. Experiment had disclosed the polar nature of electric and magnetic phenomena, and that they acted and reacted upon one another in a definitely limited electro-magnetic field. Newton's principles could not account for this polarity nor for the limited field of operation.

Faraday and Maxwell propounded what Einstein called the most revolutionary theory since Newton's time, when they formulated the field concept to account for the manifestation of electrical and magnetic phenomena.[69] "Before Clerk Maxwell," writes Einstein, "people conceived of physical reality—insofar as it is supposed to represent events in nature—as material points, whose changes consist exclusively of motions, which are subject to partial differential equations. After Maxwell they conceived physical reality as represented by continuous fields, not mechanically explicable, which are subject to partial differential equations." [70]

Maxwell still persisted in the effort to explain his field theory by the mechanical action of substances in an ether medium. Hertz and Lorentz developed the field theory to the point where electro-magnetic phenomena were properties lodged in the mobile elementary particles operating independently of the ether which was firmly fixed in space.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIELD IN PHYSICAL THEORY

There still remained the problem of action at a distance and the absolute nature of time and space. The Euclidean geometry was

[69] Physics and Reality—Einstein in the Journal of the Franklin Institute, March, 1936, pp. 362-4.

[70] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 65.

based upon assumptions of the properties of the straight line produced to infinity which had never been challenged until the nineteenth century. Riemann's geometry replaced the straight line by the geodesic which was based upon the curvature of the earth and conceived of the curvature of space with which it was bound.

The non-Euclidean school of geometry divorced itself from the purely logical conceptions of arithmetic and geometry which can be produced independent of experience, despite the fact that its methods were derived from experience and were applied to the practical affairs of life. Parallel lines produced to infinity are purely mental concepts as are the infinite properties of numbers with which arithmetic deals. Riemann had laid the mathematical basis for the future relativity theory based upon the finiteness and consequently the curvature of space in a continuous medium.

In the world of physical reality old-established fundamental principles were being brought into question, such as the unchangeableness of measuring rods used by science as standards for gauging its phenomena. Michelson and Morley determined to prove the existence or nonexistence of ether in the medium through which the earth was moving around the sun at approximately nineteen miles per second. They devised an experiment whereby a beam of light was split in two, one part traveling in the direction of the earth's motion, the other part perpendicular to it. If the earth is plowing like a ship through a sea of ether, the beam in the line of its motion ought to be retarded sufficiently to indicate its motion. Their experiment consistently failed to prove either the motion of the earth or the presence of ether. Both the perpendicular and the horizontal beams of light returned in a dead heat. What puzzled the experimenters most was that it proved too much. If the earth was surrounded by ether then apparently it stood still while the sun and the entire universe circled about it. For it was obvious that a beam of light in the direction of the earth's movement ought to take longer to return than the beam of light perpendicular to it, the difference indicating the speed of the earth's motion through the ether.

A few years after the Michelson-Morley experiments, Fitzgerald and Lorentz independently of each other initiated experiments which proved that a measuring rod placed in the line of the earth's motion around the sun contracts while it is unaffected when perpendicular to it. The contraction is minute, just one part in two hundred million or two and a half inches in the diameter of the earth.

CONSEQUENCES TO SCIENCE OF THE FITZGERALD-LORENTZ CONTRACTION

Here was a startling fact. Our measuring rods varied with their position. Yet it was impossible to detect this in the measuring rod, for all change simultaneously dependent upon their position relative to the earth's motion. Incidentally they proved that Michelson and Morley's apparent failure to prove the earth's motion through ether was actually proved by the dead heat of the longitudinal and horizontal beams. The contraction of the horizontal measuring rod was exactly equal to the retardation of the beam due to the presence of ether.

This experiment caused a revisal, among others, of the former absolute standards of measurement upon which science must perforce depend. A yardstick is still a yard, but the yardstick itself undergoes changes of length dependent upon its position relative to the earth's motion.[71]

All this seething chaos in classical mathematics and physics predicated upon absolutes was reflected in chemistry with its heretofore hermetically sealed elements and indestructible atoms. The Curies had revolutionized all classical conceptions concerning matter by demonstrating the emission of energy from radium and other radioactive elements. It was not only possible to change irreducible elements from one to another but it was possible to prove why elements could exist in two or more isotropes by the presence of an additional neutron in the nucleus while the atomic number remains the same throughout.[72] The Curies gave the clue to the world of this possibility in realizing for experimental purposes the ancient transmutation dreams of alchemists.

Niels Bohr devised the first visualization of the hypothetical internal structure of the atom which has been developed into a study of tremendously vital importance to modern science in the former closely insulated compartments of physics, chemistry and biology. These guarded divisions, with each absolute monarch in its own domain, had broken down together with all absolutism in physical and philosophical theory. Once the breach had been made there were not lacking indomitable spirits to widen it. Among them was Rutherford, who was able to establish the startling emptiness of this so-called material world in which "the atom is as porous as the solar system." [73]

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[71] See the Mysterious Universe—Jeans, Ch. IV; and The Nature of The Physical World—Eddington, Chapter I.

[72] New World Picture—Gray (1936), p. 254.

[73] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 1.

BREAK-DOWN OF ABSOLUTE CONCEPTIONS IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

In philosophy at the threshold of the twentieth century there was evidence of this disintegration of the classical world so painstakingly constructed during the preceding three hundred years. The monistic ideology which characterized science in the attempt to interpret all reality in the terms of positivism and the redistribution of matter and motion had been supplanted by various species of subjective positivism. The dualism of matter and energy once asserted, now degenerated into the ancient dualism of matter and mind. Mach preached that there was no physical necessity in the universe, but only a logical necessity.

Science, wrote Bergson, deals with analysis, philosophy with intuition. Concepts never give us more than an artificial reconstruction of an object, concerning which the mental symbols present to us only a faint shadow. Analysis operates on the immobile, whilst intuition places itself in the mobile, in the world of flux, change and duration.[74] Space Bergson reduced to a matter of the intuition, not of objective reality. He is conscious of a succession of events, and time becomes a continuity of interpenetration. Time is an invention, or it is nothing at all.[75] The entire world of classical science thus tumbled about our ears. Whitehead added to the confusion by emitting volumes whose chief claim for profundity was derived not from the merit of their inner content, but from the studied obscurity of his expression.

RISE OF OBSCURANTISM IN THE WORLD OF MODERN THOUGHT

One can sympathize with a thinker who must hew a new path and still use a terminology which lends itself awkwardly to his purpose. It is a far different matter when a writer deliberately employs words in common use but gives them strange and distorted meanings, which upon being deciphered result in nothing more than the refurbishing of time-worn philosophic truisms.

"Not the least of the difficulties," writes Joad, "by which the reader of Whitehead is confronted is his habit of using familiar words in new senses. He has also introduced a number of entirely new terms into philosophy. It is at least doubtful whether the traditional philosophical terms would not have conveyed his meaning as well as these new ones, and while the doubt remains, a critic may always plausibly suggest that the apparent originality, no less than the difficulty of Whitehead's philosophy is due to his use of unfamiliar terms and of familiar terms in novel senses." [76]

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[74] An Introduction to Metaphysics—Bergson, pp. 47-8.

[75] Creative Evolution—Bergson, p. 341.

We have quoted this opinion principally because of its temperance when one could with justice pour out his wrath on verbal absurdities which at times brings him to the intellectual level of children who play at a game where common words are given grotesque meanings. Whitehead represents to us the conscious effort of a shallow but shrewd mind endeavoring to disguise the paucity of his real content behind a smoke-screen of cross-word abstraction. He is in himself an exhibit of the dilemma in which the intellectual world found itself at the beginning of this century.

Here are some of the profound conclusions of this philosopher who sweats erudition from every pore: "It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent. It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many. It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World. God and the World are the contrasted opposites in terms of which the Creativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diversities in contrast." [77]

Whatever sense there is in this jumble of pompous phraseology was expressed long, long ago by Spinoza in severely chiseled phrases which will continue to be the model for every genuine thinker. Spinoza is far from being transparent, but he lived at the beginning of an age when profundity and clarity were not considered incompatible. Obscurantism has always been the protective armament of mediocrity.

DEGENERATION OF CREATIVE THOUGHT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Paralleling this degenerative process in science and philosophy, literature and art kept equal pace with the rest. The expose was literature's chief contribution to its time, this merciless showing up of sham, fraud, corruption and injustices. Jack London, Upton Sinclair, W. E. Woodward and Frank Norris were not only among the most expert craftsmen of the trade, but they were imbued with some sort of idealism which passed current under the label of Socialism. As for the rest, they were generally cynics who derived mordant pleasure from the ruthless tearing down of ancient shams and formulas. They had no deep sense of the constructive elements in human striving and struggle, and merely vented their spleen under the thin guise of admonition and correction.

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[76] Guide to Philosophy—Joad (1936), pp. 559-60.

[77] Process and Reality—Whitehead, p. 528.

The world of art, too, had succumbed in this whirlpool of frustration. Traditional influences were abandoned not because they no longer met the requirements of modern life, but because modern life had come to the end of the line. People did not know it, or even worse, refused to recognize it. Cubism, Futurism, Dadaism each claimed to represent in its own right some living reality of modern life, but all were equally incomprehensive to the helpless public who were sold on the idea that the latest is the best, just like the newest automobile.

Competent critics are agreed that the artists of this period were characterized by their uncompromising individualism whose work was devoid of affirmative, constructive pro-sociality. "The art of painting has suffered from the unbounded individualism, of the last century," wrote Mather, "just as manners, literature, business, industry and politics have suffered from the same cause." [78]

Impressionists strove to express the creations of their soul with the minimum influence of impact with or guidance from society. Expressionists endeavored to foist upon others their strong emotions of whose value or meaning they by themselves were the sole judge. Cubism attempted to free itself from the apparent limitations of the plane surface on which only motionless and coexistent objects could be set by achieving simultaneity in vision, motion and rhythm. In the hands of the mass of mediocrities who adopted that form of expression it soon became bizarre and ruthlessly iconoclastic. Futurism was born out of the machine age and sought to paint a world of power and movement and flux, while combining time and space with the notion of becoming.

The American painter, in the judgment of Gardner, unlike the European who was given to abstractions, symbols and pure phantasy, showed in his work a healthy realism which reflected the practical efficiency of the American temperament in what is functional and therefore actual. But obviously this was not true of the great mass of self-proclaimed artists who thronged the so-called Latin quarters in our great cities in search of the more pleasant and less arduous stimulations under the guise of a noble calling.

Those who could afford it, or contrived to manage it, soon departed from these unsympathetic shores for the congenial atmosphere of Paris, Rome and the Balearic Islands off the Spanish Mediterranean Coast. Beard gives us in his America In Midpassage (pp. 754-8) a very graphic description of these jittery egoists both in America and the emigrés to the various European artistic havens whence these esthetes fled to nurture their tender souls in an atmosphere more conducive to their survival, or rather their vegetation in futility.

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[78] Modern Painting—Mather (1927), p. 380; Art Through the Ages—Gardner (1936), pp. 731-2.

These glaring evidences of ideological disintegration were merely the surface symptoms of a far more vital ailment which was affecting the economic and political organization of society. It is pointless to extend this observation into the homologue of a Euclidean theorem that the ideological superstructure is always a faithful reflex of the state of society. We are not laying down generalizations which are independent of a particular period of historic development. The fact remains, however, that during the first third of the twentieth century the whirls and eddies of the cultural world played a very insignificant role in determining the direction of the main current of American life.

Decidedly it was the other way around. For every hundred who concerned themselves about the latest trends in science, philosophy, art and literature, there were ten thousand whose sole intellectual inspiration was derived from the mumbo-jumbo of the fraternal lodge rituals, while a hundred thousand received whatever emotional excitation to which their natures were capable of responding from the thrilling drama of the baseball diamond, the race track and the prizefight ring, not forgetting the soporific movies.

IS CAPITALIST SOCIETY AT THE END OF ITS PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT?

Society had come to the end of its creative effort on the basis of capitalist economy. But society did not know it. Nor does society recognize that fact to-day. On the contrary, this very thought will be derided as without foundation, as defeatism, as the negation of all that America stands for in continued progress toward ever greater heights. So reasoned the Tories before 1776. So reasoned the Compromisers before 1861. So still reason the apologists of the status quo despite 1914, 1929, 1933 and 1939. The First World War, the great economic crisis of 1929, the general collapse of 1933, the Second World War, all are just unpleasant incidents in their calculations. History so far has dealt with hindsight. This scientific approach to history will feel equally at home with foresight.

One is justified in inquiring about what is meant by the end of the line, how the line operates, and why it can go no farther on the same tracks. The fact is that capitalist economy had exhausted the possibilities of its progressive internal development with the appearance of the trust and the centralized money power at the turn of the century. The subsequent expansion of production, the technical inventions and the new industries to which they gave rise produced nothing new in the nature of capitalist economy. Its radius of operation was merely enlarged, but this radius was not capable of indefinite expansion.

So much the progress of physical science ought to have taught us. This lesson has not yet been learned in its social applications, though our institutions of learning teach it well enough in the abstract sciences. Relativity was hailed with ecstatic awe as applying only to distant stars and nebulae. Few seemed to realize that the same underlying principles applied to forms of social organization which had an historical and not an absolute validity.

People like to cling to the satisfying theory of gradual and illimitable progress, though their own concepts of progress were derived chiefly from the school text-books which made it a point of emphasizing the ideology of the Declaration of Independence printed in the back pages. Many here in America are peeved at the fact that people elsewhere, as in the totalitarian nations, do not subscribe to the same unalterable philosophy of life and its practical political application.

RELATIVITY PRINCIPLES MARK THE CLOSE OF THE CLASSICAL ERA IN THOUGHT

Einstein and the Relativity Theory marked both the close of an era and opened up the possibilities of a new one. We must hasten to add that neither of these objectives was within the purview of its promulgator. Russell is frank to admit that the philosophical possibilities of the relativity point of view have not yet been investigated. Einstein himself does not claim for his theory more than it represents itself to be, namely a comprehensive explanation of physical relations involved in the measurement of time and space.

The special theory first enunciated in 1905 applies to all physical phenomena with the exception of gravitation, while the general theory provides the law of gravitation and its relations to the other forces of nature.[79] One has but to read Einstein's views on economics, crises, and the causes of war to recognize in Einstein a finely attuned spirit who feels keenly about the troubles of the world, but yet with no definite views on how they came about, nor what is to be done concerning them.[80]

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[79] The World As I See It—Einstein, pp. 75-6.

On the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War he approved as the best solution for the world's dilemma, the organization of a "Court of Wisdom" to be composed of the world's leading thinkers whose impartial judgment on great world problems would represent a sort of conscience of mankind.[81] He foresaw certain difficulties about filling vacancies on this august world tribunal, but said nothing of the impossibility of getting such a body to function, let alone its ability to appeal effectively to the conscience of mankind. His naïve outlook on the nature of the State would do justice to a medieval monk suddenly thrust out from amid the serene seclusion of his retreat into the maelstrom of every-day existence. His views are both an eloquent tribute to the generosity of his heart and to the abstract nature of his philosophy of physical reality, including the social world about him.

From an historical point of view Einstein's role is important because it fitted admirably into the cultural picture of his time. Insofar as the general relativity theory administered the final blow to the classical conceptions of physics it helped to increase the intellectual disorganization which was the counterpart of world disorganization in 1917 when it was first published.

With engaging modesty Einstein wonders why it is that his theory seemed to capture the imagination of the world whereas, he asserts, Planck's constant was of much greater significance.[82] This is no attempt to answer that general question, but when one considers the state of the world in 1900 when the Quantum Theory was first announced and the world disintegration which the First World War created, there exists a definite relation between the apparently humdrum scientific discovery of Planck and the obviously topsy-turvy arrangement of the fundamental physical laws which Einstein announced to an already addled world in 1917.

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIVITY IN THE FORMULATION OF THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

We are not concerned with the technical details of relativity which are beyond the scope of this inquiry. We are vitally concerned, however, with the philosophical implications of this theory. First of all, absolute reality is ruled out with its independent entities of time, space and the material point. All existence was deduced from the electro-magnetic field whose basic principles were worked out by Faraday, Maxwell, Hertz and Lorentz. Einstein elaborated that into the field of the co-ordinate system in which bodies were in relation to each other. Action at a distance where the force of one body was exerted upon another body instantaneously was replaced by velocities of temporal magnitude where the speed of light occupied the role of a constant.

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[80] Ibid., pp. 188-213.

[81] New York Times, March 14, 1939.

[82] Where Is Science Going?—Planck; Prologue by Einstein.

To the three dimensional world with which we are familiar was welded the concept of time as an essential element. Time and space were the conditions of each other, and neither could be conceivable without the other. As to the broader philosophical implications Bertrand Russell writes: "Its importance to philosophy is perhaps even greater than its importance to physics. It has, of course, been seized upon by philosophers of different schools to support their respective nostrums: St. Thomas, Kant and Hegel are claimed to have anticipated it. But I do not think that any of the philosophers who have made these suggestions have taken the trouble to understand the theory. For my part, I do not profess to know exactly what its philosophical consequences will prove to be, but I am convinced that they are far-reaching, and quite different from what they seem to philosophers who are ignorant of mathematics." [83]

We shall presently see that it is precisely at the hands of mathematical philosophers such as Heisenberg, Dirac, Whitehead, Jeans and Eddington that the philosophical implications of relativity were weirdly distorted out of all contact with the objective physical reality which was the basis of Einstein's world-view, and continues so to this day, twenty years after the general theory was promulgated.

From the standpoint of historical science the philosophic implications of relativity pertain to its methods, rather than to its world concepts. It would be difficult to conceive of a historian who doubted the objective reality of the world and the people who constitute the material of his labors. We are chiefly interested in relativity because of its field concept. All existence, all physical events take place within this field, and are inconceivable without their medium. All absolute, extraneous forces are ruled out, but those which are self-contained and self-generated. There is no instantaneity, but events take place in a definite field and are temporal in nature.

These concepts are of deepest significance. If, as is the fact, the human intellect yearns for law, regularity and explicitness with the least possible number of essential factors, then the science of history must find itself powerfully re-enforced by the grand generalizations through which relativity summed up the achievements of scientific thought during the past fifty years of uncertainty and turmoil.

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[83] Analysis of Matter—Russell, pp. 55-6.

Uncertainty still remains, however, just in the place where Russell thought he would be least likely to find it; namely, among the very mathematical philosophers to whom he looked for broadening the vistas made possible by Einstein's grand generalization. We refer, of course, to the dethronement of Causality in physics and the enthronement of Probability. And we shall see, that while Einstein remains loyal to causality, it is rather because of his general philosophic viewpoint than because of his mathematical theory, while the die-hards still claim this formidable prop for their side of the grave dispute concerning the causality concept.

E. The Intellectual World as a Reflex of the Contemporary Social Organization

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

We stated that relativity marked both the close of an era and opened up the possibilities of a new one in the realm of thought. It would be puerile to assert that, while Einstein's theory represented the final death-blow to the classical conceptions of physical science, relativity was announced at the very time when world capitalism was coming to the end of the line of its progressive phase of development; that it had exhausted its internal creative powers and with it the conceptions of physical science upon which it was based.

Einstein himself would be the first to deny any imputation of motives beyond that of the earnest pursuit of his own specialty. So is he the first to pay generous tribute to the group of physical investigators who laid the basis for his theory in a society where physics and chemistry were the handmaidens of technology. To-day monopoly capitalism curbs the free application of technological advancement, while science is imprisoned in giant laboratories where its specific development is determined with a relativistic vengeance of a type never dreamed of in the work-shops of the classical scientists. An Einstein does not flourish in a Tibetan lamasery. At the same time his theories are not divorced from the real world which gave them significance.

Nor do we desire to press the iron-clad, formalistic relationship day to-day between the state of the economy and its ideological superstructure. Yet there is such a relationship. It cannot be drawn as between specific individuals and the social atmosphere in which he moves and lives and has his being. But it can be drawn between scientists as a class and their milieu. It may be incorrect, for example, to say that a certain keen intellect of the nineteenth century would have made an excellent theologian had he lived during the Middle Ages, but we can assert with confidence that our present class of theoretical physicists would have been the metaphysicians of the thirteenth century.

One has but to study the history of technology to discover that the practical requirements of capitalist economy gave rise to science, and not the other way around. Of course, it is needless to argue that eventually science gave birth to new industries which were never dreamed of, not even among the tireless investigators through whose researches those industries were born.

Nor do we intimate that the inability of capitalist economy to solve the contradictions inherent in its basic cycle—production-distribution-re-production resulting in recurrent crises, depression, expansion, imperialism and war—reacted mechanically upon physicists and resulted in the iconoclastic developments we have described. But again we can assert with fullest confidence in our ability to prove the point conclusively, that had capitalism been in a healthy, progressive state, neither relativity nor quanta, nor indeterminacy would have succeeded in making any impression whatever upon the world outside of the ivy towers of a select few intellectuals.

No one to-day can seriously question that the dominant world economy sets the tempo for modern life, and while the Relativity Theory would be just as valid in a healthy as in a decaying civilization, it makes all the difference in the world as to how it would be received by the intelligentsia. The special theory in 1905 did not set the world afire, although it already foreshadowed the general theory of a dozen years later. Timing is of the essence.

Whether Relativity would be thrust out in a period of virile capitalism, or of a capitalism that finds itself frustrated, thwarted, and finally enmeshed within a chain of circumstances which can bring about at best only stagnation, while the essence of its existence is the ever-widening circle of economic expansion; all that helped to explain the phlegm with which the special theory was received, and the furor which the general theory created. It is safe to assert that upon both occasions most of those who spoke of Relativity knew even less about it after they had vehemently affirmed or denied its tenets.

EFFECT OF RELATIVITY ON BERTRAND RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

To appreciate the significance of the profound revolution which the general Relativity Theory initiated in the intellectual world, one has but to compare the writings of Bertrand Russell: one "Our Knowledge of the Eternal World," published in 1914, and the other "Analysis of Matter," published in 1927. We select Russell's works because both of them represent the ideas of a finely trained intellect among the best of their respective times yet locked up in the same personality.

For the differences between the points of view are as divergent as could be desired from the best respective champions of pre-Relativity and post-Relativity thought, with 1917 as the dividing line. It is true that Russell wrote in his later book that "The most remarkable feature of the theory of relativity from a philosopher's standpoint, was already present in the special theory: I mean the merging of space and time into space-time. The special theory has now become only an approximation, which is not exactly true in the neighborhood of matter. But it remains worth understanding, as a stage towards the general theory. Moreover, it does not demand the abandonment of nearly such a large proportion of our common-sense notions as is discarded by the general theory." [84]

Actually the special theory of relativity which concerned itself with the internal structure of matter [85] was merely a development of Lorentz's ideas where ether played the role of a mechanical transmitting mechanism of force, whereas Einstein divested ether of this mechanical function and ascribed it to the electro-magnetic field which is created between bodies in a co-ordinate system. This field is the ultimate, irreducible reality.

The significance of this theory was not at all appreciated in its time, and though nine years had elapsed since its first publication by Einstein in 1905, Russell gave it but passing reference in his earlier work. Alert student that he was, he could not but recognize that the entire world of physics and chemistry was awake to the possibilities opened up by the Curies, but his writings clearly indicated that no more was to be expected from their discoveries than the usual expansion of knowledge along the well-beaten path of experimentation, objectivity, law and causality.

Significantly, Einstein is not even mentioned in Russell's earlier work. Bergson, Spencer, Kant, Plato and Zeno still occupy the center of the philosophical stage. Russell's arguments follow the well-worn pattern. Space and time are still independent absolutes, logic is still the essence of philosophy by "enlarging our abstract imagination, and providing an infinite number of possible hypotheses to be applied in the analysis of any complex fact." [86] The space-time of physics still is something far different to the space and time of the world as we know it.[87]

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[84] Analysis of Matter—Russell, p. 49.

[85] The World As I See It—Einstein, pp. 127-131.

Thirty pages are devoted to the serious consideration and solution of Zeno's paradoxes,[88] which to-day are accorded no more space in a general work on philosophy than is merited by any other problem of merely historical interest. Such problems as the distinction between the special and the general, finite and infinite, and the proof or disproof of infinity by the properties of numbers are all the mature questions which any thoughtful writer felt bound to discuss in the pre-Relativity days.

Thirteen years later one cannot with strictest assiduity recognize in Russell the same writer of his earlier work. Its very title "Analysis of Matter" indicates the revolution in thought which had already taken place. The problems which concern the author are still the same, but the manner of approach and the nature of the solution are radically different. It can be asserted that long, long after America's participation in the First World War is forgotten in our histories, or referred to in the same mechanical fashion as we now do to the numerous Indian wars, the year 1917 will stand out as the dividing line between two eras of thought, and which presaged the beginning of a new era in civilization.

Again, we repeat, it is of no consequence whether its author recognized its revolutionary significance, for in truth—as Einstein is the first to admit—its real author is the co-operative genius of mankind as synthesized in Einstein's tremendous generalization. The historian's concern is rather with the method, the new epistemology which relativity ushered in.

Russell ranks among its most brilliant exponents. Planck, Rutherford, Reimann, Minkowski, Bohr, all of whom had given to the world the product of their labors before 1914, but whose work in Russell's estimation did not merit especial attention at that time, are now among the principal participants in the new drama of science that had become somehow inextricably interwoven with philosophy.

Planck's inconspicuous constant "h" which is the invariable unit of energy absorbed or emitted from an atom, whether that be of hydrogen, calcium, sodium or of any one of the known ninety-two elements, had first been announced to the world in 1900.[89] Now in the light of relativity, quantum physics began to take on new meaning, and, as Russell remarks, just in the nick of time to rescue us from ennui by letting us understand that there were still problems in the world left unsolved by the magnificent scope of Relativity. The physics laboratory was abandoned by top-rank thinkers to humble technicians, while they betook themselves to the evolvement of mathematical equations which it was the duty of the technicians to prove in the field of microscopic and molar physics.

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[86] Our Knowledge of the External World—Russell, p. 68.

[87] Ibid., p. 129.

[88] Ibid., pp. 159-188.

INTELLECTUAL DEGENERATION OF CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT AS EXHIBITED BY ABSTRACT MATHEMATICIANS

Strange to say, this mathematical method of procedure in theoretical physics met with remarkable success. The logical explanation for it was that physicists had hit upon the fact that nature was constructed essentially upon a simple pattern which could be worked out for molar physics once the secret of the laws of motion had been discovered. It is a far different matter, however, to claim that all existence is a matter of mathematical calculations.

From the relations of definite bodies whose existence was assumed to be outside of the observer, physicists rapidly developed over a period of twenty years the same egocentricism which it had required two thousand years of metaphysics to perfect. Jeans was the perfect embodiment of this new spirit in topsy-turvy science: "The essential fact is simply that all the pictures which science now draws of nature, and which alone seem capable of according with observational fact, are mathematical pictures." [90] From this he went a step further to announce that nature seems very conversant with the rules of pure mathematics as our mathematicians have formulated them in their studies, and he made no bones about announcing boldly that by pure mathematics he meant "creations of pure thought, of reason operating solely within her own sphere, as contrasted with applied mathematics which reasons about the external world, after first taking some supposed property of the external world as its raw material." [91] The Great Architect of the Universe "now begins to appear as a pure mathematician," [92] he announced. The universe cannot admit of material representation for the reason that it has become a mere mental concept.[93] The final truth about a phenomenon resides in the mathematical description of it, and we go beyond the mathematical formula at our own risk.[94] Mathematics replaced mechanics in the explanation of the universe.[95]

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[89] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, pp. 181-2.

[90] The Mysterious Universe—Jeans, p. 150.

[91] p. 154. [92] Ibid., p. 165. [93] Ibid., p. 167.

Eddington proceeded to express grave doubts as to the reality of the world external to our own consciousness. "Most of our common impressions of substance, world-wide instants, and so on," he wrote, "have turned out to be illusory, and the externality is equally strong in the world that comes to me in dreams, the dream-world is less rational, but that might be used as an argument in favor of its externality as showing its dissociation from the internal faculty of reason. So long as we have to deal with one consciousness alone, the hypothesis that there is an external world responsible for part of what appears is an idle one. All that can be asserted of this external world is a mere duplication of the knowledge that can be much more confidently asserted of the world appearing in the consciousness." [96]

There is a higher reality transcending the narrow limits of our consciousness, Eddington argued, and his final judgment concerning the nature of this reality stops at the limits of the Unknowable as established by Spencer.[97] To this conclusion Jeans also is inevitably drawn.[98]

COLLAPSE OF THE CLASSICAL INTELLECTUAL WORLD

We may well give vent to a feeling of despair. For many hundreds of years great minds had labored painstakingly to prove the objective existence of reality. It is not enough to say cynically, as Eddington does,[99] that classical science has proved this external world to consist of mostly emptiness, including the paper of which these pages are made, and its apparently hard cover. But that is not the issue. The eye which runs over the ink marks, the table on which the book rests, the hand which turns over the pages, the food which sustains us, all is made of the same stuff as is the atom whose relative emptiness the physicist delights in describing.

We meet nature with the same stuff of which she is made. Hardness, softness, heavy, light, solid, gases, all exist in the very world of which we are a part, and of whose nature we partake to the tiniest cell in our body. We cannot in our corporeal being assume the aspect of a reality outside of the reality which is the substance of our existence. The familiar story about Samuel Johnson kicking a stone to demonstrate the objective nature of reality is repeated now-a-days with a twinkle implying that he did not know how empty was the stone upon which he stubbed his toe. But then again, his toe brought back to him a very vivid impression of externality. And that is what we mean by reality to-day, despite all learned verbiage, when we insist upon an actual world external to us and independent of our consciousness.

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[94] Ibid., p. 176.

[95] Ibid., p. 184.

[96] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 284.

[97] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, pp. 228, 291, 351.

[98] The Mysterious Universe—Jeans, pp. 151-2, 154-5.

[99] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, Introduction.

Historians are keenly aware of the implications which this problem bears to their own particular field of inquiry. It is not so much the actual objectivity of the physical world which one is asked to concede. Even Eddington will grant that and more, if he is so unfortunate as to be required to pay a steeply-graded income tax because of his country's present difficulties. The historian quite naturally is much concerned about those difficulties, about income taxes, why they are paid and how the income is earned. It makes all the difference in the world whether he searches for his explanations among the phenomena of the outer world, or cudgels his inner consciousness to derive laws of motion out of its recesses which he afterwards applies in a fashion among the myriad historical data which is submitted to his attention and selection.

During our discussion of historical methods we have had ample opportunity to observe the methods and to study the results of the subjective idealists. It is incumbent, therefore, upon us to create a sort of inter-locking directorate with the other sciences in order to establish the correct method for thinking, before we can hope to meet with any substantial success in unraveling the relations of the greater problems of social existence. Obviously, if pure mathematics is the basis of world existence, it is not a far step to prove that history itself can be mapped out in accordance with some subjectively-devised mathematical schematization.

Who has not come across elaborate diagrams, charts and tables showing the course of trade, commerce and industry over a period of years, with trends stressed and periodicity noted in order to deduce therefrom some moral of future hope or disaster, which, by planning as presented, can be realized, or obviated?

President Roosevelt has frequently announced, for example, that a balanced budget is not a practical objective until the annual national income reaches eighty billion dollars.[100] It is conceded that we now have at least ten million unemployed. How can an absolute relation be established between an historically limited national budget, national income, Federal expenditures and the number of unemployed?

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[100] New York Times, Feb. 6, 1940.

There exists none, though politicians and some economists find no difficulty in creating one.

Their methods of extra-polation are exactly the kind to which mathematicians resort in physics, with this important exception. Theoretical physicists work with relatively simple factors from which there is no kick-back, or that itself is a calculable factor. Our social statisticians work with factors they do not understand while they prognosticate concerning the operation of forces they have not analyzed, and make definite predictions about historical elements whose nature they have never grasped.

In our detailed study of the present period in American history we will see how widespread is this resort to mathematical formulation among all classes of thinkers who concern themselves with social problems. They have yet to learn that statistics and graphs are merely the representation of certain realities, and not the realities themselves. But they cannot well be blamed if the high and mighty ones in the realm of physics do the same. It must be patent that history as a science will be an iridescent dream so long as it is unable to eliminate from its ranks all those who wander where they listeth for their material and insist upon their inalienable constitutional right to do with their material what they pleaseth.

We do not object to that, so long as they do not publish it. For by that act they lay upon themselves the solemn responsibility to society which inheres in the fact of publication intended to influence the mind of fellow beings. Opinions must pass beyond beliefs into the realm of knowledge which is both subjectively and objectively sufficient in the famous test of validity laid down by Kant. Since mathematical principles are the basis of the theory of probability which is substituted by many for classical causality, we must determine, at least for our own satisfaction, just what are the probabilities upon which the mathematical method is founded when its processes are carried over in the diagnosis of social phenomena.

WIDESPREAD APPLICATION OF PURE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES TO CURRENT SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Russell hails mathematics as the highest developed among the sciences. To this Kant who was himself a great mathematician agreed. But unlike the present members of his noble calling, he warned us over a hundred and fifty years ago of the dangers inherent in the mathematical method when applied to science. In mathematics, he urges, it is a priori intuition which guides the synthesis, whereas in science the ultimate test of a conclusion must be its compatibility with experience.

"Unless we pay particular attention to this requirement," Kant wrote, "our proofs, instead of pursuing the straight path indicated by reason, follow the tortuous road of mere subjective association." [101] He warned against imitating in philosophy the mathematical usage of commencing with definitions, unless they be by way of hypothesis which must be clearly established in the conclusion.[102] Mathematical judgments are always synthetical. "Now a postulate in mathematics," he wrote, "is a practical proposition which contains nothing but the synthesis by which we present an object to ourselves, and produce the conception of it." [103]

With remarkable penetration into the character of the mathematical mind, Kant warned against the masters of the science who are so confident of the success of the method among whom "it is a common persuasion that it is capable of being applied to any subject of human thought." [104]

RELATION BETWEEN MODERN HISTORICAL INQUIRY AND MODERN SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT

Off-hand one might ask what possible bearing, except the most remote, would the technique of physical investigation have upon the methods of historical inquiry? The answer is specific and direct. Modern physics goes far beyond the classical boundaries of that science. Relativity has given us a new world outlook based on a fundamental revolution in our methods of thought. The Quantum Theory and the wave mechanics which developed out of it have revolutionized for many their method of analysis in a most startling degree, by substituting probability for strict causality.

This remaking of fundamental processes of thought could not but affect in a most vital degree the thinking of contemporary historians. Admittedly the weakest of the social disciplines, never admitted to the status of a science, but still showing unmistakable evidences of reaching that level through the labors of Smith, Ricardo, Buckle, Mill, Marx, Darwin and Spencer and the persistence of their present-day disciples, all hopes of attaining scientific standing for history would be irretrievably ruined were law and causality to be denied as the foundation props of its intellectual edifice. This revolution in thought was expressed in these pregnant words of Eddington: "When

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[101] Critique of Pure Reason—Kant, p. 440.

[102] Ibid., p. 410.

[103] Ibid., p. 152.

[104] Ibid., p. 407.

Einstein's theory arrived, which not only propounded a new epistemology but applied it to determine the law of gravitation and other practical consequences, physicists were puzzled how to classify it. Some argued that it was philosophy, alias metaphysics, and must be rejected out of hand. Others conceded that the formulae appeared to agree with observation and accomplished a valuable systematization of knowledge, but believed that a 'genuinely physical' interpretation of its meaning would in time supplant the epistemological jargon which at present envelops it. Fewer realized that the new epistemological outlook is the very heart of the theory, supplanting a fallacious system of thought which was barring progress." [105]

Present day reaction to this change initiated by Relativity is unbelievably superficial among the literati. All old-time classical striving for the discovery of law is dismissed out of hand for the cretinism of mere observation and the rationalization of experience without attempting to pierce through the apparent and the factual for the disclosure of the underlying law of motion beneath the phenomenal.

We saw how Berle and Means abandoned the prediction of the scientist sure of both the facts and the law, for what they called the calculus of probabilities charted out by resort to pure mathematical conceptions. This, in spite of Einstein's frequent admonition—none ought really to be necessary if the philosophical basis of his theory is thoroughly grasped—that observation and reality is the supreme arbiter, and that the methods of Euclidean geometry still apply in the co-ordinate system of which we are a part. Relativity did not abolish law; it only gave us a deeper insight into its mode of operation.[106]

Recent writers on the philosophical aspect of mathematics like Cooley, Gans, Kline and Wahlert point out that pure mathematics "is an abstract process borrowing nothing from observation or physical objects, except, perhaps, suggestions as to what to prove. Having developed a mathematical system it is possible to select a set of physical elements and investigate whether these physical elements obey the axioms of the system. . . . One of the important consequences of the creation of non-Euclidean geometry was that it made mathematicians appreciate that they were not tied down by any physical limitations. They were and are free to choose any system of axiom they please to develop. As pure mathematicians they can be concerned only with the correct development of theorems from whatever axioms they select. Thus the range of mathematical thought is unbounded." [107]

[105] The Philosophy of Physical Science—Eddington (1939), p. 55.

[106] The World As I See It—Einstein, pp. 92-3.

[107] Mathematics From a Cultural Viewpoint—Cooley, et al. (1935), pp. 600-1.

No one can raise any objection to this procedure so long as it is confined to the luxury of pure mental exercise. It is a far different matter when these axioms and their conclusions are foisted upon the world as an expression of the nature of external realities. It becomes a matter of serious import to the historian when these axioms and their conclusions concern the laws of social phenomena which are within the purview of his particular inquiry.

The mathematicians above quoted proceed in a quite unmathematical, because illogical, manner to apply to the world of reality some of the results of their methods of pure thought in the analysis of population statistics, stock market operations, statistics on unemployment and the like.[108] We shall discuss some of their conclusions for the light that this projection of mathematical methods will cast on some of the weighty problems which concern the historian.

ATTEMPT TO DERIVE A LAW OF POPULATION, FOR EXAMPLE, OUT OF PURE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES

They endeavor to establish a law of population for the City of New York by charting its growth in decades from 1790 on, by the operation of the function concept. To do so they seek to establish an inherent relationship between the passage of time and the progressive tempo of growth.[109] This they accomplish by means of a purely empirical equation of formidable dimensions which could not stand the test of experience and which the intervening few years has thoroughly exploded. The tempo of the city's growth has been decidedly lowered by a vast complex of social and economic factors which can never be expressed in mathematical equations.

That does not mean that social laws do not exist because they cannot be mathematically expressed. It only goes to prove that not all laws need be so stated, nor is it necessary to state them in mathematical terms in order to establish their validity. The authors are quick to retreat from their own ground by asserting that empirical equations are more reliable in physical fields than in social sciences.[110] Yet such mathematical equations are being continuously put forth by mechanical engineers and social engineers of sorts in matters of great importance to the masses of our people.

An interesting case in point were the efforts made by the private companies owning rapid transit property and lease-hold interests in such property in New York City to unload their lines upon the City at a grossly inflated price which represented the capitalization of present income derived from their operation. Everyone who studied the question was convinced that no price could fairly be arrived at between the parties on the basis of such computations as the original cost less depreciation, or the reproduction cost less depreciation, or upon the basis of their book values as a going enterprise. The present writer who made a careful study of this problem over a period of years used it as a sort of economic guinea pig for the practical working out of problems in sociology, history and economics.

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[108] Mathematics From a Cultural Point of View—Cooley, et al., pp. 352-3.

[109] Ibid., p. 306.

[110] Ibid., p. 371.

New York City's rapid transit properties represented one of the nation's major enterprises from the standpoint of the amount of capital invested by both the City and private companies, aggregating over one billion, seven hundred million dollars. Because of the contractual relationships between the City and the Companies the records were unusually explicit, and what is more, were open to the inspection of interested citizens.

City engineers were compelled by law to determine the prospective revenues of the properties. Naturally the city's population had a great deal to do with the number of fare passengers. By adopting the methods commonly used by the mathematicians, the experts in the year 1931 projected the number of revenue passengers up to the fiscal year 1945. On the basis of the assumptions they made the number of paying passengers for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1938 ought to have been 2,188,000,000 on the company-owned lines. As a matter of fact only 1,514,000,000 passengers actually passed through the turnstiles during that year.[111] This meant a decrease in gross revenue of almost $35,000,000 from what the statisticians had estimated only seven years before.

Those with experience in the transportation business or any enterprise involving large outlays of fixed capital know that certain expenses are practically independent of the total revenues received, such as taxes, interest, depreciation and wear and tear due to time, long-term maintenance of structures and so forth. Obviously a large part, perhaps the greater part, of the missing revenues would have constituted net income. Upon the basis of capitalizing income those properties were worth much less in 1938 than on the calculations in 1931. And so, indeed was the fact. It might be stated, parenthetically that the opponents of the plans of purchase by the city succeeded in the end in reducing the price by over two hundred million dollars, besides reducing the rate of interest for the purchase bonds issued from around 4½% to 3%, within over a period of forty years, the lifetime of the bond issue, which will result in additional hundreds of millions of dollars being saved to the city's tax payers.

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[111] Report of Samuel Untermeyer, Special counsel to the Transit Commission, June 10, 1931, p. 19. Summary of Report For Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1938 by Transit Commission, pp. 7-8.

CONCRETE APPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC HISTORICAL METHODS TO A PRACTICAL PROBLEM

Among the contentions raised by the opposition were the decline of the birth-rate, the stopping of unrestricted immigration, the decentralization of industry due to the shift from steam to electric energy as the prime source of power, the reduction of the working week to five days in many industries, the lengthening of the vacation period which took people out of town, the shifting of population to the suburbs, the increasing use of busses and private cars, all of which militated against the larger use of rapid transit facilities. As to the rate of interest, the present writer undertook a detailed analysis of over thirty factors which operated in establishing the rate of interest at a given time, and had the satisfaction, among others, of following out the justification of his position by the events as they subsequently developed.

OTHER ERRORS OF MATHEMATICAL EXTRAPOLATION WHEN APPLIED TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Our pure mathematicians are not abashed in applying their abstractions to the analysis of concrete economic forms with rather disastrous results. Just like their medieval counterparts, these modern metaphysicians are determined to assume the very thing they would have the greatest difficulty in proving. Over a short enough period of time, they assert, some or all of the variable factors in an economic situation will not change. They then undertake to consider the functional relationship between the quantity of goods and the total cost of producing them and feel confident, that if space permitted, a mathematical formula could be found which would establish the cost-quantity curves production.[112]

All the copy-book illustrations would avail them nothing, since none of the factors they assume as given ever are given. No solvent manufacturer could continue in business unless he had something more substantial to go by than generalizations concerning costs of production divorced from reality.

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[112] Mathematics From a Cultural Viewpoint—Gans, et al., pp. 457-8, 507-510.

At another place they make the total amount of corn produced on an acre as a function of labor, seeds, fertilizer and other things, while weather conditions are assumed normal.[113] Any working farmer given this graph to plot out for the future would be justified in throwing it out of the window, for no experience is more common in agriculture than that there is no, and can be no, iron-clad relationship between a given quantity of labor and seed, and the final yield, for the unpredictability of the weather and amount of sunshine is proverbial.

So do these writers establish a law of wages based on the frequency distribution of wages for the group of workers. The wage fund is the independent variable and the number of workers who are to receive that fund is the dependent variable. "Since to each wage there corresponds a certain frequency or number of men, we can regard this frequency distribution as a functional relation in which the wage is the independent variable and the frequency is the dependent variable." [114] We have here the restatement in modern jargon of the ancient "Wages Fund" theory of a classical economist who assumed that annually a sum of money was paid out in wages; therefore the larger the number of wage-earners, the smaller was the amount each received.

Ricardo and Marx had demolished this "annual wages fund" assumption as a figment of the economist's imagination over a hundred years ago. Now come these modern mathematicians of the New York University and restate it in modern dress. Let them, if they can, cite a single shoe-manufacturer, whom they use as their illustration, who does in practice what they do in theory, say to their workers at the end of the week: "Sorry, but there will be less in the pay envelope for each of you this Saturday. We took on more help, and we've got to make the weekly aggregate wage fund go around."

There are many similar absurdities to which these mathematicians resort, but enough has been stated to indicate the thoroughly unreal application of their abstractions to the problems of actual existence. It is but another proof of the inability of sheer mathematics to solve a problem where the facts are incontrovertible.

At a given time, it is true, the wages fund is a definite quantity. So are the number of workers who receive that money. Where the mathematician falls down is in assuming that the fund is a definitely fixed sum within a given field of operation. These experts in Relativity know all the rules of that theory, but fall down in their practical application. For the laws governing wages are of a far different character than mere numbers of dollars or hands to receive them. Both factors are not in co-ordinate relationship, and the reasons for that statement involve a knowledge of social factors which is beyond the limited horizon of the academic pure mathematicians.

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[113] Ibid., p. 512.

[114] Ibid., pp. 512-13.

Well might they gloss over their obvious shortcomings by the apology that "the reason for this limited achievement in economics as compared with that in sound, for example, is that economic relationships depend greatly upon an unpredictable human element and hence do not have the mathematical precision of purely physical relationships." [115] Once more our expert mathematicians are unfortunate in their analogy. No physicist has yet been able to give us an exact picture of what goes on every instant in a sound wave which they profess to understand so well.

Einstein unfortunately does not possess their assurance, for he tells us that it would require a probability wave in thirty dimensions for the quantum description of only ten particles, and that a probability wave with an infinite number of dimensions would be needed for the quantum description of a field within a single atom.[116] If that be the case, there would be little hope indeed for any but the vaguest description of molar phenomena.

However, Gans and his associates are deserving of a prize, or at least honorable mention, for this pure gem of mathematics in political science: "Good government is a function of the honesty of its officials." [117] So that's all there is to it. The honesty of German officials has long been proverbial, as alas, that of American municipal officials has been the reverse. Yet problems of government are infinitely more complex than the foot-rule they seek to establish by that inane mathematical proposition.

F. Statistical Principles In the Analysis of Current Problems

PROBABILITY STATISTICS APPLIED TO SOCIAL PHENOMENA

Science feels more at home dealing with the mass than with the individual. The probability principle applies only to the individual within the mass so far as social science is concerned. The unpredictable human element of which Gans and his associates write is not as unpredictable as they imagine, but old-fashioned, classical science as still practiced has not given up the tedious labor of studying both the individual and the mass objectively, instead of generalizing about them.

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[115] Mathematics From a Cultural Viewpoint—Gans, et al., p. 536.

[116] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, p. 308.

[117] Mathematics From a Cultural Viewpoint—Gans, et al., p. 277.

Speculative metaphysicians disguised as theoretical physicists dote on nothing so much as a high-sounding generalization woven out of their inner depths. "The theoretical worker in the future," writes Dirac, "will therefore have to proceed in a more indirect way. The most powerful method of advance that can be suggested at present is to employ all the resources of pure mathematics in attempts to perfect and generalize the mathematical formalism that forms the existing basis of theoretical physics, and after each success in this direction to try to interpret the new mathematical features in terms of physical entities." [118] It is the old story of belling the cat. Now all that Dirac has to do is to devise the mathematical formula of a village market transaction, and then hunt for the principles so deduced and apply them to the Stock Exchange. By the time he will have devised the mathematical formula for the first five seconds of trading it is greatly to be feared that neither Dirac nor the Exchange will be here to benefit by his labors, granting a long and prosperous career to the distinguished mathematical physicist.

Eddington puts the case succinctly for Dirac and others who ascribe such potent power to mathematical symbols which they translate from a semblance of reality to reality itself: "It is easy to introduce mathematical notation; the difficulty is to turn it to useful account," [119] and he quotes a clever little ditty by Professor Rankine about "x" denoting beauty, "y" manners and "z" fortune, then L (which, if one does not suspect it, stands for love) is a function of "x," "y" and "z" with M-arriage as the definite integral. This, of course, solves all ticklish problems, past, present and for the future, and all novelists, dramatists and Hollywood scenarists might as well begin right now to fold up their scenarios. However, candor compels the admission that this marvelous mathematical formula was put forth in 1874, but somehow has failed to catch on in spite of the long head start.

Whatever success mathematics has achieved in physics, the application of its rigid formulae to the analysis of social phenomena must fail, not only because social phenomena is not susceptible of such formulation, but because its laws can seldom be stated in mathematical language. Neither, for that matter, can that be done about the internal state of the simplest atom. But that does not prevent the physicist and the chemist from making predictions with absolute certainty in their respective fields, and the degree of that certainty is the measure of the successful organization of a particular inquiry.

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[118] Quoted by Gray in his New World Picture, p. 249.

[119] The Philosophy of Physical Science—Eddington, p. 138.

ARBITRARY NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL SYMBOLS: VIEWS OF BERGSON AND EINSTEIN

Bergson emphasizes the arbitrary nature of the mathematical method. "Modern mathematics," says he, "is precisely an effort to substitute the being made for the ready made, to follow the generation of magnitudes, to grasp motion no longer from without and in its displayed result, but from within in its tendency to change; in short, to adopt the mobile continuity of the outline of things. It is true that it is confined to the outline, being only the science of magnitudes. It is true also that it has only been able to achieve its marvelous applications by the invention of certain symbols, and that if the intuition of which we have just spoken lies at the origin of invention, it is the symbol alone which is concerned in the application." [120]

Now no one can object to the use of symbols and inventing schemes for their employment. What really matters is the significance which one attaches to the symbols. To the idealist a well-reasoned out mathematical formula, granting the assumptions, is equivalent to reality. To the realist, all symbolic concepts are inventions, albeit necessary inventions, which have proven their inestimable worth in the pursuit of scientific inquiry.

Einstein and Infeld express perfectly the realist attitude toward all conceptual inventions. "Science," they write, "is not just a collection of laws, a catalogue of unrelated facts. It is a creation of the human mind, with its freely invented ideas and concepts. Physical theories try to form a picture of reality and to establish its connection with the wide world of sense impressions. Thus the only justification for our mental structures is whether and in what way our theories form such a link." [121] These words ought to be engraved over every portal to the seat of higher learning in mathematics, in the phrase of Buckle.

HALDANE PROTESTS THE APOTHEOSIS OF PURE MATHEMATICS AFTER DETHRONEMENT OF EUCLID AND NEWTON

Social phenomena admittedly cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. But that does not mean that definite relations do not exist between definite masses within the social structure. Whether those masses be aggregates of capital on one side and aggregates of labor on the other, or the relations derived out of the political organization of a given time, or the relations between the church organization and its communicants, they are nonetheless definite relations under a given set of circumstances which neither came from nowhere, nor will they evaporate over night.

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[120] An Introduction to Metaphysics—Bergson, pp. 70-1.

[121] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, p. 310.

Problems of history differ in no respect from the problems of physics, but only in their degree of complexity, which is reflected in their methodology and the manner in which its results are expressed. Therefore, any revolutionary change in the fundamental approach initiated in one branch of science must affect all other sciences. That is why the entire intellectual world stood aghast at the tremendous consequences implicit in the Relativity Theory and later on in the Indeterminacy Principle.

Classical science had handed down two basic precepts, the absolute concepts of Euclid and Newton, and the law of causality. Apparently both had been dethroned, the second following shortly after a stunned world had not yet recovered from the initial shock administered by Einstein. Both effects had been achieved by mathematical formulation, the first verified by experience and the other by rigid logic following from experimental observation. No wonder mathematics was enthroned as mistress of the intellectual world while its practitioners hastened to make the title hereditary to their line. Everything was being expressed in mathematical formulas. Even the capitalist mode of production in the booming 1920's had been rationalized to continue on an even keel, if not higher levels, for all time to come. Peace and prosperity were here for an indefinite stay.

J. B. S. Haldane was one among the few respectable scientists who considered mathematics as merely an aid to science, not the content of science itself. To him, Eddington and Russell and the rest of the mathematics worshipers were only skillful manipulators of symbols who considered that pursuit more fruitful than the tedious pursuit of material objects, while "this merely shows that symbols can be as intoxicating to mathematicians as are ordinary words to politicians." [122] As for himself he was even more Darwinian than Darwin himself in his own particular field where he was satisfied with the results achieved by following the well-tried precepts of classical science meticulously pursued in two of Europe's best known biological laboratories then under his direction.

HEISENBERG'S INDETERMINACY PRINCIPLE

Heisenberg enunciated his Indeterminacy Principle in 1925, eight years after the Relativity Theory came on to startle the scientific world. Just as its predecessor dared question Newton's making of the heavens, so did this later theory bring into question the previously immutable principle of causality.

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[122] Inequality of Man—Haldane, p. 240.

Heretofore all science had proceeded upon the assumption that if we know an initial state and the laws which operated upon it, we could predict with certainty the succeeding state. Heisenberg contended that by the very process of observation we introduced an outside element into the state which was being observed, and by thus affecting the field of operation, we vitiated the effect and could not therefore determine the succeeding state. "The experimental material resulting from modern refinements in experimental technique," wrote Heisenberg, "necessitated the revision of old ideas and the acquirement of new ones, but as the mind is always slow to adjust itself to an extended range of experience and concepts, the relativity theory seemed at first repellently abstract. Nonetheless, the simplicity of its solution for a vexatious problem has gained it universal acceptance. As is clear from what has been said the resolution of the paradoxes of atomic physics can be accomplished only by further renunciations of old and cherished ideas. Most important is the idea that natural phenomena obey exact laws—the principle of causality. In fact, our ordinary description of nature, and the idea of exact laws, rests on the assumption that it is possible to observe the phenomena without appreciably influencing them. To coordinate a definite cause to a definite effect has sense only when both can be observed without introducing a foreign element disturbing their interrelation. The law of causality because of its very nature, can only be defined for isolated systems and in atomic physics we are dealing with entities that are (so far as we know) ultimate and indivisible. There exists no infinitesimals by the aid of which an observation might be made without perturbation. Second among the requirements traditionally imposed on a physical theory is that it must explain all phenomena as relations between objects existing in space and time. This requirement has suffered gradual relaxation in the course of the development of physics."[123]

Two very important points are made by Heisenberg; first, that the very fact of the observation introduces a disturbing outside influence which vitiates the result; and secondly that there is no direct space-time relationship between the initial state observed and the succeeding state. Here on the face of it are two insuperable logical arguments against the possibility of establishing a direct causal relationship in successive states.

[123] Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory—Heisenberg (1930), pp. 62-3.

Even Einstein was taken aback by the apparently iron-clad nature of the argument. He concedes that we must give up the complete localization of the particles in a theoretical model as the permanent upshot of the Heisenberg Principle of Uncertainty.[124] We realize how deeply Einstein was hurt in his philosophical foundation when he perforce contented himself with addressing a general inquiry to the world by stating: "Who would presume today to decide the question whether the law of causation and the differential law, these ultimate premises of the Newtonian view of nature, must definitely be given up?" [125] Einstein points out that the Heisenberg principle only establishes the impossibility of tracing direct causal relation in the actions of a crowd or mass, but still leaves open the question as to whether a state has a deterministic form or only a probability form. Obviously, he concludes, if you cannot observe the state of a system, as Heisenberg postulates, you cannot even ask whether it is deterministic or not. Einstein closes the debate weakly by stating "it is largely a matter of taste." He expresses the pious hope that our physical laws will, in the end, be stated in a deterministic form, but concedes that most physicists do not believe so. In his most recent work, he states that the statistical method is accepted today when dealing with an aggregation of an identical system; they cannot be verified by measurement of one individual, but only by a series of repeated measurements. [126]

THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE IS EXTENDED TO INCLUDE SOCIAL PHENOMENA

Few have emphasized the point that Heisenberg did not limit his indeterminacy to the problems of atomic physics, but deliberately broadened that to include the concept of all natural phenomena as encompassed both in microscopic physics and molar physics. Most of those who subscribe to the Heisenberg principle have not taken the trouble to draw a distinction between them, and are content to apply indeterminacy alike to both.

Eddington who is by far the profoundest thinker among the herd who flocked to embrace the new simply because it was new, was among those to point out that "the classical laws are the limit to which the quantum laws tend when states of very high quantum numbers are

[124] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 39.
[125] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 60.
[126] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld (1938), pp. 298-9.

concerned."[127] He accounts for the remarkable similarity between the classical and quantum interpretation of complicated systems by the fact of their very high quantum numbers.[128] He illustrates that by the common observation that while human life is uncertain, few things are more certain than the life expectancy charts of the insurance companies, and he emphasizes the difference when dealing with masses by the statistical method in drawing remarkably close observations which would be impossible by any causal approach in attempting to appraise the individual units of the aggregate insured.[129]

Yet this indicates the inherent fallacy of the statistical method of analyzing vital phenomena. There is no absolute relation between the state of society and longevity. It can be shown that the average life expectancy is today much greater than it was twenty, fifty and a hundred years ago in every age class. The reasons for this cannot be discerned by the minutest scrutiny of the actuarial tables. They will not show the causes, but merely record the results of a long process of development within society which manifested itself in the standards of living, general sanitation, purer food, the growth of public medicine and a myriad of other factors which no statistical table will disclose. These can be established only by the patient labor of the classical scientific method.

Where the indeterminist succumbs to the easy ways of pragmatical observation and the plotting of charts which can give only the results, the classical scientist will study the facts and draw the necessary conclusion which these facts disclose. There is no mystery about this process. No insurance company ever paid a claim because Mr. X's sudden death just fulfilled the quota to be expected for his community as mapped out by its statisticians. The coroner's jury will still inquire into the causes of unexpected death despite all the charts one can muster to prove their inevitability.

Einstein was far too ready with his concession concerning the power of the statistical method to explain the laws of crowds.[130] It can only guess as to the efficient factors. Its conclusions are pragmatical, not scientific.

There are no laws of a statistical nature when applied to social phenomena. Statistics are only a method of representation by graphs and forecasts which describe events causally effected in the past or project guesses as to the future. The actuality as causally effected will either satisfy or modify these charts. There has never yet been a graph scientifically constructed which forecast exactly the number of deaths for a certain year. If guesses have been correct, they have been nothing more than lucky guesses.

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[127] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 195.

[128] Ibid., p. 198.

[129] Ibid., p. 300.

[130] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, p. 302.

PLANCK'S DEFENSE OF CAUSALITY IN MOLAR PHYSICS

There is not a single event involving masses which is not due to sufficient causal factors as we will prove in the analysis of the full range of American history. Admittedly it is hard to grasp all the factors involved, but difficulty does not mean impossibility. But what is of greater importance, exact description to the minutest detail is not necessary to the adequate understanding of the social phenomena which is the raw material of history.

In this respect, Planck, with all his hesitancy concerning causality stands far above some of its distinguished champions. "It may be objected," he writes, "that a strict causality can be regarded as definitely proved only if we are in a position to predict the entire course of the event; and it might be added that nobody can check the movement of a single molecule. To this we might reply that a rigorously exact prediction is never possible of any natural event, so that the validity of the law of causality can never be demonstrated by an immediate and exact experiment, since every measurement, however exact, inevitably involves certain errors of observation. Yet in spite of this the result of the measurement as well as individual errors of observation are attributed to definite causes. When we watch the waves breaking on the sea shore, we have every right to feel convinced that the movement of every bubble is due to strict causal law, although we could never hope to follow its rise and fall, still less to calculate it in advance." [131]

This powerful restatement of the law of causality for molar physics is of the greatest significance to the social sciences, for by their very nature they must deal with masses. Nor can we rest content with the acceptance of theories involving aggregates conglomerately as modern mathematics does in its function concepts.

It is very well for Spengler to obfuscate the necessity of detailed analysis by pompous panegyrics to the Theory of Groups in respect of the value of variables. It may be Faustian to him, but it is sheerest obscurantism to everybody else.[132] We still insist on inquiring into

[131] The Philosophy of Physics—Planck (1936), pp. 24-5.

[132] The Decline of the West—Spengler, pp. 426-7.

the nature of these aggregates, the composition of the independent and dependent variables, and what forces make them do the things they do. Spengler seeks for some sublime "numerical transcendence," but all we are concerned with are provable facts and how they came into existence on this common sphere.

Heisenberg brought into question the very fundamental proposition of relating things which are the same in space-time relationship from moment to moment. Eddington has already demonstrated the impossibility of undoing an event and recreating a condition which already is past. The Second Law of Thermodynamics proves conclusively that a state once passed can never be reproduced in exactly the same setting in Eddington's remarkable chapter on entropy. The progress of time introduces more and more of the random element into the constitution of the world, and what was will never exist again in exactly the same relationship.[133] In that case, all law which is based fundamentally on the continuance of definite relations in a field of force would be impossible.

But this is only a restatement of the principle already dealt with by Planck. The Second Law of Thermodynamics deals with the study of organization, and obviously we are not exactly the same individual from moment to moment. Tissues die and are replaced, the internal arrangement is changed never to be exactly the same again, and it is certain that every passing moment makes one that much older. But still the landlord will have little difficulty in recognizing us when the next rent day comes around.

It is true that the units within the social structure are undergoing a similar transformation and yet society will go on substantially the same tomorrow and the day after. But we know it will not go on that way forever, and it is precisely why society has changed, and what it is that made it evolve in the past, and still continues to do so that forms the subject matter of history and its philosophy.

At the same time it makes all the difference in the world how historical phenomena is approached, whether we look upon it as a continuing entity in a limited space-time relationship or as something which will keep on evolving by some inner power beyond our present knowledge or even mental powers, or perhaps wind up in a gigantic cataclysm involving universal ruin. In any event, a great deal depends upon whether we approach its investigation from the standpoint of causal or statistical law. If looked at from the statistical point of view, it is all a matter of chance, accident, probability, despite all we can do. If considered from the causal standpoint, then no doom is inevitable so long as man exercises some rational power over the unfoldment of the historic processes.

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[133] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, Ch. IV.

INHERENT DEFECT OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS BASED ON STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES

Because statistics are supposed to be conclusive and self-explanatory, they are frequently resorted to by public men in all sorts of apologetics or to cover up their theoretical difficulties. This is predicated upon the psychological reaction of the same subtle nature which makes the small boy feel that two apples are better than one, or conversely, that the lesser evil than two D's on his report card is one D. That our most brilliant statesmen have not gone far beyond their school days in either logic or understanding is abundantly evidenced by their utterances. But this very subtle mathematical process cannot establish why the boy's existence should be limited to the apple and class room range at a definite stage of his career.

We must draw a distinction between social statesmanship and political statesmanship. While the two are not incompatible they are rarely found in the same individual, nor are the historical conditions always appropriate for the full play of their powers. Powerful personalities require the conflux of both the background and the circumstances in order to advantage the occasion. Action must be guided by the appropriate historical circumstances as Lenin discovered in his premature July, 1917 putsch during the Kerensky regime, and Hitler at the Munich beer hall in the early days of the Weimar Republic.

This by no means is to disparage political craftsmanship which is in itself an art of the highest order, requiring for its proper exercise besides the adequate external conditions, a great degree of coordination and an intuitive grasp of a given situation. This is the principal reason why extraordinary political skill is acquired but seldom transmitted.

Social statesmanship is of a different order. It can be both acquired and transmitted to succeeding generations because it rests on the foundation of science, and its rules of procedure can be handed down in the same manner as any other science. But first of all it must rest on knowledge, and not intuition, and the safest, the most dependable kind of knowledge is that which classical science builded upon the principle of law and causality.

Plans of social action founded on statistical analysis must prove fallacious. This fundamental defect is intertwined with its procedural methods. Statistics in themselves mean little. Assuming, as we must, that they are correctly and logically gotten up, they give us only the results of a process, but they can never tell us the nature of that process, nor disclose its real significance. Nothing is more common than the spectacle of two perfectly honest adversaries drawing different conclusions from the same body of facts.

A great deal depends upon the scope and adequacy of statistics. Because the social sciences are called so purely as a courtesy, no sustained effort has been made to establish law in their phenomena as in other sciences like physics, chemistry, bio-physics and even in the practice of medicine, where individual judgment has leeway in inverse ratio to the definiteness of procedural methods where clinical experience has perfected the conceptual structure.

Where shall the student of social phenomena draw the line in his resort to statistics? If their mere number could cure social ills, it were strange, in view of the bulging Washington archives, that American society were not now purged of all its ailments. Obviously no finite mind can master all the detailed statistics, and even if that were possible, the question would still remain as to their significance. Therefore, resort to statistics must be selective, and the question again resolves itself into the substance of our inquiry, which is to discover scientifically valid basis for such selection in accordance with the laws of social motion.

To the shallow contention that we look only for the statistics that fit into our theories, the reply is that only a theory of equal shallowness could find genuine and validly gotten up statistics to support its conclusions. Historical laws are not made by statistics, but statistics—full, detailed, comprehensive and material—will support, modify and in some cases destroy recognized historical laws. For then these statistics will show that new factors have arisen for which the old theory cannot account.

Science receives a powerful impetus from generalization, but eventually the concept must be related back to reality for its final validation. "Every speculation," writes Einstein and Infeld, "must be tested by experiment, and any results, no matter how attractive, must be rejected if they do not fit the facts." [134]

It is futile to discuss which comes first, the theory or the fact; although it would be rather difficult for Robinson Crusoe to evolve a theory of industrial crises from experiences confined to his lonely island. However, that did not prevent the economist, Jevons, who was right in the midst of things from blaming the sun spots as the prolific source of present day ills.

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[134] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, p. 252.

A TYPICAL POLITICIAN'S ANTI-NEW DEAL HANDLING OF SOCIAL STATISTICS

Thomas E. Dewey, an enterprising and ambitious New York county District Attorney who proved himself a veritable prodigy in running down a certain type of evil in contemporary life, was by that very fact considered by many to possess the necessary qualifications for the Chief Magistracy of the nation. Having asserted his claim to the post, he proceeded to put in a bill of particulars against the existing regime. His exhibit number one necessarily was the potent fact of continuing unemployment for which the policies of the Roosevelt Administration were obviously responsible. His argument was woven on a simple pattern as befits great political leaders. In the six years of the New Deal from 1933 to 1938 inclusive we needed $36,000,000,000 for replacement of existing capital plant. Only $29,000,000,000 was spent for that purpose during that time, obviously not enough to make up for wear and tear. "Here are the facts," he continued, "Nine million unemployed; One-third of a nation still denied a decent standard of living. Our productive plant, which should be employing those men and producing goods our people need, wearing out at the rate of $1,000,000,000 a year. Those are simple facts, hard facts—but facts that anyone can understand. What should we do about it? Stop the erosion of our plant. Start expanding it again. Stop government squandering of the savings of a nation. Release those savings to the vital work of creating jobs." [135] Pithy, pungent sentences, which ordinarily would win any case before a jury.

Let us see how much Dewey understood about the facts that he says everybody else understands, before we will consider his out-of-hand solutions. First, as to the deficiency in replacement of worn-out capital. Mr. Dewey is too good a lawyer to try to convict a man on a generality. The replacement requirements of a capital plant geared to an expanding economy is far different from the replacement needs for a stand-still or declining economy. Upon the broad, general question of capital replacement, we would require Mr. Dewey to specify the nature of the capital plant replacement and where that was withheld. He would soon discover things he never dreamed of when he broached that subject for his own political purposes.

He would find out, for example, that an automobile industry which in 1929 had a plant capacity of eight to nine million cars annual production, never turned out more than five and a half million vehicles of all types in a single year, and made enormous profits on that basis of capital utilization, while today it operates well below its maximum of eleven years ago. Would Mr. Dewey require the same capital replacement for that typically aggressive American industry on a basis of plant capacity for which there is no demand? How would he set about compelling capital replacement where the industry does not desire it? Would he not need a government enforcing bureaucracy even more vicious than that which he condemns in the New Deal?

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[135] Speech reported in New York Times, Feb. 13, 1940.

Ah, he says, start industry expanding again, and new orders will come rushing in for cars to keep the auto industry humming. But now he has shifted the issue in the middle of the trial. His first count was that the productive plant was eroding because of deficiency in replacement. If these had been made, he contended, the unemployed would be re-absorbed into productive employment instead of doing relief made-work.

But we know that management will not replace capital structure unless there is a reasonable prospect of utilizing it. Otherwise it would be a sheer waste of corporate resources which no responsible management will undertake to do, and which Mr. Dewey should be the last person to advocate compelling them to do. For fallow capital expenditure is even worse than the New Deal pump-priming which our Presidential hopeful of 1940 so bitterly condemned. The public at least derives benefit out of the new schools, play-grounds, bridges, tunnels, and countless other projects which were carried through by use of public funds. There could be none out of idle excess productive resources.

Mr. Dewey here actually advocated pump-priming, but of a more dangerous, because useless, sort. Sinking money into capital plant for replacement or addition where unnecessary is not only a social waste, but because undertaken by private capital, would be a greater social disaster. There are certain losses which society can absorb, but which would wreck a private enterprise and bring about an ever widening circle of ruin. It is true that unnecessary capital replacement would temporarily employ the capital goods industries, but it is equally true that this would hasten the bankruptcy of now solvent firms who keep their resources in liquid form for future eventualities.

Of course, this leads to a backing up of unused capital with which our banks are now bulging. This is a problem of which our easy theorists know little. But in general, it is much better to have on hand liquid capital that can be shifted around than to have it tied down as unused fixed capital which is now the fact with so large a portion of our industries in their normal, peace-time operation. The current rearmament program is a conclusive demonstration of the corrections of this historical analysis that creative capitalism has reached the end of its line.

Since replacement as such is not the solution, its only justification on the surface is that it creates jobs, which gives the masses purchasing power, which causes the hearts of automobile salesmen to beat bigger and better as they in turn send orders to humming production plants. This is exactly the philosophy of New Deal pump-priming. We all know it has broken down. But Mr. Dewey does not know that his scheme is also based on exactly the same kind of pump-priming economics.

Neither the New Dealers nor their critics understand why pump-priming must inevitably fail and bring about another crisis which the New Deal at least has staved off for private capital, by distributing the costs on society as a whole. Private capital has its own ways of finding out when to expand and when to contract the scope of its operations. There is only one absolute limit which can keep productive capital from breaking down the doors of the capital goods industries in their clamor for equipment in the face of a profitable market. That would be in the case of one hundred per cent of its profits being consistently siphoned off in the form of taxes. Until and unless that condition exists, private capital will find its motive for production in that all-important profit incentive.

To tax profits out of existence is to destroy capitalist economy. Much nonsense has been said about confiscatory taxes. In the spread of this ignorant or malicious propaganda against the Roosevelt Administration even the New York Times editorial page can be expected to join.

Yet its news columns disclose that the corporation income tax in 1939 was only 20.9 per cent, while the recent additions to help finance rearmament in part will increase that only to 24 per cent on 1940 incomes and thereafter.[136] We can leave to politicians and ignoramuses the ceaseless chatter about a subject which is the topic of everyday conversation like the weather, and concerning which they know as little.

Social science cannot afford the luxury of cheap generalities. If private capital has not refurbished its plant, it is because it was more advisable, economically, to refrain from doing so. If profitable orders were coming in there would be no question of capital replenishment in a competitive field. From whichever way the issue is broached, we keep coming back to the focal point that capital will not produce goods without a profit, and a solvent market must exist for the purchase of its products. The problem of modern economy is in effecting the sale, and not in creating the product.

[136] New York Times dispatch from Washington in issue of Oct. 10, 1940.

ENDLESS CIRCLE OF ECONOMIC PLAUSIBILITIES

This entire problem revolves in a vicious circle of no production for lack of purchases, and no purchases because of lack of production. The New Deal tried to get out of this impasse by one kind of pump-priming while Mr. Dewey would substitute another kind.

Twenty-five years ago, a third method was used to straighten our industry after the tail-spin of 1913, through the medium of war industries stimulation. Fifteen years ago, foreign credits established here to enable purchasers to pay for our products was the pump-priming scheme of its time. Seven years ago, the New Deal simply changed the direction of Hoover's pump-priming from helping capital to weather the storm through government loans, to the Roosevelt program of sustaining the purchasing power of those cut off from employment. Instead of analyzing economic fundamentals we have resorted to political shenanigans. Inquiry should be made why pump-priming is necessary as a form of emergency infusion into the closed system which finds itself unable to proceed on the principle of perpetual motion demanded of it by our economic illiterates.

For capitalist economy is a closed system of production—exchange—reproduction on whatever level it can operate, and those workers temporarily outside its functioning orbit cannot be left to accommodate their numbers in accordance with Malthus' beautiful law of population. Other social factors have since been brought into play which limit the operation of blind natural laws as envisaged by the economists of Adam Smith's day.

We will not go into such detail concerning collateral issues raised by Dewey's speech. Whatever significance attaches to it, is not because of any intrinsic merit, but rather because of the social group for whom he speaks. Nevertheless, one must point out that it could be perfectly possible for the diminution of the amounts spent in capital replacement to follow from the reduction in price of the capital goods. Obviously just as much plant equipment could be had as heretofore by a drop in their average cost of only 25%. Again, the same degree of productive power could exist by the mere increase of efficiency in the capital goods newly purchased.

Dewey proceeded upon the theory of static capital goods in their function. Thoughtful consideration by an earnest inquirer would disclose from the history of technology what has been the fact during the past ten years; that more goods can now be produced with less manpower simply because of increased efficiency in modern industrial processes. The figures quoted by Dewey cannot possibly reflect this situation, and while his facts may be perfectly clear to himself there are infinite degrees in clarity, as there are in intensity of light.

Therefore, his plea for stopping erosion of the nation's capital plant is defective in the two vital respects of the economy and efficiency of the capital expenditure during the years of the New Deal. It is needless to emphasize that private capital has the strongest possible motive for keeping its plant in good condition, particularly in the hand-to-mouth system of production which is characteristic of modern times.

What was really incumbent upon Dewey to prove in order to make out a conclusive case was that industry could not take care of orders coming to it because of its run-down condition. That is the gravamen of the issue. And there is only one kind of proof that would convince a jury. He would have to show as a fact that American industry, say the steel industry, or the boot and shoe industry, turned down large orders because its plant was eroded and dilapidated. This, of course, he cannot do.

Even the airplane industry despite the sudden rush of war orders, is not turning any business away. As for the steel industry, after operating at ninety-five per cent capacity in November, 1939, it declined to seventy-one,[137] and is now back to within one point of its previous maximum.[138] Dewey's last argument about ending unemployment by starting industry again is about as effective as an alibi asserted by one whose offense was committed in full view of a crowd. Obviously his only reliance was not so much in the effectiveness of his statistics as in his idea concerning the gullibility of the public. War, the curse of mankind, has provided a more effective cure for the salvation of capitalism and the existing social order.

PRO-NEW DEAL RELIANCE UPON ITS SET OF STATISTICS

President Roosevelt at the same time gave every indication of relying upon statistics during the early skirmishes of the 1940 electoral battle. As a keen campaigner, he had a shrewd judgment as to the proper uses of statistics and their limitations. They are offered for their emotional effect, though ostensibly intended as an appeal to the reasoning faculties. Very few people, the President knew, read statistics, and he might have added with considerable justification, that even fewer who use them are capable of appreciating their significance. Figures overwhelm instead of awakening the powers of reasoning in most people.

[137] New York Times, Feb. 12, 1940.
[138] New York Times, Oct. 14, 1940.

In an address before the American Youth Congress the President reeled off the usual quantum of data and added: "I am repeating these figures on the air because not one citizen in a hundred reads them in the morning." [139] And for a very good reason. We firmly aver that not a single one of those figures could be grasped in its full significance unless one had mastered the details of logic, political economy and history.

Who would expect a layman to open up a book on medical practice, place his finger on a significant passage and without further ado, not only grasp its meaning, but begin to elaborate upon it? Every reasonable person will concede that to understand a single proposition in pathology one would have to master in their essentials the entire scope of physiology, anatomy, histology, biology, chemistry, and physics. Why should matters be different with current social problems? Why should quacks and ignoramuses of various degrees feel that in this, the most vital aspect of ordinary existence, any one and every one has an inalienable right to pass on for serious consideration his own superficialities? The same person would be laughed to scorn as a blubbering tyro in any other field. Then why should he be given free rein with affairs that affect so intimately the public welfare?

This does not by any means justify the totalitarian philosophy that politics is a highly specialized subject which should be left to the experts as in other fields of endeavor. No analogy can hold here for the very simple reason that every one's existence is affected by a polity which he may be called upon to defend with his life and whose effects in any event are bound to affect his existence in many ways. It is for this reason that every adult man and woman in a democracy should have a voice in deciding upon their destiny.

But this does not weaken the proposition that the great mass of political leaders record opinions which are inadequately grounded and therefore, in the long run as harmful to their country as they are dangerous to the general well-being. The fault lies deep in our educational system which is rooted in the individualistic philosophy of a hundred years ago.

We must re-orient our education to encompass a broader pro-social standpoint. In an adequate view of the situation as it exists today there is neither incompatibility nor conflict between individual development and social well-being. It can be established that the development of these polar entities is dependent entirely upon the progress of the whole. There is no ineradicable conflict between the individual and society. The development of the one is the condition for the fullest development of the other.

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[139] Reported in New York Times, Feb. 11, 1940.

THE PRESIDENT HOPED THAT SOMETHING WOULD TURN UP

There was another significant passage in the President's address which draws the line clearly between the empirico-pragmatical method of dealing with history and the scientific method which we are seeking here to establish. He told his listeners that for many years not a day passed when he did not receive one or more proposals for curing social ills: "Now those plans were not put into the waste-paper basket. They were all of them subjected to the closest scrutiny by honest liberals who have hoped that somebody, somewhere would hit on something that would save us a lot of time and a lot of worry. But I am afraid that so far, after these twelve years, that no such plan has come forth."

One cannot but admire President Roosevelt's incorrigible optimism and his inexhaustible patience. At the same time, we have contained in that simple confession of procedure a clear insight into the mental apparatus of "honest" liberals which explains the reason for all the helter-skelter policies masquerading under the generic term of the New Deal, and why the really vital ones among them which are distinctive of the liberal approach have invariably failed.

Humane relief, social insurance, modernized labor legislation, an enlightened health and housing program, are not characteristic of a liberal regime. Some of those reforms date back to the days of Bismarck. Others were carried through with equal success by Conservatives in England and Fascists in Italy. But every New Deal program which struck deep at a vital chord of the economic system failed, without exception. Admittedly unemployment has not been solved, nor have the vaster problems of social insecurity, inequality of opportunity and instability for the future been brought nearer solution for the great masses of our population. No one questions the President's enlightened humanity. But even he must concede that while human suffering resulting from social dislocation has been alleviated, no real solution has yet been found for eliminating their causes.

This frank admission does not mitigate the seriousness of its import. Obviously we are suffering, the entire world is suffering, not from some vast primordial disturbance of nature, but from evils which are man-made and man-controlled. It is sheerest defeatism, despite all its optimistic coloring, to say that honest liberals are still anxiously awaiting the next mail and in the interim will scan the skies for propitious signs and portends. The very fact that they expect somebody, somewhere, somehow to hit upon something fills the scientifically-minded with paroxysms of alternate rage and despair.

History does not show a single example where society was molded into a preconceived pattern which did not end finally in stultifying that society. Even in such matters as inventions we saw that of the countless proposals submitted during the First World War only one possessed merit, and that of a minor character.

That the President can make this open avowal proves not only the incompetency of his advisers, but what is even worse, the vast chasm that exists between the pragmatist and the social scientist in the manner of approach to the subject of their inquiry. First of all, the scientist has a well-grounded dread of hunches and happy thoughts. If he follows one out, he generally does so with profound misgivings and anxious side glances lest he be found out, instead of proclaiming that fact from the housetops or over the radio. He knows that his surest ground is in the knowledge of both the fact and the law. With scarcely any exception, the President is surrounded by men who may know either one or the other, but seldom both, and then only in the strictly legalistic sense.

No man in his right senses would presume to send a ready-made blue-print for social reorganization to the President through the mail, and those who do are apparently in need of a guardian lest the disease take a violent turn. But what shall we say of those who scan this mail with expectant eye and thumping heart?

JOHN L. LEWIS' POTENT FAITH IN THE MAGIC OF NUMBERS

Where the President of the United States is reconciled to hoping things through, the recent President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations—the C.I.O.—is ready to talk things through, provided he has the final voice and the veto power. Being a rough-hewn orator with considerable personal force, John L. Lewis feels supremely confident that he can meet the devil of Unemployment on any platform and, man to man, worst him in any fair combat, open and above-board. He too, in a fashion, is a devotee of the mathematical method in history. His idea is that if nobody knows anything about a problem, why, all one has to do is to call a thousand of them together at a convention, so that by sheer multiplication of nothing something may evolve.

In an address before the same American Youth Congress Lewis clamored for attention in characteristic fashion. Speaking of unemployment which he properly called the National No. 1 Problem in America, he announced that "the Congress of Industrial Organizations has a legislative program." One naturally perked to close attention when such a positive statement is made. However this "legislative program'' turned out to be nothing more than a demand for a national conference of our ablest men in all walks of life and let them see what they can do about it,[140] while he roundly condemned the President for having refused to accede to this program, though Lewis had been pressing it for three years.

Perhaps Mr. Roosevelt feared the effects of Mr. Lewis' oratory more than he did the depression.

Of course, this brilliantly original idea had never been thought of before. The world has been in perpetual convention on problems of everyday existence for some thousands of years without having solved the issue for all time to come. There is something so disarming and disingenuous about sitting down and talking things over; but perhaps it is not too much to suggest that the sitters first master the fundamentals of the questions they are called upon to discuss. This again brings us back to where we started, namely, the establishment of a scientifically valid theory of historical interpretation.

That Lewis himself possessed nothing more than an emotional and pragmatic approach is evidenced by his appeal that the President "hold a family conference on that question and give to Americans their right of participation in the increased productive efficiency of our productive machine and a participation in the natural bounties which nature and Providence have given us here on our own land." [141] This is a splendid theme for a moving oration, but hardly one of constructive merit.

All that Lewis blandly asked, assuming that he knew the full import of what he proposed, was that America call a conference to consider the re-making of our economy from the basis of production for profit to one of production for use. Such revolutionary matters are not decided by pink tea round-table methods, as Lewis would soon discover if he would study history instead of only quoting from it.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOCIAL STATESMANSHIP AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

If there be any quibblers or apologists who would have a joust on the meaning of production for use and for profit, and to show that one is the condition, or function, or what not of the other, let it be stated in such simple terms that even they could understand, that capitalism is predicated upon the profit motive, which is the independent variable, and that the particular good or service of whatever character is the dependent variable in this relation. The fluidity of capital shifts from one sphere of use-values to another, urged on by the need for earning at least the average rate of profit over a period of time, and lacking such profitable employment capital becomes stagnant in its fixed form, and fallow in it liquid form.

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[140] Speech in New York Times, Feb. 11, 1940.

[141] Ibid.

When President Roosevelt in the previously quoted address took sole credit unto his Administration, among others, for the decline in the rate of interest, he might as well have taken credit for the operation of the law of gravity and the movement of the heavenly bodies. Current affairs are the end result of a long historical process, and their significance cannot be grasped unless the nature of this process is thoroughly understood.

Too much is expected of public men who have reached their high eminence by assiduous cultivation of the arts peculiar to their field. The nature of their powers is determined by the medium in which they operate. One has but to compare the pompous oratory of statesmen of a hundred years ago with the product of today to appreciate how the artist changes with his medium and not the other way around. This generalization applies to political leaders in all types of government. German and Italian oratory reflect faithfully the political conditions prevalent in those countries. Statesmen are limited by their field to the expression of the appropriate and not the unpalatable. That is why they invariably lead a nation from glory to ruin if left to their own devices.

Social statesmanship must reconcile itself to the bitterness of frustration and defeat, and leave to others the intoxicating fruits of temporal success. Social statesmanship must learn to repress the longings of the soul for honor, glory and recognition and content itself to work along, perhaps in privation, knowing that recognition, if at all, will be posthumously bestowed, and yet urged on by some inner fire which will not let the spirit rest until its particular problem is solved.

James Truslow Adams correctly described the problems of history as it is envisaged by the social statesman. "The time," he writes, "calls for both synthesis and interpretation. History now needs an architect, not a lot of brick-makers. It has, to some extent, become an unfortunate tradition in American academic scholarship, due largely to its German period of tutelage, that a book is not a 'contribution to knowledge' unless it has some hitherto unknown fact or facts woven into it. In simple truth it is not difficult to uncover new facts, whether important or not, given patience and a modicum of training in how to find and use manuscripts or other sources.

Europe, better than America, understands that the far more difficult task, and the indication of a higher scholarship, is to be found in the ability to evaluate the facts and make them mean something by synthesizing and interpreting them." [142]

It is the recognition of the importance of law in general science which is the justification of this analysis of the basis of all scientific law, with its particular application to history.

HARMFUL RESULTS OF THE CALCULUS OF PROBABILITY METHOD WHEN APPLIED TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Heisenberg's apparent destruction of the law of causality was a serious blow to the further development of the social sciences. Since the calculus of probabilities offered wide opportunity for particular variation, emphasis was now placed upon the authority of experience and the rationalization to which each individual subjected the results of his experience.

Rothschild describes why the mechanical determinism of past historical methods had to break down. He undertakes a comparison of civilizations on the basis of climate, and is quite astonished to discover that though ten or twenty other locations exist in the world where climatic conditions are the same, they represent, nevertheless, a very wide difference in types of culture and stages of civilization.[143] His principal error lies in what he assumes to accept as deterministic factors, whether they be climate, wealth, language or art forms. In reality, there are no such absolute determinants, once mankind has risen above the animal stage of its evolution, and particularly so when its records become sufficiently differentiated as to constitute history with the development of civilized existence. It is not causality which is refuted, but rather the existence of historical invariants.

Having satisfied himself with this easy victory over a non-existent opponent, Rothschild concludes that history can be interpreted only in retrospect, where perspective comes to the aid of the philosophy of the historian himself by whose light he selects what is important from the confusing multiplicity and so whips into shape his own particular interpretation. He goes a step further than Dewey's amorphous "experience" from which different minds draw conclusions to suit individual tastes.

Rothschild would combine the minutiae of knowledge through the illuminating insight of wisdom. But unless he can establish a measuring rod for wisdom we come back again to where we started. Furthermore the sameness of the measuring rods has been seriously challenged by philosophical physics, and today even our knowledge of its very existence as an objective reality has become the subject of discussion.

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[142] New York Times Book Review, Feb. 4, 1940.

[143] Reality and Illusion—Rothschild (1934), pp. 318-20.

Truly the case for history then must be a hopeless one. "In the last analysis," concludes Rothschild, "all men are symbols. What it is that 'really' exists, who can say? All we know is that, if there is any significant personality at all, it is a mysterious something which organizes the events, desires and acts of life into a unified whole, a meaningful, valuable entity which includes, and yet transcends, the minutiae themselves and constitutes finally, simply what we call and have always called a myth." [144]

Yet Lewis and others loudly contend that unemployment is far from being a myth, while to the man who survived the battlefields of Europe war may indeed be a horrible nightmare, but beneath the illusion there exists for him a hard core of reality.

To Rothschild and those who believe with him, only those problems of history are real which they declare to be real. To us, and we hope many others, the problems of history are those of social existence itself, and society's objective reality is independent of either the will or the judgment of any single member of it.

G. Causality in History

ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION OF CAUSALITY OR PROBABILITY TO THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT

In order to concretize most strikingly the deep gulf which lies between the causal and the probability analysis of historical phenomena, let us consider both methods of approach to the present-day problem of unemployment. The same method of analysis would apply if the particular problem were housing, war, or the current birth rate.

Lewis and others call unemployment America's problem No. 1. This rhetoric only shows that they know little of the problem itself, because if they did, they would soon appreciate the fact that it is one segment of a chain, and that this could not be attacked without vitally affecting every other link of which this is a part.

No doubt to a starving man bread is his problem number one, but it must be obvious that there are many other factors which must be considered besides the immediate bitter loaf of charity if something more than temporary alleviation is to be achieved.

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[144] Reality and Illusion—Rothschild, p. 330.

At the very outset we are confronted by the pharisaical question: What is unemployment? One of the objections raised by opponents of an unemployment census is the speculative difficulty of establishing who is, and who is not legitimately unemployed.

If the breadwinner of a family, runs the contention, is out of a job for any length of time, pretty soon his wife, his eldest son and daughter, and perhaps even his aged parents who are under his sheltering roof, will be out looking for work. Therefore, they reason, the statistics on unemployment would show several people looking for work where only one was employed before. This bit of casuistry which would do credit to a medieval theologian, has been one of the reasons why up to now ten years after the Great Crisis, we have not had a clear-cut picture of the unemployment situation as it actually exists.

By this we mean the application of actual tests for reality as the physicist of the Einstein school would apply them to the outer world of experience. Any one now out of a job and looking for work is unemployed. Common sense is a faculty which, we sincerely trust, will long continue to remain the instinctive resort of the human race despite all theological niceties and scientific epistemological hair-splitting.

"Common sense," writes Bertrand Russell, "consists of a set of beliefs, or at least of habits, which work well in practice except in situations which rarely occur."[145] The way to find out who is unemployed is to inquire who is seeking employment. For the rest, it is a matter of rational procedure. It is important to inquire who among them has been employed before, and how long they have been out of work. This simple and necessary question would immediately solve all the self-conjured problems of our subjectivists.

Sellars emphasizes that science must come to the aid of common sense and elaborate perceptions into congruous conceptions.[146] The questionnaire must establish not only the fact, but the condition of unemployment in such detail as to clothe the resultant statistics with a four-dimensional aspect. In this respect scientific realism is superior to pragmatism, as Sellars points out, because it is concerned not only with the present and the future state, but equally so with the historical antecedents, without which knowledge is inherently defective. By the analysis of the laws of motion in an initial state classical science desires to predict the future effect. Adequate statistics concerning the present situation supplies us with the knowledge of an initial state for the purpose of further scientific inquiry.

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[145] Analysis of Matter—Russell, p. 142.

[146] The Philosophy of Physical Realism—Sellars (1932), p. 293.

Here the pragmatist and the classicist part company. The former would devote himself to the study of the functional operation of our economy, while the latter will undertake an investigation into the nature of capitalist economy and its laws of motion. "The methodology of science," writes Sellars, "is the establishment of successful methods for the discovery of empirical laws and constitutive theories. Mill's Canons are methods of detecting causal processes. They are but the principles used by science in their research; and it is generally admitted that they do not reflect actual procedure with complete accuracy. The next stage of induction concerns itself with theory, in which, as a rule, mathematical formulation with deduction and verification appears. The logic of this theoretical stage has been thoroughly worked out. Empirical control can never be eliminated. It follows from all this that science is searching for laws and fundamental connections." [147]

Obviously classical science must proceed upon the hypothesis of deterministic organization in nature, and the recurrence of similar patterns under similar conditions.

HEISENBERG DENIES POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INITIAL STATE

Heisenberg attacks these basic precepts of classical investigation. In the first place he denies that it is possible for us to know exactly an initial state; and because of that defect in our intellectual apparatus, we cannot deduce deterministic relations between states which we cannot know. To possess complete knowledge of the motion of a particle, we must know both its position and its velocity. Or, if we adopt the Schrödinger theory of an electron as a system of waves, the same fundamental requirement obtains of establishing both position and velocity, and there exists the same inherent defect. An experiment which fixes the speed with great accuracy renders the position of the electron proportionately inaccurate, and vice versa; and the product of the two uncertainties can never be less than Planck's constant "h". [148]

Now classical physics was predicated upon the assumed exact knowledge of both the position and velocity of a material point at a certain instant. If we knew the forces acting upon it we could predict its future path. Quantum physics has demonstrated conclusively that knowledge of one factor diminishes in inverse ratio with knowledge of the other. In practice, however, we deal with tremendously large masses of quanta. While we are debarred from exact knowledge of the individual unit and the initial state, by the use of statistical methods we can dispense with the individual unit for the study of the mass.

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[147] Ibid., p. 396.

[148] New World Picture—Gray, pp. 347-8; Philosophy of Physics—Planck, p. 58.

"Quantum physics," say Einstein and Infeld, "does not aim at the description of individual objects in space and their changes in time. There is no place in quantum physics for statements of this kind: 'This object is so-and-so, has this-and-this property.' Instead we have statements of this kind: 'There is such-and-such probability that the individual object is so-and-so and has this-and-this property.' There is no place in quantum physics for laws governing the changes in time of the individual object. Instead we have laws governing the changes in time of the probability." [149]

This conclusion, logical enough in the description of states of matter in either microscopic or molar physics, has been stretched beyond recognition or even coherence, by the too-easy assumption that because an initial state cannot be known therefore causality does not exist. In the social sciences it has led to the pursuit of statistical relations rather than to the investigation of causal relations as was characteristic of classical science.

CLASSICAL CAUSALITY IS APPROACHED AS THE MASS INCREASES

It is conceded by all students of the subject that quantum physics approaches the classical law of causality as the mass with which it deals increases. Einstein as a strict causalist affirms that.[150] Jeans despite his mysticism admits the distinction between classical and quantum theory disappears when we are discussing immense numbers of photons.[151] Eddington, the subjectivist. acknowledges the same proposition.[152] Dingle arrives at the same conclusion by a slightly more devious path.[153]

Therefore the historical scholar would find himself with quite respectable authority in affirming that social phenomena, which necessarily deals with masses of individuals, is not debarred by the conclusions of contemporary physical epistemology from the pursuit of laws deduced from the operation of social forces predicated upon the existence of definite relations of a causal nature within the social structure. But the defender of classical causality cannot afford to let the matter rest on such a basis because of the temporary convergence of roads.

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[149] The Evolution of Physics—Einstein and Infeld, pp. 307-8.

[150] Ibid., p. 305.

[151] The New Background of Science—Jeans, pp. 240, 253-4.

[152] The Philosophy of Physical Science—Eddington, p. 218; Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 300.

[153] Through Science to Philosophy—Dingle, p. 279.

The entire procedural method of both fields of investigation, the statistical and the causal, are radically different. The causalist must look to the derivation of his facts and their laws of motion; the indeterminist considers his statistical data and deduces conclusions therefrom. The causalist sees inevitable consequences; the indeterminist leaves the door open to chance and is content to cancel out the differences. The causalist, if thorough master of his field, can predict consequences; the indeterminist can only speak in terms of probabilities, where the very contrary is conceivable. The causalist traces his states one from the other with rigid adherence to their inner relations; the indeterminist feels safe only in numbers and glosses over important distinctions of internal arrangement. The causalist stresses qualitative relations and quantitative changes; the indeterminist has no patience with them for he lacks the apparatus and therefore the penetration necessary to differentiate between them. The causalist can conceive the end of a finite process; the indeterminist must accept the present social arrangement as final and immutable with only "bigger and better" in the range of his conceptual possibilities. The causalist can speak with finality concerning an event; the indeterminist must concede the mathematical possibility of reversibility in nature.

EXAMPLES OF SOME LUDICROUS CONCLUSIONS ADVANCED BY EMINENT SCHOLARS EMPLOYING THE PROBABILITY METHOD

One can cite some astounding examples of the utter confusion in which the supporters of probability are thrown by the epistemological difficulties of their procedure. The conclusive assertiveness of classical law can no longer be theirs. Though the probability of nature reversing itself is stated in a decimal where the zeros in ordinary type would extend on a page which would encircle the globe, still the possibility of such a reversal must be conceded.

Sellars tells us of Bertrand Russell being compelled to urge that "if we put a pail of water on a fire and could watch for an indefinite time we would be rewarded by seeing it freeze." [154] So Eddington is compelled to defy every known experience and common sense to boot, by asserting that if we step on a solid floor, the reason why we don't fall through is because a swarm of electrons hit our boot and prevent us from doing so. But he does not end there.

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[154] The Philosophy of Physical Realism—Sellars, p. 402.

Even the most naive Bushman can tell you that much, if not in the same language. But no respectable Bushman could be found who would seriously assert, as Eddington does, that the reason why we do not sink through the solid floor or fly off into space is not because that would be a violation of a law of Nature, but that it would constitute "a rare coincidence." [155] Jeans, too, has his rare coincidence in the freezing of the water kettle over a hot fire, but that would be due to the entropy of the ice-configuration being higher than the entropy of the water configuration.[156]

Both Eddington [157] and Jeans [158] repeat in all seriousness the statement that operating on pure probability an army of monkeys strumming on typewriters might write all the books in the British Museum. Truly it is time to look to the world's sanity when such respectable authority can seriously publish such nonsense. As Jeans admits at the same point, if the universe goes on for long enough, every conceivable accident is likely to happen in time, but one can well doubt if the universe would take the trouble to await the conclusion of such an experiment.

If we take their position seriously, as these writers intended, what should arouse one's concern is the shift in the epistemological method inherent in the probability outlook upon the world. The causalist would then feel it incumbent upon himself to explain, as to a class of young children, the causal elements involved not only in the writing of the books in the British Museum, but also in the construction of typewriters which our army of monkeys would require; and one could readily convince even young inquiring minds that ideas, books, typewriters and such have not an absolute but a relative existence, and therefore an historical setting; and that some things, like bombing planes for Caesar's armies, are not only improbable but impossible in every human meaning of that term—for all these problems make sense only in the significance which humans attach to them. Even the term impossible has its definite historical limitations. As for those strumming, monkey-operated typewriters there does not exist enough metal in a dozen universes before this monkey business could turn out a single Shakespearean play upon the probability methods envisaged by the distinguished British thinkers.

[155] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 342.
[156] The New Background of Science—Jeans, p. 268.
[157] The Nature of the Physical World—Eddington, p. 72.
[158] The Mysterious Universe—Jeans, pp. 4-5.

CAUSALITY, NOT PROBABILITY FACTORS, IN THE CREATION OF INDUSTRIAL UNEMPLOYMENT

Historical causality is inherent in the very problem of unemployment. Statistics and probability as it affects a particular individual will not disclose the origin of the problem. A congeries of many elements was required to produce both the situation and the dominant social reaction to it.

Unemployment relief is a matter comparatively only of yesterday, despite the fact that even in the best of times there was always on hand a fluctuating army of unemployed numbering from one to three millions. Yet government concern to the extent of financial relief gradually developed only within the past ten years. No more effective way exists for shutting up an ancient die-hard than by challenging him with the assertion that every man has an inherent right to work. This inherent right was not so generally recognized a dozen years ago.

Deep within the bowels of modern economy there was nurtured subterranean forces which impelled vast aggregations of capital for profitable production in a competitive world. The unemployed cannot be told, as of yore, to open up shop for himself or go West and plow the virgin homestead acres. The right to work for others is equivalent today with the right to maintain an independent and self-respecting existence.

How and why this revolutionary transformation in society was brought about, all the statistics in the world will not make clear. But these statistics would be an invaluable aid to the student of modern society in the development, correction and perfection of his theories, while the theories themselves would possess merit only in so far as they correctly mirrored the realities of the outer world.

The utter breakdown of statistical probability as concerns the individual in society is borne out by the fact that here at least his position and his velocity can be calculated with a degree of mathematical accuracy sufficient to satisfy the most finnicky of theoretical physicists. The average worker's position in society is dependent upon his securing a job, and his velocity in hunting the job is in direct proportion to his possibility of landing one. Here we have at last the uniting of the quantum theory and electrodynamics in a single logical system, but, we fear, in a manner not up to the specifications set by Einstein.[159]

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[159] The World As I See It—Einstein, p. 135.

CAUSAL FACTORS IN TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT ON THE BASIS OF CAPITALIST ECONOMY

Let us consider the question of technological unemployment. Many of the 'honest' liberals so beloved by President Roosevelt would solve the entire mess by going back to the good old days of small manufacture where the tool was the servant of man instead of, as today, where the man is the servant of the machine. Many a beautiful homily can be preached on this theme, and these nostalgic liberals who yearn longingly for the golden era of the Middle Ages can also prove their case by resort to the comparative, if not plenteous, unemployment statistics of the respective epochs of civilization. It is perfectly possible for society to degenerate back to the medieval level of existence, but that would hardly be accomplished in the manner these so honest liberals hold dear to their hearts.

On the other hand, there are apologists for the present order of things who still proclaim as a mathematical fact that technology does not cause unemployment. Their argument runs that while machinery displaces workers actually on the job, other jobs are created indirectly for workers in the production of those machines. It all sounds so simple for our epigoni.

Even the Editor of the New York Times in years gone by, used to employ that argument with considerable effect. Yet it can be established by incontrovertible analysis that the only reason for the introduction of machinery is the cheapening of the cost of production per unit, and that for the same number of units produced society as a whole, directly and indirectly, must expend less capital, both fixed and circulating, otherwise the new machine method of production could not be economically used in a competitive market. This is an absolute low of capitalist production, and unless one understands the reasons for it, it is futile to expect enlightenment from that source on any problem affecting modern industry.

It is true that capitalism has prospered and expanded on machine industry, and has brought within the reach of the humblest conveniences and even luxuries undreamed of a hundred years ago. This observation only strengthens our contention that history must be studied in its causal relations and not statistically, for no amount of such comparisons or analogies will disclose the laws of capitalist economy during the expanding period of its history. All poverty and riches are relative to their time, and while materially we are very rich, yet there exists relatively more misery and uncertainty today than during the time of the slower tempo of human existence.

These analogies between different epochs are inherently defective. Each period in history must meet the problems of its time, and the experiences of one generation merely disclose to their successors the historic development of their particular problem. No amount of statistical analysis can disclose, for example, why capitalist economy during the very apogee of its technological advances was already showing evidences of approaching decadence as indicated by the rapid increase in service occupations, while today we witness a decisive regressive movement of back to the land for some form of subsistence farming; a movement which has come to a temporary halt due to the recent outburst of industrial activity in the production of armaments. But not even the most hide-bound reactionary would claim that as an evidence of progress in the solution of current social and world problems.

MODERN MILITARISM, RE-ARMAMENT AND WAR ARE CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

It should be apparent that in unemployment we are confronted with no mere temporary maladjustment, but rather with an effect whose causes are deeply rooted within the social mechanism. All this talk of going back to the fundamentals of a past period in history or epoch in civilization may be effective politics, but will not help toward a clearer understanding. Analysis must be substituted for phrases and wishful thinking.

Hitler has shown one way of solving the impasse in which six million unemployed Germans found themselves in 1933. Japan has made a desperate thrust to protect her industrial life-line, which means access both to raw materials and world markets. France had its own way of finding a solution by not allowing the problem to assume menacing proportions. Grace of living there had never fully yielded to the aggressiveness of capitalism, and that is reflected in the half-and-half division of its economy between industry and agriculture. England subsidized immense housing projects while the United States hesitated between P. W. A. and W. P. A.; between great public works and work relief, where capital investment preponderated in the first, and labor-power in the second.

None of the great capitalist nations has been able to solve its unployment dilemma no matter what program it adopted. Resort to militarism and war only changed the direction, but not the nature of their economy. Congress has now appropriated over fifteen billion dollars, with more to come, in the program for total preparedness, on land and sea and in the air. Experts estimate that the total direct cost will be between thirty-five and forty billion dollars. In view of the international situation that step is unavoidable, but that is no solution, rather a destructive escape from the contradictions inherent in modern capitalist society. These expenditures will be reflected in increased employment whose effects will be diffused throughout the national economy.

This fact gives effective answer to the theory entertained by some that what this country needs is some important idea which when translated into action will mean the establishment of a great new industry to take up the slack, like that of the radio, the automobile, the telephone, and the railroad in the past. Great expectations were held out by some for television. This new industry has been lurking in the offing for over ten years, and when it finally reached the stage of practical utilization, only one thousand of those contrivances were sold despite an active advertising campaign and a great deal of gratuitous boosting in the press.

One of the excuses for this failure to catch the public imagination, as the euphemistic phrase goes, is that the sending end of the industry has not been perfected due to still unsolved technical difficulties. This is a very lame apology. Radio developed the broadcasting systems, and not the other way around. The automobile did not wait for suitable roads. The electric industry did not stop until a consumer demand was waiting for it. Railroads pushed out into virgin and practically uninhabited territory, and not infrequently brought their future customers with them to settle on their adjacent lands. That was capitalism in its progressive stage.

THE CLOSED CYCLE OF CAPITALIST ECONOMY CREATES A VICIOUS CYCLE IN ITS STAGNANT STAGE

What stopped the development of impressive new industries in addition to those already functioning is the paucity of consumer purchasing power. Capitalist economy can no longer depend upon an outside source of energy, as it did when new worlds were waiting to be conquered by innumerable willing hands.

The national income at a given time is the limit of the national purchasing power. This may be augmented in three ways. First, by borrowing against the future, which increases present consumption at the expense of previous capital accumulations, and not at that of the future generations as is commonly thought. For an increase of the public debt is an extra claim upon present purchasing power which results in a re-distribution of existing resources from the lender to that of the borrower. If A borrows $1000 from B, that does not by some mysterious process increase the national wealth by that amount, despite the fact that A now has the $1000 and B has a perfectly valid bond for that amount. Although B can sell that bond and get back his money, the net result is that C, D, and others now stand in B's position, which is a claim upon the distribution of future revenue in the form of interest and the ultimate repayment of the principal at the due date.

The second way of increasing present consumption is to increase the actual production of consumable wealth, values remaining the same. This follows only in an economy which has received some external impetus due to further development of its resources, as follows when capitalism seizes upon primitive methods of production in a contained society which has already experienced that progressive stimulus in other branches of its internal economy.

The third way for a nation to increase its purchasing power is to extend its sphere of influence over territories beyond its borders, and by exploiting the material and human resources of those lands brought under its imperial sway, be enabled to start a flow of surplus wealth toward its own borders.

Obviously we are concerned with the last two positive forms of increasing the national wealth. The closing of the American frontier for settlements is a fact of over fifty years. Extensive development has since yielded to intensive development. Theoretically there is no valid reason why the intensive development of capitalist economy could not proceed indefinitely for a nation of such limitless resources as ours. All this is said, of course, relatively to our geographic and historic situation.

Under a rational system of social organization the United States could easily support a population of five hundred millions on a level of physical well-being undreamed of during even the hectic days of the 1920's. But there do exist definite limiting factors. These factors are that consumable wealth is produced primarily to be sold. Consumption is incidental to the selling of commodities. When consumption halts, production must halt. We know that human nature possesses almost inexhaustible demands. But the satisfaction of these demands is predicated upon the ability to pay, while, conversely the ability to pay is dependent upon the primary completion of the cycle wherein all consumers have successfully negotiated the sale of their particular commodities: the worker of his labor-power, and the capitalist-owner of his products.

Statesmen have wracked their brains to discover where this cycle begins, since it is a cycle only as a figure of speech. In reality it is a process with an open end at both sides. The beginning of this process lies with the capitalist producer. As the owner of property he is sole judge as to how it is to be used. If he sees no prospect of profit he will slow down or shut down as his particular situation may justify. Knowledge of the processes of capitalist economy shows that it starts with production, where consumption is an intermediary step to the realization of profit and re-production of the cycle.

Understanding this law one recognizes that capitalism deals with no potential ability to consume, but with an economic basis which determines its power to produce. As long as capitalism was on its upgrade during which its cycle of production kept expanding there existed effective purchasers for their products. Every settler who carved out a farm for himself on virgin soil and every immigrant who was swallowed up in the hungry maws of some gigantic factory re-appeared as an effective purchaser of consumable goods.

To capitalism as a whole it is of no consequence whether those purchases be in the form of radios, washing machines or automobiles, though it makes quite a difference to the producers of these respective commodities. During a given year, the part of the national income spent for one means so much less to be spent for another. This becomes a truism if we only look back over the preceding year. In the expanding phase of its development all producers benefit, particularly those who come in with some new product which commends itself to public necessity or convenience. Therefore the inability of modern economy to rise out of its trough is not due to lack of some new product, but rather to the lack of purchasing power for even well-known commodities now in existence, be they capital goods or consumption goods.

H. Practical Application of Causality Principles to Current Problems

THE EFFICIENT CAUSAL FACTOR IN MODERN IMPERIALISM

Expansion of the field of exploitation beyond the national border, the third manner of increasing national purchase power, is by no means distinctive of the modern age. What is peculiar to it is the role which foreign trade plays in our economy.

During the early stages of capitalism, when commercialism was in its prime, the process of capital expansion consisted simply in exchanging the products of two vastly different economies, like those of Western Europe and Asia, with the merchant reaping a rich harvest at both ends of the process. Gradually the industrial revolution set in and productive capital assumed the preponderant role hitherto played by commercial capital.

After the conquest of the home market and that of the adjacent lands under free trade, self-protection induced the erection of tariff walls behind which the national economy could hasten its development in hot-house fashion. Soon access to raw materials and safety of capital investment abroad led to the development of power politics and imperialist adventure. The need for export of capital gave rise to a capitalist economy abroad in the hitherto colonial or semicolonial countries with needs of their own, which in time came into conflict with those of the western world.

Besides, the basis of the division of the world among the great nations resulted from the uneven power-politics development of the capitalist economies as represented by their respective national states at the time when such division was made. There had to develop a clash between the political theories of sovereignty which sought to freeze a temporal political relation into an absolute one for the growing requirements of the capitalist nations that arrived a little later on the scene.

Herein lies the material and the effective basis of the present world struggle. The Soviet Union occupies an anomalous situation between the contending haves and have nots in the capitalist world. It is puerile to point to its alliances and its dictatorship. The fact remains that it is a likely morsel for either or both capitalist groups, and must perforce choose its way warily among them. For after all is said and done, the basis of its economy is Socialist, and not capitalist.

The laws governing the character of its production, and the laws controlling the distribution of its national income are radically different from those controlling a capitalist economy. Its dictatorship may be transformed into a democracy without affecting the basis of its economy, but the most democratic of capitalist nations will still be bound by the laws of its production economy.

Those laws make unemployment, crisis and war inevitable. As for the Soviet Union, unemployment is impossible, or certainly unnecessary, while war is dictated by the requirements of the outer world and not by its own. We leave out the possibility of military extension of Communism to the rest of the world in the spirit of the early Christian crusades. Like that phenomenon, world domination through war is dictated, not so much by inherent necessity as with capitalism, as by the zealot's fervor where other than material considerations are the prime movers.

LENIN ON DEFICIENCY OF EMPIRIO-CRITICISM IN HISTORY

Thus we are led by the inextricable linking of historical processes to the tying-in of such fundamental modern problems as economic crises, unemployment and war. The discussion is necessarily sketchy and the conclusions are provisional, which the reader may accept or reject at his pleasure at this point of the analysis. Our purpose simply is to indicate a method of analysis which the principle of causality opens for us.

Statistical presentation must begin with a situation as it is, and not how it developed. The very essence of probability is uncertainty not only as to the present state, but of the past state, and certainly concerning the future state. Empiricism deals merely with experience, and as Lenin has shown, our most hard-boiled practical men frequently degenerate into the worst of subjective idealists when they attempt to rationalize upon the results of their experience.[160]

One has but to listen in on a convention of the National Manufacturers Association to be regaled by the weirdest conglomeration of nonsense on economics, politics and the general analysis of the situation in which the vast majority of these captains of industry function as automatons, whereas they are obsessed with the notion that they supply both the initiative and the leadership. No one questions that they are often keen manipulators of a process which they neither understand nor control, but of which they are among the principal beneficiaries by their relation to the inner scheme of things.

Pragmatism on the other hand may theorize on functions and institutions to the end of time without being any the wiser concerning their nature. Statisticians, empiricists and pragmatists of all degrees and conditions can all pass more or less learned judgment on what we should do. Only scientific analysis based on law and causality will tell us what we can do, while history scientifically studied will be able to tell us how it must be done.

Such history should be differentiated from teleology which deals with ultimate ends, for historical causality is by its very nature limited in its field of operation. A bountiful crop in a barbarian society, for example, would be the cause of general rejoicing, while in an agriculture organized on a capitalist basis where markets for the surplus must be found, nature's bounty often becomes the source of human misery.

The causal relation in social phenomena, as Bukharin points out,[161] is strictly determined by the realities of a given stage of historic development, and no absolute rules can be discovered which apply to all types and conditions of human relations. But whereas Comte, Spencer, Fiske and Ward sought the laws of social organization on some vast universal pattern, the modern materialist, to whom the ideological superstructure is just as much a material reality as the mode of production by which society gets its bread, looks rather to the objective world for the discovery of the laws of motion developed from the functional relations between the aggregates in a given historical period.[162]

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[160] Materialism and Empirio-Criticism—Lenin, pp. 227-8.

Historical science will leave to others the vast, albeit captivating, generalizations concerning the redistribution of matter and motion on a universal scale and in a grand hierarchy of arrangement without relation to a particular field. The same subjective idealism is apparent in any Fourth of July orator who gushes flowing apostrophes on life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to his crescendo-like climax, while vast masses of our population are denied access to the fundamental decencies of life, and whose broader social freedom is bound up with the vagaries of their employment. The scientific historian must content himself with generalizations developed out of concrete situations, while their value, like the generalizations of all other science, depends upon the degree of their penetration into the secret of the social organization of the epoch with which he deals, and his grasp of the laws of its internal motion. Again, like any other science, the theory must be in agreement with the known facts, and the theory becomes a law only when all the facts distinctive of the period are encompassed within the scope of its generalization.

VALID PREDICTION IN A LIMITED FIELD IS THE GOAL OF SCIENCE

Prediction must be the ultimate aim of science, but that does not make a soothsayer out of every scientist. He predicts only upon the basis of the knowledge of initial states of observation and their laws of motion. Our deep concern with the epistemological consequences of modern scientific thought is based primarily upon its denial of our knowing initial states and causal laws, with the result that probability has given an entirely different slant to human thinking. If anything is possible, then everything is possible, and by all means let us do what John L. Lewis suggests and call an immense convention to make certain that a fair consensus is obtained upon the schematic outline for the future society.

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[161] Historical Materialism—Bukharin, pp. 31-2.

[162] Marxism and Modern Thought—Article by Tiumeniev, pp. 259-61.

But the historical causalist must know not only the human material with which he deals, but the social forces which operate upon masses of men in a given social organization. He must know not what is merely desirable but what can be done under the given conditions to achieve definite ends.

Bulgakov thought he caught Marx in a contradiction when he sought to predict the future in accordance with the past and present, whereas, he contends, prognosis with regard to the future which is based on the results of the present must necessarily be in error.[163] In the first place, every scientist makes predictions based upon past and present observation.

The essence of scientific prediction is the continuity of forces under the same relations, and that new facts must be the resultant of forces already determined. Obviously Marx's critic errs when he confuses new facts with forces as being distinctive of every day, month and year. But under a given period of a definite epoch in history, like that of modern society based on capitalist production, the laws of that economy continue to prevail as long as it is the dominant economic factor in society. Therefore, granting the continuance of the present system, one can with perfect assuredness generalize its laws of motion into the future. This is implicit in every executory contractual arrangement entered into for final consummation some years hence.

As long as existing society remains and valid agreements are enforced, as they must be in capitalist society, every business man does in actual life what Marx or any other scientist does when he prognosticates under conditions previously described. But nowhere in all of Marx's voluminous writing does he lay down a blue-print for the future era of society. A scientist to the last, he analyzed the transition phases from a capitalist state through a socialist economy to a communist state.[164]

It is immaterial from our viewpoint whether Marx was right or wrong. We are concerned about the validity of the historical method he pursued. Empiricism deals with facts whose causal relations have not been fully established, whereas science is predicated upon laws, forces, relations which are susceptible of observation and analysis.

We must reject completely the condescension of indeterminists who insist that causality and probability when dealing with masses arrive at the same results. It is not the results, but how they are arrived at which is all-important to truly scientific inquiry. It may be true, for example, that during the ensuing year so many thousands will be killed on the public highways by automobiles. Yet that is no excuse for not inquiring into why these accidents occur, and to obviate many of them by better road construction, mechanical improvement of the car, and perhaps instilling a greater sense of social responsibility into the driver. No probability statistics can accomplish that. Nor can we in the discussion of corporate failures and economic dislocations console ourselves with the calculus of probabilities as do Berle and Means. Probability methods stultify scientific progress, whereas the principle of causality based on the certainty of law is science's most dependable aid to progress and bulwark against regression.

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[163] Argument and refutation in Bukharin's Historical Materialism, pp. 49-50.

[164] The Gotha Program—Marx, Section II, pp. 48-50.

CAUSAL LAWS ARE THE FIRMEST FOUNDATION FOR PREDICTION

Already toward the end of the 1930's there was in evidence a powerful reaction against the opportunist tendencies in science to which the Heisenberg principle had given full rein. Among the more thoughtful of the works then receiving attention was that by Professor Dingle. Concluding his analysis of the havoc wrought by indeterminism Dingle wrote: "I am not, be it understood, saying anything at all against the practical device of using probability terms as a means of arriving at a more complete and effective conception of an electron; their introduction was a brilliant inspiration, for the treatment of the number which constitutes an electron is similar to that applied to 'probabilities' in mathematical theory. It is doubtful if a better instrument of thought could be desired at present. But what I do object to very strongly is the assumption that this device is a great discovery of experience. It is nothing of the kind; on the contrary, its supposed reactions on experience are very misleading, and so far as they can be tested, are disproved. . . . The orthodox excuse is that they are so exceedingly improbable that they can be left out of consideration, for it may be billions of years before one of the necessary combinations of movement of the constituent particles will be realized. But the improbability, however large it is, has nothing to do with time; it gives me no reason at all why this extremely improbable event should not occur now as well as at any other time; if we allow it a temporal significance, it simply says that the overwhelmingly greater part of the desk's existence will be spent in its ordinary state."[165]

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[165] Through Science to Philosophy—Dingle (1937), p. 307.

This ringing declaration sounds a welcome call back to sanity in scientific thinking. It was one of the disheartening experiences of that gloomy period to observe how superficially the cardinal principles of sciences had permeated into the substance of contemporary thought, and how lightly savants were ready to abandon their rich heritage for the glittering bauble of the latest fad.

That scientists are seldom philosophers, as Einstein put it,[166] was not merely a gesture of modest deprecation, but eminently proven by their floundering around in the maze of subjective idealism so reminiscent in its methods of the Aristotelian suzerainty in the world of thought for two thousand years. To Einstein's greater glory, he was one of the very small number among the leaders of contemporary thought who fought for the validity of objective reality and the principle of causality.

This battle is far from won, as is evidenced by the recent work of Eddington in which he stoutly champions the subjective nature of supposedly fundamental laws.[167] Dingle is justified in issuing his broad challenge to the supporters of statistical law to produce a single, well-authenticated happening to support their possibility of the defiance of classical law in phenomena.[168] The most determined of indeterminists take caution as the better part of theory by regulating their daily lives without any consideration to the possibility of their flying off into space, or their automobile motor generating ice cubicles. In fact, when motors of sorts do produce ice cubes, they are among the first to explain by the orthodox methods of classical science just how this miracle is brought about.

MARXIAN THEOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION

It was to be expected that rigid Marxists of the formalistic school who pigeon-hole events into neat historical parallelograms, would point with delight to the crisis in the scientific thought of the 1930's, following the general outline of the crisis in world capitalism during the same period. The austere garment of proletarian science absolved them from the necessity of weighing the merit of their neat analogies.

The Marxian theoreticians of the Marx-Engels Institute in the Soviet Union have developed an academic scholasticism which would vie comparison among any in the bourgeois world. "Max Planck, the physicist," writes Uranofsky, "denying the crisis in words, gives interesting indirect testimony of its existence. Planck indeed confirms the presence of a crisis when he is compelled, in retreating and yielding his positions, to defend causality and objectivity of the physical world. He confirms the crisis in bourgeois science when he speaks of the confusion prevailing in science and complains that science is being overwhelmed by the activity of all sorts of fantasists." [169]

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[166] Physics and Reality—Einstein in Journal of Franklin Institute, March, 1936, p. 349.
[167] The Philosophy of Physical Science—Eddington (1939), pp. 64-9.
[168] Through Science to Philosophy—Dingle, p. 308.

Without at all minimizing the mutual reaction between economic and cultural decadence, the fact remains that such comparisons in specific instances are mechanical because the selected particular events are fortuitous for the argument, in the sense that there is no direct internal relation between them. Yet there is well-grounded merit in the Soviet scientist's case, despite the obviously malicious satisfaction they derive from the discomfiture of "bourgeois" science.

That the Soviet regime insists upon conformity to state dogma despite what an honest scientist may think of the facts is evident by the storm the great Russian biologist Pavlov aroused when he stressed the importance of heredity over environment in the formation of individual characteristics. Official Soviet science must bend to the requirements of a policy where the preponderance of sociopolitical factors must necessarily be stressed.[170]

Even such an enthusiastic recent convert to Marxian dialectics as J. B. S. Haldane is ready in most un-Marxian fashion to "scrap the principle of determinism, at least as understood by Laplace," [171] although he concedes a high degree of accuracy is still possible in the prediction of physical and social happenings. Yet this great British scholar who shows a profound understanding of dialectical materialism despite the few years he has devoted to its mastery, is ready to accept frankly the consequences of indeterminism which have led so many other able thinkers into the misty realm of spiritism.

"I do not see why a dialectical materialist," writes Haldane, "should reject a priori the possibility of such alleged phenomena as telepathy and clairvoyance. I do not doubt that most of the reported cases rest on conscious or unconscious deception. But I see no reason for regarding a certain lack of privacy in mental images on the one hand impossible, or on the other hand miraculous in the sense of involving a breach of natural laws of a general

[169] Marxism and Modern Thought—Article by Uranofsky, p. 169.

[170] Ibid., pp. 163-4.

[171] Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences—Haldane (1939), p. 86; also, pp. 163-4, 167, 169-70, 171.

validity."[172] Then he goes on to give the very lame excuse against which his fellow countryman Dingle so vehemently protests, that such phenomena would be rare. "I do not, of course, affirm, that such phenomena occur. But if their occurrence should be proved, I do not think that this would disprove materialism, or even revolutionize science."[173]

Haldane is singularly unmoved by the alleged collapse of the Laplace conception of classical causality. One is at a loss to characterize Haldane's testimony. No such reversal or denial of the laws governing phenomena in the manner he indicates has ever been proved. He admits that claims to the contrary are, to be lenient, unfounded. He himself does not believe in their probability. But the very fact that he concedes such a possibility puts him beyond the pale of Marxian dialectical materialism which taught, not the absoluteness of knowledge, but the absolute necessity of establishing direct causal relations between phenomena if such knowledge is to be termed scientific.

EVEN INDETERMINISTS ARE MOST HAPPY WHEN THEY ADOPT THE LANGUAGE OF CLASSIC LAW

To history this problem is of preponderant importance, for no analysis of the contemporary scene is possible unless it is predicated upon the foundation of causality. Even indeterminists in political and social science feel safest when they can establish a causal relation in the evil they denounce or in the program they support. But we must definitely banish from social science that easy resort to vagaries, opinions and theories which would be, and are, ruled out in every phase of life where suitable scientific methods have been developed out of long, and often costly, experience. Historical science seeks only to generalize these universal experiences into law, and no principle of law is so wholesome as when it is stated with a causal connection.

That no government can continue indefinitely to spend twice as much as it takes in, is a theorem propounded with Euclidean exactitude of demonstration and Laplacian logic almost daily on the editorial page of the New York Times. Of course, one of two things can be done about it; to cut down expenses or to increase revenues principally through greater tax collections. The latter is strictly ruled out by the business interests. As for the first choice, they are indifferent as to how it is done, whether by cutting down on social services or through the elimination of alleged waste, or both. Yet in this program a causal relation is sought to be established between the evil, its consequences and the proposed remedy. However, the principle should not be pressed too far, since there is always the lurking uneasiness that the eternal social system which they support axiomatically could not withstand on that score the careful scrutiny of historical causality.

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[172] Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences—Haldane, p. 169.
[173] Ibid., pp. 169-70.

As a consequence, the apologists of the status quo in its essentials are always careful to point out the importance of diversity in opinion, freedom in abstract discussion, empiricism in policy, and pragmatical forecasts as to the future. Political would-be Einsteins who question the validity of the Euclidean axioms in formal history may be welcomed when they are concerned only with abstract conceptions, but no such toleration will be exhibited toward those who question the foundations of the social order from which are deduced our prevalent social conceptions. Here indeed the more varied the theories and contradictory the councils, the less chance there is for concerted action, and consequently the greater is the opportunity for maintaining the status quo.

Everyone in the world of science is theoretically free to express whatever opinion he pleases, but scientists justly jealous of their reputation are generally circumspect in availing themselves of that privilege in a particular field. By some strange quirk of our mental processes, every one, even the most amateurish in the larger scope of scientific inquiry, feels himself eminently qualified to express judgments on the most fundamental problems of society with the avowed purpose of influencing the opinions of others.

An editorial in the New York Times states succinctly the contemporary opinion on causality: "The search for cause and effect, the striving to reduce everything to law and order, the explanation of the universe in terms of machine—all this Pavlov carried over from Kelvin, Maxwell and Helmholtz. But in physics, causality, machines, law and order have disappeared. Schröedinger even regards them as infantile concepts—as infantile as Kepler's hypothesis that angels push planets around the sun." [174] It is very doubtful whether the same writer would publish similar opinions despite the awe-inspiring analogy after the lapse of a few years. Styles in fundamental concepts are thus adopted and discarded with the aplomb of milady choosing her season's ensemble. But such liberties can only be taken with the theoretical problems of society, not in their practical manifestations.

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[174] In Issue of Feb. 28, 1936—New York Times.

IDEALISTS LIKE LODGE AND WHITEHEAD SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF LAW FOR MASSES

History by its very nature must deal with events in society, no matter how those events are interpreted. Society necessarily presupposes some form of human organization. Sir Oliver Lodge points out in his thoughtful analysis of "emergent evolution" that the function of the organization stands on a far different plane than that of the individual unit. Such an organization acquires functions not possessed by its constituent elements when in separation: "It is proved that neither an atom of hydrogen nor an atom of oxygen has any of the properties of water," Lodge wrote. "The separate atoms acquire those properties in combination. Hence a molecule has properties denied to an atom, and so also an organized assemblage of a large number of molecules; and if the molecular compounds are sufficiently complicated and sufficiently numerous so as to be organized into a portion of protoplasm, then a further property makes its appearance." [175]

The same principle is developed in Whitehead's explanation of congruence as repetition embodying the principle of uniformity,[176] and in the community of nature where "the character of the structure receives its exposition from the quantitative and qualitative revelations in space and time." [177] These two idealist philosophers who use physics as their medium of operation express the thought here emphasized that the study of society stands on a far different footing than the study of its individual components, and consequently indeterminism, even if true, did not apply to vast aggregates of individuals who are organized in a definite way.

On this showing alone, causality principles in essence should apply to historical phenomena by their own admission. But we cannot be content with a mere verbal victory. What we are striving for is to establish a conclusive method of historical analysis, and a scientific procedure in the consideration of social phenomena. For, if the method is unassailable, then we can hold our ground firmly on the facts, and the deductions which follow from those facts, and the social forces which produced them.

Dewey, too, has his epistemological argument by way of illustration on the nature of water: "There is no superstition more benumbing, I think, than the current notion that things are not what they are, and do not do what they seem to do, because these things have themselves come into being in a causal way. Water is what it does rather than what it is caused by. The same is true of the fact of intelligent choice. A philosophy which looks for freedom in antecedents and one which looks for its consequences in a developing course of action, in becoming rather than in state of being, will have far different notions about it. Yet we cannot separate power to become from considerations of what already antecedently is." [178]

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[175] Beyond Physics—Lodge (1930), pp. 150-1.

[176] Principles of Knowledge—Whitehead, p. 141.

[177] Ibid., pp. 78-9.

Dewey's concluding sentence destroys the effect of his antecedent propositions. Science is concerned with the present and past states in order more correctly to understand the laws of motion inherent in the particular phenomena. History cannot rest content with institutions and functions as they are. It is very doubtful, to say the least, whether the most thoroughgoing pragmatical investigation can establish the true nature of an existing social institution merely by studying its mechanism and its function. Every government archive groans with data and statistics on that score. History as a science must concern itself with laws of social motion, and no law known to science has the strength and power which the causal relation gives it.

PLANCK WHO PROPOUNDED THE QUANTUM THEORY VEERS TOWARD CAUSALITY IN MASS PHENOMENA

Since Planck's Quantum Theory was instrumental in effecting the revolution in scientific thought, it would be most fitting to close this discussion in the words of the Grand Old Man in the scientific world. Significantly enough he expressed his final conclusions in a recent work published thirty-six years after his theory was announced.

"In the field of macro-physics," Planck writes, "which deals with relatively large bodies and spaces of time, the classical theory will always retain its importance. Clearly then the mistake does not lie in the fundamentals of the theory, but in the fact that among the assumptions used for building it up, there must be one to which the failure is due, and the elimination of which would allow the theory to be further extended." [179]

Then follows the problems created in the uncertainty of our knowledge of the position and the velocity of an initial state in microphysics. "This impossibility makes it difficult to apply strict

[178] Philosophy of Civilization—Dewey (1931), pp. 292-3.
[179] Philosophy of Physics—Planck (1936), p. 20.

causality and has led certain indeterminists to claim that the law of causality as applied to physics has been definitely refuted. On closer consideration, however, it is seen that this conclusion rests on a confusion between the world image and the world of sense. It is, at any rate, premature. . . . The classical world image has failed and something else must be put in its place. This has actually been done. The new world image of quantum physics is due to the desire to carry through a rigid determinism in which there is room for Planck's quantum." [180]

Planck now contends that in this rigid determinism which science desires to establish, it is possible to employ Schröedinger's operators, Heisenberg's matrices, or Dirac's Q numbers, namely, the very mathematical principles as developed by the great champions of indeterminacy. "We see then that there is fully as rigid a determinism in the world image of quantum physics as in that of classical physics. The only difference is that different symbols are employed, and that different rules of operating obtain. Accordingly the same happens in quantum physics as we saw previously happening in classical physics. The uncertainty in forecasting events in the world of the senses disappears and in its place we have an uncertainty with regard to the connection between the world image and the world of senses." [181]

PLANCK THE GREAT COMPROMISER IN THE WORLD OF CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE

In this conclusion the Great Compromiser in the world of science tries to undo some of the evil by repairing one fence and constructing another a little farther down the road. From the problem of observation as Heisenberg put it, Planck now would remove it to the problem of the understanding. Uncertainty for the physical world has now been decided in favor of determinism, but a new uncertainty is created for the world of thought.

This last proposition we shall discuss during the course of this work. For the present, it is enough if we have demonstrated that causal law applies to society considered as an objective reality. We hope to meet with a similar result in attacking the more vital question to the historian of causality in the ideological processes which actuate man in different ways to effect those events that enter into the substance of history.

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[180] Ibid., p. 59.

[181] Philosophy of Physics—Planck, p. 61.

CHAPTER VIII

The Historical Field Theory

A. CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

IT WOULD be appropriate at this point to synthesize the results achieved during the analysis of the various propositions which enter into the formulation of the Historical Field Theory. The aim of this general theory is to disclose the laws of historic motion as they have developed and must develop universally in every form of Civilization. Upon the basis of this general theory, there will be evolved the special Theory of the Continuing American Revolution as it developed particularly out of the history to which it applies.

Since thinking, at best, is a painful process for all of us, even the most active minds must guard against the common frailty of accepting uncritically symbols and strings of words whose meaning or implication is taken for granted without further examination.

We have observed how widely historians differed upon the meaning of history. The definition we arrived at was that history is the record of events in society. On its face this definition appears to be self-evident. Since there can be little difference of opinion as to what we mean by an event or a happening, everything appears to hinge upon the word society. The concept of society is the keystone in our intellectual edifice. Destroy that, and the entire structure collapses. Grant that, and all else follows. It was for the purpose of rendering that conception of society herein advanced impregnable to all attack that we engaged in those frequent excursions through the range of history in different times and different lands.

Since history deals essentially with movement, with form and function in continuous re-action, modification, and transition, it was necessary to conceive of society as a fluent and flowing reality, the resultant of social forces operating in a limited medium controlled by causal laws. This was a radical departure from the methodology of classical historians who felt much safer with post-mortems and therefore would not venture beyond merest chronicling of events which dealt with their own generation, and even then with great circumspection.

Many apparently conclusive arguments have been adduced in defense of their position. Among them, there has been stressed the importance of perspective, so that the historian could view the scene in its totality and be in a position to judge the relative importance of the events which form the substance of his story. How fundamentally fallacious is this appeal to so-called practical common sense must be evident from the following consideration: By what right does one set himself up as a competent judge of events which occurred thirty or more years ago, when by his own admission he is incompetent to analyze the significance of events which transpire under his own eyes?

Two replies are generally given; first, that the contemporary record is necessarily incomplete, and secondly, that the ensemble of happenings in all their interdigitations can be grasped only after the passage of time.

SUBJECTIVITY MUST BE ELIMINATED IN HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS

Mere passage of time does not necessarily resolve the problem. For the fulsome details of the present are forgotten and minds which differ upon the specific gravity of events as they transpire are just as likely to differ about them many years hence. Obviously there must be eliminated the subjective element in the assaying of historical events, just as classical science has eliminated the idiosyncrasies of the individual scholar in other branches of knowledge. This is accomplished by the establishment of law as the controlling factor in the unfolding of events. As to whether the record in history is ever complete enough to discern such a relationship has nothing to do with the principle but with the record itself.

There is just as much disagreement today concerning the reasons which led the United States into the First World War as there existed twenty-three years ago. Historians are by no means yet agreed upon the causes of the Revolutionary War, nor the nature of the tragic circumstances which plunged the young nation into the maelstrom of the Civil War.

Mere records are not enough in themselves, but it is what those records mean to the historian which clothes them with their proper importance. Many attempts have been made to establish measuring rods for evaluating the significance of events. We discovered that all such foot-rules suffer from the same defect which physical science found in their own measuring rods. Either they are subjective in nature and therefore susceptible to the vagaries of individual temperament, or they change with time and place, and therefore do not mean the same thing to all men.

One has but to compare the historical writings of different generations dealing with the same period, to have visible proof of the inherent variability of interpretation which attaches to the analysis of the human record. This has caused Dewey and other writers to assert that a science of history is impossible because of the time gap between the present which is the standpoint of the writer, and the past facts about which he cogitates for the substance of his current writing.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL LAW IN EVALUATING THE PERSONAL ELEMENT

But we saw that all science consists in laying down rules concerning the past, and projecting them into the future, despite the fact that not even a Newton could dissociate himself from the here-now. An apple plumped him on the head and there unrolled the laws of gravitation. One shudders to think what would have happened if Newton had not lived.

Even Einstein does not claim to have abolished the law of gravity, as some people seemed to fear. History could not pretend to be scientific as long as it could not establish certain states which were independent of the observer and the time in which he lived.

HISTORY BEGINS WITH CIVILIZED SOCIETY

Since history, by its very definition, deals with events in society, only those events can come within its purview of which a definite record exists. History therefore begins with society in an advanced state of civilization. Towns, kings, wars, agriculture, industry, slaves, masters and the rest fill whatever of these records have been preserved to us.

Among them have been such authentic contributions as the myths, fables, poetry, literature and religious achievements of the past. In all of them we find little difficulty in recognizing our blood-brothers among the humans who parade before us with all their weaknesses, their foibles, their hates, loves, aspirations and despairs. The great religious leaders and thinkers of the past still pervade a warmth which elevates and inspires the present generation despite the differences in time.

Anthropology and sociology have established the fact, not that human nature is insusceptible of change, but that these changes are very slow indeed, and that the modern man on the battlefield or in the university or even in the workshop would feel very much at home among the Greeks of two thousand years ago.

HUMAN NATURE IS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR THE LONG-RANGE HISTORIAN

Knowing the relative stability of human nature through a vast mass of impeccable records, it was a logical step for us to consider why it is that social institutions have changed during the past six or seven thousand years. Consequently we undertook to investigate the nature of the social forces within the organization of society, rather than the consideration of the structure of society itself. If society evolves, we must know why it evolves before we are in a position to discuss a particular form of social organization from which or into which this movement takes place.

Yet history proves that social changes are more apparent than real. Only the form of manifestation of deeply-rooted elements in human nature mark the dividing line between epochs in civilization. Social institutions are something different than the sum of their human constituents. Habits tend to mechanize social existence, but are themselves gradually modified by the social institutions which give rise to modifiable instincts, customs, rules of conduct and forms of thought. All react upon and modify habits, being in turn controlled by them. Desires change with the nature of the obstacles encountered while intelligence operates on thought to affect necessary accommodations in conduct.

Social movement involves the concept of social forces. Now no one has been able to dissect a social force or subject it to chemical re-agents. Bodies move, or are prevented from moving because force is exerted upon them. Forces are developed from the relations of bodies rather than by being superimposed upon them from some outside agency. If this outside agency is strong enough to affect another body, then both bodies exist in relation to each other and exert influence upon each other through fields of force between them.

SOCIAL FORCES ARE DEVELOPED OUT OF DEFINITE SOCIAL RELATIONS

This fundamental principle applies to society. Robinson Crusoe alone on a desert island is removed from the orbit of the social influence. But the same Robinson as a government agent put there, we assume, to maintain title for the British Empire is very much a part of the social structure of his time. Therefore it is not an abstract society with which history deals, but the definite social relations which are established by the operation of the social forces within a given social structure.

It is quite possible to conceive of numerous places in the vast Soviet Union where the peasant goes right on plowing his fields as his ancestors did before him, but it makes all the difference in the world whether his relations to the land he tills is that of a serf on a seignorial estate, or that of a farmer member of his local collective.

Mankind, for example, has made clothes for many thousands of years. It is only under definite social conditions that one becomes a tailor producing a commodity for exchange, while other social factors will determine whether that exchange will be for a definite equivalent, like five bushels of wheat, or a universal equivalent like five dollars in gold. Social forces are therefore developed out of definite social relations, and since history teaches us that society has changed, we must examine those factors which are responsible for that change.

MUTABILITY IN SOCIAL FORMS OF ORGANIZATION

History affords abundant evidence that many great civilizations have passed from the scene, while some still linger on in various stages of stagnation or decadence. No philosophy of history which seeks to generalize the laws of historic movement can rest content with merely speculating upon the reasons for such degeneration or to moralize concerning it. For if we can establish what forces within society inhibit development and what forces promote it, we will possess an important key not only to past history, but also of great importance in the unraveling of the present.

If, for example, it can be shown that the political forms of Greece based upon Greek blood as the talisman of citizenship led to the narrowing of its base as wealth and power increased with the influx of foreigners and slaves, we can understand one of the pre-disposing factors tending toward its downfall. Again, if it can be proved that no modern capitalist economy can thrive without free access to the markets of the world and its basic raw materials, we will have in our hands an important clue to the developments of the past twenty years.

Of course we mean, specifically, of Germany, Italy and Japan. Such colonial empires as Holland, Portugal and Belgium possess are merely by the sufferance of the really dominant imperial powers. This by no means exhausts the problem of present-day power politics, since such great world powers as the United States and the Soviet Union are not directly affected by the motives which work so powerfully among the so-called have and have-not nations. Social forces are necessarily limited by the historical medium out of which they arise.

Tradition, historical ties, racial and religious sympathies and antipathies, acquired or superimposed political philosophies, all play their role. But history as a science will have failed in its purpose unless it can narrowly circumscribe both the origin and the field of operation of the social forces with which it deals.

PROBLEM OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF MOTIVATING FACTORS IN THE HUMAN DRAMA

Many writers of history expand upon the great variety of social forces which play a role in the annals of a given period. Who is to determine which are more important than the other? Any such determination, they insist, is necessarily subjective and consequently dependent upon the personal peculiarities or the particular measuring rod of the individual writer.

Here again the facts of history decide. Experience demonstrates that certain factors at a definite time are more powerful than others. What these are can be observed in the life of a given society. If one views the world from the aperture of a monastic cell, the world has an aspect distinctive of that environment and situation. That social forces are relatively stable and continuing even the lonely monk can fairly assume from the prospect of his circumscribed existence. All government, business, religious and social relations are based upon such continuity. True, upheavals do occur, but again history proves that they are of infrequent nature, and that organized existence must be predicated upon some substantial form of social stability.

Such definiteness of organization bears a direct relation to the reproduction of social forms.

Of the numerous motivating and effective forces in historic movement, a great deal depends upon the social relations of a given period if one is to establish which were, are or will be the preponderant and the characteristic elements. In medieval society aristocratic birth was a prime consideration. In modern society where the capitalist mode of production prevails it is the possession of wealth which is the open sesame to social position and power. Among the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church in modern times neither birth nor wealth is the decisive factor in the determination of rank. Yet few will deny that the secular arm wields the preponderant power in the world today. These problems in history are not to be lightly decided by general belief or individual opinion. The facts of the objective world will determine the issue, as always, and the fact of preponderant power can be demonstrated only by the events as they have been recorded.

Events in history do not always carry a self-explanatory label attached to them; neither do events in the world of physics, chemistry or biology. The role of judgment must play a factor in estimating their respective merits, and in order that individual variation of judgment may be limited as closely as possible, if not eliminated entirely, laws are sought to explain in concise nomenclature and in definite fashion the phenomena under observation. To the extent that a field of inquiry succeeds in eliminating the personal equation, to that degree does it claim a place among the hierarchy of the scientific disciplines.

THE ROLE OF THE GREAT MAN SEEMS TO DESTROY POSSIBILITY OF LAW AND SCIENCE IN HISTORY

But it will be contended, with considerable show of merit, one cannot eliminate the individual as a factor in history. Consider such great men as Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon and the rest, or Galileo, Newton, Darwin and the others if one's mind runs along the path of reason rather than of the sword. No one will question the tremendous influence individuals of their calibre wield upon the society of their time, and even long after that. Some one has yet to show what permanent direct influence these men of undoubted genius have had upon the Bushmen of Australia or the Kalmuks of Sungaria. Genius of such character is not a quality independent of time and space, but is social in origin and must have a suitable social background in which to operate. None of those great men mentioned by way of illustration could have played his role unless he represented some vital element distinctive of the society of which he was an integral part. Some, in their ideas, were ahead of their time; some were behind their time, but all were children of their time.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL FORCES ARE DISTINCTIVE OF THE HISTORICAL FIELD IN WHICH THEY ORIGINATE

Social forces are developed from the social relations of a given period, and change when those relations change. In a virile society stability and change play vital and complementary roles. It is academic to speculate upon which of them is prior, or the more important. One is inconceivable without the other, for differentiation is the essence of organization, and Spencer has well established in his famous definition of evolution that the retained motion undergoes parallel transformation during the change from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to definite, coherent heterogeneity.[1]

There is a continuous interplay between the social relations and the social forces to which they give rise and during which each modifies itself and one another. There is no attempt here to belittle the role of the great man. But it is important to emphasize his limitations, as Napoleon discovered when he tried to reproduce in the midst of developing capitalist society a form of personal government which suited the condition of Europe during the days of the great Roman emperors.

IMPORTANCE OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICALLY CONDITIONED SOCIAL STRUCTURE

In our analysis of the social forces as they manifested themselves in the history of Western Europe between the tenth and twentieth centuries we had occasion to observe from the history of Italy, France, Spain, England and Germany the particular social conditions which led to their particular historical development. While the variations due to race, environment, culture, religion and the impact of internal and external forces were necessarily varied, still there was a striking similarity in the results achieved at a given stage of civilization.

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[1] First Principles—Spencer, Ch. XVII.

Feudal institutions wrought the same general effect wherever they secured a firm foothold, and rooted themselves deeply in the consciousness of men, shaping their government, religion, and class relations. We saw that wherever social conditions were favorable, towns pressed for a measure of privileges which increased with the growth of industry and commerce. When the internal situation allowed the burgher class to expand their power, aristocracy receded before bourgeois democracy until the latter assumed ascendancy, invariably by revolutionary means.

As we approached the twentieth century and our own times, we saw once more how the social relations distinctive of modern society developed social forces peculiar to its institutions, with the growth of popular democracy on the political field along with the dictatorship of capital in the economic field of a democratic state. It is not necessary for the reader to subscribe to any particular social philosophy in order to concede what has been amply proved in our second chapter, that definite social forces are distinctive of particular forms of social organization. Our next problem must be, therefore, the analysis of the social structure which characterizes a particular epoch in the history of mankind.

FALLACY OF GENERALIZED THEORIES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION INDEPENDENT OF TEMPORAL RELATIONS

There is no abstract, idealized type of social structure which may suit the purposes of definition. Society is rather a condition, a state in which aggregates of human beings are bound together in certain relations. These necessarily reflect the changes in the social structure which determine the attitudes that groups bear toward one another in a particular form of organization.

In the speculative Utopias, the imagination can organize society at will, as did Plato, Bacon, More and Campanella. The United States also had its share of Utopia-builders in the concrete during the first half of the nineteenth century. Some lingering vestiges of these flights from reality still persist today in various communities as a reminder of the fallacy inherent in subjective rationalization which is determined to negate at will the imperious requirements of the outer world. While there is no valid generalization of the concept society, yet at a given time the social organization is both a quantitative and qualitative reality. Outside of the polar extremities there exists no portion of the earth's surface which has not been brought under the jurisdiction of man.

Society is not an organism, as Spencer would have it, with its coordinated differentiation of form and function, but rather an aggregate of component parts. The distinction is vital. In an organism above the lowest form of existence, there exists a definite relation between the component parts of the structure, each of which perform a specialized function for the whole. The aristocratic theory of government has always based itself upon the principle that the elect were destined to be the head while others were the arms and organs for the proper functioning of society in that category where God or nature placed them. However, republics have been able to set at defiance all these immutable principles by having the so-called lower organs metamorphose themselves into heads and hearts whenever the occasion was propitious.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETY AS AN AGGREGATE OF HISTORICALLY DETERMINED SUB-DIVISIONS

Society, as we saw, in all its forms of organization consisted of three aggregates—the state, the economy, and the ideological superstructure. Though individuals might function in one or more capacities, or move freely from one category to another, every society in essence consisted of these three aggregates.

The Pilgrim Fathers brought with them these fundamentals of civilized existence. Though small in number, they had a state organization in the form of their fundamental charter. During the early days of indifferentiation all contributed their labor for the common good. Their rigid religious practices grooved their ideologies into a simple mold, which soon gave rise to that peculiar New England theocracy of the seventeenth century which still excites the curiosity, if not amazement, of the modern student of that peculiar institution on American soil.

No record of civilized society exists without finding in full bloom all the three aggregate components of the social structure, for each of them fulfils a vital essential to organized human existence on the level of the given civilization. The state regularizes the social relations, the ideological superstructure clothes these relations with the garment of reason or necessity, while the economy performs those essential functions inevitable for man's perpetuation. That does not by any means prove that each must labor for himself, for one of the refinements of civilized existence is the ability of some to live by the labor of others.

INTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE SOCIAL AGGREGATES

No matter what form of social structure we contemplate, each records in a highly specialized form the division of society into the three aggregates. The particular form of state, economy, or ideological superstructure may differ, but all are present in the various ratios of their specific gravity within the given social structure. Necessarily they operate upon each other, modify each other and themselves, and consequently impress their influences upon the social structure as a whole. But only under definite conditions do either one or the other or all in combination transform the social structure.

For example, capitalist economy required for its fuller development the freedom of movement which is the very life-blood of its existence. While the early merchants were under the influence of the feudal aristocracy, this freedom was necessarily limited. Capital was furtive and cautious. Therefore it ventured into commerce rather than industry, where commercial capital was under specific control in the first instance, while the security of productive capital was subject to a combination of uncertain social factors in all its phases, each of which was dependent upon political forces beyond the entrepreneur's control. As long as feudal society remained intact, the burgher class was limited in its operations. With the disintegration and final dissolution of feudal principles in the political organization and the ideological superstructure, capitalist economy burst forth from its bonds and there started that glorious Industrial Revolution which has continued on to this very day.

PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF A SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF HISTORY

Magna Charta marked the beginning of one epoch in Civilization. We have already indicated the reasons why the New Deal, despite its frequent absurdities, due principally to the inability of its architects to understand the significance of the social forces with which they operate, marks the end of an epoch, and opens before us the possibility of a new era for mankind, that of Socialization.

For capitalism has now reached the end of the progressive phases of its development. It cannot resolve the problems created by the necessities of its own economic processes without transforming the base upon which its existence is predicated. Thyssen in Germany during the hectic days of January 1933 thought he preferred totalitarianism to Communism, and now he finds himself extremely uncomfortable with both. If the Historical Field Theory is scientifically valid, then it presents us with the key to the solution of our present economic and political problems.

Of course, no one acquainted with the human record will flatter himself that mankind will act upon a solution which appeals to their rational faculties. Mankind experiences before it reasons. But it is not too much to hope that after the horrible disasters, economic and military, which have engulfed the world unremittingly during the past twenty-five years, not a few will be inclined to consider a scientific analysis of how this situation came about, and what can be done to remedy these evils on the basis of known social factors operating through a known medium, and with materials which have long offered up to us the secret of their practical application to the spiritual and technological requirements of man.

RELATIVE STABILITY OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE DESPITE INTERNAL MODIFICATIONS

While the social organization is itself in a state of unstable equilibrium, at a given historical period it maintains the general outlines of its structure. The requirements of capitalist society is basically the same whether it be emergent as in Japan or in the fullest flower of its development as in England. But whatever the nature of its development society, so long as it maintains a degree of stability, at all times functions as the independent variable, while the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure function as the dependent variables. None of the three can exceed the limits established by the social structure without either toppling it or transforming it.

Such transformation need not necessarily be in a progressive direction. Smith and Ricardo have described in detail the factors which lead to a stationary, a regressive or progressive society.

In Europe we have excellent contemporary examples of all three. Spain and Portugal are living cadavers of their former greatness. Poland, Hungary and the Balkans have remained stationary at a comparatively low level of development judged by West European standards. France, England, the Low Countries and the Scandinavian nations have long immobilized their historic development at various levels of achievement. They have room for further refinement, but the balance of social forces is so well regulated that there is little opportunity for a further upward surge without upsetting too many comfortably-stocked apple-carts; for the worker with his social insurance possesses an apple-cart which to him is as important as the revenue of the rentier class. Russia, despite its abominable tyranny, is set forth on an experiment with infinite possibilities for its own people, and for the rest of the world as long as the means of production, the land, mines, factories, the means of transportation and financial institutions are the property of the entire nation.

From the larger social standpoint Russia's fate still hangs in the balance, since so much of it is bound up in the personality of Stalin. Succession is the Achilles' heel. The most ideal democracy on a capitalist basis must be faced with the choice either of stagnation, or recurrent crises and war, while the Soviet Union is no longer impelled to war by strict necessity as in capitalist nations, and its economy possesses unlimited possibilities for expansion provided its social organization is established on a truly democratic basis. The irreconcilable conflict reduces itself to this: The best democratic capitalist nations in the world are impelled by the necessary laws of their economy to stagnate or fight, while war will be unnecessary to a Socialist state to the extent that it is democratically organized, and aggressive war will be impossible if it is completely organized on a democratic basis.

The correctness of this theorem is demonstrated by the totalitarian states of Germany and Italy. Hitler did not exaggerate the case when he said that for Germany it is "Export or Die!" As long as Italy is organized on a capitalist basis she must expand her political sphere or subside in whatever contentment she may derive from being a first-class satrapy of some other European power. Socialism in Italy is out of the question on the basis of the present world organization as was demonstrated by the events in 1919-1922 which preceded Mussolini's seizure of power. Once more we see emphasized the inevitable dependence of the aggregates upon the basis of the national social structure, which is itself the product of the effective world influences which dominate the totality of the present world organization.

DIFFERENCE OF SOCIAL POTENTIAL IS ESSENTIAL FOR HISTORICAL MOVEMENT

Among the relatively unstable aggregates of the social structure there continues a necessary inter-play of forces without which organized existence would be impossible. But a great deal depends upon the nature of the inter-change. If the state or the ideology is sufficiently powerful to dominate the situation, the economy will continue in an even tenor from century to century, undisturbed except by frothy changes on the top, while the basic life, politically, economically and spiritually continues on in somnolent fashion.

Such has been the experience of the nations which once constituted the great Arab Empire, and is now characteristic of India and China. Whatever impulse there was for change among them came from the outside. This intervention generally encountered fierce resistance, for the introduction of a powerful foreign element could not but affect the indigenous social continuum. Where the state power is strong enough to compel a vegetative process, history must be uneventful. Ability to respond to external stimuli is one of the first factors toward modification and evolution. The difference of potential between the elements of the social aggregate, and between the aggregates themselves is recorded in the vitality of their reactions and in their consequent modification.

History records the indubitable fact that capitalism has been the most progressive element in the tortuous progress of civilization. The reason for this is not far to seek. Every agent who came within its sphere became an active stimulant in the furtherance of its processes. The entrepreneur obtained outlet for his venturesomeness, and delighted in the overcoming of obstacles where the reward was alluring. No part of American history is so rich in the fulsome variety of dominant human elements as during the hey-day of the great captains of industry who fought, schemed, robbed, betrayed, but who also got things done.

The vegetative factor in capitalism began to manifest itself when its beneficiaries were no longer the creators of its economy but merely the recipients of its usufruct because of their formal relations to some form of title to capital.

In this we observe the inertial influences which tend to groove all existence into fixed relations. This was the cause of Graeco-Roman decay. Thus it was that the feudal barons who achieved their patrimony sword in hand, bestowed it upon their successors as a legal right in which personal competence played no part. Eventually, feudalism had to collapse because its vital spark had long since departed. So, too, do we now witness the degeneration of the second, third and fourth generations of the great founders of American industry.

This is only one factor. The modern corporation by distributing legal ownership takes the burden of management off the hands of its owners. By so doing, it renders them socially useless, because their relations toward industry is that of tribute-gatherers under various forms of legal title, while the actual operation of industry becomes the duty of paid retainers. This relation will continue only so long as the exploited classes remain inert.

At the same time the laws of capitalist economy must respond to the profit motive which regulates the expansion or contraction of industry. The time is not far distant when large masses of our people will seriously balance the advantages of an undisturbed but stagnant national economy as against the assumption by society of the entire burden of large-scale industry, after making suitable arrangements with their present owners if this social transformation is to be peacefully effected.

But that is a problem for more detailed presentation later on. The historian must consider why it is that certain forms of social organization tend toward stagnation, others to absolute regression, while few are amenable to the progressive spirit outside of that which is permissible within the limits of its social structure. The difference of social potential among the constituent elements explains only the inter-play of force, but it cannot account for its direction.

Some have contented themselves by ascribing purpose to history. Purpose pertains to man, not to nature, and man's purposes are often shrouded in mystery, even to himself. We will leave out all teleological or eschatological considerations, since they germinate from theories steeped in religion, destiny or the final cause or purpose of existence. In so far as these conceptions affect human conduct they are definite phenomena which every historian must treat with the respect that he entertains for all other historical factors.

SOCIETY UP TO NOW HAS DEVELOPED BY INHERENT NECESSITY

History up to now has developed by inherent necessity rather than by the conscious will of its actors. There does not exist a single example of an historical form which developed according to the pattern laid down by the pattern makers. The American Founding Fathers would have considerable difficulty in recognizing their offspring in these modern times. But because mankind does not understand the laws of historic motion is no reason for assuming that such laws do not exist. So does man in the gross enjoy the pleasures of the table without knowing much about the physiological processes involved in digestion.

Great minds throughout the ages have concerned themselves with the why and wherefore of existence. Equally great rulers and lawgivers have attempted to canalize history along a pre-determined mold and have, without exception, failed to realize their purpose. Evidently laws do exist which regulate the relations among the constituents of the social structure; laws not in the technical sense, but in its universal sense as meaning forces developed out of definite relations between bodies in translatory movement within a given field. Social laws mean nothing to an outcast on a lonely island. The same individual in the midst of a busy metropolis finds himself involved in a multitude of social relations during every one of his waking moments; nor can he even sleep on a public thoroughfare without being pursued by one or another of the social laws in whose meshes he finds himself inextricably involved.

Now these laws are not unchangeable. Even the immutable laws of the Medes and Persians were of a temporal nature. But the fact that laws change only emphasizes the point that laws do exist. The problem necessarily arises as to what governs their changeability. Obviously it must be the nature of the social relations from which they derive. The social relations between feudal lord and serf determined the complex of other relations between them. That this was not given for all time is observed in their fluctuating character as established by the history of that time.

It is puerile to argue which came first, the social relations or the social laws. One is dependent upon the other, and is inconceivable outside its field. The law establishes the relation, and the relation determines the law. No man is born marked with the insignia of lord or serf. Under definite social relations there is no mistaking either. If social conditions are indefinite, time and conflict will resolve the issue under that mode of civilization or they will be transformed into some other mode.

THE CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL CONTINUUM DETERMINES THE NATURE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

Likewise today no one comes into this vale of tears as either exploiter or exploited. Definite social conditions will determine the role, but by a foot-rule far different than that employed during the epoch of feudal society. Laws and social relations are each other's counter-part, while their nature is determined by the character of the social continuum. This does not allow for infinite variations. There comes a time when the gap is either bridged or sprung wide open. The census statistics do not disclose endless variety. Beyond a certain point the merely poor become paupers and therefore the object of a certain degree of social concern. So do the merely wealthy become the very rich as they discover from the graduated nature of the income tax percentage.

Physics, chemistry, and biology afford ample proof that beyond a certain point quantitative differences bring about radical qualitative changes. So is it in society. The novitiate bursts out as the full-fledged minister, the medical student into the practitioner, the mere accumulation of small saving of money from a hoard into an active capital sum which demands its usufruct in the form of profit of enterprise, interest or rent. Particular social laws are distinctive of their period in history and change their nature in consonance with the historical field from which they arise.

SUMMARY OF BASIC DEFINITIONS

Every historical epoch is characterized by a distinctive social structure. The social structure is determined by the resultant of its aggregate components, which consist of the state, the economy, and the ideological superstructure. The character of these aggregates is established by the social relations which are peculiar to its time and their inter-action gives rise to the historical circumstance which produces the facts history records. Civilization is that era in the development of mankind which is centered about the concept of private property in the means of production and the particular relations to which it gives rise. The philosophy of history will establish the nature of the specific laws of social motion.

There are four general types of private property in the means of production, and each gave rise to distinct epochs of Civilization. Asiatic civilization was based fundamentally upon the agricultural commune which explains the vegetative nature of its social organization. In the Graeco-Roman epoch the distinctive principle involving the means of production was private ownership in land and the institution of slavery.

Medievalism was that epoch in civilization characterized by the feudal principle in land through various degrees of tenure in fief with the masses as serfs, and slaves even beneath them in its earlier days as a hangover from previous social systems.

Capitalism is that epoch in civilization where the relations of production are characterized by the private ownership of capital and the sale of their power to labor by those who use the means of production.

Each epoch of civilization centered around the means of production about which the social structure is created. Some may object that too much importance is attached to the means of production as the fulcrum of a particular epoch. It may be contended that this selection is arbitrary and purely subjective, and that some one else may with equal justice select another moving principle about which to construct an historical theory. The reply is that the theory reflects, but does not make the facts. Let that some one select his own "frame of reference," whatever that means. Then let him test his theory by the light of all the facts, and it will be seen that no matter what epoch of civilization is under consideration, no theory meets all the requirements of scientific inquiry so successfully as does that which centers an epoch about the social relations of production.

Again we dismiss as puerile the question as to which is more important, the state, the economy, or the ideological superstructure. All of them are engaged in constant inter-play, and only the particular facts of a period will establish their relative temporal importance. It is this inter-play between the aggregates of the social structure characteristic of an epoch which establishes the historical field peculiar to a particular period of history.

A period is therefore a segment of an epoch which is centered about some special problems arising from a situation which is characteristic of its time. When we speak of the colonial period in American history we have no difficulty in establishing that as the time between the first settlements and the emergence of the colonies as an independent national unit. The historical field therefore pertains to the social relations as they are being constantly modified in that state of continual flux which is characteristic of a particular period within the social continuum. The social continuum is the field for the operation of the social forces created by the aggregates within the social structure while the historical field supplies the matrix for the particular events which is the duty of history to record. The philosophy of history generalizes the laws of social motion.

B. Time-Space Continuum of the Social Structure

THE DIALECTICAL SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORIANS

Philosophers and historians have long coped with the problem as to whether the laws of social motion are susceptible of generalization. Poets, myth-makers and religionists have encountered little difficulty in explaining the cause, process and ultimate end of all earthly strivings. History in the classical conception was concerned only with the details of the drama's enactment. The most successful in the delineation of the processes of history is the Hegelian dialectical school, which reached its highest degree of perfection at the hands of Marx and his disciples.

We presuppose a reader who is willing to divest himself of all preconceived prejudices, and who is ready to consider the dialectical theory on its intrinsic merits. Its most significant aspects are described by the great Marxist scholar, Bukharin, and as presented by that writer encompass every conceivable move which is likely to exert a vital influence on society. Such generalizations, while rare in history, are frequently met with in every other branch of scientific inquiry. In fact, science would be impossible without their assistance. It is the consciousness that nature, that all existence, is based upon a few fundamental laws that have given impetus to the scientific development of our knowledge concerning the world of which we are a part.

While one may think himself justified in dismissing as impossible of attainment the grand objective of establishing law in historical phenomena, he should at least view with sympathetic understanding the work of those who essayed this gigantic task. For if the laws of historical motion could be definitely established, the consequences of that achievement would be of inestimable benefit to the human race. Then humanity would no longer have to grope around in the dark from one disaster to another in politics, in economics, in social planning and in international relations.

ROLE OF A SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF HISTORY

We are not so fatuous as to believe that, assuming the Historical Field Theory is a correct representation of the course of contemporary history, mankind will thereby be kept from piling blunder upon disaster as it has been doing for the past twenty-five years. But we do feel justified in asserting that at least mankind will be in a position to know where it is heading, and, what is more important, why.

For the Historical Field Theory can do no more than any other valid theory in science. It can point out by the analysis of the laws of motion of the past why the present state came into existence. It can show the tendencies of present-day developments, and by rigid analysis of all the factors involved draw important conclusions concerning the consequences of certain acts, while indicating at the same time how desirable ends can best be attained. How vital would such a theory be to statesmen who could know beforehand the consequences of policies before they were promulgated with such high hopes and then failed, as so many have, with direful consequences to this nation and to the entire world!

PREDICTION IS THE ESSENCE OF A SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF HISTORY

Prediction is the essence of science, and historical science will have attained full maturity when its predictions will be as definite as those of other social disciplines. We have fully considered in the earlier parts of this work the nature of social predictions and the careful limitations with which they must be surrounded. We have at the same time given instances where historical predictions based on scientific analysis have been realized fifty years after they were advanced.

In the last part of the work on the Periods In American History which deals with contemporary times and the immediate future, certain results of current historic developments are forecast for the next twenty years. The basis for these prognostications has already been established by means of the Historical Field Theory. One way of testing a theory is to just sit back and let things happen. Another way of disproving a theory, particularly when human beings are concerned, is to work for its opposite. But social forces are too vast and deep-running to respond either to individual hopes or to mere cantankerousness.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION AND SOCIAL LAWS

Many who deny a priori the possibility that historical generalization can possess the validity of social laws will accept without question generalizations of equal vastness in the spheres of physics, chemistry, biology and other sciences. It is contended that human motivation is too devious for scientific analysis, whereas physical phenomena are governed by relatively simpler patterns.

During the course of our investigation, this easy assumption has been effectively countered. For we saw that history deals with society, with social forces, and not with the individual and his motivations. While it is true that society is composed of individual units, these units function as social factors only when they submit themselves to the operation of its processes. Those who violently disturb its functioning are perfunctorily dealt with; others who merely stand in the way are brushed aside or conveniently disposed of. Those who cannot accommodate themselves must make the best possible out of a disagreeable situation or remove themselves from the social scene.

But the burdens of social existence cannot be too onerous, since there are still left many lonely spots for the convenience of individualistic irreconcilables. The vast masses of the human race find social existence more congenial to their inclinations or aptitudes. Of course, there are many who live in the midst of society and yet are merely nominal parts thereof, but they are only passive factors in history.

For those who have discovered the necessity or the desirability of acquiescence, there arise problems of how to accommodate themselves in the swirling life about them. These problems are purely theoretical or even non-existent for the overwhelming numbers of mankind who submit to the pressures of social existence as self-evident laws of nature and go about their hereditary tasks by making the essential adjustments required for their maintenance or life's fulfillment. At any rate, they are soon caught up in the swirl of the social maelstrom and discover betimes that its laws cannot with impunity be violated.

Hence no matter how varied the individual's personality, his hopes, fears, ambitions or idiosyncrasies, conformity is the first law of social existence. The rules may change; they may be revolutionized by some cataclysmic upheaval; but whatever the form of social organization the rules are established once stability is achieved, and woe to him who lightly trespasses the more important of them. Democratic America is no less stern toward the malefactor than is the Soviet Union or Fascist Italy. Order and stability is still the prime consideration for every form of social structure whose first law, as always, is self-preservation.

REPRESSIVE AND PROTECTIVE NATURE OF THE STATE

For this purpose the state was evolved. It may be important for the student of society to be reminded every once in a while that the state as we know it did not have its origin with the beginning of time, and so will continue to the end of eternity. Anthropology has amply proven that the human race has practiced the art of self-government long before police, courts, jails and standing armies were evolved.

Despite common fears to the contrary, the natural propensity of humans is not to go about killing, maiming and robbing each other. It is only at a definite stage in the evolution of the human race that the state comes into existence. The history of the Greek and Roman gens and phratries shows that while the government form was evolved from the tribal institutions, it soon became a powerful lever in the hands of the propertied class to protect their holdings against attack from internal and external enemies. The history of ancient Greece and Rome, as well as the dramatic story of the Iroquois Federation as told by Lewis H. Morgan where the state form had begun to develop, portray the incipiency of the state from its barbarian connotation to its present significance in the era of Civilization.

Among the vital functions of the state is that of the great conservator of society. It seeks to harden existing relations, and particularly the property relations. Force is its ultimate resource, and it is for that reason that revolutionaries have an instinctive hatred of the state.

Yet none but philosophical anarchists would abolish it out of hand. Even they believe in some form of cooperation, though they insist that it be voluntary in form. Conservation plays as important a role in history as modification. School-room philosophers can platitudinize tremendously on this theme, but in the grim realities of life every other consideration will be sacrificed by the state for its primary function of maintaining the status quo in all its fundamentals.

CLASS NATURE OF THE MODERN STATE

In chapter three we discussed the various theories concerning the nature and origin of the state. It cannot be controverted that the state with all its organs of enforcement is the effective instrument of the class which happens to be in power to preserve the basis of property relations which distinguishes the social classes.

While this function is fundamental, it does not necessarily imply that class consciousness is always an active factor in the life of society. It is just as often the contrary. Custom, tradition, prejudice, blood-ties, religion and the rest of the elements which enter into the ideological superstructure all tend to make the existing class relations of a civilization appear to be as natural as the heavens and all other existence. It is only when the subject classes become conscious of their degradation that a revolutionary situation is in the making. The classes, too, seldom act by conscious self-determination, but rather by inherent necessity. Most accept their position as a self-evident law of nature.

It is only when the historic conditions have wrought their inevitable changes, as we observed in our analysis of feudalism, that a previously subject class rebels against the existing social arrangements as maintained by the instrumentalities of the state. The most convincing proof of this proposition is established by the facts of English history from Magna Charta in 1215 to the Bill of Rights in 1689. This absorbing story is of the utmost significance to the philosophical conception of history as presented in this work. It is for that reason that we engaged in a rather spirited discussion concerning the consequences of Runnymede, not for the purpose of disproving the theories of distinguished historians as to develop from that record the universal laws of historical movement.

Nothing could have been further from the thoughts of those English barons than to lay the foundations for the development of the political power of the burgher class which eventually was to supplant them as the masters of England. It is true that the English bourgeoisie to this day has not learned the art of governing, but that does not prevent them from making the English aristocracy the effective agents of the Commons' will.

Objection may be raised that the class relation theory of the state is too rigid to be universally applicable. Historical laws are by their very nature limited in time and place. History applies only to that era of human development which we denominate as Civilization. There were other eras, such as Barbarism and Savagery with which history is not concerned. That properly lies within the province of anthropology and in some aspects of sociology.

Civilization implies a highly organized form of social existence wherein man has already solved the problem of producing in a comparatively short time the necessaries of existence for himself, and a surplus for various other social classes. Legal forms had already made manifest the relations of the classes toward the land and other means of production. Society was no longer bound together only by consanguinity. The family as an institution was essential for the descent of property, and all former blood-ties were merged in the generality of the state to which all were bound according to their status.

Nothing is a more common experience in human annals than the serf or the slave who accepted his position in life with equanimity as the law of nature and nature's God.

ROLE OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN A CLASS STATE

Class consciousness amongst members of a subject class arises only when the existing class relations become onerous, and that develops only as the end result of a long process which has been going on behind the back, so to speak, of the principal actors. In England from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries this process of social transformation gradually made itself evident by the nibbling and cribbling of the burgher class for that greater measure of self-protection which is inherent in political power via the exchequer. The transformation of the social structure from a feudalistic to a capitalistic basis went on intermittently from Henry VIII to James II for over a period of one hundred and fifty years.

France also experienced the same thralls of transformation, but its results were made evident in one grand climactic outburst, which was signalized by the fall of the Bastille in 1789 and ended with the Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799. Only by the patient study of the particular historical conditions of both England and France can it be established why both nations pursued different courses to achieve essentially the same result.

Apropos this very point, the recent history of Japan will show how a nation sealed off from contact with the world for many hundreds of years suddenly assumed the processes of western civilization based upon industrialism. Once embarked upon that road, Japan became amenable to the internal laws of motion characteristic of capitalist economy, and soon found itself involved with over-production, unemployment, crises, need for markets, imperialist expansion, militarism, war and all the other blessings of modern civilization.

The laws of historic movement are universal only in the sense that all those who come under its influences at a given stage of social development must respond in the same way. Japan is still embroiled in the contradiction of a state dominated by feudal psychology and an economy responsive to the urge for imperialistic expansion. Both form an uneasy partnership in the China and Far East adventures.

Class rule is not necessarily effected by obvious exertion of force on the part of those who dominate the state. It is sufficient only if consciousness of its presence is ubiquitously felt. Preservation of law and order becomes the primary duty of the state. Everything depends upon what one means by that sonorous phrase. To the Southern Negro it has a signification from which happily his Northern brother is emancipated. A Communist critic of the Stalin regime in Russia, no matter how lofty his motives, soon discovers the vastly different implications of law and order as experienced by his Communist comrade in New York.

But every state, regardless of its nature or the class which dominates it, feels the same all-impelling compulsion to maintain itself, and justifies that as being synonymous with the primary duty of preserving society from disintegration. On the whole this attitude is justified, although experience proves abundantly that if one set of rulers are overthrown it does not take very long before another set of rulers are installed in the seat of power.

To recognize the class nature of the modern state is to admit that society is divided by irreconcilable distinctions. Some societies may successfully conceal the nature of this division. Among the classes themselves there may exist many gradations of rank in the form of an hierarchy or castes. Most of the members of society, perhaps even all, may acquiesce to this arrangement, and even support it with all their might. Our own Civil War amply demonstrated the existence of this subservient human quality when the very Negroes whose freedom hung upon the successful outcome of the struggle for the North, kept on growing and harvesting crops for their Southern masters and otherwise contributing the sinews for the forging of their chains of thraldom.

Slavery to a slave does not mean what that condition connotes to a free man. So today we have the spectacle of so called loyal workers who refuse to organize for their self-protection in strengthening their bargaining power. As a reward for their virtues, which is quite widely extolled in the capitalist-minded press, some of these workers, quite a few of them, will be entitled to a monthly pension of ten dollars after fifty years of faithful company service; providing their company is still in existence, business is good, and the changing generation of owners do not renege on their obligation.

Champion of the working class that Marx was, he poured forth his bitterest scorn upon the Lumpen-proletariat, whose forebears throughout history loyally gave up their lives that their masters might live.

HISTORIC FUNCTION OF THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE

Modern democratic states are no less class states in function, though not in nature simply because the masses of the people are numbered among the majority of its most fervent supporters. The

American democratic form of government is the most humane as it is the most highly developed in the world today. To trace the absorbing story of its origin and growth will be the particular problem of the following volume.

In no country in the world is the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure more closely attuned to the next step in social evolution than in the United States. But that in itself is the end result of a long social process. Modern democratic governments do not avow themselves the champion of the capitalist class as against the small farmer and working classes. This very division is disguised in a multitude of ways by the democratic form of organization.

Class distinctions here are not hereditary, though the offspring inherit the substance upon which it is based. Every man, theoretically, has the right and the opportunity to raise himself to any level among the social strata. If he fails, so runs the argument, he has none to blame but himself. If, having been born to riches or having acquired it, he later loses that potent talisman which opens all doors and softens all hearts, then his misfortune is the patent consequence of his own incapacity. His successor, or a newcomer will be welcomed with the same acclaim, and treated with the same scant considerations if he in turn fails to hold his ground.

Furthermore, all are equal at the ballot box, and the billionaire's vote counts for no more than that of his lackey. That he is enabled to influence many thousands of votes by his control of lackeys among the intelligentsia, the press, the pulpit, the radio and the other means of forming public opinion, all this, to the apologist, is beside the point. In an age where conscience, honor and virtue are purchaseable commodities, there is no valid reason why the ruling class should not purchase all the rest, provided it observes the amenities and pays the price according to the stipulations of the contract, expressed or implied.

It is truly pitiable to what depths the human mind will not sink in either fulsome praise or abject apologia of the most glaring inconsistencies and injustices of a social system of which these apologists are merely stipendiaries.

Yet all this should not blind us to the historic role of democracy. It is so simple for the radical to sneer at its forms, because he has no understanding of its nature. Communists talk about Marx, but do not read him. Perhaps they glance over his minor pamphlets, like the Communist Manifesto; yet none but a thoroughgoing Marxian could discern, let alone dissect, the dialectical processes of history which that brochure presents. That is why, in their denunciation of the democratic state they have bended their neck to the yoke of a totalitarian state under Stalin.

ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE CAPITALIST STATE FORM

While political democracy is a form of the class state, that state will continue only so long as the masses of the people are reconciled to the economic basis upon which that state-form rests. This economic basis is the private ownership of national resources in large scale production.

Apologists are quick to seize upon this as a denunciation of all private ownership of property including tooth-brushes and clothes hangers. In the preceding chapters these apologetics have been thoroughly analyzed. It is necessary here to state simply that modern economy is dominated by big industry. Percentages can be quoted to point out how many small businesses still maintain themselves. Analysis will show that these are chiefly service businesses, but that in the production of basic wealth it is the big corporations that dominate the field. In the preceding discussion it was demonstrated how the internal laws of capitalist economy brought the modern corporation to its present dominating position.

MARXIAN FAILURE TO ANALYZE THE ROLE OF THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE IN THE UNITED STATES

For many years it had been the position of the Kautsky type of Marxian Socialists who dominated the Second International that the next step in social evolution would consist in the economic democratization of the most highly advanced capitalist countries. That pointed unmistakably to England, France, Germany and the United States. Unfortunately the First World War brought to the surface other factors in social evolution which effectually settled the Darwin-Spencer evolutionary processes of gradualism as applied to history.

So have the intervening twenty years disclosed that formal socialization of the economy, as in Russia, is not incompatible with the most abject enslavement of the human spirit. As we pointed out at another place, Marx's greatest mistake was not in his analysis of capitalist economy, but in his failure to appreciate the role of democracy in a country like the United States. We firmly maintain that the next great transformation in society will consist in the spread of democracy from its political form to embrace the economic form, and through the resultant industrial democracy, evolve both the political and industrial form into Social Democracy.

We are now in the Fourth Period of American history which is characterized by nationalization. This process is observable in every western European country. But under definite historic conditions nationalization becomes Fascism or Nazism. The essential ingredient for its development into Social Democracy is the prior existence of political democracy on a firm basis in the capitalist state. By this we do not mean merely the formal aspects of democracy. Its essential spirit is the dignity of the individual and the sanctity of his rights. Both his person and his privileges must at all times be inviolate, while the effective means for their defense should always be in the hands of the people.

Under the dominant spirit of our institutions their pro-social instincts have been perverted or suppressed, while their principal outlet has been the fostering of genteel philanthropy under the disgusting cloak of charity which demeans the giver as much as it does the recipient. It is well within the range of possibility for the present American democratic state to foster a generous spirit of prosociality. So is it possible for the social transformation hitherto effected by revolutionary means to be wrought here by peaceful means, and it is one of the purposes of this work to show what are the antecedent conditions which must exist before this desirable result can be achieved. Force is merely an intermediary in history and its use may as well lead to social degeneration as toward social progress.

It is one of the qualities of our American democracy to be amenable to change through the demonstration of the popular will as exercised at the polls. Still the Civil War has proved that certain changes are too formidable to be effected without the intervention of force. This problem is too important to be decided by analogies. While a sanguinary struggle was necessary to abolish private property in slaves, it does not follow that the abolition of private property in the socially necessary means of production—principally large-scale corporate industry—can likewise be effected only by employment of force. Many things have happened both to our democratic institutions and to the popular mind during the past eighty years.

This entire question will be considered with great detail at the proper point. All that we are now concerned with is to distinguish the role of the state as the great conservator of the social structure, regardless of the specific historical epoch under consideration. In our fuller analysis of this point we saw why some states effectually prevented social change, while others allowed to develop within their midst social elements which in the fullness of time entered the arena to struggle for political supremacy.

It is in the nature of a state to harden its forms. There comes a time when the state can no longer bend or adapt itself to quiet transformation, but must break the elements which would change it, or be broken by it. This is a universal law controlling all state forms. As for the United States, the course of our investigation will disclose that in this Fourth Period of our history the crucial struggle for the larger aspects of Social Democracy will be fought out in the arena of public debate, with every prospect of a favorable outcome for the supporters of social change.

FLUCTUATING ROLE OF THE AGGREGATES WITHIN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Frequently during this presentation we have alluded to the relations of production as determining the character of the state. This might lead to the assumption by some that economic interests preponderate in the determination of the social structure and consequently of those happenings at a given time which form the substance of history. To this view we have strongly dissented for reasons elaborated in the appropriate part of this work. It is contrary to the very foundation upon which the Historical Field Theory is constructed.

The state is only one of the social aggregates. The nature of the economy, it is true, determines the state, but we must never overlook the fact that the state itself exercises a potent influence upon the development of economic forms. Spain, we pointed out, stagnated for three hundred years with a state form but little modified from the days of its grandeur under Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second. Consequently its economic forms were those of a somnolent feudalism long after the historic mission of that mode of economy had been fulfilled. There exists between the economy and the state a continuous re-action, with each reflecting the requirements and the limitations of the other.

The short-lived Spanish Republic was an attempt to modernize the state in accordance with the requirements of capitalist economy and enlightened ideology. But Spain, as usual, was far behind the rest of Western Europe in effecting this transformation. When betimes it did rouse itself from its chronic lethargy, it was confronted by a complication of historic factors from outside systems which now began to play a role in the history of the world, namely, the Fascist states and the Communist International.

One of the principal reasons for the defeat of the Loyalist government was this essential conflict between its bourgeois and its Communist wings. Both were revolutionary as against the aristocratic principle represented by Franco, but both were inherently incompatible. Spain's bourgeois revolution came a hundred years too late, while the Spanish people found it too difficult to digest both a bourgeois and a proletarian revolution at the same time.

The hollowness of the Communist United Front was exposed at the first test for power, not only in Spain but later in France. The revolution of the eighteenth century cannot be fought with the slogans of the twentieth. The state and the economy cannot be dissociated. No sincere Communist could struggle to establish a bourgeois Spanish democracy, while the bourgeoisie were fully justified in viewing with keenest suspicion and apprehension those among their forces who pretended to be their companions in arms but with a stiletto held to their back. Everyone realized that the success of the Loyalists would be only the prelude for the struggle to establish a Communist State, and it was upon this rock that the crudely synthetic United Front had to split. The Spanish Republic was crushed more by this division among its friends than by the power of its enemies.

THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY MOLDS THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE FORM

No nation lives by politics alone, though the classical historians of Greece and Rome would appear to make out a strong case to the contrary. But even Plato and Aristotle gave sound advice on the management of slaves so that philosophers might have time to discourse on immortality and the nature of the soul.

It is one thing to assert the importance of the economic substructure of society; it is a far different matter to ascribe prime significance to the economic factor in the making of history. It is the social forces in their ensemble which molds and compresses the economy of a nation. Many examples have been cited in our discussion of feudalism. But one need not go back that far. The world today abounds in cases where the current state policy as shaped by the dominant ideology molds the economy to its own uses.

The Soviet Union is based on a Socialist economy, yet even the most forgiving of its admirers cannot bring themselves to support the anti-social policies of the dictator who now holds in his hands absolute control over the state mechanism. Japan is still a hybrid of feudalism and capitalism with the former in control of the state, while the interests of the industrialists for the time being coincide with the expansionist ambitions of the military clique. Its internal politics clearly show the irreconcilable conflict between the two classes, but in the present historical situation both are doomed to work together, since neither can get along without the other. The militarists must look to their mortal internal enemy for the material of modern warfare, while the capitalist class must depend upon the rulers of the state to protect their access to markets and supplies.

Germany possesses a highly developed capitalist economy, yet the capitalist class does not dominate the state, as was the early thesis of the mechanical Marxists during the first years of the Nazi regime. It is even untrue to assert that Hitler is the unconscious or unwilling agent of the German capitalist class, since he has now effectively harnessed the economy to achieve his imperialistic ambitions. His alliance of convenience with Russia was merely a step forward to the ultimate end toward which Germany is heading; namely, the abolition of capitalism as the dominant economy for a program of National Socialism without the democratic ideals of Socialism, which at any rate, had not made much headway in that country despite its once powerful Social Democratic party. The inculcation of the democratic spirit in a people appears to be the process of centuries, and not of decades.

THE HISTORICAL FIELD THEORY WELDS TIME AND SPACE IN THE CONSIDERATION OF HISTORICAL EVENTS

Economic determinists are too easy with their mechanical formula of actions determined by interests, while the only interests which they can conceive as efficient determining factors are material interests. They have not the courage, for the most part, to assert that the economic motive is the sole factor, though they imply as much by ascribing to that element the preponderant influence in historic happenings.

History deals with events, with the momentary and even evanescent happenings. Not all happenings are of permanent importance, despite the furor they may create in their time. H. G. Wells was charged by one reviewer when his Outline of History appeared as being a perfectly good Englishman but a poor historian because of his slighting reference to Napoleon's permanent place in history. There is no doubt the future will ratify Wells' judgment. Without at all dimming the spectacular aspects of the Corsican's career, he sought the recrudescence in the nineteenth century of a type of personal despotism which had already become anachronistic toward the decline of Louis XIV's reign.

So today Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini all loom large in the events of the day. Fifty years from now they will be faint memories to the generation of that day. The philosophical historian must seek for the fundamental, underlying forces of social development, and establish the laws of their movement. In the formation of the social forces the economic factor is but one of the constituent elements, and only the definite requirements of a period will establish whether that was the preponderant element.

We must never lose sight of the dominant elements controlling the state apparatus, nor of the ideological stimulations which spur men on to action at the risk of both life and fortune. Economic determinism is the over-simplification of a complicated historical process that can yield its secret only after careful examination of a number of other factors which enter into the formation of those continual head-on collisions we call historical events. We must consider also the situs and the particular setting for the events which take place in time. The Historical Field Theory welds time and space in the analysis of the laws of social motion as the Relativity Theory welded time and space in the analysis of the nature of physical reality.

HUMAN NATURE HAS NOT CHANGED MUCH SINCE JESUS' DAY

While we have emphasized the role of human nature as the independent variable in the analysis of historical phenomena, we have adverted at the same time how that is modified by its relation to the variable factors of a given time. Changes in habits are never as great as they may appear in different social epochs. Nevertheless customs are modified by transformations in the material basis of the social structure. In fact, the social structure of an epoch cannot change unless there has taken place a simultaneous modification of all three of its constituent elements, the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure.

How little human nature is truly affected one has but to compare the present day with the beginning of the Christian era. Leaving aside the mechanical contrivances which merely change the aspect but not the nature of existence, our times are not more humane than those of two thousand years ago. We point to our charitable institutions as if charity were unknown in Christ's time. We point to our hospitals as if care for the sick was not then enjoined as a precept of social existence.

In all else we are the same, and in view of our greater resources due to the conquest of nature, even worse, since there has been no concomitant refinement in our nature to lead toward its general diffusion and better use. The horrible mass murders which characterize our age, the ubiquitous presence of abject poverty among even the wealthiest of nations, the recurrent outbursts of the vilest form of racial hatreds and religious intolerance, the overwhelming ignorance, bigotry and superstition which afflict all peoples of all cultures while the educated classes wallow in phrases as a convenient escape from thought, all this proves how little the human race has changed during the past two millennia.

From the larger aspect the era of Civilization will have but one achievement to commend it, and that is its conquest of the forces of nature, and the development of the productive processes chiefly for individual aggrandizement. Capitalism has meant the greatest move forward in solving the problem of physical existence, but it has not, and cannot solve the far greater problem of rational existence. That is the historic mission of the future era for which it has laid the groundwork, the era of Socialization, which is the next great step in the human drama.

THE EXTROVERT RADICAL IDEALIST IS THE SAME OLD BIGOT UNDER THE SKIN

Ideologies are shaped by the temporal relations of the constituent elements of the social structure. Inevitably they reflect the world picture of the dominant class. In so far as they are rooted in fundamental human traits there is not much difference between the ideological superstructures of different epochs in history. Dewey remarks upon the diversity of institutional forms and customs which the same human nature may produce and employ.[2] A brief conversation with the average active Communist will convince one that underneath the apparent pro-social idealism there lurks the same egotism and vanity which characterizes the rest of the human species; the same power-hunger, the same veneer of intellectuality, and the same vindictiveness which only ignorance and bigotry can breed. There is the same cant, hypocrisy and double-dealing, and the same old historic justification that the means justifies the end, forgetting every lesson of history that this is the cloak of weakness in its desperate grasp for the essence of power while the original idealistic impulse is throttled in the process; forgetting, too, the teachings of the great dialectician, Marx, who proved that there can be drawn no valid distinction between the end aimed for and the means adopted toward its obtainment, since both are inextricably bound together by their polar relation in the dialectical processes of history.

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[2] Human Nature and Conduct—Dewey, p. 110.

In our discussion we traced the intimate connection of the laws, morals, concepts, ethical principles, religious practices, the literature and culture of an age with the particular epoch in history to which the ideological superstructure gave expression. Here again we dismissed the rigid relation which some would establish between the economy and its ideological reflex, where the economy was the active principle while all the rest was its image. This mechanical separation of cause and effect is anti-historical and anti-dialectical, because it is anti-scientific.

There is no such thing as an absolute factor from which all else are derivatives. History affords ample proof that dominant ideologies react upon the economy and the state and therefore determines the character of the social structure. But a social structure like that of Spain from the seventeenth century on to the present day, which is the resultant of the inter-play of its component aggregates, affects each of them in different ways. The economy did not allow for the fuller development of capitalism, nor is the religion that calls for frequent holidays and groups of holy days which must be strictly observed, compatible with a mode of production based upon sustained consecutive activity as is that of modern capitalism.

So today in the United States the rugged individualist of the Adam Smith vintage would pour contempt upon New Dealer and enlightened Anti-New Dealer alike. His philosophical myopia would not allow him to see that modern life is inconceivable without some form of government intervention and subvention, and it is interesting to note that one of the reasons for Big Business' traditional love for Alexander Hamilton was the fact that during the first years of the young Republic he urged the adoption of a tariff policy for the fostering of American industry under the protective wing of a benevolent government.

It is precisely because of the aggressive spirit characteristic of an essentially pioneering people that many of us look to the United States to solve with one blow the Gordian knot of contradictions by which modern society now feels itself bound, after first trying every devious scheme which interested ingenuity can devise.

There is one thing the American people will not do, and that is to relinquish their government to a group or a dictator to solve their difficulties for them. In this respect we are more fortunate than the English people who rule, but through the judgment of their betters.

There are powerful traditional objections to a third term for Franklin D. Roosevelt and while the American people will feel considerable conscience-pangs in changing that wholesome example of one hundred and fifty years, yet they are vain indeed who do not credit our people with sufficient discernment to distinguish the really overwhelming issue involved in the forth-coming campaign; [3] namely, the definite control by the people of their government until they see clearly the next great step in historic progress which will present itself to their judgment in time, as the only practical solution for their present dilemmas. Ours has become a real democracy, despite its limitations.

RECAPITULATION OF THE ARGUMENT TO THIS POINT

Our analysis up to this point has established the basic elements for a scientific theory of history. We have strictly limited the scope of its investigation and the reality of its phenomena which is independent of the observer. The structure of society has been analyzed and the fact has been established that there exist definite forces within society which affect, and in time modify, its internal relations. These social forces possess a definite direction for a given form of social organization, and the historical field established by the inter-action of the social aggregates provides the matrix in which are created those circumstances, or events, which history records.

The problem now arises for us: Are these events the creation of a fortuitous combination of circumstances, or are they governed by definite laws which arise from the relations of the internal aggregates which in their ensemble constitute the social structure? These questions obviously are of a critical nature for a scientific theory of history which must prove the existence of definite laws of motion developed from the relations of definite social aggregates. That is why so much care was taken to demonstrate the existence of social forms and the fact of movement within a specific field of operation. The next problem for us was to analyze the nature of social laws, and finally to resolve the question whether these laws are of a causal character, or indeterministic in nature.

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[3] The above was written Feb. 26, 1940, before President Roosevelt had definitely decided to be a candidate for a third term.

IMPORTANCE OF PREDICTION IN THE HISTORICAL FIELD THEORY

At this point we interrupted the course of the discussion to consider the various theories of history as presented by contemporary and classical writers. The justification for this procedure must be self-evident to the scientific mind. Obviously the method of approach to historical phenomena here presented is out of the beaten path, with consequences of far-reaching importance if the validity of the Historical Field Theory can be established beyond possibility of successful attack. The reward justifies the effort.

If law, and particularly causal law, can be demonstrated as controlling the unfoldment of historical events in the past, the present, and the foreseeable future which knowledge of our historical field makes plain, then the main current of history becomes an open book for us. We watch the unfoldment of the human drama with the same rapt attention that we observe the movement of the heavenly bodies, but with this important difference: We are active participants in this great drama, and can, within the limitations which will be carefully discussed, control the unfoldment of the events in which we are also actors. That is why causality or probability played such a large role in our discussion.

Man is not altogether a free agent, and yet not a blind instrument of inscrutable destiny. Man makes his own history, but not out of the whole cloth.[4] The Historical Field Theory must not only show the possibilities of a given historical situation like the present, but must prove by the analysis of the laws of social motion what will happen under a given set of circumstances.

Now not all things that do happen must happen in the sense that some force external to society impresses its will upon us. All social laws are human in origin, but under a given form of social organization, knowing the human material that we have to deal with, some things cannot happen not because they are impossible, but because they are inconceivable in a given social set-up. It is safe to assert that in the forthcoming Presidential election the people will not vote for a party platform which advocates our admission as a constituent state of the Soviet Union, nor of the British Empire for that matter. In history, as in physics, there are certain constants upon which we can confidently rely.

Since classical historians, as well as contemporary writers, do not consider history as susceptible of scientific analysis, we undertook to analyze their theories of history not only to clear the ground for our scientific conceptions—based as all science must be on definite laws—but to lay our foundations upon an irrefragable basis through the dissection of the shortcomings of existing theories. We proceeded upon the assumption, as all science does, that nature does nothing in vain, and does not create a multiplicity of laws where one will suffice. We had to destroy the lackadaisical idea that since this is still a free country every historian has an inalienable right to produce his own laws of social movement.

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[4] The Eighteenth Brumaire—Marx, p. 23; Ludwig Feuerbach—Engels, p. 58.

Admittedly, this courteous policy has ruled up to now. But science, like Jehovah, is a jealous god, and brooks no other gods, and if a multiplicity of historical laws can be asserted, then truly no law exists. This conclusion may appear arbitrary, but experience in every other science justifies it, and we hope similarly to prove here its correctness when applied to the actual developments of American history. The stakes involved are well worth the effort, for the possibilities opened up are illimitable. For one thing, the late Chamberlain's call for a new order which, he says, must follow the close of the present war,[5] will not result in a new war some years hence, as the geniuses at Versailles in 1919 so generously provided for us in 1939, if the historical theory herein presented truly possesses the merit of scientific law.

POSITION OF THOSE WHO DENY POSSIBILITY OF HISTORY AS A SCIENCE SUMMARIZED

Dewey sums up the most powerful arguments of epistemology to prove why history can never reach the status of a science. The considerable effort which we put forth to answer his position is but the recognition of their cogency and the high rank which Dewey so justly holds among contemporary thinkers. He marshals the weapons supplied by both classical philosophy and modern psychology, while he delves deeply into the theoretical position of quantum mechanics in order to replenish his armamentarium with the latest weapons of contemporary thought.

To conquer these redoubts meant to clear the path for the Historical Field Theory, and unless that could be accomplished our own work would have been in vain. To answer Dewey is to answer most responsible modern thinkers on the philosophical aspects of history.

Among his chief contentions were that history is written in the present, and therefore about a past which is past to the now-present.

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[5] Speech reported in the New York Times, Feb. 25, 1940.

A future generation will necessarily be confronted by the same problem of relation in which the now-present becomes the past of the future-present. Therefore every generation must re-write the history of the past, not merely because of a deeper insight into its nature which subsequent investigation has disclosed, but because of the more fundamental time drag which Dewey discusses.

Behind all these abstractions there is lurking the intellectual position of Heisenberg's Indeterminacy Principle and the role in history of Eddington's Second Law of Thermodynamics. For that reason we reserved the discussion of modern physical principles and their philosophical signification to the seventh chapter, while in the fourth we considered chiefly the practical application of Dewey's theories.

All events are viewed from the present standpoint, whether these events take place in physics, chemistry, biology or history. There is no turning back of Time's Arrow, nor is it necessary to do so in order to understand the laws governing phenomena. In the study of history it is not pertinent to recreate the past as it was—an obvious impossibility—in order to understand it. Even if that could be done, there is no guarantee that its meaning to us would become any more self-evident. Ability to recreate does not imply full knowledge of the forces involved in its creation. Mankind cast metals for thousands of years without knowing much about the chemistry of metallurgy. If the ability to re-create meant automatic knowledge of the laws governing the sequence of events, then the nearer we are to the creation, the clearer ought to be our understanding of the thing created. Yet applied to history the very opposite is the fact. The nearer we are to an historical event the more conflicting are the views concerning it.

Unfortunately Dewey, being an epistemologist could content himself with the enunciation of a doctrine and leave it suspended in a philosophical limbo. It was up to the historians to apply its doctrine, and with unanimous resolution they declared that it cannot be done. They apply a theory which is quite the opposite of Dewey's here-now. They call it perspective. By means of this magical principle the less you know about events transpiring under your nose, the more you will know about events happening behind your back. The further back you go, the more clearly are illuminated the events of history until the past becomes more brilliant than the present shining sun.

If you don't understand what you see, wait for perspective to make it clear to you. So, for example, while a thousand and one theories are perfectly admissable regarding the present World War, only a hundred and one should properly be considered as applicable to the First World War; a statement which conveys more truth than irony. Yet by some strange fatality, of all the writers on the more distant American Revolution there is not yet an acceptable theory regarding its origin; and none at all concerning its effects.

C. Causal Law in Social Movement

WITHOUT LAW THERE IS NO SCIENCE

But enough of this playing around with concepts. We must dismiss peremptorily the idea that the less you know about historic events you can observe, the more you will know about historic events your equally ignorant predecessors observed. There is only one infallible way of knowing events in the present, past or future, and that is to know the laws of social motion which produced those events. If we presume to talk about the past, it is because the past talks to us in a language we can understand. Behind all the apparent chaos and multiplicity of events, the scientific method has taught us to observe order, regularity and recurrence. It is beside the point to argue that we do not then see history as it really was, but only through the intellectual time glass with which we observe its phenomena, and that the methods of observation which we intervene between the phenomena and ourselves vary with the character of the observer. In short, according to the classical school one can make his history as one likes it.

MATERIAL OF EVERY SCIENCE IS SELECTED AND PRE-SELECTED

All this sounds erudite enough, but its very plausibilities render it less convincing. In the first place, there is no such thing as "history in itself" which one has to search out with the same logical weapons which Kant applied to the "thing in itself." The events are there. The facts are recorded. But only through the scientific method of searching for and discovering the laws of historical motion can we establish order and regularity in those events. By so doing, we inevitably import a different meaning to many of the observed events, just as chemistry gave a rational and logical explanation to the empirical findings of the alchemist.

Having established the validity of the historical laws by the standard proofs which science demands, it is then a comparatively easy task to interpret the events of history, past and present, if we understand their field of operation. By pursuing the same rigidly logical regimen, knowing our structures, aggregates, and forces of movement, it is not impossible to prognosticate the immediate future as it evolves out of the known present.

Our position is therefore quite the opposite of that adopted by Dewey and his followers. It is easier for us to understand the present, knowing the laws of social motion, than it is to apply them to the past, if only because of the intimate knowledge we possess of our own times, provided we know how to analyze the data before us.

To argue that the historian selects his material from materials already selected by his predecessors for him, it to posit a logical conundrum more formidable than it turns out to be on closer examination. So does every scientist proceed about his business. He soon discovers the presence of close checks upon his methods of selection. His conclusions must necessarily be defective unless the material he selects is of a character competent to disclose all the pertinent factors applying in his field. Comparison of conclusion with reality is an excellent test; ability to predict future states is another.

As we have remarked before, no historian could give a thoroughly sound explanation of his phenomena unless he understood all its laws of motion. This is the real check upon the adequacy of his selected and pre-selected materials. No historian could write of any period, nor describe any event without having the completed picture before him in its essential aspects. The astronomer agrees without question that he could not describe the motion of the heavenly bodies for any given time unless he understood their motion for all time from the standpoint and within the limitations of our inertial system.

MEANING OF SYMBOLS MUST BE DIVESTED OF PRECONCEPTIONS

Much is being written today about semantics. It is a healthy sign, provided we do not stop merely with words in clearing up the mist which surrounds them. We must search for the solid kernel of reality whose nature it is the mission of words to convey to the intellect. Hence we cannot content ourselves with such statements like Boas' who contends that every generation interprets history from the standpoint of its present prejudices. All prejudices at any time are beclouding, while they inflict no greater damage in history than in any other branch of human knowledge. Every science must plow its way through a sea of preconceptions and misconceptions, but there again there is one infallible test which dissolves all prejudice—the agreement of the explanation with the reality.

Were it not for that ultimate test, all science would be impossible. Then indeed Teggart would be justified in asserting that since historians cannot check their theories by the same processes that other scientists employ, the science of history can never be established and we might as well reconcile ourselves to an infinite variety of theories, from which we are privileged to select according to our taste or fancy.

In science, however, everything depends upon knowing what to look for. The ancient poets wrote many beautiful lines inspired by the configurations of the heavens in which they discerned forms and figures, signs and portents. So does the modern astronomer compose many beautiful lines about the heavens, but they are concerned rather with their laws of motion, and the beauty is inherent for those who love law and symmetry in nature.

This applies to history. To those who deny it laws of motion, everything can happen that one wants to happen, and events can be interpreted to support the most egregious nonsense. But once we observe order in its phenomena, study the organization of the social structures with their internal aggregates, and follow out the laws which regulate their motion within their field, then history is no longer filled with a chaos of happenings and anecdotes, but we begin to observe law and symmetry in these events.

PROBLEM OF THE REALITY OF THE OBJECTIVE WORLD AND THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL PROOFS

Philosophers inquire: "How do we know that what we observe, or think we observe, really exists outside us, and is not the figment of one's imagination?" Each field of investigation has its own way of establishing the reality governing its particular phenomena. The chemist can by experiment prove his thesis; yet the most skillful astronomer has not succeeded in juggling his planets around to prove his own mistaken notions. He devises another set of tests and controls which reason accounts to be sufficient. The scientific historian, also, is not lacking in devices for establishing his own proofs.

For ourselves, we have chosen the realities presented by American history. But the same rules and principles would apply for the investigation of any other history. We might have selected a particular period, but we felt very early in our investigation that any period would present the same scientific problems and the same difficulties. In order to demonstrate the universability of the historical laws of motion, we have moved more or less freely through many ages and many lands during the course of this analysis; and not the least of the reasons which impelled us to adopt this course, was the danger of pre-judging in the eyes of some, the proof of their existence from the American record which will function as the ultimate tests of their validity, as far as our development of the Historical Field Theory is concerned.

CONFUSION AMONG CONTEMPORARY HISTORIANS CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THEIR PHENOMENA

Among contemporary historians Cheyney stands out in his advocacy of law in history. That in itself is an encouraging advance. Consider, if you will, the deplorable state of present day history when equally great authorities like Robinson and Nevins can deny the existence of such laws. Cheyney failed to disclose the nature of historical laws because he had not discerned the relativity of the field in which they operate. For him, as for Ward and Fiske, the grand generalizations of the Darwin-Spencer era were engrafted onto history and developed in a straight-line evolutionism whose absolute movement was ever upward and onward with the realization of universal democracy as its ultimate goal. To this goal all history pointed in the great concourse of nations from the beginning of time.

So wrote Motley about the course of history in general from the fourteen centuries since the fall of the Roman Empire to his own time, and drew that moral from his particular study of the career of Philip II.[6] It may be regretted that the course of history is not so smooth for the greater convenience of our classical historians. But the same reply can be made that was given at the time when the Relativity Theory was exciting so much furor in the world of science. While we might despair for the present generation, it is just as easy for the future generation to be brought up in truth as in error.

The Historical Field Theory—assuming it is valid—is not at all more difficult to grasp than the mechanical evolutionism of the nineteenth century. For the absolute laws of historical motion we substitute the historical field laws characteristic of a given epoch in the development of Civilization. They most assuredly are more

[6] The United Netherlands—Motley, Vol. III, pp. 512-13.

rational, and what is more, give a great deal of room for both individual and collective initiative and variation.

PRAGMATIST, OBSCURANTIST AND MYSTICAL SCHOOLS OF HISTORICAL WRITERS

Inability to discern the scientifically valid laws of historical motion led to the emergence, among others, of three schools of writers —the pragmatist, the obscurantist, and the mystical.

Barnes has his handy measuring rod by which to gauge the product of a writer; first, he asks, what luck has he had in the analysis of the past; second, how will his system work out in clearing up the present and encourage the possibility of forecasting the future, with a lot of leeway all around? The difficulty with the pragmatist is that, possessing no body of laws which bind together the observed phenomena into a rational and systematic whole, he stoutly maintains that no one else has been able to achieve that goal, and furthermore, that it is impossible of obtainment. The result is that Barnes becomes an historical iconoclast as regards the past, and a worldly-wise cynic as he views the future.

In its time that method of writing history made a stir, particularly when de-bunking was the reigning fad. But the crisis of 1929, the ensuing depression and the present World War have brought to all the realization that history is not to be played around with merely to satisfy the whimsies or the sophisticated tastes of the moment.

Perhaps civilization is hell-bent for disaster, and perhaps there is no stopping in its headlong course. But many of us in any event would want to know why it must be so before we get ready to prepare its obituary. That does not absolve us from the obligation of trying to stay its course, even up to the last moment before the fatal plunge.

GRAND AIM OF THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

Of course, there are many who do not adopt this pessimistic point of view. Your true scientist does not know the meaning of pessimism or optimism. To him there is a problem to be solved, and all subjective idealizations must be repressed if it is to be solved. As for us, the human factor preponderates over the mechanical factors in history. If history has proceeded in a mechanical fashion, it is because up to recent times society did not master the means of taking stock either of its present course or of its future possibilities. It is one of the grand aims of the science of history to establish proof to mankind that at long last the time has arrived when it can be the master of its historic processes, and not, as today, its helpless victim. For this reason the ground must first be cleared of all doubt and obscurantism, and be replaced by the clean and buoyant spirit which exact knowledge helps to stimulate.

That is why we entered into an elaboration of the historical theories of Spengler and Kyserling since it aided in exposing the intrinsic shallowness of their obscurantist conceptions and the deliberate involvement of their ideas, which for a time passed as profound because the loose ends had been carefully tucked away in hidden places.

Such sincere mystics as Berdyaev and Tillich stand on a far different footing because their religiosity is as fervent as it is well-grounded spiritually, and their views were weighted with the respect which sincerity seldom fails to arouse.

In order to round out the case more fully, we presented the theories of distinguished sociologists and anthropologists of the present day because their views on society and history must be intrinsically important. All three fields are offshoots of the same human society but with different time elements. The science of man blends into the science of society and both contribute toward elucidating the science of events which are the substance of history. Yet this similarity should not disguise their fundamental differences. To the anthropologist, twenty thousand years, a hundred thousand years, are ordinary methods of reckoning. The sociologist figures in millennia, while to the historian decades are sometimes too long.

The evolution of man supplies many keys to the understanding of his nature and his capacities. Yet we observed how a thinker as well-grounded as Boas can err when he uses the technique of his specialty in trenching on the historian's preserve in his discussion of the role of the modern nation. So likewise did sociologists of the undisputed rank of Goldenweiser and Sorokin indulge in questionable generalizations when passing judgment on current social problems.

Sociology must deal with the morphology and physiology of the social structure, but only the historian is in a position to describe in detail how the social structures of Civilization came into being, what were the factors in their modification, and their subsequent abolition; and if they were replaced by another epoch of civilization, what were the social factors which were instrumental in bringing that about. That does not mean, of course, that one cannot rise to eminence in more than one field of the social sciences. It is only to point out that the different natures of these fields make it impossible to apply the same methods of analysis for all. The microscope is of great assistance to the anatomist, but he must still rely principally upon the scalpel.

Let no one read into this the elements of incipient professional jealousy. There is no reason on earth why a first-rate historian cannot exist underneath the appellation of anthropologist and sociologist, except the ridiculous compartmentization to which our universities reduce all knowledge, and therefore those who profess a proficiency in them.

DIFFERENCE IN METHODS OF CLASSICAL AND SCIENTIFIC HISTORY

Classical history is distinguished from scientific history by this difference in their methods: Where the one rationalizes about an event, the other searches for the laws which produced that event. In this simple sentence there is exposed the gulf which divides them. The historian, says Beard, is concerned with the interpretation of events and not with their cause. To the first part we agree, but we go on to say that it is impossible to understand the event unless we can trace its causal connections. But classical historians deny the existence of law, and by that very denial are condemned to continue ruminating unceasingly within the capacious recesses of their inner consciousness for a rational explanation of the events which they record. This opens the door wide for the infinite number of historical theories to which Nevins confesses, and who admits despairingly that nothing can ever be done about it.

For this reason we have asserted that without the establishment of scientifically valid laws of historical motion events will always be interpreted according to the bent or inclination of the individual, and that history will remain an art reflecting individual temperament until and unless the prime goal of every science is achieved.

In the chapter on the classical and miscellaneous theories of history we undertook a rather exhaustive, and perhaps tedious, analysis of the historical methods adopted by the various schools of writers. It was our aim to leave no possible loophole for the claim that this or that theory which was unfortunately overlooked, possesses the charmed key to the mystery. At the same time it was an excellent opportunity for the practical application of the Historical Field Theory methods to concrete historical problems, and gave one a fair idea not only of the limitations of the particular theory under criticism, but also an opportunity to observe for himself the logical and scientific validity of the historical method herein presented. Nevertheless our primary objective still is the presentation of the principles upon which the theory is based, until it will meet the supreme test of its application to the reality of American history itself.

All classical theories of history possess this common quality: The writer has developed what is for himself a rational and logical basis for the interpretation of his period. This theory may be the result of careful study and observation, or it may be the result of an inspiration or even of a revelation. At any rate, it is the product of one's own rationalization.

For that matter, so may be the most valid of scientific conceptions. But there is this vast difference between the subjectivist and the scientist; the first looks for facts to fit into his theory, while the other looks around to see if all the pertinent facts support or disprove the theory. Before long, the subjectivist, even with the best of intentions, is found trimming the facts or carefully selecting them, while the objectivist is continually repairing and modifying his theory, if it has safely survived the initial shock of contact with reality.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HISTORICAL FIELD THEORY AND ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

Economic determinism is the latest of the classical theories, and the first whose merits we analyzed. One has but to read the editorial page of a great metropolitan newspaper or listen to the speeches of public men over the radio as they discuss current problems to note how deeply engrafted is this theory onto the mental processes of our leaders of thought. Few of them are willing to go so far as to assert that it is the sole effective motivating force, but all are agreed that the economic factor is the preponderant stimulating power which dictates the actions of men and shapes the destiny of nations.

Both Beard and Seligman are agreed that no monistic interpretation of humanity is possible, but they are equally agreed that the economic motive determines the balance of the scale. Herein the superiority of the historical field method is plainly manifested. Certainly we are the last to minimize the role of the economy in the determination of history, but that factor must operate with a given state apparatus and an established ideological superstructure.

All three of the social aggregates must be considered together, and no one of them operates without the other two. The facts of a given time will establish their relative role within the social structure. Even a Hitler or a Stalin could not proceed without the necessary ideological preparation and support, or at least with the passive acquiescence of their peoples, while neither of them could move a hairsbreadth without the control of their state apparatus.

From this standpoint the self-inflicted wounds from which Beard's theory suffers in its practical application would have been unnecessary. The reader will recall how that writer was nonplussed by the fact that the First World War in which America was involved presumably through the machinations of finance-capital actually cost the country and the capitalist class many times over the profits which were extracted from that sanguinary struggle. So also we became painfully aware of his predicament when the logic of his theoretical position compelled him to establish some sort of a connection between the material interests of the individual members of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, and the frame-work of the governmental apparatus upon which that body ultimately agreed.

No one, perhaps, was more deeply conscious of the serious dilemma created by the theory of the economic interpretation of history than its leading American exponent. In his more recent works Beard relegates that theory from its primary position to one among other possible interpretations, though in a pinch he falls back upon the old stand-by, sometimes with ludicrous results.

For example, at the time when Beard's "Rise of American Civilization" appeared, it was quite stylish to stress the role of women in history. They were pictured in that work as the inheritors of vast estates, as heavy taxpayers on individual income, and above all the controllers of the consumer buying power of the nation; hence as a sex they must be drawn into the main stream of history.[7]

It is the relations of production which determine the basis of an economy, as we have previously shown. Mankind has never had much difficulty in consuming the good things in life no matter who was the nominal purchaser. For that matter, servants do a great deal of the buying for the wealthy without thereby becoming an important economic factor. As the mere recipients of income women stand in the same impersonal legal relation to income-producing capital as do their men-folk, minors, foundations and charitable institutions. Many an inmate of an asylum for the mentally sick has had his fortune increase without at all being an active factor in the production of the wealth of which he is the beneficiary. Consumption is part of the cycle of capitalist re-production, but before one can consume, there must be something produced.

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[7] The Rise of American Civilization—Beard, Vol. I, pp. XIII, 25, 264, 476, 518, 755; Vol. II, pp. 75-7, 215, 457, 541, 624, 645.

Were Beard to show women playing a role proportionate to their wealth as bankers, industrialists, and managers of vast enterprises, that would be most interesting and encouraging, but still they would assume that role not as women, but merely as human factors in the processes of capitalist economy which begins with production and starts the cycle anew with re-production on the same scale, or an enlarged scale, or a diminished scale. The historical field processes of history are far more vital and true than the monistic formula toward which economic determinism inevitably tends, and in which it gets hopelessly bogged down.

MATRIX ESTABLISHED BY THE HISTORICAL FIELD THEORY FOR THE OPERATION OF SOCIAL FORCES

What a tremendously different vista history opens out to us once we discern law as the regulator of phenomena! Definite lines of force take the place of the vagaries of human consciousness. For the arbitrary restrictions imposed by monistic conceptions, there is substituted the infinite pliability of the individual as he becomes involved in the maelstrom of social forces until he disappears in the vortex, yet withal maintaining his individuality in other forms of his social relations. In the privacy of his own chamber he is unrestricted in his actions so long as he does not break the peace. But as a worker, an employer, a banker, or as a civil agent he is immediately restricted by the definite limitations of his relation.

This leads us to the consideration of the nature and origin of these social relations. Obvious as this is, or rather as it appears to be, the social relations have been assumed by historians as a self-explanatory fact of life whose critical discussion would constitute a sheer waste of time. Yet the entire problem of history is locked up in the analysis of these relations.

Once the mechanistic straight-line method of interpreting history is abandoned for the limited, definite field in which the social forces operate between the aggregates constituting the social structure, then the events which history records assume their proper meaning in the inter-play which is enacted on the stage of society. This does not imply that events are born with the earmarks of their progenitors for all to decipher who care to read. It requires something more than good eyesight to discern the significant movements of the heavenly bodies. So does the deciphering of history call forth a discipline of a different order than that of a chronographer. Therein lies the importance of law as the regulator of historical phenomena; else all is inextricable, inexplicable chaos.

RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

In the seventh chapter we discussed fully the problem whether laws are really objectively existent, or are simply a device which the scientific mind calls forth in order to preserve its sanity. Whether laws are real or only conveniences of the intellect is the particular question of modern science. Classical historians found little difficulty in devising them in accordance with some subjective order of things. A beneficent Providence with an especially kindly eye for the nation of the historian's love is an ancient device which pays tribute to the patriotism, if not the critical acumen, of the writer.

Among this type our own beloved Bancroft occupies a position of unquestioned pre-eminence. Writers like Berdyaev, Tillich and Paton transcend the particularist God of bumptious nationalism to discover some profounder meaning in existence and so decipher the ultimate destiny of man on some universal pattern. One cannot but admire the reverent spirit in which they approach their tasks; nor is their sincerity at all questioned if they stretch some points here and there for their own purposes in their handling of the more obscure phases of mysticism in current scientific thought. There are not lacking counterfeits beneath the sombre cloth who, like Jerrold, would recreate in modern times the rule of ecclesiasticism as it flourished during its prime in the Middle Ages.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWYER AS AN HISTORIAN

While some look for law in nature or in God, other historians search the inner recesses of logical forms to discover the regulating rules of history. So reason our constitutional lawyers and the distinguished occupants of our higher courts. Principle follows out of precedent, and precedent begats principle, just like the generations in the Bible. Fortunately for us, as Boudin remarked, neither life nor the growth of political institutions is governed by rules of logic. Somewhere a change in the line of progression takes place, and with it change the social institutions and juridical principles to which it gives rise. Even the abortive attempt of President Roosevelt to make over the Supreme Court at one fell swoop did not fail wholly of its main objective, as was noted in important decisions on New Deal legislation after the failure of the frontal attack to dislodge the more conservative among the Nine Old Men.

Some writers have abandoned altogether the search for objective historical laws as either non-existent or unimportant. Burke's whole postulate rests on the proposition that one's attitude toward history is determined by one's subjective frame of reference. The only difference between Aquinas and Marx, he argued, consisted in their particular, personal approach to society, implying that their philosophical positions might have been reversed had they been inclined to think otherwise on social problems. If that were all, the world would find it just as difficult to accept the Aquinian theories of society as it does the Marxian.

For the rest, it is an egregious assumption to assert that the ideologies of the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries are interchangeable. Subjective attitudes cannot but reflect the times of those who entertain them, and the good saint would have experienced considerable difficulty in conjuring up in his mind the high-powered machinery which is the key to the production of relative surplus value and the mainspring to industrial mechanization. To some writers everything depends on the phrase, and if it is sufficiently lilting it is bound to catch on and carry them over as luminaries among the intelligentsia for quite a while until its novelty wears off.

Some of them have developed a positive genius for phrase-making which is deep-sounding and sonorous and empty of content, and saves those who accept them with such avidity the bother of all further thought. Should one mention the price mechanism, nothing more need be said of the laws of capitalist economy. After a while it is production for use, or the balancing of the budget, or the neo-Malthusian principle, and all becomes as clear as the noon-day sun. Scintillating brilliancy and superficiality are frequently interchangeable terms, but most people require nothing more to satisfy their requirements, and no more solid intellectual pabulum need be provided.

THE SELF-RIGHTEOUS MUCKRAKER IN HISTORY

From the pragmatic approach to problems of life in its multifarious relations there derived the muckraking school of history. Underneath that standpoint is the surreptitious assumption that poverty and righteousness are synonymous. Its practitioners delighted in exposing some of the evil origins of great American fortunes, while dallying with evident relish among the muck of corruption, intrigue, and downright anti-sociality that characterized the careers of many great leaders who laid the foundations for those tremendous family accumulations. Not a few write true-story thrillers about the goings on of the scions of the fortune-makers, and if the details are more sordid and bizarre than any of the weird stuff turned out by Hollywood in its most lascivious mood, everything is duly spiritualized under the protective mantle of history.

Others concerned themselves with the statistics of modern corporate development, seeking to establish by all sorts of subtle combinations some guiding principle which, with good fortune, would survive the date of their publication.

PROPAGANDA AS HISTORY

Sagas and epics played their role in historical interpretation before the dawn of Civilization. Now at its full ripening and toward its decline, new sagas and epics are being created to serve the purposes of the existing rulers of states. Hitler's work is a compendious contribution in that field, but he is not too far ahead of those who manipulate public opinion in behalf of the so-called world's great democracies which are struggling so mightily to keep alive the spirit of freedom and human dignity wherever their flag is unfurled.

Yet it is precisely among the ruling classes of the democracies where Fascism and Nazism met with active support at their beginning and, at worst, with a benevolent neutrality. It was only when the imperial interests of the ruling classes in these democracies were put in imminent jeopardy that they began to furbish over the shopworn phrases of a past generation. The peoples of the democracies fight, as they should fight, for their national preservation. But there is no question in any thinking mind that the world as now organized cannot go on without some fundamental social transformation.

Everybody feels that. Chamberlain, Churchill and others gave utterance to that thought. But they cannot—it is not too much to say they dare not—implement the phrase of a new order which is to follow the war.[8] If by a new order they mean some little re-distribution of colonies, or another League of Nations with some minor embellishments or some minor social reforms then indeed this struggle will have been in vain. But there is a deep-running current within the bosom of the common man which makes him feel that a change must take place, though he possesses no definite ideas as to what that change should be.

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[8] Churchill refused to answer queries on Britain's precise war objectives in the Commons; N. Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1940.

HISTORICAL BASIS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

This led us to the consideration of the problem of progress in history. Somehow we all vaguely couple progress with improvement. That, too, is one of the weasel words which historians and publicists have learned so well to manipulate for their particular purposes. Every epoch in history has its own concept of progress.

It arouses one's indignation to read admissions by way of palliation by apologists of the present order of things that even in the hey-day of prosperity in 1929 vast masses of our people were living on a sub-marginal basis. That is another of those weasel words, like its companion, the under-privileged. These confessions are not made because of frank avowal of incompetency on the part of the existing social organization to supply all who are willing to work with the same minumum standards of decency they would require for themselves.

The underlying motive is to win over popular favor by making a clean breast of things, as it were, pointing out that after all they were the creators of the nation's resources, and what they once achieved, they can do again on a larger, and, they even hint, on a more humane scale. That was the basis of the Republican appeal in the 1940 campaign. It is bound to fail, not because the people have so much confidence in the present crop of New Deal blunderers, but because they have lost faith in the capacity of the old masters to do any better; in which case, they must certainly do much worse.

Our people feel instinctively what we will establish affirmatively, that the present social order has reached the end of its progressive development. By progress we mean the opportunity for the fullest development of the economic, political and ideological possibilities inherent in the social structure of an epoch. We will demonstrate that the active principles which raised capitalist economy to its great heights have now been checked, and that while it is possible for it to expand its horizon beyond its zenith in 1929, it can do so only by sharpening its present internal conflicts and hastening on the disorganization which is already manifested in every phase of its life.

No serious student of the contemporary American scene is blinded by the sudden splurge in employment and dividend declarations induced by our tremendous preparedness efforts and further stimulated by the war orders from abroad. Government officials estimate that expenditures for defense will reach thirty-five billion dollars (N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1940), while the Twentieth Century Fund experts figure that six million new jobs will be created as a result. (N. Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1940).

Despite all this the American Federation of Labor whose statistics on unemployment are considered even more reliable than those of the government, declares that there are still 8,130,000 jobless workers in the United States willing and able to work (N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1940). With all the turmoil and furore of the great national effort in this most wasteful—but under the existing social arrangements the most necessary—of public expenditures, the total number of workers gainfully employed in October 1940 totalled 46,063,000 as compared with the peak of 47,600,000 in November 1929. And this, despite an increase in population of almost ten per cent during the intervening years.

SCIENTIFIC HISTORY MUST PREDICT THE FUTURE COURSE OF SOCIETY BY APPLICATION OF LAW

Science is based on law, and the crucial test of a law is the ability to predict events. Scientific history must meet this test or surrender its claim to that proud dignity. Continuity of existence is the essential requirement of prediction, and that necessarily involves the concept of an external reality independent of one's own existence. All these propositions appear axiomatic, but modern science and the new epistemology to which it has given rise seems to take particular delight in destroying many of the cherished self-evident truths which we were prone to accept as the indestructible foundations of reality.

All classical concepts of reality was based on absolute law, while the nature of the external world was as obvious as the floor of the dwelling which supported one's weight. The revolution in physics destroyed one by one these familiar illusions until the late so-solid science met with airy metaphysics and both asked in unison whether reality itself was not some form of illusion, or perhaps hallucination.

For a time the metaphysical side of the discussion had the upper hand, ably abetted by such distinguished scientists as Lodge, Jeans, Whitehead and Eddington, among others. Strange to say, good old-fashioned determinists and realists of the old stamp like Maxwell, Hertz, Michelson, the Curies and Planck were instrumental in affecting indirectly this revolution in thought. Planck has the distinction thirty-six years after contributing the initial impulse to the wave of uncertainty, of leading some errant souls back to the path of scientific righteousness. History cannot remain aloof from this great struggle, although historians have been singularly unaffected by the combat so far, being content merely to report the events and to total up the casualties whenever they deigned to pay attention to these battles in the realm of science, which was seldom indeed.

Our keenly alert historians feel it beneath their dignity to consider any problem that is more recent than a generation ago. Yet the scientific historian cannot maintain such discreet aloofness. The entire problem of existence is thrown into his lap, and he cannot cast it off unless he is content to remain a mere reporter of events.

The problem of the nature of external reality touches upon the nature of historical phenomena, and unless we can prove its objectivity, there is not much to be gained by soliloquizing about the past and the future. Law is the expression of an exact connection between phenomena developed out of the relation which they bear to one another. If knowledge of historical phenomena itself is brought into doubt, then patently all question as to their connection is premature, to say the least. Hence the ultimate of philosophical problems is no more stranger to history than it is to physics. Historians thought they could turn their nose away from it, while the issue persisted in lodging itself across their doorstep in a very metaphorical sense. Historians thought they could afford to be empirical. The most highly developed of the sciences, physics, had long grown out of those swaddling clothes.

FALLACY OF APPLYING STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES TO HISTORY

Mathematics is the most perfect language of the physical sciences, because essentially the physical basis of existence is constituted upon the operation of relatively simple factors. Social phenomena cannot be reduced to the exact expression of a mathematical formula, but this fact does not preclude it from reaching the status of a science. All sciences, including physics, reach only relative degrees of exactitude. The claim of mathematics to the title of the queen of sciences is based solely on the fact that its ideal equations need bear no relation to reality. In so far as it is referred back to the actualities of existence, to that extent does it partake of the infirmities of all existence, one of which is that the internal organization of even the simplest atom can be only approximately arrived at.

From this was derived the probability laws of physics with which we dealt in the seventh chapter. Not all scientific laws need be stated in the language of mathematics. The chemist, the metallurgist, the astronomer, the economist need not be conversant with the permutations of every single electron of the masses with which they deal. That does not justify the chemist in expecting to squeeze rabbits out of a hatful of water, nor does the metallurgist propose to run milk out of his blast furnace. They both join in recognizing a certain coherence in nature, though the more philosophical of them would not care to commit themselves as to whether that coherence is of a causal or indeterministic character.

CONSTANTS WHICH FUNCTION IN THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

Objection has been raised that history cannot become a science because it has no constants to which it can relate its events in the same manner as does physics. Discovery of constants in physics are tremendous achievements of generalization, but history, too, has its constants if we know where to look for them.

There is no valid analogy between the constants of history and physics, yet we had no difficulty whatever in recognizing homo sapiens wherever we found them and in whatever degree of development. Historical laws are derived from definite social relations, since history itself presupposes the existence of society where events are sufficiently varied to be recorded. Where human existence had not raised itself above the all-absorbing requirements of its biological status, then the entire range of its cycle was the monotonous repetition of life's processes.

But with the evolution of social forms in the relatively definite social structures as we find them in the era of Civilization, events then became important. These happenings registered the results of a state of existence which was developing out of or into another form of social existence. Otherwise the events would bear the same uninteresting uniformity which led Gibbon to dismiss the reigns of a number of monarchs of the Byzantine Empire with the remark that their name and number is sufficient, together with a few scant lines in a story of over twenty-eight hundred pages.[9]

Mere repetition of happenings presents by that fact the strongest probative support for the existence of laws, but these are scarcely of a nature to arouse the interest of the historian, who is concerned with the laws of motion of an active rather than negative form of social organization.

Man has an instinctive yearning for law in the explanation of phenomena. While it is only recently that he has succeeded in unraveling the workings of nature as it presents itself, for countless other years he has substituted the constructions of his imagination for the realities of existence and has been quite content with them. Only in problems concerning man himself does dogma and self-assertion stand on the same footing as science.

It is truly amazing to observe what rank nonsense parades as wisdom in the pages of our best metropolitan newspapers, chronicling as they do the opinions of leaders of society and the matured views of the editorial sanctum. Opinions are expressed on the weightiest of social problems by people who do not possess the faintest rational idea concerning their nature and origin. Only too often are these people the very pillars of society whose errors of judgment so frequently result in crushing helpless millions who look up to them for light and guidance.

THE RULING CLASS PLACES OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF A SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF HISTORY

However industriously science is cultivated in all other fields, its pursuit in the social sciences is quietly but effectively curbed. The reason is as obvious as it is ignoble; ignoble on the part of those intellectuals upon whom lies a heavy obligation to society, though understandable on the part of the dominant social class which has an instinctive dread of those who would lay bare with genuine impartiality not only the laws of social motion but also the causes of so much social derangement.

The social sciences as officially taught in our higher institutions of learning is that shoddy counterfeit which contents itself with the impartial negation of all theories by placing them in juxtaposition and canceling out their contradictory claims. Opinions which no self-respecting scientist would care to present for scrutiny in any other branch of science are conscientiously gathered together with the result that they do not instruct but confuse.

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[9] The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—Gibbon, Vol. II, Ch. XLVIII, p. 557 (Modern Library Edition).

In every discipline outside of the social sciences opinions are deliberately scorned in the ruling passion for laws. But in politics, in economics, in international affairs, in all those vital relations which determine the well-being of the remotest inhabitant of this so compact earth, the merest cant, the shallowest superficialities, the most blatant and vulgar inanities are not only listened to with respect, but receive courteous consideration from recognized leaders of thought with a disarming impartiality that only adds to the confusion.

Millions of men today are in arms, many more countless millions are in want of life's barest necessities. Throughout the world in every nation of this bounteous earth there stalks hunger, disease and privation amongst the world's creative workers; while locked up in our collective hands are the means to still all guns, to send back robust manhood to joyous homes, to dry up the tears of those that fear the dawn as well as the night, to succor the weak and the helpless, to heal the sick and comfort the unfortunate, while we gather from this abundant earth the generous provisions with which God and nature endowed it for that nobler existence implicit in our Civilization.

All, all this is within our reach and can be realized with the means we already have at hand. And yet there stands a barrier between us and the infinite possibilities which life holds out for enlightened mankind. This barrier does no longer exist in the objective world but is created within the bosom of society. What man has created he can undo or re-make, but we all recognize that it must be re-made on a different pattern.

It is the mission of scientific history to show how the present pattern of society was evolved, and to point out the manner in which society must be reconstituted if it is to achieve the fullest possibilities inherent in the creative powers of mankind. The first step in this process is to establish the laws of social motion so that mankind shall no longer exhaust itself in fruitless efforts for the speculative and ideally desirable, and betake itself while yet there is time to the practical task of realizing that which is possible with the materials and the forces already at hand.

PROBLEM OF ACCIDENT IN HISTORY

Accident is a negation of law, but deeper insight into the realities prove that these are accidents only insofar as man's limited purposes are concerned, but not in nature itself. We discussed Sorokin's conception of causality in closed systems, and analyzed his contention that accident can apply when there is an impact between two unrelated systems, such as the intrusion of the white man upon the Indian's preserve. But once we yield causality so easily, there is no end of such accidents which can be discovered or invented. Every auto collision on the highway is such an impact between closed unrelated systems, where but for some momentary lapse or unexpected happening, yet all susceptible of causal analysis, both automobiles might have continued uneventfully on their respective course.

Design plays much less of a role in man's affairs than one imagines offhand. All existence is full of such uncertainties, if one is willing to ascribe to mere accident everything which happens beyond that which was contemplated. Yet beneath all these coincidences and unexpected sequences nothing has happened for which a rational causal explanation cannot be found, or at least, exists. Even irrationality itself is a sufficient causative factor. No one cares to dispute overly man's free will, but no one yet has proved that man can thereby violate the laws of nature, despite the authentic accounts to the contrary as recorded in the Bible.

Man is free to act, or thinks he is, but no sooner than he undertakes to do so he is confronted by a multitude of factors which limit that freedom. That does not mean that man is the blind instrument of inscrutable destiny, in the florid language of both religionists and mechanists. Man is a factor in the making of his own history, provided he first acquaints himself with the methods of nature, and develops within himself both the faculties of apprehension and the energy to persevere in his efforts to make nature serve his purposes through the instrumentality of her forces.

Purpose in existence pertains to man, not to nature. If mankind as a whole will emancipate itself from the limitations of the animal species to realize but a fraction of the potentialities of his race, he will achieve yet unbelievable miracles to the present generation of men. Operating with the forces of nature through the mediation of his will, mankind as a whole can well leave to theologians and philosophical physicists the debate to continue for eternity as to whether man's will is free or conditioned.

During the course of our discussion on causality and indeterminacy in the preceding chapter, we emphasized the importance of pressing home the issue, despite the fact that indeterminists concede that probability laws coincide with causality laws where large masses are involved. Satisfactory as that compromise may be to some scientists, history cannot be content with such an inconclusive result. For once the door is left open to probability, a host of charlatans will be free to enter the field, each presenting his particular nostrum unrestricted by law or principle, and freed of the painful obligation to acquaint himself with the factors governing the development of historical processes. It is not for them to quibble about the niceties of microscopic and molar physical or historical theories. Since the choice is open to all, they are entitled to the privilege of selection and consequently the inalienable right to be heard. We have no objection to their speaking, but we protest being compelled to listen.

RESPECTIVE ROLES OF SOCIAL STATESMANSHIP AND POLITICAL STATESMANSHIP

Reason is doomed to defeat in the unequal struggle with demagogy. Knowing as we do the propensities and limitations of the human faculties, social statesmanship must yield before political statesmanship. The sonorous phrases of the most mediocre politician will in the minds of the masses always prevail over the halting, closely reasoned observations of the social scientist. That is why mankind up to now has attained whatever progress it enjoys not so much through conscious determination as through the blind groping of natural forces operating through the limited vision of man.

This is not to advocate that the affairs of society be placed in the hands of social scientists, as technocrats and mechanists of all types have advocated for their particular sect. There is no analogy between the technical problems involved in the operation of industry and in the conduct of the affairs of society. A mistake of mechanical engineering results in limited loss; but a mistake in social engineering often spells irretrievable social disaster. The responsibility is too great. Democracy has been devised chiefly to share the responsibility for disaster. Mankind can easily acclimate itself to successes and distribute the glory of achievement.

What we do advocate is that history should be ranked among the sciences, and taught with that dispassionate impersonality which distinguishes all other sciences. Only then can man become the master of his destiny when he learns the nature of the social laws which now operate with himself as its instrumentality. But we do not disguise from ourselves that this goal will never be realized so long as the beneficiaries of the status quo remain in control of the state and the economy, and thereby exercise a predominating influence in determining the social ideologies.

REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE EFFECTED BY PLANCK, EINSTEIN AND HEISENBERG

Prior to the revolution in physics, classical science lived, breathed, and owed its existence to the certainty of causal and absolute laws. It suffered all the more from the destruction of these cherished convictions. Once the absolute foundation of its laws was destroyed by the Theory of Relativity, its causal principle soon found itself undermined. It is astounding how the scientific world only a short decade ago was willing to surrender with scarcely a protest this most vital of its beliefs.

After all, relativity did not destroy the law of gravitation; it only gave us a different way of interpreting it, yielding thereby a more exact explanation of reality as a process rather than as a dogma. The shock induced by Einstein's tremendous generalization proved to be too great, and while the scientific world was still involved in the confusion which followed the collapse of the Newtonian conceptions, Heisenberg launched his Indeterminacy Principle at that other bulwark of classical science.

Causality yielded with scarcely a struggle. With Einstein there remained but a few of the stalwarts of modern thought to defend it, while all the rest rushed to embrace the new philosophy as courtiers do to a new reigning prince.

History suffered less than the rest, because it had not yet sprouted its scientific wings. But the new principle did give a powerful impetus to the pragmatical application of statistics to social phenomena. Anything and everything could be conclusively demonstrated by an impressive array of well-authenticated charts. Unfortunately opposite sides too frequently based their conclusions upon the same set of figures. Obviously there was something wrong with the manner of their interpretation.

This started the cycle back again to the laws governing the phenomena, but with the important modification that they were to be interpreted as to their probability, rather than according to strict causality. This intellectual subterfuge could not long maintain itself and now the swing is back again to normalcy; but not before considerable damage had been done to the entire world of thought. The pragmatical indeterminists have had their full inning, and it is problematical whether the intellectual world could stand for more and still maintain its sanity.

IMPORTANCE TODAY OF A SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF HISTORY

Scientific history must remain inflexible in its determination to establish causality in social phenomena, for only through the certainty which deterministic law affords can it clear the field of the vast horde of incompetents of high and low degree at their various posts of responsibility. The fatal error of trying anything once too often is well known in every field but that of practical statesmanship.

Wilson had his League of Nations and World Court all carefully worked out and properly authenticated at Versailles. Roosevelt had his N. R. A. along whose flowing lines the greater part of American industry was to be re-organized. The world now teems with plans, programs and panaceas which would strike terror into the hearts of mankind even greater that that induced by a diving bomber, if it but knew of the greater evil consequences inherent in these variegated products of various brainstorms now being prepared for future generations of men. These short cuts to social perfectability will prove without exception to be misleading, and only too often would wind up in the very evils, or worse, which they were devised to abolish.

"But all noble things are as difficult as they are rare," said Spinoza in concluding his Ethics. The end aimed after is well worth the effort. There is only one safe and certain way to the goal toward which the hopes of all are directed. At no other time in the history of the world than today, has mankind stood poised with the fate of all civilization suspended upon the outcome of their decision.

We stand now at the crossroads undecided where to turn, knowing only that we cannot remain still or go back to that which produced the present world chaos. Before us lies the choice of two paths, one of which must lead to disaster, the other toward a new era in the history of mankind. But which is the road? By what signs can we tell? And having chosen, what shall be done to pave the way toward the coveted goal?

It is the purpose of the Historical Field Theory to give an answer to these ultimate questions of contemporary history in the decisive manner known to science. This is the road, and this is what must be done with the material we have at hand—such will be the incisive terms in which we shall speak as we approach the concluding analysis of the Fourth Period in American History.

Already there has been established on an irrefragable basis in this work all the essential elements which enter into the formulation of a scientific theory of history. We have rigidly defined our terms, delimited the field for the social forces, and proved their origin and mode of manifestation on the basis of causal law. There is now left the essential test of their proof in the facts of American history from its very beginning, and the final application of the Historical Field principles in the forecast of our future within the limitations of the present historical field.

DEFINITION OF THE HISTORICAL FIELD THEORY

The Historical Field Theory is based upon the application of scientific principles to the analysis of history. These principles are: (1) history is the record of events in society; (2) society is an aggregate of three component divisions—the state, the economy and the ideological superstructure; (3) the specific form of the social structure is determined by the nature of the social continuum established by the relations of these aggregates; (4) this continuum provides the matrix for the events which history records; (5) society is progressive to the extent that it permits fuller play for the difference of social potential in its creative elements during its virile state; (6) and finally that happenings of historical significance are derived from the operation of definite social laws which are causal in character.

END

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